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ABSTRACT
THE RISE OF 'PEOPLE POWER': ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE "COLOR
REVOLUTIONS"
Vladyslav Galushko
Old Dominion University, 2009
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

This dissertation has been spurred by the surprising turn of events that took place
in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Both countries were scheduled to
have elections - parliamentary in Georgia and presidential in Ukraine. Though fraud,
voter intimidation and opposition harassment were widely expected, few predicted the
magnitude of popular response that swept away the regimes of Leonid Kuchma and
Eduard Shevarnadze. Grappling with the unexpected, many heaped praise on the socalled "people power" that was able to bring masses to the streets and sustain their
involvement in what were quickly labeled "color revolutions." Civil society groups like
Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia became the cause celebre for Western media.
Few questions were asked as to what made the civic organizations in Ukraine and
Georgia so effective. This neglect of deeper investigation is especially puzzling, given
the vast array of past assessments that decried the civil societies in those and other postSoviet states as weak, overly dependent on Western aid and unable to relate to the local
populace.
The analysis that this dissertation will perform is critical not only for our
understanding of contemporary political events in transitioning societies, but also for the
evolution of major theoretical debates in the field. By stressing the primacy of civil
society's involvement in "color revolutions," it lends substantive support to the
participatory approach, confirming the leading role of ordinary citizens over domestic

elites in democratic transformations. At the same time, because the research is focused
on the specific features which enhance the effectiveness of civic groups, it contributes to
the scholarly discussion (often dating to the times of Locke, Kant and the Scottish
Enlightenment) on the merits and weaknesses of civil society as well as its connections
to the political and societal realms. Finally, the research suggests how the particular
circumstances of "color revolutions" can enhance our general appreciation of democratic
transitions.
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CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW

The research for this dissertation has been spurred by the peaceful democratic
transitions, more commonly known as the "color revolutions," that occurred in Georgia
and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Although many actors have contributed to
the successful fall of the Shevarnadze and Kuchma semi-authoritarian regimes, the
public attention has been fixated on civil society. Many credited civic groups, like
Kmara and Pora, for starting the snowball of public protests and helping sustain them for
several days, sometimes in harsh weather conditions. Others, refusing to believe that
apathetic post-Soviet masses can do anything on their own, saw foreign-funded nongovernment organizations as pawns in the geopolitical game between the West and
Russia to delineate and control the spheres of influence. As a result, one is still left with
the question whether, regardless of their influence, non-governmental organizations were
an independent or a controlled player in that process.
For all the research generated by the interest in those events, there is no answer
what made specific civil groups, not an amorphous civil society, effective in those days.
Most research pieces look at the domestic civil societies comprehensively, asserting that
by 2003 or 2004 they were strong enough to be an independent actor. However, during
the revolutions it was not the whole civil society, but specific organizations that proved
critical in mounting and sustaining the protests. Furthermore, the abysmal performance
of civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia in the post-revolutionary period rejects the
This paper follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style: The Essential Guide for Writers, Editors and
Publishers 15th edition.

argument that they were uniformly strong. This work seeks to fill this gap in research by
analyzing four civic groups in the two countries - their founding, growth and, finally,
involvement in the "color revolutions." It posits that a high degree of their connection to
the host society helped them play a critical role in those events. Such connections,
known as organizational embeddedness, included their ability to relate to ordinary
people, interact with and be respected by relevant political actors, and use any foreign
financial and methodological assistance effectively.
The primary focus of my dissertation lies at the intersection of two distinct issues
- civil society and democratization. On one hand, the research seeks to determine the
role of civil society organizations in the process of democratic transitions, more
specifically peaceful "color revolutions." This task necessitates a closer evaluation of the
available studies within the democratization literature. On the other, the dissertation's
key hypothesis asserts that the influence of civic organizations will be dependent on the
extent of their embededdness in the fabric of respective domestic societies. In order to
select valid indicators for empirical testing, it is important to review the extant literature
on civil society, too. Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to provide a critical
overview of scholarly research in both fields with a specific attention to how features of
the internal organization of civil society groups impact their wider relevance in emerging
democracies.
To this end, the chapter will begin by reviewing the general aspects of civil
society - the available scholarly definitions and debates on the concept, the purported
external and internal reasons for its emergence and development, the benefits and
challenges that civil society often generates. The second part will concentrate on the role
of civil society in democratization. The discussion will include an assessment of
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relations between civil society on one hand and democratization and foreign aid on the
other. To illuminate several theoretical propositions, this part will draw on a number of
available case studies from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as
the dissertation's main region of interest.
As seen from the structure of the chapter, the research intends to pursue a number
of tasks. First, it seeks to show how the phenomenon of civil society has evolved
historically from general philosophical concepts to contemporary civic organizations.
Second, it describes how civil society has become linked to democratization and turned
into a major component of Western foreign aid. Third, the review considers the available
case studies on the former Soviet Union to underscore the impact of internal elements of
NGOs on their overall performance and their specific influence in "color revolutions."

GENERAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Definitions and scholarly views on civil society
From Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment to Hegel and Durkheim, the notion of
civil society has undergone a lengthy historical evolution in the writings of classical
philosophers. The continuing recurrence of debates on its key attributes attests to virility
of the phenomenon.
In the "Second Treatise" Locke was the first to devote considerable attention to civil
society, which he defined as "the realm of political association instituted among men
when they take leave of the "state of nature" and enter in a commonwealth."1 His
interpretations were built on the writings of ancient Greek philosophers, like Grotius,
and some political theorists of the Middle Age. Because of the heavy influence of the
1

Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1992), 22.
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latter, Locke's approach did not differentiate between civil and political societies. As we
will soon see, this understanding of their unity was not uncontroversial. On the
theoretical level, numerous authors grappled with the issue whether, and if so, then to
what extent, civil society is both separate and distinct from the state's political life. The
debate has had obvious practical ramifications for democracy-promoters in the field,
who were left with the formidable challenge of drawing more precise boundaries
between civil and political organizations that they choose to support. Locke postulated
that the roots of civil society lied in Natural Law and Christian traditions, and its
attributes "were derived from the nature of man himself."2 To him, it was a unique
model for social order set out to overcome competing challenges between the individual
and social, public and private (the theme that would be recurring in almost all future
works). Therefore, the freedoms and equality that civil society brought with it were
ontological, not historical in nature. Yet again, the points raised by Locke so casually
became among the most contested issues in the discourse and practice of civil society.
Since his rhetoric is so steeped in the tradition of Christianity, one may wonder whether
the notion of civil society may not be applicable to those who are not Christian. This, in
turn, spurs a larger debate about the ethnocentricity of such Western concepts as civil
society, nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, etc. To rephrase a set of familiar
questions, can Western assistance produce a Chinese or an Arab civil society that, while
being distinct, would have the same normative essence as civil societies in Canada, Great
Britain or the United States? His other assertion also posits problems for democracy
promoters. If, as Locke suggests, civil society is ontological in nature, is it possible to
inculcate the habits of civicness and ultimately build a civil society in other countries? A
2

Ibid., 3.
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positive answer raises only further questions. For instance, in their civil society building
efforts, should donor states tap into the dormant civic potential of a host country or begin
their efforts from scratch?
Theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment deepened the problematic of the individual
within society, and clashes between individual and public interests that are bound to
occur as a-result of these interactions. For many of them, civil society was "primarily a
realm of solidarity held together by the force of moral sentiments and natural
affections."3 It was therefore not a neutral arena of exchange. Instead, all exchanges
were derived from the nature of man himself. The finding is significant when we
consider an ongoing debate on the impacts of civil society. Putnam describes its mostly
positive influences (such as increased civicness, efficacy, tolerance and higher
participatory attitudes and behaviors) on individuals and states.4 Sheri Berman in her
analysis of Weimar Germany challenges the assumption about the inherent goodness of
civil society. At the time, German civic organizations fell victim to the same social
divisiveness that permeated the country. Because they tended to get members along the
lines of social cleavages, their activities furthered, rather than ameliorated, a general
societal fragmentation.5 Regardless of the seeming difference, the major points
elaborated by Putnam and Berman hark back to the philosophical proposition of
Ferguson and the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Because exchanges within civil
society are not content-neutral, its specific impacts depend on the meaning (good or bad)
that actors put into their interactions within civic organizations.

3

Seligman, 33.
Robert D. Putnam, ed., Democracies in Flux (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167-176.
5
Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 401-429.
4
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At the same time, theorists within this school (like Adam Ferguson in "An Essay on
the History of Civil Society") make a substantial departure from Locke in one point.
While for the latter the roots of civil society were ontological, for the former they
became epistemological. In other words, Ferguson regarded civil society more as a
natural inwardly and ultimately human source of social power. Though he did not move
far enough to cast off completely civil society' s connections to God, the departure was
nonetheless crucial. It opened a path to closer examination of human interactions within
the realm of civil society with the purpose of their improvement. Moreover, for the first
time it was implied that people had a share in controlling their civic destiny.
Kant further distances from the ontological premise behind the workings of civil
society. Being a chief proponent of Reason, he attempts to establish a connection
between it and the moral sphere. Thus, civil society is presented as a shared public arena,
which validates critical discourses on Reason and equality. He asserts that "through
participation in the civil structure of political activity that man's autonomy, and with that
of reason, were guaranteed."6 For the first time in political theory and in a sharp split
from Locke, Kant separates civil from political society, by pointing to its uniqueness as
the natural province for public rational debate and critique. To summarize, his
contribution to the discourses on civil society is critical for a number of viewpoints.
First, Kant's writing places civil society deeper into the epistemological realm, thus
opening it to empirical examination and research. Second, his notion of a shared public
area elevates the stature of civil society as one of the core components in a state's
existence and orderly functioning. Third, Kant makes the very first distinction between
civic and political lives. It is important to know where one starts and the other begins in
6

Seligman, 43.
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order to achieve a desired outcome. At the same time, he points to an important aspect in
the operation of civil society that would become later magnified in the notion of service
NGOs. Specifically, not all civil society organizations have to be inherently political or
linked to politics. But all civic groups must have a link to their domestic societies (the
notion of embeddedness, which••this dissertation advances) before they establish their
political aspirations.
Though Hegel echoes parts of Kant's definition by emphasizing mutuality and
reciprocal recognition as the key features of civil society, he points to one significant
flaw in his line of arguments. Specifically, for Kant the public sphere (within which civil
society is located) is highly judicial, but not ethical in nature. It is divorced from the
private sphere of morality and ethics. Hegel asserted that this constriction forecloses the
complete realization of Reason, which seems to be one of the major preoccupations of
Kant. Hegel (as Marx after him) sought to overcome the distinction between legality and
morality and bring the two together. He believed both notions had been at the core of the
original idea of civil society. In order to show that, Hegel developed the idea of ethical
solidarity based on the unity of public right with private ethics. The concept asserts that
the individual need for recognition is attained through the recognition of property.
Because the essence of civil society lies in mutuality and reciprocity, it inadvertently
helps humans fulfill their basic need for recognition. By doing this, it acquires a certain
normative status.
In the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel deepens the analysis of civil society in a number
of important ways. First, the norm of mutuality contains not only an element of
participation, but also of conflict. His observation was built on the writings dated as
early as the Scottish Enlightenment, which claimed that exchanges within the realm of

8
civil society are not neutral. Second, Hegel makes a final break-away from the
ontological basis of civil society, by noting that it is an object of historical development
rather than a natural state. This has profound theoretical and practical implications. In the
first dimension, it completely negates Locke's rather theological perception of civil
society. From the practical standpoint* this means that forms of civil society do not
emerge on their own or exist naturally, but need a conscious human effort. One may
insist that Hegel's proposition provided a critical groundwork for the emergence of a
future democracy promotion paradigm. It comes as no surprise that he was the first to
emphasize the educative nature of civil society "where the individual learns the value of
group actions, social solidarity and the dependence of his welfare on others."7 Third,
Hegel purports that the realization of ethical life begins, but does not end with the sphere
of civil society. His understanding of the bridge between civil and political spheres is
close to the contemporary one. Hegel believes that civic participation prepares
individuals for the participation in the public arena of the state, which is a true space of
reason and universality. He further suggests the state ought to exploit civil society by
o

nurturing the cooperation it is capable to produce. His contribution is illustrative of the
evolution in thinking about the relationship between political and civil spheres that had
occurred over time. It began with Locke and theorists within the Scottish Enlightenment
who did not separate the two realms. Then, Kant was the first to distinguish them, but
did not draw any sort of relationship. For Hegel, the feedback mechanism seems to be
clearer, as civil society finds its final embodiment in political one.
7
S. Reichardt, "Civil Society - A Concept for Comparative Historical Research," in Future of Civil Society: Making Central
European Nonprofit-Organizations Work, ed. Annette Zimmer, Eckhard Priller, and Matthias Freise (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag flir
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 37.
8
Jon Van Til, Growing Civil Society: From Nonprofit Sector to Third Space (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 1415.
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Marx elaborates on the nature of interactions within civil society. Taking one part of
Hegel's observation, which noted of a possibly conflictual side to civil society, he places
it within his own theoretical framework of class struggle. For Marx, civil society is a
mechanism exploited by the state to enforce invisible, intangible and subtle forms of
power.9 Like others before him, Marx supports the separation of civil and political
societies in his famous piece "On the Jewish Question."10 However, in unison with his
other theoretical propositions, civil society (Burgerliche Gessellschaft) is firmly
connected to the economic aspects of social life, more specifically the needs of labor.11
In the end, he recognizes that conflicts, which civil society may potentially harbor, will
not be resolved either within it or in the sphere of politics, as both are manipulated by the
ruling class for the purpose of securing, maintaining and expanding its power. Therefore,
such struggles must be overcome in a different political body that will emerge in the
future and unify both civil and political realms.12
When looking at the timeframe of major theoretical debates on the concept of civil
society, it becomes apparent that philosophical explorations of the phenomenon
intensified especially between the 17th and the mid-19th centuries. The chief interest in
civil society stemmed from the social crises of the 17 century and the sense of
uprootedness that they created. European societies had to deal with the issues of land
commercialization, labor and capital growth in market economies and consequences of
the English and North American Revolutions. By the middle of the 18th century, the
European civil society failed to incorporate the demands of its participants into the
political life, which gave rise to social movements and, ultimately, powerful trade
9

Van Til, 14-15.
Seligman, 48-50.
11
Reichardt, 38.
12
Seligman, 52-55.
10
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unions.13 At the same time, political philosophers had to look elsewhere to find real-life
models of the civil society, about which they were so tirelessly theorizing. That place
became the United States. The richness and vibrancy of American civic arena astounded
such outside observers as de Tocqueville. His writings are significant for two primary
reasons. They provide a rare empirical application of the previous philosophical
conceptualizations as well as illuminate most significant theoretical debates on the merits
and role of civil society and its place within the political life of a country. Our review
will deal with de Tocqueville's practical observations on American civil society in the
later sections. At this juncture, it is pertinent to elaborate on those experiences of his
journey in America that relate to broader theoretical disputes.
Similar with other European authors of his time, de Tocqueville takes the distinctness
of civil society as a realm of social life for granted. However, his analysis goes one step
further. While most of the previous writers saw the final resolution for numerous
disputes of the civic arena in political society, de Tocqueville (thanks in a large part to
what he saw in America) came to believe that civil society would be able to stand on its
own. Indeed, his analysis was one of the first pieces that considered civic associations as
an alternative to the growing statist movement. At several points, the French political
scientist speaks of civic organizations as a powerful instrument of interest representation
that can provide an answer to increasingly complex problems through people, not the
government. Furthermore, when civil society limits itself to mere debates and delegates
problem-solving to purely political institutions, it inadvertently increases the potential
for abuse and tyranny.14 His voluminous book "Democracy in America" addresses

13
14

Seligman, 103,105.
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 226-228, 598-599.
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another contentious issue in the civil society discourse - the relationship between the
individual and civil society. More specifically, there is a perennial two-fold question of
how the person decides to get involved in civic activities (thus sacrificing part of her
autonomy) and, once engaged, how she balances the achievement of her personal
interests with the good of a larger group of which she is a member. The viewpoint that
de Tocqueville provides is different not only because it is country-specific, but also
because it is rooted in a particular form of governance - democracy. He proceeds to
explain that in democracies all individuals are fairly independent as none commands the
absolute power over others akin to traditional monarchies. At the same time, they are
also weak in pursuing their particularistic agendas, because they deal with others whose
cooperation they cannot order by force. This creates a certain pull-push effect. On one
hand, people are pulled together by their own inability to achieve anything without
external assistance. On the other, any emerging cooperation always has a potential for
members' pull-out if they believe they have ceded too much of their autonomy and
independence. As de Tocqueville aptly observed, "the same conditions which make
associations so vital for democratic nations also make them more difficult to achieve
there than elsewhere."15 Finally, his work also touches upon the interactions between
civil and political societies. He posits that there is a direct relationship between the two where political associations are banned, civic organizations are also rare, as citizens are
no longer sure which forms of association are permissible.16 Furthermore, even those
few civic associations that manage to function are "small in number, feebly conceived,
incompetently run, and will never engage in plans on a vast scale or will fail in

15
16

Ibid, 596.
In the contemporary language, such associations would be advocacy groups.
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attempting to execute them." De Tocqueville's addition on this question is critical for
two reasons. First, it re-iterates a previously forgotten point that civic associations pave a
way for political ones as free schools of teaching the general theory of associations. In a
democracy, the learning is not limited to purely political aspects of participation. It helps
citizens take their freedoms more responsibly and avoid the dangers that many freedoms
may pose if abused. Second, it implicitly cautions of the efforts to build a vibrant civil
society in a setting with stifled political competition.18 In such conditions the established
civic associations stay weak, because they are unable to embed themselves into the
fabric of the domestic political landscape that is inherently set up to reject open
competition. In other words, such civic organizations became a foreign (and inevitably
temporary) body in a society where all other forms of participation are discouraged. The
remark (as we will later see19) was somewhat lost on democracy-promoters in the 1990s,
who sought to draw an artificial line between civil and political spheres and proceed with
the development of the former irrespective of the circumstances in the latter.
The concept of civil society fell out of vogue in the mid-19th and early 20th
centuries.20 Among the most notable writings of that period, one ought to mention Emile
Durkheim and Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci's approach espouses a dual vision of civil
society. On one hand, he concurs with Marx in seeing civil society as one of the venues
where the present social order (with all its' oppressive class hierarchies) is grounded. In
this first capacity, civil society is the shaped object that helps support the capitalist status
quo. On the other hand, civil society is simultaneously the realm in which a new social
order can be founded. Because the process of transformation deals with social change
17

De Tocqueville, 607.
Ibid., 604-605,608.
19
See the discussion on democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia.
20
Reichardt, 41; Thomas Carothers and William Brandt, "Civil Society," Foreign Policy 117 (Winter, 1999-2000): 19.
18
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and (as seen later) with revolutions, it is worth elaborating on it in more detail. The
change would begin with the formation of class alliances into a counter-hegemonic bloc
that would ultimately displace the bourgeoisie (whose interests the present civil society
is serving). Unsurprisingly for a Marxist, Gramsci envisions the bloc including
peasantry, working class and, to increase its strength, petty bourgeois elements.21
Mobilization of this force would not be spontaneous. Instead, it will occur as a result of a
combination of leadership and pressures from the below. Within the ranks of leadership,
the intellectual plays a critical role in raising the consciousness of social groups on the
local, regional and world levels. This individual would be able to transcend immediate
corporate interests of his group in order to achieve a commonly shared vision of a
desirable and feasible alternative future. It should be assumed that the contribution of
intellectuals would become the basis of what Gramsci called the war position - a
strategy for a long-term construction of self-consciousness of the social classes into an
emancipatory bloc within the society. The author finds his own answers to the question
on the relationship between civil and political societies. Under normal circumstances, the
former supports the power structure of the latter. However, during the times of change a
revolution would first occur on the level of civil society (making it the leading agent of
transformation) and only then spell into the state. At the same time, Gramsci realizes
that the change, which civil society has a potential to bring about, may not be definitive
or final. His further qualification talks of a passive revolution, which is an abortive or
incomplete transformation of society. In this case, changes, which are introduced by
external actors, attract some internal support, but do not overcome the opposition of
21
Robert W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order," Review ofInternational
Studies 25 (1995): 9
22
Ibid., 7,15-16.
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other entrenched domestic forces, resulting in the revolution-restoration cycle. Another
subcategory of a passive revolution is a stalled war where oppositional forces are strong
enough to mount a challenge, but not sufficiently powerful to overcome it. The third
variation may lie in transformismo - an Italian term for the cooptation of oppositional
elements by the dominant power. The categorization offered by Gramsci carries some
contemporary validity j especially when applied to post-revolutionary situations in
Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia. For instance, Ukraine may be experiencing the beginning
of a revolution-restoration pattern after in 2006 the Orange coalition proved unable to
form a government, which returned to power the forces of the ancien regime. Serbia is
displaying increasing features of the transformismo model as the country is struggling to
come to grips with its past and fully embrace European demands for the independence of
Kosovo.
Emile Durkheim was another prominent theorist who turned his attention to the
concept of civil society. His research agenda both echoes and expands a number of
discourses that were previously so central in the field. The first among them is the
question of positioning civil society. In this regard, Durkeim places it firmly in-between
the modern state and capitalism. However, this positioning is not entirely new and falls
in line with de Tocqueville's vision of civil society as the public sphere. What
distinguishes Durkheim from others is the inclusion of such intimate structures as family.
To him, "the conjugal-nuclear family ... remains a focal point for group norms and
attachments, and a key matrix for individual moral development."24 In "The Evolution of
Educational Thought" the reader could witness how the two terms - education and

23

Mustafa Emirbayer, "Useful Durkheim," Sociological Theory 14, no. 2 (July 1996): 112.
"Ibid., 113.
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family - come together to explain the vibrancy of civil society. Education connects "two
kinds of moralities, the affective morality of family life and the more rigorous,
impersonal faith that controls civic society." In other words, family plays two roles.
First, it helps build personal trust that family members show toward each other. Second,
by acquiring this trust, an individual is getting simultaneously socialized into certain
norms of civicness and attitudes of participatory behavior. But without any education,
such mechanisms will be extended only to those with whom the person is familiar
through face-to-face interactions. In this sense, education becomes a bridge that assists
the individual with learning about interpersonal trust and practicing it toward people who
are not his family members. Attesting to the importance of Durkheim's insight, the link
between personal and interpersonal trust and the role of education in enhancing the latter
is now taken for granted. Numerous studies on civic participation conventionally
measure the educational level of their participants with an automatic assumption that
those with more education will display higher civic and participatory behaviors.26 The
other important addition of Durkheim is his attention to the emotional dimension of
social life. In his work "Professional Ethics and Civic Morals," he stresses that
interpersonal interactions, which occur with or without institutions, have an emotional
foundation. This theme was developed by other authors, who assert that in order to
flourish, democratic structure and processes need to have not only cultural ideas, but also

25

Alexander Jeffrey, Theoretical Local in Sociology, vol. 2: The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1982).
26
For examples see Gabriel Badescu, Paul E. Sum and Eric M Uslaner, "Civil Society Development and Democratic Values in
Romania and Moldova," Eastern European Politics and Society 18, no.2 (2004); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust
and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies," Journal ofPolitics 59, no.2
(May 1997); Eric M. Uslaner, MoralFoundations of Trust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ronald Inglehard, "How
Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure I f " Political Science and Politics 36, no. 1 (January 2003): 51 57.
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patterns of emotional commitment.

Thus, like many before him, Durkheim was subtly

pointing toward the duality of civil society that could encompass not only conflict and
contention, but also interpersonal trust and resultant affection. He also saw a clear link
between civil society and the state. But his perspective was somewhat different from the
previous authors. While others before him considered civil society as a path that helps
citizens to connect With or get educated about political life, Durkheim placed a higher
emphasis on the benefits of civil society for the individual. In particular, he advocated
that intermediary bodies, such as occupational and professional groups, were the venues
through which the moral authority of the state enters into individual life. Without them,
such authority would be too distant from ordinary people. His point is interesting for two
reasons. First, it re-states the usefulness of civil society as another mechanism, which
can be used by the state to get through to its citizens. Second, it underscores (though
rather implicitly) the benefits of participation for the individual. One of them is an
increased sense of familiarity with the state where a person resides. Durkheim's
observation was a precursor to more explicit theoretical and empirical assertions28 in the
future that civic participation fosters a feeling of empowerment that the individual gains
in the process of engaging with governmental structures.
After WWII, academic attention toward civil society continued to be on the wane.
The concept was rescued from the dustbin of history by the transformations in Central
and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, most prominently the Solidanorst movement in
Poland.29 Since then, Zimmer points to the emergence of four distinct (but we may add,
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rather intertwined) approaches. The first is the so-called communitarian model that
emphasizes the benefits of civil society that lie in socializing, building solidarity and
enjoying "good life" anchored in networks. The works by Putnam and Etzioni are most
prominent examples of this viewpoint. Putnam's comparison of the civil societies of
northern and southern Italy offers a remarkable illustration of how a vibrant civil society
helps advance other aspects of the social and political life in the north of the country,
whereas the prevalence of patronage networks retards economic development and
engenders corruption in the south. Putnam sees a very intimate connection between
civil and political societies. Like de Tocqueville in his assessments of the U.S. civic life,
Putnam clearly links the health of civic society to the virility of political life. He comes
to the similar conclusions - the patterns of interactions in one will be utilized in the
other. Therefore, political life may be stymied by the same challenges (e.g. corruption,
patronage, lack of trust) that permeate the civil realm of activities. The second model,
which emerged in many post-WWII writings, is a differentiation on the democratic
theory. It states that civil society provides a means of active participation in a grass-root
democracy and helps ameliorate an existing democratic and representative deficit.
Because every society has a minority group whose interests cannot be represented
through the regular channels of election and voting (as such interests are always trumped
by the majority), civic organizations become a natural outlet where minority members
can get together and ensure that their interests are not completely obliterated by the
electoral will of the majority. Schmalz-Burns is one of the most prominent adherents of
this position. The next model stems from the liberal version of civil society. It stresses
individual competence and empowerment over state's coercive mechanisms. Similar to
30
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the idea presented long ago by Kant, the approach presents civil society as a venue for
upbringing and education of citizens in the provision of public goods and interests. The
final approach comes from Habermas' discourse theory31 that regards civil society as the
social space where communicative action takes its most distinct shape in the form of a
non-coercive discourse and open debate. In this capacity, it serves the role of a pluralist,
free community for communication that is not power-ridden, but operated through
observation and reflection. Habermas' interpretation combines a liberal view of the legal
protection for free citizens with a republic view of active participation in mediating laws
and institutions.
As noted before, the presented approaches share a wide range of similarities. One has
to do with the role of civil society as an educational means to create solidarity among
people (communitarian approach), to teach them about active participation and defense
of their interests (democratic theory) or to provide information on how their interests can
be defended (liberal approach). Many of these approaches assume the connection
between civil society and the state. It can either mitigate the democratic deficit
(democratic theory) or enhance the quality and practices of political life (communitarian
approach), or offer an alternative and more secure route for the freedom of expression
and debate (Habermas' discourse theory). In the end, these latest views on the role of
civil society highlight the continuity of the theoretical debates on the concept.
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Emergence of civil society
It is usually much easier to describe an existing civil society than to pinpoint the
mechanisms, processes and historical circumstances that facilitated its formation. This
section will review and evaluate the existing approaches on how a civil society emerges
and evolves.
Most of the literature acknowledges (implicitly or explicitly) two broad ways of
how civil society in general and civic organizations in particular appear on the domestic
arena. The major distinction between them lies in whether the process is driven by
domestic or external factors.

Domestic sources of civil society development
If the formation of a domestic civil society is primarily influenced by internal
actors, it starts at the informal level and is spontaneous in its character. In that case, civil
society derives its beginnings from individuals and their private life.32 The point is not
entirely new, as it was Durkheim who first paid attention to the role of family in civil
society. However, O'Connell is quick to mention that civil society usually moves toward
other levels - the level of a community (which has the most immediate impact on our
lives) and the level of government (where the participation of citizenry is essential).33 In
this sense, he echoes the thoughts similar to de Tocqueville. The French political
scientist asserted that individuals, who are independent, but weak in a democracy, band
together to enhance their separate voices for a common concern.
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The discussion raises a critical question as to what factors influence the rapidity
with which civic action (and civil society itself) expands from the individual to the
community and later societal levels. De Tocqueville provides a part of the answer, by
considering the impact of political culture. His analysis underscores that one of the key
components of a highly participatory culture is an inherent suspicion toward
government. For instance, American culture advocates self-reliance and views the
authority of state with distrust.34 One of their key conclusions states that civil society
organizations are more likely to emerge in states with a participatory culture where
public input has a greater chance of influencing systemic outcomes.35 This takes us back
to the previously described theoretical discussion on the link between the civil and
political societies. Understandably, political culture is not the only domestic ingredient
that shapes a civil society.
In his comparison of the differences between Western and Eastern European civil
society, Zimmer (albeit implicitly) points to a number of other factors that have the
potential of modifying the contours of a domestically-formed civil society. In particular,
the scholar notes that Western European civil societies grew out primarily of the middle
class, while those in Central and Eastern Europe - from nobility (like szlachta in
Poland).36 If his observation is true, it then has a direct impact on the notion of
embeddedness with which this dissertation is concerned. It can be speculated that civic
groups that grow out of the middle class will generally be more aware of the needs of
ordinary people (thus more implanted into the domestic fabric of their societies) than
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those that originated within the nobility. The failure of Russian Decembrists in 1825 is
an empirical piece of evidence that lends additional proof to this speculation. The
informal civic group whose members hailed from Russia's most aristocratic families had
no support of the local population and saw no need to secure such support in the first
place. To summarize the point, civil society may become more or less embedded in the
domestic scenery depending on the social class of its members.
The second difference between Western and Eastern European civil societies lies
in the sequence of their formation. In Western Europe, civil society predated the political
one, while in Eastern Europe (and most notably in Russia) the political society existed
long before a civil society emerged.

Therefore, in the case of many Eastern European

countries, the state had an opportunity to construct a political setting and a framework of
rules within which its civic society would operate. It should come as no surprise that an
inherently strong hold of the state over the realm of public life had a chilling effect on
the emergence and development of genuine civic organizations. As de Tocqueville
predicted, where a state heavily regulates political activity, it also generates intrinsic
uncertainty as to what forms of associations are acceptable. The overall point that
follows from Zimmer's comparison is as follows - in those states where the political
society preceded the civil one, the state, not the society, would define the space and set
the limits on civic organizations. This, in turn, impacts how well such entities would be
able to anchor themselves on the domestic landscape.
Finally, his analysis notes that the development of civil society in Eastern Europe
was fueled by ethnic and religious sentiments as the mechanisms to preserve a local
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identity under the foreign yoke. Thus, established civic organizations may be more
exclusive, limiting their membership (either purposefully or through the agendas that
they pursue) to certain national and/or religious groups. When carried to the extreme,
such membership tactics may bring about the negative effects of civil society, which
were so vividly described by Sheri Berman in her analysis of the civic life in Weimar
Germany.39 More specifically, instead of promoting a wider public discourse, German
civic groups hindered it by encouraging parochialism and reinforcing existing societal
cleavages. In the end, the civil society becomes only partially embedded in the domestic
landscape and remains at the constant risk of decline. When religious and ethnic issues
that rally its members can be resolved only through the political process, it has little else
to offer. To sum up the point, it is important to consider the external circumstances (such
as historical, national and religious factors) that shape the public platforms of emerging
civic groups.
Along with the influence of the abovementioned variables (i.e. as social class,
role of the state and historical conditions), civic organizations go through two critical
stages in their internal development. It is important to review both, as they shed some
light on the notion of embeddedness, which is central in my work.
In the first stage, civic organizations represent loose organizational structures that
came to being in a spontaneous manner. Here one can see the cherished ideal of civil
society in action - a group of individuals getting together to resolve a certain issue. At
this point, the organization remains highly horizontal with minimal distinctions between
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leaders and followers. As it is trying to form the base of followers, the new organization
advances diffuse, value-laden and frequently non-negotiable demands.40
At the second phase of their organizational evolution, civic associations become
more institutionalized, shifting in their activities from the expressive (making one's
voice heard) to the instrumental and strategic (influencing relevant policies). A formal
organization replaces loose networks. With further formalization comes a separation
between members and leaders. The nature of participation in organizational activities
begins to change. Whereas at the beginning all members take part in the activities of
their association, at later phases direct forms of participation are combined with
representation. In reality, it means that some members choose to contribute to the
organization indirectly (most frequently, financially), leaving the burden of
programmatic activities (like designing public campaigns, conducting legislative
lobbying) to the professional core of the group.
It is important to note that the transition from the first to the second stage is not
preordained. A host of factors influence whether a group will be able to shape itself into
a more formal entity with wider impact. Two of them are the capacity of a group and the
influence of the state. Unfortunately, little has been written on the organizational
changes that ought to occur in order for a loose network to become a civic association.
However, it is possible to extrapolate from the research done on the evolution of interest
groups.41 The literature makes it clear that in order to get to a more organized stage, the
group has to abandon the peripheral areas of concern and pursue a set of few, but major
issues that would be of paramount interest to the majority of its members. Doing so will
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enable not only to weed out participants with disparate demands, but also to establish an
intra-organizational consensus on what exactly it wants to accomplish. At this point, the
input from the state also becomes crucial. Such factors as the respect for individual rights
(in institutional and social spheres), the ability of institutions to incorporate demands
generated within civil society determine the establishment and evolution of
organizational capacities.4 To put it differently, if a state's support for civil society does
not extend beyond declarations in domestic and international documents, associations
will not have sufficient space to evolve and assume advocacy functions. Their
development may thus be retarded by a state that is more comfortable with unorganized
public disgruntlement (which is much easier to quell or ignore) than with wellarticulated demands backed by specific constituencies. In this situation, two outcomes
are plausible. Civil society groups may remain at the level of loose networks or be
eviscerated altogether if a government begins to perceive them as a threat/competitor to
its authority. In case of the former, further radicalization of their demands and tactics can
be expected, as groups do not have a public outlet where the reasonableness and
soundness of their agenda can be tested and moderated through open debate.
If, however, a state is receptive to the inclusion of civil society, the latter
becomes an important societal player and gains the capacity to generate political
alternatives and to monitor the state and the government. For that to happen, its
autonomy from the interference of a state has to be supported by the rule of law.43
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External sources of civil society development
The other path for civic groups to emerge on the domestic arena lies through
external international influences, which can be grouped in two broad categories. The first
includes impacts and interactions with foreign and international civic associations and/or
movements. The other has to do with the efforts of other governments to promote the
growth of civil society as a component of the larger democratization agenda. Since the
dissertation devotes a separate section44 to the latter issue, at this point I will elaborate
how external civic groups spur the growth of a domestic civil society.
One of the ways that foreign associations, especially advocacy networks, extend
their influence abroad is through a so-called "boomerang pattern."45 According to its
logic, because the feedback loop between the society and the state is blocked for various
reasons, domestic organizations get stuck at the first (loose) level of formation and begin
searching for allies elsewhere in the international arena. Having found their counterparts
abroad, they get an opportunity to exchange ideas and hone their strategies and tactics.
The process of weeding out disparate and often radical demands, creating a coherent
agenda and setting up an internal structure occurs not on the domestic, but on the
international level. Different types of transnational actors provide different kinds of
expertise. Transnational advocacy networks serve as a conduit for information exchange,
coalitions enhance coordination and social movements contribute to mobilization.46
More broadly, each of these actors transmits broad ideas and forms of public action,
symbols and general cultural models. One of their central goals is to make the process of
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democratic diffusion successful by replicating social structural circumstances that
worked elsewhere.47 In the end, the "boomerang" comes back to hit a government that
was initially dismissive of a civic association, which is now not only better organized (no
longer just a mob of enthusiasts), but also has powerful backers on the international
arena that can exert additional pressure on that government.
Political entrepreneurs (sometimes labeled as external promoters48) often become
the second source of growth for domestic civil society groups. Such individuals and
groups have previous transnational experiences and promote the establishment of civic
organizations in the issue areas where the growth in international contacts is the driving
force of the movement.49 In the past, such issues included environmental, human rights,
gender concerns, etc.
The suggested patterns of external influence on the growth of domestic civil
society pose an interesting question - to what extend is the level of embeddedness of
those civic groups altered as a result of their cooperation with other foreign advocacy
networks and/or political entrepreneurs? Stark, Vedres and Bruszt believe that
organizations with international roots are more likely to have deeper domestic
connections than NGOs without them. In turn, greater rootedness of such groups is
critical for their ability to mobilize and their capacity to defend civic values against state
encroachment.50 While Keck and Sikkink do not address the issue of embeddedness
directly, they look at the conditions that may increase or hinder the influence of external
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advocacy networks. Such include the characteristics of a chosen issue (its universality,
causality/marketability) and characteristics of involved actors. The latter category
represents a particular interest to this dissertation as it indirectly touches upon the
concept of embeddedness. In particular, the authors speak of network density as an
indicator of its influence. Strong connections between an international advocacy network
and its domestic counterpart produce regularity in the diffusion of information and, in
the end, create reciprocal exchanges.51 These conditions will increase the likelihood of
success in anchoring international values into the domestic context, leading to a higher
level of domestic embeddedness of a foreign advocacy network. Though Keck and
Sikkink do not analyze the features of a domestic setting needed for a civic group to be
effective,52 their criteria of network density can be extrapolated to associations operating
purely in the local (regional or national) environment with or without cooperation from
foreign entities in order to assess their domestic embeddedness. In this case, the notion
of density would mean the nature of interactions among group members. Thus applying
their criteria, a civic group will be denser (or more embedded) if it has strong
connections among its members with regular and reciprocal exchanges of information. It
also means that information must flow both upward (from organization's leadership to
its base) and downward (in the form of feedback and criticism of the base to the leaders).
To summarize the gist of the section, the emergence and development of civil
society may be influenced by domestic and external factors. As every theoretical
construct, the division presents itself neatly in theory, but not always in practice. In
reality, such factors are intermingled. Therefore, it is worth speaking of one or the other

51
For the elaboration of these ideas, see Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 312-315. The authors put forward a set of prerequisites that
help transnational NGOs sustain their moral authority. One of those include being representative.
52
1 do not mean to imply that this is a drawback in their work, but rather the issue is outside of the scope of their study.

28
being the primary (rather than the sole) force behind such processes. With that in mind,
on the domestic level civil society groups go through two stages - the initial (where they
represent loose networks with multiple vaguely defined interests) and the formative
(where they find their issue niche and pursue specific tasks of advocacy and/or service
delivery). Their evolution is shaped by a host of critical factors, such as social class,
historical circumstances, strength of the state. In terms of the international factors that
influence the development of civic groups, international advocacy networks and policy
entrepreneurs are said to play a prominent role. Finally, the review of the existing
literature has pointed to several critical implications on the extent of embeddedness of
domestic civic organizations that depend on the trajectory of civil society development.
Specifically, their embeddedness may be impacted if a transition from the first to the
second stage does not occur or is incomplete. It may also be influenced by the degree of
external involvement in building associations' domestic structure and capacity.
Extrapolating from the available research, it can be asserted that organizational density
(and inevitably higher embeddedness) in the domestic context means the viability and
strength of its membership base and strategies.

Benefits and weaknesses of civil society
As Van Til aptly observes, since its latest revival the concept of civil society
became somewhat of playdough.53 The shallow infatuation makes it even more
important to look at the supposed benefits and harms of a developed civil society. The
literature review on this subject matter will enable not only to balance a widely spread

Van Til, 14-15.

and overly positive perception about it, but also to understand the inherent attractiveness
of civil society as a key component in democracy-building programs.

Benefits
Social capital is often cited as the most overarching benefit of civil society that
encompasses a range of positive attitudes and behaviors.54 Before proceeding further, it
is important to define the concept. "The basic idea of social capital is that a person's
family, friends and associates constitute an important asset... Those communities
endowed with a diverse stock of social networks and civic associations are in a stronger
position to confront poverty and vulnerability, resolve disputes and take advantage of
new opportunities."55 Social capital is created by civil society (among other actors) as a
result of spontaneous cooperation and increased interconnectedness. It can be broadly
subdivided into four categories: a) informal (like civil associations at the first stage of
formation) or formal (officially registered NGOs); b) thick (where social contacts are
deeply embedded) or thin (where they are sporadic, irregular and shallow); c) inward- or
outward-looking, depending on whether and to what extent civil society organizations
are open to outside influences; d) bridging (by enabling different audiences to come
together) or bonding (by conducting interactions within groups of same interests).56
However, not all civil associations make the same impact on social capital. The tendency
seems to be that the more political is an organization, the better it is able to generate
social capital.57 The correlation begins to make more sense if we remind ourselves of the
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process that civic groups undergo in transforming from loose activist networks to
coherent organizations. As elaborated in the previous Section, when organizations enter
the latter stage, they ought to have more specific demands as well as be able to search for
a compromise. Because politics in a democracy is inherently about finding a consensus
among disparate interests, civic groups of political nature tend to generate more social
capital because the major bulk of their activities lies in engaging with various societal
actors to achieve their interests. Therefore, they are more exposed to the diversity of
opinions than, for instance, non-political service organizations that tend to attract and
interact with only certain actors with the passion for one issue.
The second most important benefit of civil society lies in its impact on individual
trust. As we grow up, we exhibit high levels of trust to a relatively narrow circle of
people that encompasses our family members and close friends. What civic groups help
do is expand this circle to others with whom we may not be intimately familiar. When
individuals interact with each other in civic associations, they develop a high level of
personal trust toward their fellow members. These positive experiences are likely to
make a larger contribution, by increasing their overall trust in people whether they know
them or not. The research findings by Eric Uslaner re-iterate the point - civic
engagement extends a link between the people we know (particularized trust) and the
people we come to trust as a result of experiences with them (strategic trust) to the
people that we do not know (generalized trust). As it can be expected, not all civic
groups equally contribute to generalized trust of their members. The available research
has confirmed that the more diverse is an organization, the higher is the level of general

Uslaner, 14-21.

31
trust among its supporters.59 In other words, members of those civic groups that are more
inclusive will have an opportunity to meet people from a lot of different backgrounds.
Consequently, their positive experiences of working with such individuals on a common
cause contribute to a perception that people in general can be trusted. This finding
inadvertently brings us back to the central theme of the dissertation that has to deal with
organizational embeddedness. If more diverse civic groups produce higher levels of
generalized trust, then one can speculate that more diverse civic groups are also better
embedded in the domestic fabric of their societies. In the end, trust is not only a
byproduct of civil society, but also a necessary mechanism for its own development. As
Lovell correctly notes, while trust is not necessary for establishing civil society, its
development and deepening are critical to get the most out of civic interactions.60
High levels of generalized trust leads subsequently to increased tolerance. It is
frequently referred in the literature as the virtue of civility or civicness which "as a
feature of civil society considers others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in their rights
and obligations as members of civil society."61 When citizens take part in larger societal
processes and are exposed to various viewpoints and individuals of diverse backgrounds,
their participation and attitudes become more ideologically moderate and considerate of
others.62 It is important to note that civicness does not eliminate conflict. Civil society
will remain an arena where issues are hotly and vigorously contested. But civility and
tolerance help produce a belief in a democracy, which functions through increased
horizontal interactions and robust self-enforcement of norms. Under these conditions,
59
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citizens do not perceive any dispute (and for that matter, their occasional losing an
argument) in zero-sum terms.
The resultant levels of high trust extend not only to individuals, but also to
institutions. Because many civic activities provide additional checks on the legislative
and executive branches of the government, activists feel not only empowered, but also
more trusting toward public institutions whose daily routines they are able to monitor
and with whom they interact on a more regular basis. 64 However, a higher level of
institutional trust that members of civil society groups feel is not by any means blind or
permissive, in terms of providing state institutions with a blank check on governance.
The remark by Eric Uslaner draws a fine, but important distinction, "Trust in people will
not lead to trust in government, but it may lead to a better government."65 In other words,
civic activists with high institutional trust will be better equipped to understand complex
institutional dynamics and will be more willing to engage into a long and convoluted
process of reforming some institutions, because (as a result of previous interactions) they
believe in their general utility. Therefore, in the case of civil society organizations,
numerous disappointments and criticisms of institutional processes, outcomes or leaders
do not lead to disenchantment or even resentment of institutions per se.
Their willingness to improve state and societal institutions and processes is
driven by increased personal autonomy and efficacy. In his analysis of associations'
impact on efficacy and institutional empowerment, Warren indicates that membership in
associations contributes to personal autonomy by honing the skills of rational decisionmaking. Because these organizations serve as an important social forum and conduit of
64
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information at the lowest level, participation in their processes allows an individual to
recognize his potential in impacting the situation. Through this feeling, a person comes
to understand the egalitarian and representative nature of power. Participation also
assures that various viewpoints on an issue are heard and, consequently, contributes to
the legitimation of the decision through the legitimation of the process.66
The last, but not the least, benefit of civil society lies in its capacity to induce
reciprocal engagement where no monitoring of the third party is required. When
individuals interact with each other in civic groups, they come to expect that others will
fulfill their end of the bargain. Otherwise, as de Tocqueville pointed out, their
cooperation in a democracy, where individuals cannot be coerced into participation,
would halt. In this regard, civic participation makes a wider societal contribution,
because the habit of reciprocal engagement spreads beyond the realm of associational
activity. Citizens adhere to laws, rules and regulations on a daily basis, because such
adherence has become a mutually expected societal norm. As a result of that, societies
with substantial social capital and developed civil societies have less reliance upon the
forces of police and army, as monitoring and coercion are not needed to such a great
extent. Robert Putnam emphasizes the importance of civil society and social capital at
the current stage of global development where impersonal communication is more
prevalent in industrial societies.
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Weaknesses
At the same time, civil society can have its downsides. Though not commonly
mentioned, they include two possible dangers. The first lies in contributing to further
radicalization and internal societal divisions. The second has to do with the ability of
civil society to push the state's political system to the breaking point by overloading with
the amount and diversity of demands that result from wide public participation.
Sheri Berman touched upon the two features in her seminal analysis of the civil
society in Weimar Germany. The first one (polarization) has already been mentioned in
this dissertation,68 so I will elaborate on it just briefly. Because the Weimar political
system widened the existing cleavages between social classes, political parties organized
around discrete and particularistic social groups. Disillusioned with parties, citizens
turned to civic groups to air their grievances. Unfortunately, those proved similarly
unable to overcome systemic constraints by attracting diverse audiences as their
members. In the end, associations not only reinforced the existing divisions, but also
tapped into nationalist and populist sentiments to increase their base. Berman observes
that by 1920, Germany had a highly organized, yet vertically fragmented and
discontented civil society. It soon became infiltrated by Nazis or Nazi-sympathizers, who
used communal civic organizations to tailor their messages, eliminate their opponents
and gain new supporters. It is during this period of time that the National Socialist Party
switched from its traditional electorate (urban and working-class voters) to the middle
class and rural groups. In essence, through a highly compartmentalized civil society
Hitler's party was successful in bridging the existing gap between the German bourgeois
society and party politics.
68
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This might not have happened if the country's political system had been
different, meaning more mature in its development and more inclusive in its workings.
The observation brings us to the second danger of a civil society — its contribution to the
collapse of a political system through overloading. The most recent debate in this field
concentrated on what should come first - democratization or institution- and statebuilding.69 Though little has been written directly on this matter, some useful insights
can be deduced from the literature on democracy-building and promotion. Specifically,
many authors noted a lukewarm attitude of American policy-makers toward building
civil societies in nascent democracies during the Cold War period.70 Their reluctance
stemmed from the fear that an immature civil society would become a safe heaven for
leftist extremists (such as Maoists andMarxists). As a result, it would have the potential
not only to further societal radicalization (as it happened in Weimar Germany), but also
to lead to the crumbling of weak post-colonial governments that may not be able to
withstand the pressures exerted by organized (and possibly well financed) leftist groups
against the backdrop of feeble state institutions and polarized domestic societies.
The lack of accountability is the third danger that runs concurrent to a
functioning civil society.71 Unlike politicians, who are periodically elected, or even
bureaucrats who can be fired by those politicians fearing for their election prospects,
civil society groups have to please only a narrow audience that has propelled them into
existence and/or supports their activities. This means that projects and initiatives, which
69
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might have otherwise been dropped by the government or, through elections, by people,
may continue to live on irrespective of their effect. In the context of democratization, the
issue of accountability also deals with whether NGO leadership is responsive to grassroot activists. As much of my research will show, bottom-up mechanisms of control are
especially hard to establish in the situations when NGO leaders come from urban, welleducated and socially advanced classes. In the end, low accountability may provoke a
crisis of legitimacy when civic associations are no longer perceived to represent the
interests of ordinary people. The public begins to treat them with contempt as a social
group in itself- no different from corrupt authorities, nepotistic political parties and
profit-hungry businesses.
To summarize, civil society brings a vast array of benefits and a much smaller
(though not less potent) set of weaknesses to the host society. At its best, civil society
helps increase the society's social capital, which, in turn, brings the citizenry together to
address common challenges. Civic activists are able to translate their personal trust
toward fellow members into a higher level of confidence in all people and societal
institutions. They become more empowered and tolerant. Countries with robust civil
societies can rely less on the coercive mechanisms of governance because a conscious
citizenry is able to monitor itself and enforce existing rules without a specter of available
punishments. However, the perils that a civil society may bring with it are no less
spectacular in their magnitude. In societies where the political system is not set to
accommodate external demands in an expedient manner, civic groups can foster internal
discord and division. They can deepen a general crisis of legitimacy, because they are
not directly accountable to the public (or sometimes even their own members) through
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37
elections. In the worst-case scenario, NGOs are capable of becoming an instigating force
that would overwhelm and bring down a -state's political system to the full-scale
collapse.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Civil society in democratic transitions
In the late 1970s-early 1980s, three distinct occurrences highlighted the renewed
viability of civil society. The first was the Solidarnost in Poland. The success and
visibility of the movement proved the central argument of Adam Micnik - the challenge
to the Soviet regime was not going to emerge from the above, initiated by liberal
segments of the Communist nomenclature (the Prague Spring of 1968), or from the
below through public riots (the Hungarian protests in 1956), but from the within.73 The
agent of reforms would be a domestic civil society that Communist governments are
never able to eviscerate completely. The second event was the transition of Latin
American states from authoritarian regimes to democracy and the role played by civil
society organizations. Finally, the third occurrence was widespread dissatisfaction with a
growing crisis of the Western welfare state and a neoconservative critique of "social
statism."74 In this regard, civil society began to embody an alternative to the overly
protective state.
Predictably, all of these events ignited scholarly discussions on the importance of
civil society. One of the most contentious debates in the literature on democratic
transitions is between supporters of elite and participatory approaches. The former
73
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emphasizes the primacy of a country's ruling class. The process of transition occurs
smoothly "so long... as the alteration in power ... and decision-making involves
compromises among elites and acceptance by the population."75 Thus, under the normal
conditions of power transfer civil society is accorded little role. If the compromise
cannot be reached, a struggle between the government and the opposition begins.
Therefore, the transitions in Poland and Latin America are qualitatively different,
regardless of their chronological proximity. Whereas Solidarnost represented the "people
power" of trade unions (thus confirming the assertions of the participatory approach),
civic groups in Latin America were more public rather than mass in their membership.76
The fact that artists and intellectuals in those states were the first to oppose a dictatorial
rule to be joined only later by the middle class lends more proof to the elite-driven
77

approach of transition.
The case for elite-driven transitions was eloquently developed by Samuel
Huntington in his "Third Way of Democratization." Unsurprisingly, most of
Huntington's analysis is focused on the role and interactions between and within the
government and the opposition. The notion of civil society does not figure prominently
in the transformation, except for massive protests that erupt at the later stages of a stand78

off between the rulers and the ruled.
Contrary to this viewpoint, the participatory approach posits that what makes for
good leaders are good citizens. That is why, civil society, which fosters popular
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participation, is vital in democratic transitions. For example, while recognizing the
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influence of elites, McFaul underscores that masses played one of the leading roles in
the fourth wave of democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civil society
helped skew the domestic balance of power toward challengers of the ancien regime and
ensured that democratization and its societal gains could not be reversed. However,
McFaul ascribes the increased stature of civil society and its greater potency as a societal
force to the altered nature of the international system. The unipolar system created
permissive conditions that among many other things (e.g. normative preponderance of
market economy and democracy) enhanced the profile of civil society.80 Furthermore,
the successful performance of many Central European civil societies undermined a key
assertion of the elite-driven approach that in the transitions from Communism greater
participation would produce more non-negotiable demands and overwhelm the political
system.81
The debate between the two viewpoints has surfaced again after the "color
revolutions." The adherents of the elite approach stress that such revolutions were
successful primarily because of the split within domestic elites, which prevented the use
of force against demonstrators. Those on the other side point to the exceptional role of
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mass movements and civil society groups that forced the rulers in Ukraine, Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan to acknowledge the results of fraudulent elections and step down.83
At the same time, a middle-of-the-road position begins to emerge within the
literature. It acknowledges the impact of civil society, but assigns its contribution to the
specific stages of a democratic transition. For instance, in his analysis of the "color
revolutions," McFaul puts a robust civil society along with many other indicators, like an
unpopular incumbent, united opposition, a modicum of independent media, divisions
within internal military forces, etc. All of them contributed to the success of democratic
post-communist transformations in Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia, but to a different extent
and at different points. The likelihood of civil society' s participation varies with the
nature of a democratic transition - "the shorter and the more unexpected the transition
from authoritarian rule, the greater the likelihood of popular upsurge and of its producing
a lasting impact on the outcome of the transition."85 Schmitter and Whitehead consider
past experiences and the general wealth of a domestic civil society as two indicators that
may increase the probability of a popular, mass-driven revolution.86 Their observation
has a two-fold importance for the theoretical and empirical parts of my work. First, it
touches upon the notion of embeddedness, because civil society needs to be mature
enough and sufficiently implanted into the domestic landscape to respond to unfolding
transformations in a fairly rapid manner. Second, from the empirical standpoint both
Ukraine and Georgia had revolution-like events (the student hunger strike of 1991 in
Ukraine and the student protests of 1978 in Georgia).
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Others pay more attention to the importance of civil society in the subsequent
steps of democratization, such as the completion of transition and the consolidation of
democratic governance. Cohen and Aratonote that "a highly articulated civil society
with cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping memberships of groups, and social mobility is
the presupposition for a stable democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent
domination by anyone group and against the emergence of fundamentalist mass
87

movements and anti-democratic ideologies." If public engagement is low, anew
democracy may assume hollow, procedural and formalistic forms and encounter a
OQ

persistent problem of consolidation. Ideally, civil society is expected to perform a
number of roles in a democratizing state. First, it helps alter the balance between the
state and society toward the latter. This is critical, given overwhelming state power
during totalitarian times. Second, it serves as a transmission belt between the state and
society, making sure that public demands are accorded proper attention. Third, it plays
an important disciplinary role by setting and promoting the standards of morality that
apply to the state as well as to regular citizens. Finally, civil society performs a
consultative function by observing compliance with the rules of a democratic game.89
In the end, it should be noted that the debate between elite and participatory
approaches on democratization may never be definitively resolved, as many other
theoretical battles in political science. In this case, the major reason lies in the divergent
understanding of what constitutes an event of democratic transformation. The elite
approach looks at a long-term picture, which naturally suits its position, because it is the
political cream of the crop, not ordinary people, who performs day-to-day governance.
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The participatory school emphasizes the "here-and-now" perspective that zooms on the
role of civil society in specific events, which mark a turning point to democratization.90
To summarize, democratic transformations in Eastern Europe and Latin America
and the malaise about the ever-expanding welfare state not only re-launched the concept
of civil society in the late 1970s - early 1980s, but also sparked a contentious debate on
what is (or, in the case of state-related reforms, should be) the primary driving force
behind such changes, how and where civil society generally fits into the process.
Because this research is preoccupied with the role of civic groups in the "color
revolutions," it naturally sides with adherents of the participatory approach in asserting
the power of masses However, it attempts to step forward and fill in the gap by showing
that it is organizational embeddedness that helps civic groups rise to the occasion and be
an effective player during various stages of a democratic transition.

Civil society andforeign aid
Scholars' assessments on U.S. democracy promotion efforts during the Cold War
present a rather consistent picture - democratization was fairly low on the American
totem poll of priorities. Kegley and Hermann explain that by pointing to the realist
nature of American policies, which used democracy promotion as a vehicle for the
projection of U.S. political ideas and for the pursuit of the country's material selfinterests.91 Under those circumstances, the ideological stance of a recipient country
constituted an important factor in determining U.S. foreign aid policies.92
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Reagan administration
When the concept of civil society and its benefits became popularized in the
middle of the 1980s, the United States and other Western providers of foreign aid were
about to reverse their stance on supporting NGOs. Before that, civic organizations were
viewed with a great deal of suspicion in the West. Fearing that bottom-up developments
would enhance the strength of leftist and radical Marxist movements, American policymakers preferred working through governmental channels to promote democracy.93 In
the mid-1980s, the U.S. government was growing increasingly disappointed with the
experiences and outcomes that emerged out of providing aid directly to governments.94
Instead of bringing long-awaited change, the funds given to some regimes in Africa and
Latin America encouraged corruption and helped undemocratic leaders hold on to power
without undertaking deep reforms. The first signs of a possible policy shift became
obvious during the ouster of the Philippines' President Ferdinand Marcos. Faced with
large-scale public protests in that country and heightened international scrutiny, the U.S.
government and President Ronald Reagan (in what was described by James Mann as a
rather dramatic decision95) had to withdraw their support and acknowledge the victory of
Corazon Aquino. It was one of the first instances where a large-scale public movement
played such a fundamental role in bringing down an authoritarian regime. More change
was yet to follow. The Reagan administration quietly abandoned the Kirkpatrick
doctrine, which suggested maintaining friendships with pro-American dictatorial
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regimes, and pulled out its support from General Chun of South Korea and General
07

Augusto Pinochet of Chile. Soon, domestic civic movements, like Solidarnost in
Poland, National Fronts in then Baltic republics and Rukh in Ukraine, challenged the
dominance of the Communist party in the first allowed multi-party elections. The step
precipitated a chain of events, leading first to the Soviet retreat from Central and Eastern
Europe and then ultimately to the country's collapse. The latter created an urgency to
help newly independent countries move along the transitional paradigm by installing
democratic procedures in order to prevent the spread of radical nationalism (so widely
predicted by such neorealists as John Mearsheimer).98 It was also seen as important for
the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to see some
positive signs of democratization, before tangible benefits of economic liberalization and
the free market materialize."
George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations
By the end of the 1980s, President George H.W. Bush identified democratization
as a key element of the "new world order." Unfortunately, busy with the management of
rapidly unfolding events (the dissolution of the Soviet Union, unification of Germany,
the first Gulf War, to name a few) Bush senior never got a chance to spell out or
implement his "new world" agenda.100
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With the party switch in the White House (from Reagan-Bush to Clinton) the
support for democratization, and civil society as apart of the process, finally got some
traction. President Bill Clinton embraced the enlargement of the democratic community
that served four concurrent goals: a) it reflected the reality of world politics after the
Soviet demise; b) it promoted U.S. economic growth; c) it led to the alignment of U.S.
policies with other international organizations; and d) it accepted the Kantian view
behind democracy promotion.101 It was therefore during the Clinton years when the
normative change has been completed. NGOs and their support have become a staple of
democratization programs.

Democracy and good governance have emerged as the new

priorities for aid organizations previously focused on economic development.103 The
normative shift has permitted advanced democracies to strengthen non-state actors (like
NGOs) with increased legitimacy and important resources.- the actions deemed
previously unseemly under the requirements of sovereignty.104

The Evolution of foreign aid for democratization
However, giving aid to civic organizations was a challenging endeavor from the
very beginning. First, donors had to identify how and where precisely to draw a line
between "civil" and "political" spheres of the society.105 As we discussed, the two are
very intertwined from the theoretical and philosophical viewpoints, but have to be
separated in order to establish a sense of impartiality behind direct foreign assistance to
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the former, but not the latter.106 Because civil society is such an encompassing concept,
donor countries also had to decide what exactly within the realm of civil society they
would like to finance. Based on their domestic experiences,107 the natural choice seemed
to be the support to the so-called "third sector."
Civic associations of the third sector are commonly referred to as NGOs (nongovernmental organizations). They are self-organized, self-governing, private, and (an
important differentiation from businesses) non-profit entities.108
There are two contending opinions on the role of nonprofits. The first views them
mostly as the product of government, market and contract failures that serve as
alternative providers of goods and services.109 Supporters of this view acknowledge that
nonprofits may have some advocacy functions, but those come somewhat secondary to
service provision. The other view ascribes to nonprofits a broader and deeper role as
assets of social capital. In this regard, Bryce's analysis offers interesting insights for this
work, because it touches upon the concept of embeddedness. He asserts that strong
nonprofits possess embedded social capital with a certain marketing value.110 That
allows nonprofits to differentiate their products and services among others and even
create brands that can be patented.111 Two benefits of embeddedness can thus be
deduced - more generated social capital and higher public visibility. These benefits
produce a number of contributions that encompass increased goodwill of public
106
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involvement, a reduced risk of project failure (because NGO members have a shared
mission) and an ability to attract additional resources.112 In their second role, NGOs
monitor public expenditures, articulate and channel citizens' demands.113
The available literature draws an important distinction between civil society and
the third sector. As Zimmer points out, civil society is a normative concept, shaped by
citizens' voluntary engagement, civic responsibility and participation, whereas a
nonprofit sector refers to the so-called non-distributional constraints that are attached to
operational activities of civic groups.114 In other words, nonprofits represent a more
narrow manifestation of civil society.115
Before proceeding further, it is worth specifying what we mean under Western
donors. The group includes not only foreign governments and government departments,
but also so-called political foundations and quasi-governmental actors. In many cases,
Western governments are simply unable to administer directly vast amounts of assistance
on the ground. This is when they turn to political foundations and quasi-governmental
entities that are created to promote liberal democracy and support organizations and/or
individuals that fall in line with this broad image. For instance, the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) awards a large number of its grants to the
International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI) that
implement USAID projects on working with civic groups or training political parties.
Though the nature of relations between political foundations and their host government
is mutually reinforcing and generally cooperative, occasional rivalries and tensions
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emerge as a result of altered domestic circumstances and colliding agendas.

For

instance, many American nonprofits that provide HIV education and prevention were
forced to adjust their strategies because of the Bush administration ABC policy that
placed a higher premium on promoting abstinence.117 In the end, though such
organizations are afforded some space to operate more independently, most of their
programs serve a purpose corresponding with national interests.
The decision to assist new democracies with the establishment of professional
NGOs was motivated not only by the desire for impartiality and the need to
contextualize the meaning of civil society, but also by the preference to work with
organizations that would ease donors' administration of and accountability for funds.
Though usually NGOs' activities are centered on advocacy and/or service provision,
international donors gave attention to the former, hoping that trickle-down effects would
someday enable the latter. It is thus not surprising that supported nonprofit organizations
did not include such traditional groups (in the American understanding of civil society)
as sports clubs, religious charities, trade unions, etc.
Most of the foreign aid was given for institutional and administrative capacity
building of newly established nonprofits. Western donors provided funding, technical
advice, training and assistance with a general legal framework.118 Their strategies were a
combination of imported programs, which succeeded elsewhere, with initiatives to fill in
the gaps and needs on the ground.119 Many projects attempted to create partnerships
116
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among four major societal actors - the state, market forces, civil society and donors.
Some sought to put local NGOs in touch with their likely international counterparts that
have a similar cause. As a result, a number of domestic civic organizations learned
various transnational strategies of persuasion and socialization, such as "frame
alignment" to render disparate events more meaningful, "frame resonance" to connect
those events with broader societal repercussions, etc.120
The results of donor assistance are mixed at best. On one hand, their programs
were helpful in starting civil society organizations in the countries that had little financial
resources for anything else, but bare necessities. In most successful scenarios, Western
assistance provided tangible equipment and trainings for nonprofits, increasing their
organizational capacity and ultimately their ability to survive independently once the
funding stopped.121 As discussed in the next chapter, Western funding priorities were
beneficial in terms of raising certain issues (e.g. domestic violence, treatment of the
Roma minority), which domestic government would have preferred avoiding.
On the other hand, foreign aid brought a host of its own problems. The first
among them lies in its restrictiveness. Donors operate with a thin slice of civil society
organizations. As a result, they create entities consisting of non-embedded elites with
strong knowledge and weak membership.

The second closely-related issue is that of

funding. Because the economies of emerging democracies remain weak, domestic NGOs
are heavily reliant on international support, which in the end becomes a fundamental
Limits ofNGOs - a Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, ed. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 1-10.
120
Keck and Sikkink, 16,20.
121
Sarah H. Henderson, "Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia," Comparative
Political Studies 35, no. 2 (2002): 140.
122
Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise ofSemi-Authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2003), 195-225; Howell and Pearce, Civil Society and Development, 89-123; Sarah E. Mendelson, "The Power
and Limits of Transnational Democracy Networks in Postcommunist Societies," in The Power and Limits ofNGOs - a Critical Look
at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, ed. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002).

handicap. Such organizations are usually preoccupied with donors' priorities and
discouraged to look for domestic constituencies. It should be noted that money is an
issue not only for NGOs abroad, but also for their funders in the West. Consistency and
coherence of their activities are often hindered by changing political winds in Western
capitals and fleeting policy fads in Western democracy promotion communities. In
essence, many international and Western democracy promotion organizations also lack a
stable financial base, aside from their governments or international bodies.123 The third
factor has to deal with the content of foreign assistance. Quite often, the emphasis on
certain Western practices (as we will see in the next section) ends up isolating NGOs
from their natural communities, because such practices and campaigns to promote them
clash with local customs and beliefs.124 Fourth, in many cases when promoting
partnerships between nonprofit organizations and other societal actors, Western aid
structures erroneously assumed that all sides would enter such partnerships on equal
terms and the removal of political aspects in their relations would in fact become a
mechanism for reconciliation.125 Fourth, from the theoretical perspective the framework
of assistance relied on the assumptions of the transitional paradigm.126 In relation to civil
society, it purports that as democracy gets more consolidated, the domestic civil society
becomes more domestically embedded and less reliant on external help. Because of that,
the proposed methods of support were often inadequate and inapplicable as some
democracies got stuck in the gray zone of semi-authoritarianism. Many semiauthoritarian regimes have taken advantage of lacking embeddedness by portraying their
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civil societies as elite-driven, detached from regular citizens and unable to speak their
language.127 Fifth, American strategies of democracy promotion (including those for
civil society) became the dominant discourse because of substantial funding levels, but
turned out to be rather ethnocentric. Hook asserts that the U.S. was trying to replicate its
own systemof democratic governance, which has too much emphasis on political liberty
at the expense of socioeconomic equality.128 As the following section reveals, NGOs
were often prompted to adopt strategies and concentrate on the issues that were more
relevant in the American rather than foreign setting. In another assessment, American
governmental bodies applied a "cookie-cutter" approach in pushing the same
compilation of best practices in entirely different environments.129
To be fair, the learning curve has been both steep and fairly quick with the
middle road in promoting democracy and civil society evolving by the end of the 1990s.
Emerging analyses managed to escape the two extremes of being either naively
exuberant130 or gloomily fatalist about the prospects of democratization. For instance, in
their suggestions for the future, Carothers and Ottaway call for civil society realism.
They suggest the need to abandon the assumption of NGOs being the central
representation of civil society and encourage its other manifestations. Democracy
promoters should also discard the illusion that NGGs are inherently nonpartisan or
impartial and take into account the political choices that they have to make on a regular
basis. More attention ought to be paid to the issues of NGO sustainability as well as to
the simplification of currently cumbersome and rigid implementation strategies.131
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Looking beyond the conventional assumptions of the transitional paradigm (which
envisions democratization as a sequence of steps) would provide insights on how to offer
more effective assistance to civil societies in semi-authoritarian states.132 So would the
utilization of complimentary mechanisms, like diplomacy, especially when dealing with
deeply autocratic regimes.
To sum up, U.S. foreign assistance for democratization in general and civil
society in particular has gone through a period of rapid transformation since the 1980s
when it was brought to the forefront of American policy agenda by democratic
transitions in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the former Soviet Union. The official
American position has also evolved - from recognizing the need for change to becoming
the driver behind the normative shift that legitimized external assistance to domestic
civic groups. Western governments and Western political foundations that acted on their
behalf poured their funds to build civil societies around the globe, based on American
historical experiences and recently acquired practical lessons on the ground. Though a
more moderate and realistic approach toward democratization and civil society building
seems to be developing, it is unclear to what extent it pays attention to the notion of
embeddedness that is central to making externally implanted NGOs successful on the
local ground. The analysis of the available literature reveals that if present at all, the
emphasis on embeddedness is either indirect/implicit or peripheral at best.
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CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
After describing general benefits and ills of foreign assistance to civil society
organizations, it is important to take a look at a number of available case studies to see
emerging commonalities and the extent of divergence. Because the dissertation is
primarily concerned with the countries of the former Soviet Union, the chapter will give
them a primary consideration and provide a brief overview of the civil society
development in Central and Eastern Europe (as a baseline for comparison).
In Russia civil society "is weak, atomized, and heavily dependent on Western
assistance for support."134 Its development has been impeded by domestic political
factors as well as the methods of Western foreign assistance. In terms of the former, the
Soviet legacy, the super-presidential institutional design, localism and Putin's politics
have retarded the development of a mature civil society. In addition, for the most part of
the 1990s, the economic climate was inimical to a functioning civil society. Thus NGO
leaders were more interested in political careers and making a living.135 As for the latter,
Western support is partly to blame for Russian nonprofits not being able to find their
natural constituency, because they ".. .targeted Western funders rather than the Russian
population as the voice that mattered."136 Foreign grants developed a cohort of NGO
elites who are located in major cities (mostly Moscow and Saint Petersburg) and are not
interested in fostering "civicness." Instead they hoard information from other nonprofit
"competitors" and prefer smaller memberships to avoid sharing grant benefits.137
Failures of many Russian civil society groups stem from the disconnect between their
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Westernized campaigns and the normative context of the Russian society. As Mcintosh
Sundstrom and Mendelson and Glenn show, where nonprofits pursue issues (like
environmental protection or domestic violence) that are in vogue abroad, but do not
"click" with the culture at home, their impact is fleeing and uncertain.138 In the end,
Russian civil society seems unable to find reason d'etre after the collapse of
Communism.
Stepanenko's analysis points that Ukraine's civil society suffers similar
problems. Ukrainians are more likely to trust personal connections and networks.
Especially under the Kuchma regime, the spread and persistence of clientilist political
culture139 undermined already weak civic foundations. It fed into the Soviet stereotype
that organizational activity was the purview of the state and should be done at its
behest.140 Ukraine's civic groups continue to face the challenge of institutionalizing the
norms and values of civil society by building bridges between them and the larger
population to convert the quantity of NGOs into the quality of their impact.141 It is
unclear whether the country's nationalist intelligencia (that was the driving force behind
its independence) is capable of fostering basic values that underlie the respect for law
and are so crucial for enhancing the spirit of civicness. As a result, Ukraine continues to
witness a slow pace of self-organization, with high levels of mistrust remaining the
greatest single impediment to developing a robust civil society.
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In Moldova, the functioning of the domestic civil society has been influenced by
tensions between the legislature and the executive, which both vie to consolidate control
and undermine competing sources of power.142 The country's civic organizations have a
hard time attracting younger populations, as economic hardships have created
disincentives for youth participation. Moldovan NGOs achieved little success in civic
education and human rights due to general passivity of the populace coupled with
governmental pressures and intimidation. Based on the available analyses, the key task
for Moldovan NGOs is to overcome internal divisions and pursue common projects
through broad-based coalitions.143
On the post-Soviet space it is in Central Asia where NGOs face most formidable
challenges from the state, foreign donors, their domestic societies and internal
organizational deficiencies. On the first count, local civil society groups are hamstrung
by the countries' legal framework that views them as an anti-government element.144 In
terms of the second, Central Asia was never high on the list of American priorities for
foreign aid. As Brill Olcott rightly remarked, "Whatever money and imagination is left
over is being applied to the Middle East rather than Central Asia."145 Geopolitical
considerations often led the United States to tone down its democratic rhetoric and zeal,
which did not go unnoticed by Central Asian authoritarian rulers.146 The peripheral
principle that guided Western funding and attention was exacerbated by the initial focus

142
Lucan A. Way, "Weak States and Pluralism: the Case of Moldova," East European Politics and Societies 17, no. 3 (2003): 454482.
143
Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat and Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, "Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic
institutions," Centerfor Social and Economic Research Paper no. 255 (November 2003): 19-27.
144
Daniel Stevens, "NGO-Mahalla Partnerships: Exploring the Potential for State-Society Synergy in Uzbekistan," Central Asia
Survey 24, no.3 (September 2005): 281; Alisher Ilkhamov, "The Thorny Path of Civil Society in Uzbekistan, " Central Asian Survey
24, no.3 (September 2005).
145
Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's Second Chance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 206.
146
For more analysis of geopolitical dilemmas, see Martha Brill Olcott, "U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities" (testimony
Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations Heading on the Middle East and Central Asia, 22 April 2006),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index. cfm?fa=view&id=18277&prog=zru.

56
of donors on the formal registration of NGOs and resulted in their inability to attract
more moderate, reformist elements within religious groups and the societies at large. "By
assuming that civil society can be neatly added to a transitional society... donors
underplay the historical processes that give shape to particular forms of civil society,
some of which may be permeated with apparently contradictory modernist and
traditionalist tendencies."147 Thirds funders did not foresee the impact of societal
dynamics on the distribution and utilization of grants. In fact, having access to Western
money in the times of severe economic hardships only worsened the situation with
corruption and danism in local communities. Domestic NGO leaders feel unabashed
about using grants for their personal benefit or that of their close relatives and family
members. American-sponsored NGOs have also attracted the intellectual elites within
those societies, leaving the governmental sphere drained of talent and capacity. Thus, an
internationally funded "democracy sector" has placed itself in a precarious position in
many Central Asian states. Without deep roots in local society and with little interaction
with indigenous institutions, it "is in danger of exacerbating tensions between the small
elite and the majority of population."148 Only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have more or
less viable, though struggling, civil societies. In the rest of the countries, it is either
nonexistent (Turkmenistan) or harshly eviscerated (Uzbekistan) or too feeble to notice
(Tajikistan). It is unsurprising that so far the best projects in Central Asia have been
those done on a small scale and with the involvement of local communities.149
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The situation is qualitatively different in Central and Eastern European states that
were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact. In Poland, Ukraine's neighbor to the West,
the Association Law of 1989 did away with the Communist restrictions on freedom, but
(unfortunately) excluded NGOs from the systematic assistance of the state, which
precluded them from providing a wide array of welfare services. Foreign assistance was
instrumental in helping the Polish civil society get on its feet. By the end of the 1990s,
25 percent of people were active in nonprofits, half of the population acknowledged their
donations to NGOs and 43 percent of NGOs reported using volunteers. At the same time,
Poland could not escape someof the post-communist problems. Its civil society remains
small (employing only 1.2 percent of the population) and woefully oligarchic (with 40
percent of NGOs having an annual budget less than $2,500). Though many NGOs use
volunteers, about 4 percent of people out of the whole population take part in such
activities. 15°
In his analysis of Romania, Dan Petrescu points that the domestic civil society
has yet to move from being driven by donor supply to citizens' demands. In the mid1990s, Western funders stepped in to establish nonprofit organizations at a fast speed
with little scrutiny, but with a lot of willingness to disburse money. Most of it went to
advocacy groups, neglecting religious and non-political organizations as well as unions.
By the end of the decade, it was clear that a number of American assumptions about
NGO development in Romania did not hold. Advocacy nonprofits have not become a
guiding light for all others to follow. Furthermore, it turned out that a group's official
registration status does not make it more or less potent in influencing societal and
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political change. To the disappointment of many in the West, NGOs that preached
democracy were not democratic in their internal organizational arrangements. In the end,
many failed to establish firm links with domestic communities or achieve long-term
sustainability.151
In Hungary, civil society faces many similar challenges. Its nonprofits are
plagued by the lack of and financial capacity, low credibility among publics and a lack
of effective access to policy-makers.
A number of works conduct a comparative analysis of civil society developments
in GEE and the former Soviet Union. For instance, Patrice McMahon considers the
impact of American assistance on the development of women's groups in Hungary,
Poland and Russia. Though their biggest success lies in attracting attention to women's
issues (that would not have been otherwise possible), NGOs in these three states share
the same set of problems. In particular, they are too professionalized and lack domestic
grass-root support. Most of them have also become too de-politicized to their own peril
as well as too enmeshed in promoting a purely Western agenda.

In a separate piece,

Badescu, Sum and Uslaner look at the civil societies in Romania and Moldova in order
to measure how participation impacts trust. The article concludes that in both countries,
activists are more trusting than the general public, thus affirming the classical theoretical
proposition on the benefits of civil society. However, the authors also note that members
of voluntary associations are not significantly predisposed to democratic attitudes than
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nonmembers. The latter is not surprising, given Petrescu's earlier observations on the
internal anti-democratic and non-pluralist nature of many NGOs.154
By the way of summarizing, it is now possible to take the stock of civil society
developments in the region. The available literature reveals that regardless of their
shared Communist past, civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union have taken different developmental paths. Though some are more vibrant
and mature than others,155 they all seem to face three major challenges that threaten their
long-term survival. First, NGOs need to broaden public participation in their activities.156
In all of the case studies, the nonprofit sector comes out too elitist,157 too urban, too
narrow in terms of the types of pursued activities (mostly advocacy) and too grandiose in
1SR

regard to desirable achievements.

Second, scholars frequently complain that U.S.-

funded NGOs are not sustainable.159 They are passive and lack entrepreneurial spirit with
respect to civic engagement.160 They shop around for foreign funds, but do not attempt to
engage possible local sources of support. Third, the majority of the covered scholarly
works have concluded that, due to the parameters and nature of U.S. foreign assistance, a
lot nonprofit organizations in the region have become too detached from politics in their
drive to be "neutral" and too unwilling to engage with political actors or other
representatives of the domestic civil society that are not normally covered by Western
154
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democratization programs. This detachment continues to sap efforts to institutionalize
the political representation of civil society.161
Unfortunately, almost no attention has been devoted in the literature to exploring
explicit linkages between the three problems. The existing gap brings us back to the
notion of embeddedness. As the case studies show (though not tell), a low level of
NGOs' embeddedness in the domestic landscape is the root cause of many subsequent
problems. Insufficiently implanted NGOs are less likely to look for domestic support,
precisely because their constituency lies elsewhere. They recognize (either openly or in
private) that their organizations do not have an appeal (or a marketing value) strong
enough to attract whatever meager financial resources are available in their countries. In
the end, they become an isolated and foreign body within their domestic societies. If
embeddedness is so critical, then the next question should be about the variables that
help to enhance it. What is the difference between successful NGOs that manage to make
a difference and the rest? Searching for an answer brings us to the "color revolutions" the events that are said to have shown regional NGOs at their best.

CONCLUSIONS
Before proceeding to the next chapter that will deal with the issues of
methodology and research design used to collect the data for this study, it is paramount
to take a step back and assess the critical findings that have emerged as a result of
reviewing the extant literature as well as their impact on the concept of organizational
embeddedness.

Freise.
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Though the concept of civil society has been part of the scholarly discourse for a
long while, numerous theoretical disputes are centered primarily on four key issues. The
first has to deal with the differentiation between civil and political societies. It began
with Locke's interpretation, which did not separate the two, and proceeded to Kant who
distinguished the role of civil society as a province of rational debate and critique. Those
who followed not only took this distinctiveness for granted, but also attempted to refine
the relationship. Hegel saw civil society as a vehicle to prepare citizens for political
participation. Marx and Gramsci considered it to be a supporting mechanism for the
existing power/class structure. Durkheim put it in the intermediary position between the
state and economy. De Tocqueville asserted its ability to counter statist tendencies and
(along with Putnam) to serve as a feedback loop between the civic life and politics. The
second dispute is about the origins of civil society. Here the progression has been from
ontological (Locke) to human/epistemological (Ferguson) and finally historical (Hegel)
explanations. A lot has been said and written about the nature of exchanges that occur in
the civic realm. Authors of the Scottish Enlightenment were the first to note that civic
interactions are not neutral. In fact, they help validate critical discourses (Kant) or blend
together morality and legality (Hegel). The outcome of such interactions can bring
mutuality by building upon the emotional nature of cooperation and tapping into the
existing reserves of trust (Durkheim) as well as conflict by relying on the existing class
structure (Marx) and deepening the patterns of social exclusion (Herman). Finally, the
fourth theoretical discussion addresses the relationship between the individual and civil
society. According to it, civil society may serve as an intermediary body through which
states's authority enters one's individual life (Durkheim). Or it may become a venue

where an individual sacrifices a part of her autonomy to gain greater decision-making
influence in democratic conditions (de Tocqueville).
After reviewing the breadth and depth of theoretical developments, two
implications on the notion of embeddedness are in order. First, because civil society is
both distinct and connected to the political realm, the degree of organizational
embeddedness depends on how well the civil society is able to strike a golden middle by
being sufficiently open for cooperation with political parties and governmental bodies,
yet avoiding the danger of turning into a party or state supplicant. Second, to assess the
degree of embeddedness, it is important to pay attention to the nature of exchanges
within civil society, more specifically whether they have a robust moral and legal basis
that enables its special place in the society. As the review makes it clear, the moral
standing can be achieved only if civic organizations have inclusive memberships and a
high level of internal and external openness. The legal basis stems from pertinent laws
that are put in place by the state.
Our analysis of the literature on the emergence of civil society has concentrated
on two critical dimensions. The first deals with domestic-level processes through which
a loose web of activists is transformed into a structured civic organization with coherent
positions and demands. The success of such a transformation is impacted by a host of
variables that include country's political culture, role of the state on the domestic scene,
prevalence of certain social classes as civil society members, and historical
circumstances. The second dimension pays attention to the two kinds of external sources
- political entrepreneurs and international cooperation between civic groups known as
the "boomerang pattern" - that help foster domestic civil societies. The ability of
political entrepreneurs to influence internal processes depends on the characteristics of

an issue that a foreign civic group tries to pursue in a recipient country as well as on the
nature of relationship they have with domestic partners. In the case of the former,
international input will produce better results if an issue at hand resonates with a local
society. As for the latter, the denser the relationship between an international
organization and its local partner - the better the results of their cooperation.
Therefore, in assessing the level of embeddedness of a certain civil society or a
particular group within it, a set of factors ought to be taken into account. First, external
involvement will be more effective in helping a civil society find its place on the
domestic scene (i.e. become more embedded) if it deals with relevant issues and capable
(in terms of their membership density) actors. Second, the degree of embeddness may be
lowered by a strong state that either exhibits increasing autocratic tendencies or has
existed long before a civil society. Third, civic groups may undercut their own
implantedness if they do not become institutionalized into more formal organizations.
However, even if their institutionalization does take place, civil society at large can
remain weakly embedded into the domestic landscape. The reasons for that may lie
either in its social composition that emphasizes members' exclusive, elite status or in the
ethnic, religious and historical factors that accompanied the formation of civil society.
One of the most voluminous parts of the literature deals with the description and
analysis of benefits and (less commonly) weaknesses that civil society may bring to the
domestic political and social life. Among the benefits, higher social capital, increased
individual and institutional trust, better reciprocal engagement and the feeling of
civicness figure most prominently. The rare, but quite malign, weaknesses include
possible polarization and systemic overloading.
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It is interesting to note a relationship that both benefits and weaknesses have with
organizational embeddedness. In the case of the former, benefits materialize precisely
because an organization is sufficiently embedded. For instance, the available research
stresses that NGOs, which are engaged in political/advocacy activities, will generate
more social capital than those, which are not. However, one of the major reasons for that
(i.e. embeddedness) is omitted, although the theoretical literature makes it abundantly
clear that nonprofits, which are distinct, yet connected to the political sphere, tend to do
better. Their tighter connections with political organizations produce closer links to the
society in general. In a different example, many authors assert that the level of individual
trust will be higher in those NGOs with a diverse pool of members. Again, the
observation does not link individual trust (indirectly) and diversity (directly) to higher
embeddedness. Nonprofits, which have diverse memberships, are better connected to the
society, since they simply "cover" more existing societal groups and viewpoints.
Therefore, the relationship ought to be described as follows - higher embeddeness
generates more diversity that, in turn, increases members' individual trust. As for the
weaknesses of civil society, they come to being due to the lack (or complete absence) of
embeddedness. For example, the polarization of organizational membership occurs with
a low level of broad embeddedness. In this ease, a civic group does not seek to expand
horizontally in order to encompass other segments of the society. Systemic overloading
happens when an NGO is only partially embedded into the domestic landscape because
its links with the political society are either cut off completely or severally strained. In
effect, this confirms the previously stated theoretical proposition that an NGO should be
distinct, but connected to the political system.
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As we see, the notion of embeddedness plays a key role in bringing the benefits
and ameliorating the weaknesses of civil society. Unfortunately, those who talk of the
benefits take embeddedness for granted, while the ones writing about the weaknesses do
not consider the phenomenon at all (instead concentrating on the consequences of those
weaknesses). That is why, our research will seek to assert that in order to generate more
benefits and avoid possible flaws, civic organizations ought to be sufficiently embedded.
Finally, our assessment of the studies that address the role of civil society and
foreign funders in democratic transitions has pointed to a number of observations. First,
those who believe that civic groups play a leading role in ensuring that a democratic
transformation occurs through the power of masses subscribe mostly to the participatory
approach on democratization. Second, the need for Western assistance in building
domestic civil societies in GEE and the former Soviet Union has become both a blessing
and a curse for many newly established civic groups as well as for those societies in
general. On one hand, such NGOs helped raise issues that would have otherwise been
avoided or substantially under-funded. On the other, Western aid created a set of
problems of its own. To list the most common, foreign funders have provided restrictive
funding, covering only formally registered (and mostly advocacy) NGOs and excluding
everyone else. In many cases, the content proved either incompatible with local practices
or irrelevant to local realities. By attempting to remove the political aspect in NGOs'
functioning, donors have often severed vital connections between those organizations
and the political realm of their societies and left the former with diminished societal
influence. There was a general failure on the part of funders to see that the transitional
paradigm (which envisions sequential democratic transition) may not apply to those
states stuck in the gray zone of semi-authoritarianism, thus necessitating new approaches

to working with their domestic civil societies. Third, NGOs face a number of challenges
as well. They need to broaden public participation, assure their financial sustainability
(once donors have left or decreased support) and become less detached and disdainful of
the inherently political element in their functioning.
The challenges that both Western aid structures and local NGOs are facing
highlight the importance of embeddedness in tackling many of the enumerated problems.
As the review has noted, in the field of democratization a middle ground (so-called civil
society realism) has begun to emerge. However, it is not clear whether and to what
extent the approach considers embeddedness as one of the key components for civil
society development. What is certain that if the challenge of organizational
embeddedness is not addressed by Western donors, any proposed solutions will treat the
symptoms rather than the cause of the disease. For instance, foreign grant-giving
organizations will not be able to determine what works and what does not, unless their
grant recipients are sufficiently embedded into the domestic landscape to possess some
"issue sensitivity." If it is absent, donors are likely to learn about the ethnocentrism of
their programs only post-fact. The same applies to local NGOs. None of the objectives
(be it sustainability, broader participation or cooperation with political parties) can be
achieved if they are not willing to assess their implantedness on the domestic scene. To
sum it up, assuring a higher level of embeddeness represents one (by no means the sole)
of the major solutions to the dilemmas of grant-giving faced by Western donors and the
challenges of internal development encountered by NGOs in CEE and the former Soviet
Union.
The dissertation has begun with the general hypothesis that a greater level of
domestic embeddedness made NGOs more effective during the "color revolutions." It

has been clear from the beginning that the concept of embeddedness is vague and may be
hard to measure. The issue is further complicated, because my research seeks a more
nuanced approach, by asserting that NGOs should have a certain degree (not the
maximum or the ideal level) of implantedness. This is why, the literature review has
become helpful in delineating the notion of embeddedness more precisely. Based on the
available findings, three propositions that refine my key concept should be put forward.
First, the better an NGO is able to relate itself to the political society, the more
embedded it becomes in the domestic landscape. To forestall a possible criticism, it is
critical to emphasize that this work does not advocate for NGOs to become an arm
(hidden or visible) of the state and political parties. However, the literature also makes it
abundantly obvious that civic groups must set up mechanisms for regular interactions
and viable cooperation with political actors. Second, the more connections an NGO
establishes with the society at large and its members, the more embedded it becomes. As
noted before, such connections may take a variety of forms - from pursuing inclusive
membership strategies to raising general public awareness of the "third sector." Third,
the more domestically tailored is the external involvement, the more it helps NGOs
become embedded. In the end, it should be noted that though these hypotheses provide
better ways to define embeddedness, they continue to require much more specific
indicators as well as the general framework to be placed within in order to yield
meaningful results. Coming up with these is the task of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER II
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The goal of this chapter is to elaborate the research methodology that will be
used to test our key hypotheses, gather the necessary data, establish proper causal
relationships, and, ultimately, provide insights into the main research question. To this
end, it will begin by outlining the major parameters of our research design that include a
research question, key hypotheses and definitions, a number of leading sub-hypotheses,
the indicators to measure them, and the benchmarks to evaluate their performance. The
second part of this chapter will describe how the accumulated information will be
presented and analyzed. Drawing heavily on the theoretical recommendations by King,
Keohane and Verba in "Designing Social Inquiry,"1 the work aims to address the
methodological advantages of case studies as a research tool as well as the issues of
descriptive and causal inference.

RESEARCH DESIGN
This dissertation has been spurred by the unexpected turn of events that took
place in Ukraine and Georgia in 2003 and 2004. Both countries were scheduled to have
elections - parliamentary in Georgia and presidential in Ukraine. Both were becoming
progressively semi-authoritarian with the aging presidents willing to resort to any
measures to maintain their hold on to power. Though fraud, voter intimidation and

1
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

opposition harassment were widely expected, few predicted the magnitude of a popular
response that swept away the regimes of Leonid Kuchma and Eduard Shevarnadze.
Grappling with the surprising nature of these events, many heaped praise on the socalled "people's power" that was able to bring masses to the streets and sustain their
involvement in what were quickly labeled as the "color revolutions." Civil society
groups like Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia became the cause celebre for Western
media and academics. The more positive were the assessments of such groups, the more
alarmed were authoritarian rulers elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and around the
world.
It seems that by the middle of 2005 (after the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and
the bloody riots in Uzbekistan's Andijon region), the argument that civic groups are the
driving force behind peaceful "color revolutions" has become a widely accepted fact by
Western democracy promoters and post-Soviet domestic elites alike. The former
concentrated on how "color" experiences can be replicated in other corners of the world,
while the latter got serious about suffocating any existing civic groups that were even
remotely reminiscent of Kmara, Pora or Otpor. As indirect recognition of the influence
exerted by youth organizations, the Russian government sought to preempt any brewing
dissent by establishing a fiercely statist and anti-Western nationalist movement "Nashi"
(Ours).3 The efforts took such a systematic, cross-country character that in a year the
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American National Endowment for Democracy (NED) spoke of a worldwide backlash
against democracy promotion.4
At the same time, few questions were asked as to what made the civic groups in
Ukraine and Georgia so effective. This neglect of deeper investigation is especially
puzzling, given a vast array of the past assessments,5 which decried the civil societies in
those and other post-Soviet states as weak, overly dependent on Western aid and unable
to relate to the local populace.
The analysis that this dissertation will perform is critical not only for our
understanding of contemporary political events in transitioning societies, but also for the
evolution of major theoretical debates in the field. By stressing the primacy of civil
society's involvement in "color revolutions," it lends substantive support to the
participatory approach,6 confirming the leading role of ordinary citizens over domestic
elites in democratic transformations. At the same time, because the research is focused
on the specific features, which enhance the effectiveness of civic groups, it contributes to
the scholarly discussion7 on the merits and weaknesses of civil society as well as its
connections to the political and societal realms. Finally, the research suggests how the
particular circumstances of "color revolutions" can enhance our general appreciation of
democratic transitions.
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Research question and content choices
To rectify the discrepancy between previous assessments of post-Soviet civil
societies and their actual performance during the "color revolutions," my dissertation
asks a basic research question: What made the NGOs under consideration effective
during those events? I hypothesize that the more embedded an NGO was in the domestic
social and political landscape, the more successful it was during those events. My work
refines the existing arguments on the impact of civic groups in peaceful democratic
transitions, by pointing to embeddedness as one of the core ingredients in their success.
If this hypothesis holds true, it will have significant ramifications on how the external
and internal promotion of civil society ought to be pursued. The criteria that measure
nascent civil societies by the number and variety of established NGOs may need to be
abandoned in favor of assessing how many of them possess the precise characteristics
that make nonprofits more "native" (i.e. better embedded) in their host countries.9
Before proceeding further, it is important to explain a set of five major choices
that the study had to make at the very beginning. The first deals with organizational
embeddedness, as opposed to other characteristics of NGO functioning. Because
advanced democracies have a long tradition of accepting civil society in its own right,
the notion of embeddedness is often taken for granted. It is natural to think that those
NGOs, which exist, are an integral part of their societies. Otherwise, they would simply
disappear or be replaced by others. Unfortunately, this may not be the case in those
countries where the state had been historically powerful, and citizen activism and
initiative were greatly discouraged, if not suppressed at all. Thus, embeddedness from

9

For more information about the new paradigm on promoting civil society (so-called civil society realism), see Ottaway and
Carothers, Funding Virtue.

72
being a moot point in Western democracies turns into a paramount concern for emerging
civil societies.
The second choice, to look specifically at the color revolutions, was dictated by
two reasons. One was an obvious discrepancy between the theoretical analyses and the
empirical evidence mentioned in the other paragraph - the civil societies that have been
described as feeble and detached performed so well during the revolutions. The other lies
in the fact that "color revolutions," as a rapid democratization event, represent a critical
instance where the role and utility of civil society were put to the ultimate test of
viability and can thus be assessed more precisely.
The third choice revolved around selecting particular cases to review. By early
2007, what can be described as a "color revolution" has occurred in at least 4 countries Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The decision to focus on Georgia and Ukraine
was based on their geographical proximity, shared Soviet past, chronological closeness
of the revolutions and developmental similarities of their civil societies. On the first two
counts, the two countries are neighbors, sharing the Black Sea border. This and their
Soviet legacy mean that they are facing similar sets of economic and political
challenges.10 The Rose and the Orange revolutions also occurred within a year from each
other - November 2003 in Georgia and December 2004 in Ukraine. Based on the extant
observations,11 it is more likely that these transitions will have more in common than, for
instance, the events in Serbia and Kyrgyzstan. Hence, by studying these similar cases,
my research will be able to test whether embeddedness was a critical variable in the
success of civil society groups during the "color revolutions." The dissertation does not
10
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consider intentionally the instances where a "color revolution" was predicted, but either
did not occur or would have otherwise failed. As the existing studies indicate, other
factors that are not related to civil society development might be at play in those
situations.1
The fourth dilemma pertained to the type of NGOs that ought to be researched.
The review13 of the existing works on the Orange and Rose revolutions pointed to the
three types of organizations that were present in both states - those that organized public
protests (Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia), those that performed election
monitoring (CVU in Ukraine and ISFED in Georgia) and those that conducted exit polls
(the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine and Gorby Polling Services, among
many others, in Georgia). Given the inherent limitations of any research, it was decided
to concentrate on the first two groups and exclude the last one. The choice is also
theoretically supported, because Pora, Kmara, CVU and ISFED can be viewed as classic
civic groups, whereas DiF and Gorby are closer to think tanks than pure NGOs and have
a host of problems pertinent only to that type of organizations.
The final choice was made in regard to the timeframe of my study, which would
be 1991-2003 for Georgia and 1991-2004 for Ukraine. It begins in the year when the
Soviet Union collapsed and both states gained their independence and ends with the
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eruption of the "color revolutions" - November 2003 in Georgia and December 2004 in
Ukraine.
Alternative hypotheses
At this point, it would also be useful to suggest a couple of alternative
hypotheses. The first posits that the more financial support anNGO received from the
West, the better it performed during a "color revolution." It merely tests the prevalent
assumption of the post-Soviet elites that without Western assistance, domestic groups in
Ukraine and Georgia would either not be able to emerge or simply die out. It is important
to draw a difference between the understanding of embeddedness that this dissertation
embraces and the relationship that the rival hypothesis asserts. As seen later, one of our
indicators for embeddedness indeed includes external involvement (and external
financial support in particular). However, this work believes that there is more to NGOs'
strength than just Western funding, and other measurements of embeddedness (e.g.
constituency, leadership, internal normative transfers) clearly emphasize this point. To
sum it up, the first alternative hypotheses assumes that the major thing NGOs need to be
effective on the post-Soviet space is a continuous and rather generous supply of foreign
funds.
The second rival hypothesis suggests that the tighter an NGO was allied to the
political force that fought against the ancien regime, the better it performed during a
"color revolution." As in the previous case, a distinction should be pinpointed between
this assertion and the viewpoint promulgated by the dissertation. What the former does is
lends support to the elite-driven approach on democratization, which believes that
societal elites assume the primary role in ensuring a democratic transition, whereas
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domestic civil society is given a supportive role. According to it, Pora and Kmara
attached themselves to "Our Ukraine" and the National Movement respectively,
becoming their youth wings. Contrary to that, the dissertation recognizes and appreciates
the relationship between NGOs and political parties as a means to increase their
embeddedness within the society's political landscape. However, in their relations with
political parties embedded NGOs figure as independent (if not always equal) partners.

Major definitions
Because the research frequently evokes such terms as civil society, "color
revolution," embeddedness and an NGO, it is worth to define their more precise
meaning.
Civil society is "an intermediate associational realm between state and family,
populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation
to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their
interests or values."15 At the same time, an NGO is a non-governmental organization that
channels citizens' demands (interest articulation), serves as an alternative provider of
public services and/or performs the functions of a government watchdog. NGOs possess
five common characteristics.16 First, they are an organized entity, meaning that groups
need to have a certain organizational structure (leadership and membership) and a statute
(whether formal or informal) that guides their activities. Second, because NGOs are not
an arm of the government, they are considered a private entity. However, (and this is
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where the third feature becomes important) they cannot be equated with businesses
because of their not-for-profit status. All the revenues collected by NGOs from the
public or received through charitable grants must be used to fulfill their main mission by
supporting the issues or providing the services it was set up to do. Fourth,
nongovernmental organizations are expected to be self-governing, which implies the
presence of a governing or executive board that oversees a bigger picture of
organizational activities and makes sure an NGO stays on track. Finally, membership in
NGOs is voluntary. This substantially differentiates them from the government (where
the right for participation is legally regulated and can be accorded or mandated based on
certain pre-requisites, like citizenship) or the business sector (where involvement is often
determined by contractual obligations).
Though the provided definitions of civil society and NGOs closely mirror each
other, a difference between the two should be illuminated. As the previous section - the
literature review - has noted, civil society represents a broader philosophical concept
that includes not only NGOs, but also other numerous other entities that do not have to
possess the five NGO features outlined above. In other words, civil society in general
may be much less formal, but much more loose and spontaneous in its structure and
nature. On the contrary to that, NGOs are a fairly specific manifestation of civil society
that has reached sufficient maturity to yearn for formalization. As a result, it is much
harder to assess the vibrancy and level of development of a civil society because of its
all-encompassing and resistant to the precise definition nature. To paraphrase the famous
saying, you often know a vibrant civil society when you see it or when you engage in
extensive research on its indirect indicators, such as people's attitudes that determine
their civic participation. With NGOs, the measurement is less tricky (which is why they
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became the preference of many donors). Mere numerical indicators can highlight
developmental trends, if not the potential strength, of existing non-governmental
organizations.
An NGO is embedded when it is regarded by other major political, civic actors
and target groups within the population as a legitimate element of the internal social and
political landscape. Based on this definition, an NGO should meet three significant and
inter-related standards. First, it needs to represent a specific domestic constituency. A
group that speaks for everyone ends up speaking for nobody, because it is unable to
fulfill one of the key NGO functions - interest articulation. Second, an embedded
nonprofit must possess some domestic authority among influential societal actors politicians, fellow civil society members and, more importantly, its own supporters. Its
level of expertise and the depth and breadth of practical experiences in a particular field
must command respect. Lastly, a civic group should have specific mechanisms to exert
influence. A civic organization that has members and knows its issue, but lacks the
muscle in making a difference, will eventually lose its supporters and the clout among
other actors.
Finally, a "color revolution" is a peaceful experience of democratic transition that
occurs as a result of large-scale public protests against fraudulent elections, conducted by
a semi-authoritarian regime and resulting in its ultimate collapse. It is critical to point to
the distinction between "color" and regular revolutions. The former are self-limiting in
their radicalism. Though they ensure that no return to the past is possible, they (unlike
the French or Bolshevik revolution) do not entail a complete destruction of societal

Note that the dissertation uses interchangeably such terms as embeddedness, implantedness and rootedness.

78
foundations or undertake a total elimination of the ancien elite and its supporters.18 The
color revolutions under our consideration also share several common characteristics.
They took place in states with a semi-autocratic regime whose leader was not only
unpopular* but also unable to consolidate the power and command complete authority of
the government's coercive apparatus. The opposition was united and capable of
mobilizing the citizenry, by conducting ambitious campaigns to register voters and
ensure their participation on the Election Day. A modicum of freedom was given to the
media, which made it possible to inform people about the fraud through election
monitoring and exit poll results.19

Sub-hypotheses and their indicators
Because our major hypothesis talks about embeddedness in rather general terms,
further specifications are needed to ensure adequate empirical testing. That is why, the
dissertation is advancing three sub-hypotheses, which touch directly upon the key
components of organizational implantedness, as well as the indicators to measure them.
First, the better an NGO is able to relate itself to the political society, the more
embedded it becomes in the domestic landscape. To specify political embeddedness, it is
important to consider both its formal and informal components. The formal legitimacy of
NGOs is based on laws and legal guarantees that recognize the distinctiveness of the
nonprofit sector, ensure non-interference by the state, provide balanced mechanisms of
state control and create a propitious environment for nonprofit development. The other
side of political embeddedness lies in informal legitimacy whose nebulous nature is
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harder to measure. In that regard, the study will evaluate the effectiveness of joint NGOparty and NGO-government projects. On the basis of that indicators, it will seek to
classify the nature of cooperation between anNGO and political actors as subservient
(NGOs function as mere attachments to a party or a state), independent (NGOs cooperate
with parties on relatively equal terms) and epiphenomenal (NGOs' cooperation with
parties is insignificant or meaningless).
Second, the more connections an NGO establishes to the society at large and its
members in particular, the more embedded it becomes. For the second sub-hypothesis, it
is important to look at the set of four indicators on social embeddedness - constituency,
internal normative transfers, societal influence and financial sustainability. To evaluate
the constituency of a group, the research considers the characteristics (such as age,
gender, social class, ethnicity and residence) of its members and leaders. It also evaluates
NGOs' recruitment strategies, mobilization and communication capacities. Internal
normative transfers have to deal with how an organization handles the issues of
competency acquisition for its members. Our work reviews whether members have
initial expertise in the field and, if not, how they are provided with in-house training and
retraining services. The analysis will also assess the relevance of internal normative
transfers by considering whether certain training practices and methodologies have been
adopted, adapted or rejected. The third indicator for social embeddedness measures
NGO's societal influence. It first looks at an organization's general relevance that
encompasses the reasons for its emergence, the length of its operation and
external/internal assessments of its effectiveness. Then, the inquiry proceeds to analyze
the relevance of NGOs' goals, in particular a relationship between goals and external
events, and their possible adjustment as a result of the latter. Appropriateness of

activities is the next component of societal influence, which considers a relationship
between goals and activities, between activities and external events, and possible
adjustments of activities due to unfolding events or a change in goals. Attempting to
capture the larger picture of an NGO within a domestic society, the study moves to focus
on its relations with other fellow groups through joint projects. Based on their quantity
and effectiveness, it should be possible to determine the nature of NGO-NGO
interactions as subservient, independent or epiphenomenal. Finally, wider public
involvement is considered by summarizing nonprofits' volunteering practices,
interactions with the media and general public relations. The last in the set of indicators
on social embeddeness addresses a group's financial sustainability. It employs such
metrics as diversity, extent, longevity and regularity of domestic financial support (both
monetary and in-kind), by identifying the number of sources, the percentage of total
funds that they contribute and the chronological length of their availability. In the end, it
should be possible to determine whether the nature of relationship between an NGO and
its domestic supporters is deeply dependent, cooperative, independent or non-essential.
Third, the more domestically-tailored the external involvement, the more it helps
an NGO become embedded. For this sub-hypothesis on external influence, two
indicators are reviewed. The first has to do with external norrnative transfers, which are
attempts by foreign actors to transmit their methodology to NGO members in other
states. Here we consider the extent of cooperation with foreign NGOs and INGOs,
whether such organizations offer training and re-training services, how often they do so
and what issues they cover. A step further is then taken by evaluating the relevance of
such normative exchanges, in particular whether proposed methodologies and programs
were adopted, adapted or rejected. The other indicator assesses the external mechanisms

81
of influence that include the diversity, extent and longevity of foreign financial support
and its impacts on the nature of interactions between a donor and a domestic civic group.
To specify those, the dissertation will employ the same types of measurements it uses for
an NGO's domestic financial sustainability.

Index of embeddedness
As this work has noted numerous times, embeddedness is a rather ambiguous
concept. Seeking to address this challenge, we have so far come up with the three sets of
categories that assess embeddedness along several dimensions - societal and political as
well as the influence of external involvement. However, the composite picture of
organizational implantedness will be impossible to obtain without bringing all the
utilized indicators (and the outcomes they produce) together in a meaningful and
comprehensive fashion. To do so, the research will develop an index of embeddedness
that provides numerical measurements for each category and, in the end, strives to
classify NGOs as strongly, moderately, insufficiently or marginally embedded.
Our index will consist of three broad categories that correspond with the major
sub-hypotheses of the study. They deal respectively with societal embeddedness,
political embeddedness and external involvement. Within every category, there will be a
cluster of particular indicators used by the dissertation for its further specification. As a
result of this structure, the research has to address two concurrent challenges - how to
determine the order of the categories and how to assign weight to individual indicators.
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When beginning to decide on the placement of the categories, the question of
prioritization immediately arises. According to the index,20 societal embeddedness
comes prior to political one and is accorded the highest number of points. The ranking
decision was based on numerous theoretical definitions, which suggest that civil society
occupies a space distinct from the state and the family. It is precisely because of its
location within the domestic society and apart from the state apparatus that the societal
aspect of implantedness assumes the primary role. Arguing from the reverse, political
embeddedness cannot come ahead of societal one, as it will imply a certain degree of
secondarity that civil society has in relation to the state. To change the order by putting
political implantedness first is not only theoretically flawed, but also empirically
dangerous. NGOs that place the state first inevitably turn into its informal extension (like
GNGOs in China and Russia).21
Among the three categories, external involvement ranks last, because it plays an
assisting, not determining, function in anchoring NGOs in the societal and political
contexts. Under normal circumstances, foreign advocacy groups and donor organizations
design their involvement in a way that strengthens the domestic standing of a civic
group, by providing it with additional normative and/or financial clout. If nonprofits feel
more at home with external partners than their societal constituencies and domestic
political structures, they run the risk of turning into local branches of the former.
The second step in creating our index is to assign relative weight to the specific
indicators that compose each of the three broad categories. The challenge is compounded
by the requirement that a total amount of points assigned to separate indicators cannot
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alter the overall ranking of a category within which they are located. In other words,
after all points assigned and added up, societal embeddedness should come first,
followed by political embeddedness and then external influence.
Among the indicators, constituency will be given the highest number of points
(16). Multiple sources in the literature review note that a group will not be able to
advance from a loose to more formal stage unless it has a clearly identified pool of
members and leaders able to guide it. Therefore, the presence and strength of
constituency are the backbone without which further embeddedness is unimaginable in
any shape or form.
Societal influence and informal legitimacy rank second and are equal in
importance, which accords each of them with 14 points. Both indicators represent the
pillars of different contextual dimensions when it comes to embeddedness. The first
(societal influence) reflects the relationship between an NGO and people at large. The
second (informal legitimacy) relates the organization to the political structure of a host
society. To put it differently, their position is determined by the classical understanding
of civil society, as being distinct (i.e. a part of the non-political22 sphere), yet connected
to the political realm (thus the link to informal legitimacy).
Formal legitimacy is next, because it sets up a legal framework, which, in turn,
demarcates an allowable space for NGOs to function. In the index, it is worth 13 points.
Given the importance of the rule of law in building nascent democracies, it would be
logical to wonder why formal legitimacy has not been placed ahead of societal influence
and informal legitimacy in terms of its vitality for civil society development. The answer
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to this justified concern is two-fold. First, NGOs and other types of civil groups may
have substantial influence within their host society and among its political actors even if
there is no sufficient legal framework for their activities. For instance, the Ukrainian
Rukh or Baltic National Fronts emerged in the Soviet society, which viewed public
organizations as a mere informal attachment to the Communist Party, and flourished
before the infamous "6 th Article"23 of the Soviet Constitution was abolished. The
opposite seems also true - many post-Communist states have strong legal frameworks
with NGOs that do not command any public influence or political respect, because they
are inherently weak on their own or are purposefully weakened by the state from behind
the scenes. As our literature review points out, many NGOs in Central Asia were
epiphenomenal, even preceding the legal crackdown on civil liberties by the executive
branch.24 To sum up the point, formal legitimacy is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for embeddedness.
Domestic financial sustainability comes fourth with the total of 12 points. The
indicator sheds light on the NGOs' ability to harness financial resources that assure their
ultimate capacity to survive. It is located after formal legitimacy, as the latter is a prerequisite for a civic group to be able to raise funds legally and over a long period of time.
However, it is also ahead of such two critical measurements as internal and external
normative transfers. The placement thus begs a question of whether this work puts
money before ideas, by rating funding as the issue of a greater magnitude than the
normative ends it is used to serve. Though the research acknowledges the importance of
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ideas,25 it continues to press forward with a more pragmatic approach, which posits that
without sufficient funds NGO's ideas - no matter how powerful - will never get
sufficient traction. Furthermore, regardless of how effective and innovative an
organization is in processing internal and external normative transfers, it will be helpless
without funds to implement them through in-house trainings or inter-NGO exchanges.
As already mentioned, in the index of embeddedness internal and external
normative transfers weigh less (11 points each) than financial sustainability. Their
primary importance is to indicate the capacity of NGOs to be normatively open and
flexible. External mechanisms of influence (which deal with donors' financial support)
are accorded the least weight on our index (9 points), since they mostly play a financially
supportive role in NGO's existence. One can challenge our ranking by pointing to the
discrepancy between theory and reality in this particular case. In the real life, NGOs in
emerging democracies are far more dependent on the Western sources of funding and
should be arguably assigned a greater number of points to reflect that fact. To respond to
this suggestion, it is important to note that this works intends to analyze what kind of
external involvement would help NGOs to be more embedded, not what kind of foreign
aid and dependency patterns exist right now. Therefore, the natural attention is on how
external mechanisms of influence should work, not how they are working. It is perhaps
because the presently big footprint of foreign donors seems so problematic in terms of
long-term maintenance and so troublesome in regard to its detrimental impacts on NGO
development that we downplay foreign assistance in the index of embeddedness.
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The final task in putting together any index is to determine how to match numeric
measurements with their qualitative equivalents. In the process of doing so, the
dissertation bases its assessments on the expectations of performance, as outlined in the
section below. NGOs that are close to the end or ideal state of embeddedness will score
90 percent or above and be considered highly embedded. Those organizations that meet
the expected outcomes will get 65-89% and be classified as moderately embedded. Civic
groups that fail one or more of the outlined expectations will receive between 40-64
percent and should be viewed as insufficiently embedded. Finally, nonprofits with largescale failures will obtain below 39 percent and be categorized as weakly or marginally
embedded.
Both success and failure are easy to spot. What is harder to do is to estimate their
extent and magnitude. The description of expected outcomes that is to follow will try to
do just that through a sequence of three steps. It will portray how NGOs are expected to
perform (something that would earn them a moderate level of rootedness). It will then
tell what an ideal state of things would be - the situation that will make nonprofits highly
embedded. And it will conclude by describing the process of disembeddedness, which
catalogues the flaws and failures that, depending on their gravity, would make an
organization moderately, insufficiently or marginally implanted.

Expected outcomes
Before the actual process of data gathering begins, it is necessary to elaborate
what outcomes can be expected for each of the given sub-hypotheses and within the
suggested indicators. Undertaking this task has a three-fold advantage. First, it will
enable us to recognize a success when we see it. The avalanche of information, which
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large-scale research projects like this tend to generate, brings the danger of inadvertently
omitting serious observations. Second, the specifications of outcomes will pre-set a level
of performance anticipated from our indicators in advance. This will diminish a possible
researcher bias when the significance of some indicators (usually those that have
received more confirmation) is over-emphasized at the expense of the others that were
either rejected or scantily confirmed. Third, the description of the end condition for each
indicator should decrease the propensity of considering the best outcome as the only one
possible to confirm the hypothesis.
Our first sub-hypothesis underscored the importance of political embeddedness
and proposed formal and informal legitimacy as the indicators to measure it. In terms of
the former, the research expects that embedded NGOs will reside in a state that has a
separate legislation on nonprofit organizations, recognizes their differences from parties,
businesses and governmental structures, and provides a favorable tax environment for
their activities and clear mechanisms of state control over them. State's formal
acceptance of NGO legitimacy will also be seen in such secondary indicators as a high
status of civil liberties (as measured by annual Freedom House reports) and the absence
of highly publicized instances of state-sponsored NGO abuse. The latter will be
manifested through the evidence of common cooperative efforts (such as projects,
programs or initiatives) that an NGO undertakes with parties and the government. Such
efforts should also receive positive assessments from the actors involved as well as
possible external observers. The end, or ideal, state of political embeddedness would be
the situation when an NGO is accorded a distinct place in the society, respected and
engaged by the state and political parties.
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The sub-hypothesis on social embeddedness considers such indicators as
constituency, internal normative transfers, societal influence and financial sustainability
to determine whether an NGO is implanted in the environment, in which it has to
operate. As far as the issues of constituency are concerned, an embedded NGO would
have a diverse and inclusive membership, by allowing people of different social classes,
ages, genders and ethnicities to join it in different capacities and at different stages of an
NGO's existence. It will also welcome potential "black sheep" - individuals whose
socio-economic characteristics do not match those of a typical member of that NGO. The
leadership of a rooted civil society organization will be socially diverse, horizontal (with
few layers of authority separating leaders from regular members) and open to feedback.
It will be elected on a rotating basis and accountable to the organizational base through
reports and board oversight. An embedded NGO will conduct its recruitment campaigns
frequently, publicize them widely and offer a wide range of internal positions. In that
group, organizational communication would usually take place through multiple
channels with a constant and predictable frequency in exchanging information. Thus,
ideas are able to flow effectively bottom-up (from members to the leadership) and topdown (from leaders to members). Because of well-developed recruitment and
communications techniques, an embedded organization is expected to have a clear plan
for mobilization, which accounts for possible contingencies and is known to all of its
members. In the end, such an NGO becomes an internally democratic and externally
open entity.
In terms of the second indicator - internal normative transfers, a nonprofit is able
to attract people with relevant expertise and provide novices with an initial battery of
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trainings as well as regular (once every organizational cycle ) re-training activities on
mission-specific and general issues. This will be the evidence that trainings are
successful as an internal process of organizational development. The evidence of
trainings' external success envisions members having sufficient skills and knowledge to
perform their duties with competence, as evaluated by an NGO itself and other external
sources. To identify whether an internal normative transfer has been successful a set of
three measurements has been put forward. If an NGO follows a methodology closely
(with or without minor changes), it is said to have adopted the normative transfer. If an
organization decides to alter some details (add new elements, modify or discard old
ones) to address various local specifics, but does not change the central purpose of a
methodology, this serves as the evidence of adaptation. Finally, if a methodology is
discarded without pilot-testing or after initial failure, it lends proof to its rejection.
According to the ideal scenario, a firmly embedded NGO should be able to train its own
members effectively as well as evaluate the relevance of its methodology independently.
Speaking of societal influence that an implanted civic group should have, five
points ought to be noted. First, this NGO would fulfill a niche by providing absent or
underperformed services within the host society. It has existed for a period of at least
five years28 and received internal and external assessments29 that confirm its positive
impacts in a qualitative and/or quantitative manner . Its goals correspond with societal
needs and take into account unfolding events, and its pursued activities are directly
connected to the stated goals and external circumstances. At the same time, neither goals
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nor activities remain static. Regular adjustments of both take place to reflect changes in
the domestic situation as well as the outcomes of previous programmatic and
organizational experiences. An embedded civic group stays active within the NGO
community, by taking part (as an equal partner) in domestic NGO coalitions that
advance the same or similar issue. Furthermore, such experiences receive positive
feedback from all participating sides and external observers. Finally, a rooted nongovernmental organization offers an ample of opportunities for wider public
involvement. It employs volunteers and interns, conducts media outreach through a
variety of means31 and, if needed, organizes public actions32 to attract attention to its
cause. In the end, an embedded nonprofit is viewed as a natural participant in societal
processes.
The last indicator of societal embeddedness deals with financial sustainability. A
civic group that has a considerable level of implantedness relies on several (at least 2)
types of domestic sources, which include private citizens, businesses, government and
NGO coalitions, for monetary support and in-kind donations in its annual activities. The
end state would therefore be a nonprofit that has medium-term sustainability (i.e. the
ability to survive without external support beyond one year).
The third sub-hypothesis deals with the questions of external influence that
comes as a result of normative transfers and financial support. It is reasonable to expect
that an embedded NGO would cooperate with foreign non-government and donor
organizations by participating in joint projects, international events and NGO coalitions.
Furthermore, all the involved sides and external observers will share positive
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experiences about such instances of cooperation. Though NGO members may be initially
trained by foreign experts, they will show decreasing reliance on additional foreign
training, as the organization becomes more implanted. At the same time, members'
skills, knowledge and, more importantly, the capacity to train themselves or identify
their training needs will be positively evaluated by their key donors. In reality, this
capacity means that an NGO requests external training rather than is ordered to have one
by a foreign donor. When considering the relevance of external normative transfers, such
as trainings and seminars, the dissertation applies the same set of criteria that was
previously used to assess the impact of domestic educational and training activities.
To sum it up, the final state for an embedded NGO would be when normative
transfers take place in a more natural setting, where it becomes an active partner in the
cause, rather than a passive recipient of advice. As our literature review has shown,
foreign funding is a thorny subject for many civic groups. It can be foreseen that an
organization that has attained a significant level of embeddedness will use a diverse pool
of foreign funders (at least two33) and exhibit progressively decreased reliance on
external grants. Furthermore, even those grants, for which it applies, will seek funding
for specific projects rather than broad organizational support as well as complement
external grants with domestic contributions. For an embedded NGO, the donor-grantee
relationship moves from subservient to cooperative. Ideally, foreign funding becomes
one of the many means to support that NGO's existence.
While all the preceding materials have described what an embedded organization
will look like, it is also important to consider the opposite - the process or the state of
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disembeddedness. Doing so will help us evaluate more accurately how far- from the ideal
or the moderate stage of implantedness anNGO under our consideration is.
In terms of its relations with a government and state's political structure, a
disembedded nonprofit would possess little informal legitimacy, commanding no respect
among parties and state officials. The existing instances of cooperation, if any at all,
would be infrequent and superficial, with the sides feeling obliged to engage for the sake
of public relations and image rather than at their own volition. Under these
circumstances, the existing legal framework is either insufficient in offering civil society
an adequate space to develop or underutilized by nonprofits themselves to get enough
strength. A marginally embedded civic group would thus be relegated to a peripheral
status in the society and viewed by major political actors as a pariah.
In regard to societal embeddedness, such an organization will have a small pool
of members, most of whom derive some material benefit from their involvement. Its
leadership structure will be hierarchical and resistant to change. Furthermore, it may
seek to limit opportunities for expertise acquisition for the fear that its monopoly on
power might be contested/Though a disembedded NGO is able to evaluate the relevance
of internal normative transfers, the process of doing so will be much slower and much
more covert. As a result of internal secrecy, many of its activities will quickly become
obsolete and bear little connection to the original goals and/or external events. In the
end, a weakly embedded nonprofit will not be known beyond a handful of NGOs
working in the same field34 and will not be able to secure necessary domestic financial
support for its activities.

Even with those, the relations are more likely to be competitive than cooperative, because of the fight for funds.
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Finally, the nature of external involvement will be different for a marginally
implanted civic organization. Instead of serving as short-term assistance, foreign aid will
become an irreplaceable crutch. Because an NGO does not have a pool of trusted
members and responsive leaders, it is more likely to accept any ideas and pursue their
implementation with a lot of vigor and very little critical analysis of their applicability in
order to prove its loyalty to the funder. The result will be a slew of ill-conceived
initiatives that retard the progress and trivialize the goals in a specific issue area. Without
significant domestic funding sources, a nonprofit would become exclusively dependent
on foreign grants.
A marginally embedded non-governmental organization will have few, if any,
connections with the political society and the domestic public within which it has to
operate. It is also quite common for an entity like this to look down upon both, claiming
that politics and politicians are too "dirty" and too removed from the high ideals of
civicness to deal with and the public is too uneducated in civic manners to involve in
NGO's intricate internal workings. A disembedded nonprofit is glad to cooperate only
with a pool of foreign donors, which provide it with financial support and
unquestionable normative guidance. It is thus unsurprising that in the society such civic
groups will be perceived as "foreign agents" that come and fade at the behest of their
overseas benefactors.
It is pertinent to finish our discussion about embeddedness, by concentrating on
the natural state of affairs that a regularly embedded NGO would find itself in on a daily
basis. The necessity to do so stems from the danger of taking the index too far or
perceiving its classification too literally. The capacity to categorize nonprofit
organizations according to their level of rootedness may inadvertently lead one to
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assume some statism - once the ideal state of high embeddedness is attained, an NGO
does nothing, but rest on its laurels. This vision would be not only oversimplified, but
also erroneous at the core. Like many social processes, embeddedness is neither final nor
permanent. Instead, NGOs - mature and new alike - have to grapple and balance
continuously the key dimensions of embeddedness. The dilemmas of how to interact
with political parties without being swallowed by them or how to attract new generations
of citizens to support an old cause (which by then has been extensively redefined), or
how to cooperate with international partners in advancing shared goals, while
maintaining NGO's own identity, remain at the forefront of every nonprofit's concerns.
What makes it all different for those organizations that are significantly implanted into
their host societies is the ability to strike the right balance (sooner, rather than latter) by
relying on the acquired experience, innate intuition and knowledge of the local society
and its circumstances, and never-ending feedback from all the relevant actors that is
available in abundance in highly participatory societies.

Defining success
Since the second part of the main hypothesis ties greater embeddedness to more
success during the color revolutions, it is important to specify what success means in this
particular case.
The dissertation advances two indicators of success - function and contribution.
In the first case, we will evaluate whether the four organizations under analysis
performed the function that was expected of them by others and defined by the
organizations themselves during those events. For instance, an election watchdog (like
ISFED or CVU) is supposed to monitor elections, announce the results of its efforts and
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distribute its assessment among relevant political and societal actors. A youth group (like
Kmara or Pora) is expected to mobilize previously passive segments of the population to
vote and to defend their choice. The second indicator deals with an NGO's specific
contribution to the revolutionary process, which may come in four different forms
(which also coincide with the stages of a revolution) - initial mobilization of protestors,
organizing and sustaining large-scale demonstrations, helping to resolve (through legal
or political means) the impasse that generated the revolution.
After assessing embeddedness for each organization, the dissertation evaluates
their performance in the color revolution to determine their success based on the two
indicators outlined above.

Anteceding variables
As the dissertation's first chapter makes it clear, civil society never emerges and
develops in a vacuum. It is, therefore, not possible to analyze the embeddedness of
specific civic groups without considering broadly the variables that shape the milieu for
civil society in general. Based on the review of the extant literature, two of them should
be distinguished.
The first one is political culture that is defined as "the specifically political
orientations — attitudes toward the political system and its various parties and attitudes
toward the role of the self in the system" as well as "the particular distribution of
patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation."35 The
importance of a specific political culture for organizational embeddedness lies in a set of
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behaviors that either encourage or discourage citizens to be involved in wider societal
processes.
Within the three types of political culture, which Almond and Verba identify, the
participant one provides most features that are conducive to wider public involvement.
Its members are oriented both toward input and output mechanisms of the system and
see themselves in the "activist" role. The least amicable to participation is the parochial
culture where people hold no expectations of the political system and/or are deeply
unaware of the political aspects of life. For this culture, most participatory activities
occur within a narrow range of one's family or most proximate community settings. The
subject culture occupies the golden, but rather unhappy middle. Though its members are
aware of specialized governmental authority, they have either a generally passive
attitude toward the system and their role within it or, worst of all, perceive the whole
structure as illegitimate.
The outlined categories enable us to hypothesize that NGOs will be best
embedded in the participant political culture, which encourages various forms of
engagement and draws strong links between civil and political societies. On the other
hand, NGO's embeddedness will vary from moderate to low in subject cultures with the
range being dependent on the extent of people's estrangement from the system or the
strength of their perception that the government is illegitimate. Finally, civic groups will
not be embedded in the states with parochial political cultures, because traditional
societies are prone to expunge any external influence.
Our research will test these hypotheses by looking at the political culture in
Ukraine and Georgia. Using public opinion surveys, we will consider the following set
of indicators - people's attention to politics, their discussion of politics in social settings,
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national pride, trust in government and other state institutions, sense of efficacy, voting,
social/general trust, education, tolerance, a belief in democracy, self-assessment of
government's impact on one's life and strategies to influence it. Citizens in a participant
culture are expected to be more concerned about politics and discuss political matters on
a regular basis in common settings, such as family, friends and work. They believe
government plays a great role in their daily life. They also have a high feeling of national
pride, greater trust toward the state and its institutions (note - institutions, not specific
individuals who may head them at present) and a greater feeling of efficacy. Because
politics matters to them and they believe they can matter in politics, such people have a
belief in democracy and are more likely to vote. Aside from voting, they employ a wide
range of other participatory strategies, like civic involvement, meetings, demonstrations,
legislative petitioning, etc. As a result of civic actvitism, they meet a great variety of
people and become more tolerant of diverse political, social views and lifestyles.
The second critical anteceding variable is the role of the state. Our previous
analysis has noted numerous times of the link that exists between civil and political
societies. It has also been mentioned that where the state historically precedes civil
society, it has the power of shaping the legal, social and political settings within which
the former will have to operate. The hypothesis that comes out of this historical
analysis can be summarized as follows - the more powerful the state, the harder it is for
an NGO to get embedded. In other words, a potent state will not only subsume the space
normally taken by nonprofit organizations, but will also seek to use the mechanisms to
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ensure control over such entities. The dissertation intends to look at two types of
indicators to determine the state's strength.
The first deals with its coercive capacity, more specifically the scope and
cohesion of suppression. If a state is highly repressive (i.e. responding with toughest
instruments to most minute incursions on its authority), the scope is said to be high. If it
is relatively tolerant (i.e. preferring not to interfere unless the absolutely vital interests
are at stake), then the scope is determined as low. The cohesion of coercive powers
depends on whether and to what extent the state is able to induce compliance with its
apparatus. Such powers are high if groups comply immediately (or even preemptively by
not pursuing certain actions) with state demands. However, if individuals and groups are
able to resist and/or successfully avoid the state attempts of coercion, then the level of
cohesion is deemed low.
The second indicator of strength assesses the role of the governing party
organization, by looking at the scope of its infrastructure and its internal cohesion. A
state will be Strong if a governing party has a highly developed infrastructure that is able
to penetrate all layers of societal functioning. Here the analogy with the Communist
Party is pertinent. During its seventy-year hold over millions of Soviet citizens, the party
had legendary omnipresence that included Communist cells in villages, schools,
kindergartens, as well as party supplicants, like Communist pioneers, Komsomol and
obedient trade unions. Wherever you were and whoever you were, the Communist Party
made sure it was somewhere close to you. The example goes to illuminate the
importance of state infrastructure in controlling its populace, observing its mood and
forestalling possible dissent. The opposite is also true - if the government is absent in
37
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certain areas, the vacuum of authority will soon be filled by other actors, including civil
society groups. At the same time, it is not enough for the governing party to be widely
present. It also needs to be internally coherent, by offering significant rewards to party
members and other loyalists to support and promote its policies in their localities. Going
back to the Soviet example, one of the reasons for the country's collapse was a split
within the Communist Party between hard-liners (represented at different times by Yegor
Ligaehev and Vladimir Kryuchkov) and reformers (led by Mikhail Gorbachev). The
high-level divisions manifested themselves at all echelons of the party. In the end, it was
weakened and unable to remain the mechanism of repression it used to be in the past. To
summarize, in reviewing the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, the research will consider to
what extent the regimes of Kuchma and Shevarnadze relied on coercion and how
effective such repression was. It will then assess the role of governing party
organizations in shoring up support for these regimes.
While political culture and the state's role can be labeled as background variables
(because they determine the setting within which NGOs have to seek embeddedness),
Western leverage and domestic elite responsiveness often become ongoing anteceding
factors in the process of embeddedness. Unlike in the previous cases, Western leverage
does not play an unambiguously positive role. On one hand, the presence of Western
pressures can ensure that civil society is given a chance to emerge and develop. Fearing
Western economic and political retributions, state leaders may choose to ease their
pressure on domestic civic groups. On the other hand, too much Western attention and
leverage can isolate NGOs from the rest of their society or, even worse, make them look
as foreign stooges. Though there is a positive correlation between Western leverage and
elite responsiveness, the impact that foreign governments can make is obviously not

limitless. It depends on three sets of variables. The first includes such leverage factors as
state's economic and political vulnerability, the consistency of Western attention and
pressures, and the existence of countervailing powers. The extant research asserts that
the state will be more vulnerable if it possesses any of the five following characteristics:
recently acquired statehood, a hybrid form of democracy, heterogeneous population,
indicators of poor economic performance and post-communist structural deficiencies.
Western impact will be amplified if it is both consistent (i.e. it happens on a regular basis
around predictable issues) and credible (i.e. Western assessments and observers are seen
as not openly supporting a specific domestic constituency).39 However, it may be
severely undercut if it occurs in the region with one or more countervailing powers,
which can offer alternatives to Western support. The second set includes a wide range of
linkages, such as shared history, interconnected economic development and close
geographic proximity.40 All of them will undoubtedly enhance Western impact. Finally,
whether or not national political elites choose to respond to external pressures from the
West depends on their internal cohesiveness, domestic popularity, political upbringing
and a country's previous experiences of domestic unrest.41 If elites are divided from
within, they will be more susceptible to foreign pressures in order to placate the internal
group of moderates. Unpopular governments are also more likely to be responsive, as
they try to avoid giving their domestic rivals another issue to rally around.42
Furthermore, leaders who have matured politically during the Soviet times are more
sensitive to Western criticism because of their intention to be seen as "democrats"
38
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abroad. In the end, domestic leadership will base its responses on the past record.43 If the
instruments of coercion were once used without Western reproach, they have greater
chances of being utilized again on the assumption of a similar Western reaction.
To conclude, the dissertation will consider three anteceding variables - political
culture, the role of state and the influence of Western leverage. The first two set the stage
for NGO's embeddedness. The last frequently intervenes in the process of an NGO
getting rooted within the society. In terms of expected outcomes, the research anticipates
that states with highly participant political culture and restrained mechanisms of coercion
will provide a more favorable climate for NGOs and enhance their chances to become
embedded. It is also speculated that the presence of several leverage factors, the specifics
of elite composition and its domestic standing, and a country's tight linkages to the West
will increase the responsiveness to Western pressures, which aim at helping NGOs to
survive and thrive.

Addressing causality: civil society and embeddedness
It is important to elaborate on the causal link between civil society and
embeddedness in order to avoid making a circular argument, thereby a strong civil
society contributes to greater embeddedness and greater embeddedness contributes to a
strong civil society. In civil societies of developed democracies, there is indeed a strong
inter-linkage between the two phenomena because of the long record of embedded civic
entities (ranging from trade unions to groups on social causes, like the Mothers Against
Drunk Drivers). Such circularity is, however, absent in developing democracies because
NGOs do not have a long record of existence. In many of such states we still deal with
43

Bunce and Wolchik.

nonprofit organizations of the first wave that were set up in the mid-1990s. Therefore,
the natural mutual enrichment - where strongly embedded NGOs make the whole civil
society more in touch with the domestic landscape and a firmly rooted civil society will
push NGOs to become more implanted simply to stay afloat and be competitive with
others - is absent in the former Soviet Union because most nonprofit groups are still
weak and the civil society in general does not have a history of being truly independent
from the state.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The reliance on case studies to investigate the notion of domestic embeddedness
brings a number of methodological advantages to our analysis. First, as a research
approach, case studies are believed to be better suited for exploring complex phenomena
that are difficult to model statistically.44 It has been previously noted that embeddedness
managed to escape a careful research scrutiny, precisely because it is so elusive in its
manifestations. When NGOs are well implanted in their prospective domestic societies,
embeddedness is implicitly assumed. When they are weak and detached, researchers
choose to pay attention to other more perceptible problems (such as NGO's weak
fundraising strategies, bad relations with parties, or an apathetic public), which are easier
to track down. Second, the ease study approach is useful in studying embeddedness as a
conceptual innovation, because the engagement of theory and a close analysis of cases
bring an unusual capacity to see the general in the particular.45 From the theoretical
perspective, this dissertation brings together the accumulated knowledge of two fields 44
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democratization and civil society. It combines them to flash out the hypotheses on how
embedded civic organizations fit in democratic transformations. On the practical side,
this research takes a step further by looking at the two events of rapid democratic
transition to see to what extent embeddedness, as a theoretical construct, impacted the
role of NGOs in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia.
In the end, the insights gained from these cases will be used to refine the initial
theoretical speculations on NGO embeddedness and democratization, thus enriching
both scientific fields from which they were derived.

Method and data collection tools
The dissertation will use the method of controlled comparison that collects data
on the same variables across units with a small number of cases.46 For this purpose, it
has defined the concept of embeddedness and developed a specific set of indicators that
will be tested separately, but consistently, for two non-governmental organizations in
Georgia and Ukraine. The following four data collection instruments would be utilized in
the process of data gathering.
First, the research will conduct participant interviews with leaders and members
of the NGOs under consideration to get first-hand perspectives on their experiences as
well as their views on the NGO's embeddedness and the stature of the domestic civil
society in general. Second, expert interviews will be undertaken to obtain independent
evaluations that would serve two concurrent purposes. On the one hand, they would
supplement the information available from primary participant interviews, by providing
additional detail. On the other, they may serve as a means to diminish the interviewer
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bias, by offering alternative viewpoints and interpretations on the same issue. Third, the
study will perform extensive content analysis of relevant NGO materials (such as
websites, public statements, interviews, press releases, etc.) to see whether the private
responses of NGO members and external experts match with the image that anNGO was
projecting in public at the time. Fourth, a wide array of secondary sources will be used to
fill in the gaps that emerge as a result of the interviews and the analysis of primary
sources. Among qualitative secondary sources, the research will rely on reports and
assessments by domestic governments, civil society watchdog groups, foreign and
international donors that consider the performance of our NGOs and/or the civil society
in general. The quantitative instruments will encompass public and NGO surveys that
offer numerical data to strengthen our assessments. It should, however, be noted that the
dissertation will not perform any statistical analyses of its own.
To emphasize, the complementarity of data collection tools is designed to
achieve two critical goals. The first relates to the ultimate task of case studies - "to bring
as much information to bear on our hypothesis as possible."47 Thus, the reader should be
presented with a richer, multi-dimensional and highly nuanced picture of organizational
embeddedness. The second seeks to ameliorate one of the inherent weaknesses of any
qualitative methodology - the possibility that individual biases will greatly skew the
obtained responses. To this end, the dissertation makes it a specific goal to consult
several sources, juxtapose their responses and (in the process of collecting data) pursue
on inconsistencies through additional interviews or subsequent clarifications. Secondary
sources will become another valuable (though mostly indirect) check on the validity of
the acquired information. Therefore, in the end the dissertation should combine a
47
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richness of detail and vividness of personal accounts with the reliability of a scientific
inquiry that provides empirical and theoretical contributions to the field and enables
future replicability.
Research structure
The research structure of this dissertation is a three-pronged approach that closely
follows the model suggested by King, Keohane and Verba in their seminal writing
"Designing Social Inquiry." It begins by summarizing the historical detail. The goal at
this stage is to focus on the outcomes (i.e. the background that led to the success of the
"color revolutions") that I wish to explain and to condense the information at our
disposal. In the process of doing so, the research will review the general development of
civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia and the legal framework that regulates NGO
activities in the two states.
The second step conducts descriptive inference, which is "the process of
understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations."48 The
key objective in this undertaking is to distinguish between systematic and nonsystematic
components of embeddedness as the phenomenon under analysis. In order to do that, the
research will gather data on the set of specific indicators (e.g. constituency, societal
influence, external and internal transfers, etc.) that have been outlined earlier in the
chapter.
The third and final step is about making causal inference. The aim here is to
establish a causal effect, by showing "the difference between the systematic component
of observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic
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component of comparable observations... takes on an other values." It is worth
mentioning that this stage is fraught with difficulties and frequently avoided by
researchers for the fear that presented evidence will not amount to a compelling case of
causality. In our case, the challenge is further complicated by the choice of case studies
as the research methodology, because qualitative techniques are thought to be more
elusive (than their quantitative counterparts) in establishing apparent causal links. To
evaluate whether there is a positive causal relationship between embeddedness and an
NGO's performance in a "color revolution," the dissertation will rely on the index of
embeddedness, which assigns weight specifications to each of our indicators. Therefore,
when summarizing NGO's performance, it will be able to conclude whether an
organization is strongly, weakly or moderately embedded based on a cumulative
weightedc score it obtained on all the indicators.

Design of the case studies
Each case study will consist of two profiles. The first one describes a domestic
civil society in general features. The second looks at the four non-governmental
organizations (two in each country) that are the focus of this dissertation in Ukraine and
Georgia.
Though the primary theoretical reasoning (i.e. the importance of summarizing the
historical content) for putting the portraits of Ukrainian and Georgian civil societies first
has been already presented, a couple of arguments ought to be further highlighted.
First, the composite picture of a national civil society and its members allows
developing a certain background against which the embeddedness of our organizations
49
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can be better judged. For instance, it is not surprising that a more mature civil society is
likely to produce a greater number of highly or moderately embedded nonprofits,
because it provides more propitious conditions that help NGOs connect to people and
political actors. Whereas in weak and underdeveloped civil societies, nonprofits may
need to go an extra mile to achieve the level of embeddedness that their counterparts
elsewhere take for granted.
Second, civil society profiles will enable to make a future descriptive inference as
to whether our NGOs are typical, as compared to the general parameters of a nonprofit in
that country. Furthermore, if they are not typical, the study will be able to pinpoint the
specific features make them stand out in their host societies.
Data will be collected along two lines of inquiry. The first deals with overall
characteristics of a nonprofit sector and looks at such variables as a number of registered
NGOs,50 their regional distribution, average size,51 issue orientation, longevity,52 and
sources of funding. The second seeks to identify general socioeconomic and normative
qualities of NGOs members. For the former, it pays attention to their age, income,
gender, and length of membership. In the latter, the research looks at whether members
of civic groups have a set of pro-democratic attitudes (like a belief in democracy, high
general and institutional trust, patterns of volunteering, voting and greater tolerance as
well as more civic-minded reasons for involvement).
The second part of each case study will deal with two non-governmental
organizations in Ukraine and Georgia. The first type of NGOs includes those that
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organized public protests and received the greatest amount of attention from the Western
media and policy-makers - Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia. The second group
encompasses such nationally famous election monitoring groups as the Committee of
Voters of Ukraine (CVU) and the International Society for Fair Elections and
Democracy (ISFED) in Georgia.
Their description will be divided into two large parts. The first delivers in-depth
evidence of their background and activities that relate to the key indicators of
embeddedness. The other details how organizational implantedness works in practice, by
showing the ways in which the NGOs under consideration have exercised their influence
on a regular basis and during the critical days of a "color revolution."
Therefore, in the first part data will be gathered along four areas - organizational
background, constituency, legitimacy, and external and internal normative transfers. In
the second one, the information will be collected on two dimensions. The first will
include the description of NGO's general programs and activities and how well they
have been able to penetrate the domestic political system and reach the ordinary public
in order to produce the desired outcomes. The second scrutinizes the initiatives that the
NGOs pursued during the color revolutions and their influence on the overall course of
events.
Each case study will conclude by summarizing the state of the national civil
society in Georgia and Ukraine and bringing together the major findings related to the
performance of the four NGOs on the indicators of embeddedness.

CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY: UKRAINE

My dissertation seeks to provide its own answer on what it takes to build a
functioning civil society in a nascent democracy. As Chapter I describes, civil society is
a broad theoretical construct that consists of a variety of formal and informal elements.
Civic groups, which represent interests of diverse constituencies, are the most prominent
formal manifestation of civil society. They are especially important in the former Soviet
republics where a historically produced lack of genuine civic structures is combined with
mass apathy and withdrawal from the public into the private realm of life.1
Under these conditions, in order to strengthen civil society as a whole, it is
necessary to create successful civic organizations. In turn, my work asserts that NGOs'
success is determined by the extent of their embeddedness in a host society. Deeply
rooted civic groups will enhance the capacity of civil society to become a relevant and
independent actor. Such NGOs will be more pro-active and flexible in regard to
changing political and social circumstances. They will also serve as a magnet for
individuals and other elements of civil society to get involved in public life.
With the goal to assess whether embeddedness contributes to the success of civic
groups, this chapter considers how two Ukrainian organizations - Pora and the
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) - participated in the Orange Revolution. The
narrative begins with an overview of the event and the contribution that each group has
made to its success. The description of Pora's and CVU's performance during the
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revolution answers the question - "What did they do at that critical juncture for their
domestic societies?"
However, limiting the analysis to just that would provide only half of the picture.
The other half lies in finding out how those groups became so influential and why they
decided to be (or not to be) involved in the revolution in the first place. Therefore, the
research will proceed to a detailed assessment of the formative period for both civic
associations. Enlarging the scope of inquiry beyond the timeframe of the revolution will
accomplish two goals. First, it will set the context within these organizations had to
operate in 1991-2004 by sketching the profile of the national civil society. Second, the
evaluation of the groups' formative years will trace the process of getting domestically
implanted, which occurs over time.
The final section of this chapter will consider the failures and successes of Pora
and CVU in the Orange Revolution, thereby setting the stage for a more comprehensive
analysis of their embeddedness.

ORANGE REVOLUTION
Stakes and candidates
In 2004, Ukraine was scheduled to have the fourth presidential elections since its
independence in August 1991. Though voters were offered a plethora of contenders, two
Viktors - Yanukovych and Yushchenko - stood a real chance of winning.
The election was significant in marking the end of a decade-long and
increasingly authoritarian rule by President Leonid Kuchma. Having finally decided not

Ill
to seek another (and dubiously legal2) term in office, the Ukrainian president anointed
Viktor Yanukovych as his successor. Hailing from Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine,
Yanukovych represented the interests of the region's and the country's richest oligarch
Rinat Akhmetov and became prime minister in November 2002. He endeared himself to
Kuchma by showing a ruthless style of governance as well as an ability to deliver results,
more prominently an astounding victory of the pro-governmental party "For a United
Ukraine" in the 2002 parliamentary elections in his region. As a presidential candidate,
Yanukovych emphasized the continuity of economic stability and growth that ensued at
the end of Kuchma's second term.3
On the opposite side of the battle, there was Viktor Yushchenko. In 1992-1999 he
served as the Chairman of Ukraine's Central Bank and later in 1999-2000 as prime
minister. Widely credited for a successful introduction of hryvnia (the national currency)
and an economic upturn in the late 1990s, Yushchenko was extremely popular in
Western and Central Ukraine. With Yulia Tymoshenko, a colorful and boisterous critic
of Kuchma, agreeing not to run in favor of Yushchenko, he had no competitor within the
usually fractious pro-democratic camp. His appeal among voters attracted second-tier
oligarchs and former regime loyalists,4 like chocolate baron Petro Poroshenko.

Election campaign
"Dzerkalo Tyzhnia," an influential weekly newspaper, once compared President
Kuchma to the sun that commanded every single object in the Ukrainian political solar
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system to revolve around his interests. From this perspective, the presidential campaign
became the ultimate solar eclipse.
In summer 2004, authorities were anxious about their inability to control the
campaign narrative.5 Yushchenko's rallies were attracting increasingly large crowds,
regardless of media boycott. Foreign and domestic civic groups proved to be a noisy
bunch that was hard to silence. Pora sent jitters with its public protests and recurring
street posters. CVU reports were well read in foreign capitals, particularly in Washington
and Brussels. Few independent media, like the already mentioned "Zerkalo Nedeli,"
online website "Ukrainska Pravda" and small TV station "5 Kanal," were outposts of an
endless critical coverage of the regime.6 President Kuchma felt pressured by foreign
delegations that descended upon the Ukrainian capital to emphasize the link between fair
elections and the international recognition of a future Ukrainian president.7
The campaign took a decisive turn for the worse when on September 5, 2004
Viktor Yushchenko was allegedly poisoned during his dinner with the head of Ukraine's
security services (SBU) Ihor Smeshko.8 Demonstrations erupted throughout the country.
Both campaigns ratcheted up their rhetoric - Yushchenko with the famous slogan
"Prisons to the Bandits!" and Yanukovych with the description of his opponent as
"BUSHenko."
Voting
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The first round of presidential elections took place on October 31,2004 and revealed that
the government had greatly improved its vast expertise in fraud from the 1999 and 2002
campaigns.
Thousands of employees were coerced into voting in advance with absentee
ballots, which were collected by employers to verify the "correct" vote. Ballots of those
who voted at home (often the elderly and the physically handicapped) were switched on
the way to a district polling station. Discrepancies in voter lists were staggering. Citizens
stood hours in line only to find out that their name did not appear on the list. Authorities
relied heavily on the use of "dead souls,"9 who predictably supported the government
candidate. In a massive effort to skew the results, bus tours transported thousands of
people from Eastern Ukraine who used their "absentee coupons"10 to vote several times
at several polling stations. Finally, large-scale irregularities occurred during the vote
count by district commissions and most importantly by the Central Election Commission
(CEC) in Ukraine. A suspension in counting was frequently announced when
Yushchenko threatened to take the lead. The announcement of official results was
delayed by more than a week. On November 10, the CEC informed that with 74.9
percent of the turnout, Yushchenko won the first round by 0.61 percent. He received
39.87 percent and Yanukovych got 39.26 percent of the total vote.11
The campaign continued for another month and a half. However, the tactics of
campaigning and the methods of conducting elections only worsened.12 In the end, on
9
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November 21, 2004 78.7 percent or 29,291,744 Ukrainians voted, surpassing any
previous records of participation. On the night after the elections, extra 1.1 million votes
were thrown in via computer manipulations. The results produced a Soviet-like turnout
and voting in Yanukovych's native Donetsk region. Additional 871,402 votes also tilted
the victory in his favor by 2.9 percent.13

Orange Revolution
By the end of the Election Day, first tents appeared on Khreshchatyk (Kyiv's
central street), and about 25,000-30,000 activists gathered at the Maidan of
Independence (the location of future protests). On November 22, the crowd grew up
between 150,000-300,000 protesters who were mostly from Kyiv.14 Others were arriving
continuously from western and central parts of the country. Demonstrators demanded the
recognition of Yushchenko's victory. During first two nights, a violent crackdown on
demonstrations by authorities was possible. As the New York Time revealed, the option
was hotly debated inside the Kuchma circle. By November 23, the number of people
downtown Kyiv was so large that any use of force was unfathomable. The
announcement of official results by the Central Election Commission the following day
had an opposite effect, by adding the oil of anger and determination to the fire of the
revolution. Sensing a breaking point, Pora activists staged protests at major government
buildings, including Preident Kuchma's dacha. On November 25, international mediators
arrived to Kyiv to monitor negotiations between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. That day
major Ukrainian TV channels lifted state-imposed censorship to cover demonstrations.
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By the end of the week, Ukraine's parliament - the Verkhovna Rada - recognized the
second round as unconstitutional and ordered a re-vote. The situation remained tense as
sides were haggling over precise details of the compromise, and Yanukovych's Party of
Regions attempted to instigate the partition of Eastern Ukrainian oblasts into a SeveroPonetsk Republic.15 On December 3, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled on
Yushchenko's appeal, by invalidating the results of the second round and ordering a revote on December 26. The Orange Revolution has achieved its main goal. The
demonstrations began to dissipate after December 8 when the Ukrainian parliament
approved a package of legislative and constitutional changes that enabled the third round
of voting.

Pora and CVU in the Orange Revolution
Both Pora and CVU participated in the Orange Revolution, but did so in a
different manner. Whereas Pora's input was direct and visible, CVU preferred to provide
informal analytical assistance and strenuously maintain public neutrality.
Pora made three critical contributions. First, it enabled the revolutionary cascade
by brining initial protesters to the streets. The magnitude of immediate support and its
seemingly high level of logistical organization tilted the public perception and persuaded
hesitant politicians to join Yushchenko. The organization showed an astonishing ability
to persuade and mobilize a large student population of the capital. Guided by Pora
activists, young people from Kyiv's two largest schools - Kyiv Shevchenko and Kyiv
Polytechnic Universities - marched downtown to the Maidan of Independence.16 The
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growing crowd of students was quickly joined by Kyiv residents and began producing a
ripple effect elsewhere.
Second, Pora was crucial in sustaining the demonstrations and the level of public
involvement. By setting up and manning the Orange tent city downtown Kyiv, the group
provided a focal gathering point for protestors and ensured that the demonstrations could
not be crushed at night when mass participation dramatically decreased. In the end,
Pora's tent city signified the endurance of protestors, determined to have their grievances
finally addressed.17
Third, thanks to coordination with Yushchenko's bloc "Our Ukraine," Pora's
well-attended and noisy protests at key government buildings instilled a sense of the
opposition's inevitable victory. The national government was brought to a standstill
when the group picketed the Cabinet of Ministers, Central Election Commission and the
Presidential Administration.18 At his own dacha President Kuchma had to bear with a
continuous drumbeat organized by Pora activists who were determined to sap his
confidence. The tactics achieved their main goal - the recognition of the second round of
voting as illegitimate and scheduling a re-vote.
In answering my question about the influence that the Committee of Voters of
Ukraine exerted on the course of the Orange revolution, its Chairman immediately
demanded a qualification on what is meant by the revolution. In his opinion, if one
considers mere protests at Kyiv's central square as the revolution, then the impact was
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minimal. If, on the other hand, one looks at the contributions to the revolution as a social
event, then CVU can boast two achievements.19
One, its long-term observation reports kept Ukraine in the news on the Capitol
Hill and became a powerful tool to exert influence on the Kuchma regime. The other,
CVU was critical to the legal resolution of the revolution's conundrum - i.e. how to
legitimize the ordering of a re-vote. By providing the factual dossiers to Our Ukraine, the
Committee provided much needed substance for the case that the voting on November
21,2004 was manipulated to such an extent as to completely alter the will of Ukrainian
people.20
To sum up the influence of both groups, Pora was crucial in empowering the
politically disenchanted youth, organizing and sustaining its involvement in general and
specific events that occurred during the Orange Revolution. Thanks to the media
coverage, its activists became the face of the protests. Through the meticulous work of
its activists, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine provided a critical coverage of the
election campaign as well as a basis to legally challenge the outcome of the vote.

FORMATIVE YEARS
The majority of available research on the Orange Revolution usually stops at this
point. Even the best analytical pieces do not go further than analyzing general trends and
factors, which contributed to the successful performance of civil society as a whole.
However, such analyses do not reconcile the discrepancy between previously negative
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assessments of civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia and a surprisingly strong
performance of specific civic groups in color revolutions.
The assessment below is designed to redress this problem. Its approach is twofold. The first part will sketch a composite portrait of the Ukrainian civil society, thereby
helping to understand the milieu within which groups like Pora and CVU had to operate.
More importantly, the diagnosis of Ukrainian civil society's pathologies and strengths
will provide a baseline to compare whether (and how) the civic associations under
analysis differed from the rest of non-governmental organizations. The second part will
trace the organizational evolution of Pora and CVU before the Orange revolution in
order to provide evidence on the groups' political and societal embeddedness as well as
the role of external influences.
In the end, both parts are key to answering the dissertation's main hypothesis on
the contribution of embeddedness to the groups' performance in the revolution. If indeed
groups were different from the rest of Ukraine's civil society and the differences can be
attributed to their greater connections with ordinary citizens and political parties, then it
would be possible to assert that embeddedness plays a critical role in facilitating the
maturation of nonprofit organizations in nascent democracies. With this purpose in mind,
we begin by evaluating how the Ukrainian third sector developed in thirteen years since
the country's independence.
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NONPROFIT SECTOR IN UKRAINE
Legal framework and NGO growth
Though Ukraine has a generally liberal legal framework in key areas of nonprofit
activities, some remnants of the Soviet system persist. In the first decade of
independence the growth of new non-governmental organizations was vigorous.
However, their sheer number did not translate into potency or longevity.
The domestic legislation offers a fairly broad definition of a civic organization as
"an association of citizens to satisfy and protect their legal, social, economic, creative,
age, national-cultural, sport and other Common interests."21 NGOs are allowed "to
organize the collection of charitable donations and contributions from individuals and
legal entities, foreign states and international organizations."22 The reasons for NGO
dissolution encompass such widely accepted postulates as calls for violence against
specific societal groups and activities to undermine state sovereignty.23
One of the legislative loopholes is the requirement for NGOs to undergo, what in
fact amounts to, a double registration process. An organization has to be registered by
the Ministry of Justice to confirm its legality and obtain an approval from local police to
qualify for a not-for-profit tax status. The redundancy is obvious - a group has to seek
authorization from two state bodies where one (local police) is a subordinate of the other
(the Ministry of Justice), which has already permitted NGO's existence.
Soviet suspicions about any entrepreneurial activity also permeate the laws that
regulate financial aspects of civic organizations. The Law on the Taxation of Enterprises
is both convoluted and restrictive (if applied unfavorably). First and foremost, under the
21
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concept of "public organizations" it lumps together different types of entities. In the past,
the ambiguity allowed states authorities to sponsor disproportionately state-funded
groups, while claiming credit for supporting civil society as a whole. Second, the
legislation imposes same reporting requirements on small civic groups and big
businesses, even though the former may often have no funds to employ a full-time
accountant.24 Third, most confusion and frustration arise from the legal clause,
prohibiting NGOs to engage in commercial activities without establishing a business
sister entity, unless such activities support an NGO's core statutory goals. This
ambiguity leaves many nonprofits at the mercy of local tax inspections that have the
discretion to classify NGO services as serving their statutory goals (thereby noncommercial) or revoke their nonprofit status. It is not surprising that under these
circumstances 50 percent of organizations wishing to register as not-for-profit were
denied the status by Ukraine's tax authorities.25 Finally, the legislative base before the
Orange Revolution substantially limited the ability of NGOs to receive private donations
from individuals and businesses to 4 percent of their total taxable income.
As a consequence of the abovementioned issues, 50 percent of nonprofit
organizations see legislative obstacles to NGO development and 43-46 percent claim a
lack of experience in implementing the pertinent legislation appropriately.26
When speaking about the growth of the Ukrainian civil society, it is hard to
imagine the striking magnitude of developments. The country began with merely 319
registered civic organizations at its birth in 1991 and accounted for over 23,000 NGOs
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and charity foundations by 1999.27 The State Committee of Statistics reveals a
progressive growth rate of civic groups, with Ukraine's Ministry of Justice registering
between 1,006 (in 1996) and 2,069 (in 2004) new organizations.28
Unfortunately j the official data is less helpful in determining how many of the
registered organizations were able to survive. Because the government tracks only
"birth," but not "death" of nonprofits (when they do not submit their financial reports
and lose their nonprofit status), it is impossible to establish either mean longevity or
survival rate. However, cross-regional evaluations from civil society experts offer a grim
picture - only 10-15 percent of the legally set-up organizations function in the real life.29
Their comments also point to a great level of fluidity within the sector when NGOs
mushroom in the fields favored by foreign donors at the time. To sum up the situation,
by 2004 Ukraine's civil society was only statistically strong.30

Public participation and attitude
The research on civil society development in Ukraine has spoken at length about
low public participation as a powerful impediment to greater civic activism.31 In 19942004, over 80 percent of Ukrainians were not members of any civic group.32 Explaining
their apathy, almost equal portions saw either no need in civil society or indicated being
busy with other problems, or simply not interested.
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A big part of public apathy stems from a deep resentment of organized
participation that dates back to the Soviet times. That is why, even among those who
were active, apolitical modes of involvement dominated over political activism. For
instance, almost twice as many people took part in clubs than in civic organizations and
social movements.33
Lack of participation also informed a dubious public attitude toward NGOs. In
2004 (the year of the Orange Revolution) one half of Ukrainian citizens were, to a
varying degree, distrustful of civic groups, and over one-third found it hard to determine
their attitude at all.34 While the number of people who had no information about civil
society dropped from 24 percent to 14 percent between 2002 and 2004, the percentage of
those who felt uninvited to join NGOs stayed the same at 11 percent.
It is possible to speculate that these predominantly negative sentiments might
have stemmed from either insufficient awareness or the feeling of being excluded from
nonprofit activities. The attitudes change rather dramatically when similar questions are
asked of Ukrainian elites and the informed public. The two groups have a shared
understanding on the proper role of civil society as a government watchdog (for the
public) and as a tool for democratic development (for elites).35

NGO landscape: distribution, structure and capacity
The survey of key indicators for NGO sustainability reveals the picture of a
sector that is going through the pains of growth. That is why, a string of positive
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developments in one area of organizational management is often countered by a
persistent failure in another.
There are some apparent and hidden disparities in the geographical location of
civic groups. Kyiv, the capital, accounts for 15 percent of all organizations. Though at
first blush its share does not appear as large as in other post-Soviet states, like Russia or
even Georgia, it can be suggested that there are more functioning NGOs in Kyiv,
because of their proximity to funding sources (i.e. foreign donors and domestic capital)
and much more propitious economic conditions in the capital. As another confirmation
of this assertion, most NGO projects are implemented at the national and regional levels,
but do not have any local presence.36
In terms of their internal structure, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian
NGOs are permanently established operations with salaried staff. 87 percent employ
from 1 to 7 people, 57 percent have a permanent staff of five individuals on average.37
The majority of NGOs are membership-based organizations that rely on volunteers.
However, their use is disproportionate among different organizations. For instance, 77
percent report working on average with 18 volunteers who spend 8 hours helping their
nonprofits. But, if the outliers (i.e. nonprofits with the highest number of volunteers) are
taken out, the average drops to eight volunteers per organization who contribute 2-3
hours per week. The profile of a typical Ukrainian volunteer includes traditional suspects
- students (56 percent), who seek new experiences, NGO clients (30 percent), who are
invested in the success of their helpers, unemployed (15 percent) and the elderly (11
percent) both of whom, for obvious reasons, have free time.38 NGOs' access to modern
36

EU Commission, 30,32.
Counterpart Creative Center, 21.
38
Counterpart Creative Center, 23.
37

124
technology is rather modest. Though most organizations have an office phone, only a
small minority (11 percent) was connected to the Internet in 2004.39
In general, nonprofit organizations maintain a medium level of internal
capacity.40 Over a half of Ukrainian civic groups survive on the modest budgets that
range from $500 to $5,000. The available information also dispels the myth about a
generously funded nonprofit sector. Only 5-8 percent of organizations in 2002-2004 had
budgets over $50,000. And an extremely thin layer of civic groups (7-10 percent)
enjoyed a comfortable living (by Ukrainian standards) on $20,000-49,000 per year.41
When these statistics are combined, only between 12-18 percent or less than one-fifth of
NGO can be considered financially well off.
As the third sector grew and nonprofits became more mature, their budgetary
priorities began falling in line with the inherent logic of their existence. Whereas in 1996
NGO salaries constituted the largest identifiable expenditure, trailed by service payments
and only then charitable expenses, in 2004 the difference in expenses for charitable
activities and remuneration constituted about one percent, and service payments jumped
to 22.5 percent of the total budget. In another positive development, NGOs became more
transparent by cutting almost half of unidentified "other" expenses, which in 1996
constituted 65 percent of their budgets. Regardless of these improvements, overall
financial auditing for nonprofit organizations remains weak, as over a half of them do
not (or are not able to) release their reports.42

39

Ibid., 25.
Ibid., 63; also see the summary of the USAID rankings in Appendix II.
41
Ibid., 30.
42
Ibid., 27, 29, 53.
40

The analysis further confirms previous assessments on the dependence of postSoviet civil societies on foreign funders.43 Most well financed groups admit that they get
72 percent of money from international NGOs, only 11 percent - from domestic
businesses and merely 4 percent - from citizens' donations.44 Unsurprisingly, the largest
number of organizations (60 percent) considers funding shortages as the most significant
threat their survival. Domestic studies have also determined that NGOs, which combine
international and domestic funding, have more capacity than those that rely
predominantly one type of support.45
Finally, long-term capacity and sustainability of many organizations is dependent
not only on finding money and supporters, but also on having an office space. In this
regard, 13 percent of NGOs that own their offices have a secure future. Other 40 percent
depend on the mercy of entities that donate their facilities for free. And almost one half
relies on administrative expenses (i.e. grants and donations) to rent a space.46
To sum up, most functioning Ukrainian NGOs are modestly funded, staffed and
equipped organizations that are located in the capital or regional centers. While their
financial practices have improved, future sustainability remains problematic because of
the dependency on foreign funds and the lack of long-term financial planning.
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NGO members and inter-NGO relations
Because the internal capacity of any civil society depends directly on the type of
members it is able attract as well as the nature of cooperation among those members, it is
worth looking at both variables in greater detail.
Demographic and normative characteristics of NGO members in Ukraine present
an interesting picture. The nonprofit sector attracts people who are in the prime of their
life and professional careers. Between 1994-2004, the share of those aged 30-55 years
old increased from 48 percent to 52 percent. Considering the fact that 87 percent of
NGOs employ between one and seven people, it is possible to speculate that over one
half of Ukrainian civic activists get paid to be active.
In the decade since its independence, Ukraine has begun to catch up with other
developed states in attracting retirees to civic work. Their involvement rose from 18
percent to 23 percent. Civil society engages slightly more women than men. However,
the gender disparity is not large and varies greatly by regions.47
Large majorities of civic activists acknowledge that they are driven to join NGOs
by the desire to help others or an opportunity to influence societal development. Over
one-third wants to achieve personal self-fulfillment or assist fellow NGO members in
their tasks. Merely 16 percent report being interested in obtaining funding.
In 2004 inter-NGO cooperation was high. 88 percent of groups exchanged
information, 70 percent conducted joint activities and 57 percent had partnership
projects. Many organizations found it advantageous to work with their civic counterparts
to use additional experiences (68-70 percent) and increase their own reach and
effectiveness (66-73 percent). At the same time, obstacles to greater collaboration
47
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included (in decreasing importance) rivalries over formal leadership, competition for
funds and resources, and insufficient awareness about activities of other groups.48 The
Ukrainian third sector was more oriented on domestic than overseas interactions. Onefifth of all civic groups pursued contacts with foreign counterparts and international
governmental organizations in a partnership capacity.49
To conclude, Ukrainian civil society is composed of mature individuals who are
cognizant of the reasons for their involvement. They tend to be middle-aged, female and
more philanthropic in their beliefs. The majority of civic activists are also positively
predisposed to cooperation with other fellow members. However, through years of
experience they remain clear-eyed about the obstacles that any joint efforts are likely to
generate.

NGOs and other societal actors
The essence of embeddednes lies in the ability of NGOs to connect with other
societal actors outside of the civic realm, thereby enhancing their overall relevance as
one of the players on the domestic scene. From this perspective, interactions between
civic groups on one side, government authorities, political parties and the general public
on the other must be properly assessed.
In Ukraine, the intensity of civic cooperation with government authorities
increases as one moves down the chain of governance. Specifically, only 6 percent of
non-governmental organizations thought they had a high level of cooperation with the
national government, whereas 52 percent believed it was low and 32 percent perceived it
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as medium. The majority of NGOs blame the situation on the lack of understanding (68
percent) or awareness about civil society (60 percent) on the part of national state
structures. The picture was somewhat brighter at the regional level where 47 percent saw
NGO-government collaboration as medium and 8 percent believed it was high. One of
the greatest obstacles to a greater partnership with civil society lies in the state's
budgetary constraints. In 2004 (the year of the Orange Revolution), 60 percent of civic
organizations received up to $500 of government money. Domestic observers note that
state funding did not have any regularity or predictability in terms of disbursement
targets and amounts.50
While state funding is scarce and sporadic, the support from businesses is
reluctant. About one half of entrepreneurs complain that they do not have sufficient
funds to contribute to civil society and charities. The argument is valid when applied to
small and medium-size businesses suffocated by tax inspections during the Kuchma era.
However, the major concern of businessmen seems to be a larger purpose for which their
donation will be used. That is why, legislative and taxation hurdles worry only small
minorities, whereas one-third fears their financial contributions will be misdirected
toward a non-charitable purpose - a delicate euphemism for embezzlement. In fact, of
those that donate, 80 percent give to the issues of social protection (e.g. feed the hungry,
shelter the homeless and help the poor) rather than civic activism. My interviews have
revealed that businesses do not consider advocacy NGOs as those whose causes require
urgent support.51 The mode of interaction between the business sector and civil society
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remains mainly financial, with 77 percent providing money and only 5 percent
volunteering for civic activities.52
As for the Ukrainian public, nonprofit organizations interact with their target
audiences on a regular basis, but do so through impersonal methods of communication.
On a positive side, 47 percent of civic groups reach their supporters/clients on a daily
basis, 31 percent - weekly and 13 percent - monthly. However, the effect of these
outreach efforts remains dubious for two reasons. First, the prevalent means of
establishing contacts do not assure that organizations get the attention of their specific
audience or that informational materials convey the right impression. 81-85 percent raise
awareness about their activities through the press and over a half relies on booklets and
brochures.53 Second, impersonal methods of outreach are unlikely to change a utilitarian
manner in which many ordinary citizens perceive civic organizations as distributors of
charitable goods and services. My interviews with NGO leaders and experts and an
external assessment of the European Commission further confirmed a strong presence of
this misconception as well as a negative impact it has on people's trust toward those
NGOs, which simply by the nature of their work (i.e. advocacy) fail to offer free material
benefits.54
To summarize, Ukrainian nonprofit organizations cooperated more effectively
with regional and local, rather than national, state authorities. They struggled to establish
a better relationship with new businesses that did not perceive advocacy as a charitable
cause. Most importantly, the prevalence of impersonal methods of outreach made it
difficult for many groups to secure support among ordinary citizens.
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Fundraising practices
The review of nonprofit fundraising practices produces a number of critical
observations, which confirm the dependency of NGOs on external support and a lack of
domestic contributions to their activities.
According to different estimates, charitable donations (which include donor
grants) constituted 32-37 percent of NGOs' budgets in 2004.55 The figure has increased
by more than 10 percent since 1996, thereby confirming the assertion of foreign donors
that maturation of the Ukrainian civil society would not have been possible without
external aid.56 Over this period of time, the state support for NGOs was cut in half from
12.6 percent in 1996 to 5.9 percent in 2004.57
In a surprising finding, the economic growth of the past decade did not increase
the capacity of NGOs to raise funds by selling their services. The percentage of income
derived from commercial activity dropped two-fold - from 33.2 percent to 14 percent.58
Combined with another statistic, which shows an almost two-fold increase in funds from
other unidentified sources (from 17.4 percent to 32.7 percent),59 the dynamic suggests
that civic groups might have become more adept at hiding their sources of income for the
fear of taxation or state harassment of contributors. A survey of NGOs by a fellow
nonprofit group lends further proof to this claim. Because organizations felt at ease to
give approximate estimates of their financial support to a non-government source, the
percentages of donations from businesses (19-21 percent) and citizens (11-12 percent)60
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roughly match the figure, which they submit to the State Committee on Statistics as
under the rubric of "other sources."
Next, the lack of substantial variation in the share of membership fees indicate
that in 2004 Ukrainian civil society organizations did not perceive members as potential
providers of financial support.
Finally, the dismal fundraising performance of many nonprofit groups could have
been predicted, given their happy-go-lucky attitude to financial sustainability. Only 40
percent of NGOs relied on any written plan to secure funds, and 69 percent of those that
had a plan looked no farther than one year ahead.61 Under these circumstances, as one
Western donor aptly summarized, "you had a lot of groups chasing a lot of money
without any real, concrete results." 62
To conclude, the Ukrainian nonprofit sector remains significantly dependent on
foreign assistance for charitable donations. While covert support from business sources
has increased, contributions from the state or NGO members remain dismal. The
inability of many civic groups to attract funds stems not only from unpropitious political
and economic conditions, but also from nonprofits' own lack of financial planning and
management.

Ukrainian civil society: strengths and pathologies
My portrait of the Ukrainian civil society will not be complete without outlining
its strengths and pathologies. I classify these factors based on whether they contribute or
hinder NGO embeddedness.

Counterpart Creative Center, 27.
Western NGO representative.

Strengths
The Ukrainian third sector has a number of advantages that help domestic civic
groups to become better rooted in the host society. First and foremost, it possesses a
sense of vibrancy and freedom that many civil societies in the former Soviet republics
lack. The rate of NGO growth indicates that people are given sufficient freedoms to
register such organizations with relatively few obstacles.
Second, the notion of civil society has an overwhelmingly positive connotation
among the knowledgeable public and elites. This further strengthens the viability of the
third sector as an independent societal actor, at least among those who are informed
about NGOs.
Third, a set of organizational features, such as membership composition, internal
interactions and technological capacity, facilitates better connections between civic
groups and the society in general. Most NGO members are mature individuals who
espouse (at least publicly) noble reasons for their involvement. Cooperation among
nonprofit organizations is driven by pragmatic concerns of improving the effectiveness
of performance and the efficiency of resource utilization. The civil society by and large
has sufficient organizational structures and technologies to support its daily operational
and programmatic activities.
The key strength in terms of political embeddedness lies in the liberal domestic
legislation that regulates crucial political aspects of civil society functioning, such as
registration, state control and dissolution. Our research has indicated that even during its
most repressive years, the Kuchma regime did not move to change the framework that
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enabled the proliferation of NGOs.63 This fact further proves that the norm, regarding
non-governmental organizations as a staple of any democracy, became firmly embedded
in the domestic political discourse.
Finally, external involvement played a critical role in deepening both societal and
political embeddedness of Ukrainian civic groups. Foreign funding provided a launching
pad for most nonprofit organizations. Without seed grants from Western (primarily
American) donors, the civil society would not have developed a base for continuous
(though often struggling) existence. The attention of Western governments and donors
to civil society raised its profile among Ukrainian intellectual and political elites and
prompted the country to adopt and maintain a liberal framework for NGO activities.

Pathologies
In 1991-2004 societal embeddedness of the Ukrainian civil society was hampered
by three sets of factors. The first stemmed from social conditions and resulted in low
funding. The other lies in political and legal deficiencies, such as the inadequate
regulatory base for NGO activities and limited cooperation with political parties. The
final one includes negative externalities of foreign aid that manifested themselves in high
dependency on donor funds and low accountability for their proper use.
First, like many post-Soviet states, Ukraine suffers from low public involvement
in civic organizations. The majority of ordinary citizens are unaware of the benefits of
participation and thus suspicious of civil society. As the compiled evidences shows,
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those members of the public and elite who are cognizant of civil society were unable to
spread their knowledge or pass their optimism to the rest of the population.
Two major reasons for this failure lie in the limited methods of NGO outreach
and their predominantly urban concentration. Civic groups continued substituting
meticulous (but largely unglamorous) grass-root work with impersonal forms of message
delivery. Though the initial concentration of NGOs in urban centers was a result of
discrepancies in urban-rural development during the Soviet Union,64 newly emerging
civic organizations further contributed to that divide. Trying to avoid grass-root work in
general, they were even much less likely to spread the message and look for supporters
in the depressing living conditions of non-urban areas.
As a result of these problems, the Ukrainian third sector was not implanted
enough into the fabric of the host society to derive sufficient support from three possible
stakeholders - t h e public, the business or the government. Funding from state authorities
was meager, because of budgetary deficits and low interest in civil society. The support
from businesses was limited and reluctant, for many of them either did not view
advocacy as a charitable cause or feared that their donations would be misused.
Combined with a low public appreciation of the sector, this left many organizations
chronically dependent on Western support and continuously struggling for survival.
Second, in 2004 societal embeddedness of the country's NGOs was hampered by
two political factors. One was related to the domestic legislation on taxation that
severely constrained the opportunities for fundraising and survival, by limiting the rate
of non-taxable donations and circumscribing entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore,
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during President Kuchma's second term, legal ambiguities provided an ample room for
the government to harass unfriendly civic groups through tax inspections.65
The other factor had to do with the cooperation of NGOs with political parties. It
is revealing that none of the domestic studies, which were reviewed in this work, asked
civic groups about their contacts with political actors, besides the government. My own
interviews with civic and political activists revealed a lack of understanding and interest
in civil society on the part of politicians.66 Mirroring the artificial delineation between
parties and civic associations established by foreign donors,67 politicians did not consider
NGOs as a serious partner in the political transformation of the country. Their purview
was believed to be "soft politics" (i.e. social and humanitarian issues), whereas parties
were to deal with "hard politics," like wrangling over laws, constitutions and authority.
Moreover, whenever politicians dealt with nonprofits, they were likely to apply the
instincts acquired during political battles - to negotiate with the strong and to crush or
subsume the weak. Having an uncertain base of support within the domestic society,
many nonprofits were not enthusiastic to pursue this kind of cooperation.
Third, in the environment where societal roots were weak and unsystematic,
formal collaboration with political actors was, at best, feeble, external involvement
assumed a skewed importance, thereby resulting in two pathologies. One was a high
reliance on foreign funds. The problem is not new and has been widely discussed in the
previous studies about civil societies in the former Communist states. However, it
acquires a special meaning when placed in the framework of embeddedness.
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Organizations that rely for their survival on external actors can never become a full
participant in their host societies. Their loyalties will stay divided as long as foreign
support continues to have at least an equal say in their organizational existence.
The other had to do with low financial accountability that NGOs exercised in
regard to their funding. The issue is two-fold. On one side, foreign donor organizations
are not accountable to the Ukrainian public, even though their funding is used by
domestic NGOs to meet allegedly public needs. On the other side, the situation is made
worse by the fact that the majority of organizations did not have transparent reporting
procedures and/or did not release their financial audits to the larger public.
These pathologies undermined social and political embeddedness of NGOs and
weakened the positive impact of foreign assistance. Instigated by the Kuchma
government, the campaign against "grant-eaters" alleged that many third sector
organizations were either embezzling foreign funds or were used by donors as a
"destabilizing agent."68 Because the Ukrainian civil society had shoddy financial
practices, the accusations could never be denied decisively. In the end, the campaign was
partially successful, by tarnishing the image of NGOs among ordinary citizens and
further complicating their cooperation with political parties.
To sum up, by 2004 Ukrainian civil society had a strong physical presence, but
limited societal and political influence. Non-governmental organizations, as the most
frequent practical manifestation of civil society, were sprouting everywhere, assisted by
the liberal legislative base and continuous foreign support. However, the rapidly
developing and vibrant civic community proved unable to locate and secure its niche
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within the larger society for it lacked support from the public and acknowledgement
from politicians. Its chronic dependence on outside assistance amplified many of its
internal weaknesses and the rift of estrangement from other societal actors.

PROFILE: CVU
Launch
The Committee of Voters of Ukraine was established in 1994 and had been
operational for ten years prior to the Orange Revolution. The idea of launching an
election watchdog emerged at the Ukrainian office of the National Democratic Institute
(NDI).69 That year the country was to hold its first parliamentary and second presidential
elections as an independent state. Though it had no shortage of political parties and
candidates to run for office, there was no visible public group that would monitor the
election process. Election observation itself was a novel idea in a former Communist
republic where voting had been a formality in the past. Thus, NDI sought to fill the void
as quickly as possible and urged local activists to establish an association of voters who
were concerned about fairness of elections and people's ability to vote.
At the beginning, CVU tasks were fairly straightforward - to recruit and train
Ukrainian citizens as observers, send them to as many polling stations as possible on the
Election Day and then compile a report on the conduct of elections. Thus, CVU
developed and followed the same routine since its inception in 1994 and until 2000.
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Maturation
In 2000 the organization faced two challenges. First, it was coming of age as a
civil society association. With the growth of its staff in Kyiv and in twenty-five regions
(known as oblasts) of Ukraine, it confronted the question of what should be done
between election cycles. CVU needed a more expansive reason d'etre in order for NDI to
continue funding activities that were more meaningful than paychecks for dozens of
activists waiting for a next election. Therefore, the Committee made an argument to the
Institute that funds were necessary for CVU not to lose its regional network and
capacity.70 It also started looking for new programs. One of them was a public hours
initiative that enabled the Committee to work with ordinary citizens, by collecting their
complaints and advising on possible solutions.
Second, the 1999 presidential election became the first omen of increasingly
authoritarian tendencies within the Kuchma regime. The election might have been free,
but it was definitely not fair.71 To ensure Kuchma's victory, the government employed a
number of methods - from skewing TV coverage, using administrative resources,
coercing/bribing dependent voters to firing Ukraine's ambassadors who failed to secure
the "correct" outcome in their embassies. CVU recognized that if a major bulk of fraud
were committed long before voting, then the group's activities on the Election Day
would become meaningless. That is why, it decided to complement its usual monitoring
efforts with a long-term observation (LTO) program that would begin at the early stages
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of an election campaign and monitor the fairness of the political playfield for all participants.72
To summarize, a greater level of organizational maturity as well as a more
complex political landscape helped CVU pass the first critical test on embeddedness. It
was able to adjust its focus from elections to election-related matters. In doing so, it was
ahead of its major funder in understanding domestic realities. As late as 2002, many at
the NDI-Washington office expressed doubts as to whether additional activities, such as
public hours and LTO, were a distraction from the CVU's original mission to do solely
election monitoring.

Mission
CVU mission crystallized as a result of successful programmatic experiences. Its
issue-specific but fairly expansive nature was grounded in the organization's expertise in
election monitoring as well as the certainty of foreign funding.
As many sources within and outside of GVU tell, the first conscious discussion of
the organization's mission took place only after the 2002 elections. It was spurred in part
by the group's successful performance, especially the notoriety that the Committee's
long-term observation reports gained in the international community.73 Activists were
keen to build on that success without departing from the initial mission of election
monitoring.
As a result of internal deliberations and an active involvement from NDI, three
goals were identified as complementary to the mission. The first one was to provide
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democratic monitoring of elections. For this purpose, CVU employed its traditional
programs that included election observation and parallel vote tabulation. The second
goal was to foster active citizenship through public office hours and various community
development projects. The third goal - to raise citizens' awareness and education - left
enough room for the organization to include many miscellaneous and auxiliary projects.
The latter were resource centers for communities, exit polls, support of international
observers, election monitoring in other countries and lobbying to reform the domestic
election law.74
The presented list of goals and activities to accomplish them shows a growing
level of sophistication and maturity on the part of CVU leaders. Unlike many Ukrainian
nonprofits, which left their goals purposefully vague to assure that they can respond to "a
theme de jour" of foreign donors, CVU presented them with sufficient precision. It put
first the areas (i.e. election monitoring) where it performed best, having possibly no
national competitors. It then outlined the second- and third-tier goals, which carved
some niche for operation in-between election cycles as well as enabled it to look for
supplementary projects. At the same time, the nonprofit was in a unique position when
developing its goals and the mission. Unlike the majority of Ukrainian NGOs, it had one
main sponsor, which, it was certain, would not renege on CVU. Therefore, the second
and third goals were perceived at the time to be not a safety valve, but an opportunity to
explore what else it can do, having the financial support of NDI.
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Fundingand sustainability
Though internal and external (mostly with NDI) discussions about CVU' s
financial sustainability were constant, until 2002 real progress in this area was hampered
by three factors.
First, CVU had the same challenge as many other Ukrainian NGOs - difficulties
in fundraising from sources other than Western donors in an economically unpropitious
environment. Frank assessments from domestic civic experts admit that financial support
from local businesses, not to mention the ordinary public, was not possible until an
economic turnaround in late 1999 - early 2000. After that, the nonprofit sector was
caught in a conundrum. Businesses did not perceive the causes promoted by advocacy
groups as truly deserving their assistance, whereas advocacy groups adopted a somewhat
"holier than thou" attitude, reluctant to make their case to entrepreneurs, whose wealth
was dubiously acquired. CVU was not different in this sentiment, in large part due to the
second factor.
While other NGOs were forced to make compromises either with businesses,
parties (by often becoming their "pocket" groups) or donors (by rapidly shifting their
priorities to satisfy another issue de jour), CVU had the luxury of NDI support. The
relationship between the two entities vacillated from a bond of parents with their
adolescent child to a long-term courtship on ill-defined terms. In fact, the dependency
worked both ways. On one hand, the Committee relied on the Institute for support and
survival. On the other, by 2002 NDI could not have backed out of cooperation with CVU
and let the organization languish without admitting its own failure of over-committing

resources to one group. Therefore, the Committee's sustainability was harmed not by
over-reliance on one donor, but by the particular contours that this interaction assumed.
Specifically, the core leadership of the Committee understood that bureaucratic reasons
for supporting the group (which, to be fair, was good, but far from perfect) had long
surpassed in importance the conceptual reasons for continued support.
This brings us to the third reason for CVU's lackluster funding record. Other
grant-givers reported caution in cooperating with the Committee too vigorously for the
fear that this "dancing with another's wife" would upset NDI.76 In addition to not being
clear on the terms of CVU-NDI relationship, they also felt little need to sponsor a group
that had been already so well funded.
When all the three reasons - bad economic conditions, skewed dependency on
one donor and the caution of other grant-givers - are combined together, the outcome
was not promising. Initial attempts to secure external funding took place during the 2002
parliamentary elections when CVU got money from the Adenauer Foundation.77
However, fundraising began in earnest in 2004 when many donors demanded matching
funds for their grants. Only then CVU opened a bank account, which individuals and
businesses could use for donations.
To summarize, the Committee was rather forced to fundraise rather than did so
voluntarily or out of need. Its aversion to one of the core aspects of nonprofit existence
stemmed from unpropitious economic and social conditions. It was further amplified by
the presence of a financial safety net provided by NDI.
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Donor influence
The previous discussion raises the natural question of donor influence. In regard
to CVU, three distinct stages should be outlined.
The first took place in 1994-2002. At the time, the influence of NDI, as the sole
driver and financier behind the establishment and functioning of CVU, was supreme. All
initiatives were donor-driven.78 The CVU leadership discussed and wrote all the projects
under a watchful eye of NDI. Having access to the American donor scene in
Washington, the Institute closely monitored the Committee's proposals to make sure that
they fit into the framework of priorities designated for the former Soviet republics by the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the United States Agency for
International Development (US AID). This pattern of cooperation brought clear
advantages - CVU was always guaranteed foreign funding and entered a small pool of
Ukrainian NGOs that did not need to worry about survival. The price tag was hefty, too.
The Committee had to cede quite a bit of authority in internal matters. NDI
representatives were omnipresent in CVU daily activities. Until 2002, an NDI Civic
Program Officer attended CVU weekly staff meetings (to much consternation of all
staffers).
The second stage occurred in 2002 and lasted well past the Orange Revolution.
Recognizing the Committee's growth, NDI began to loosen its reigns. However, the
arrangement lacked clear terms of engagement, and its dynamics were formed on a caseby-case basis. The group was more likely to bow to NDFs requests on the issues of its
core competency - election monitoring. For instance, CVU was once requested to train
ten thousand observers and refused to do so, citing a lack of capacity. When pressed by
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NDI, it relented, because the donor began questioning the effectiveness of its long-term
investment into an organization that cannot meet its main goal.79 When it came to
internal politics, NDI refused to play an arbiter between the CVU central office in Kyiv
and its regional branches, thereby relegating any decision-making power to the former.80
Therefore, the Institute exerted strong influence in external matters where a danger of
CVU missteps would impact the NDI's'own reputation, but preferred a hands-off
approach in usually messy office politics.
The third (at this point last) stage of donor relations is beyond the framework of
this study. It began in 2006 when NDI pulled out institutional support behind CVU
because of the clashing priorities between the two organizations. As a CVU regional
supporter aptly remarked, "NDI could no longer digest us in the new form, while we did
not want to go back to the past."81
In sum, the Committee of Voters made a one-hundred-eighty-degree turn in its
donor relations - from complete dependency on NDI to a complete and almost hostile
disengagement from it. Like in a relationship that goes sour, the two entities matured at a
different pace and resented each another for not being on the same page or at least trying
to be sensitive about newly found concerns. Whereas CVU wanted to continue receiving
funds, but with fewer conditions and day-to-day oversight, NDI preferred having a
mature and financially accountable grantee that would still heed its advice.
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Membership
Membership is the cornerstone of any civic group. As Chapter emphasizes, a
civic organization without true supporters is hollow at its core and doomed for a quick
demise. In 1994 NDI recognized that when it launched the Committee of Voters of
Ukraine and encouraged members of the newly formed group to look wide for possible
supporters.
The recruitment strategies at the time were quite vigorous. CVU activists put
together street presentations, distributed leaflets and the organization's newspaper to
attract supporters. The emphasis on visibility and grass-root methods of recruitment
reflected the influence of NDI and its understanding of how civic groups make
themselves known in the domestic environment.82
The recruitment proved to be successful for a number of reasons. One of which
was certainly the feeling of novelty. Merely three years past the independence, civic
groups (like patriotic Prosvita) still had a reputation for being a niche for high-level
intelligencia, not the masses. The other lied in the funding that permanently employed
activists would receive. In the environment of a dire economic crisis, a Westernsupported organization provided a stable salary that neither the bankrupt government nor
the feeble, mafia-infused business sector could not offer.
By 1999, the core of CVU leaders was stable, and a rather rigid organizational
hierarchy emerged. Twenty-five regional centers (each with a director and an assistant)
were subordinate to the headquarters in Kyiv run by a tightly knit circle of 5-7 activists.
Due to the internal hierarchy, the number of key paid positions was inherently limited.
The situation was exacerbated by the slow staff turnover. Being part of the exclusive
82
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group of leaders created a sense of personal comfort that CVU key activists cherished
and thus were not eager to abandon.
That is why, new membership strategies were adjusted to satisfy a two-fold goal
- to have enough members to do fieldwork, but not to pose a challenge to the present
leadership. With that purpose in mind, CVU recruited people for temporary positions
(such as election monitors), but limited any outsider's access to leadership posts.
Established in 1998, the Committee's youth wing was also supposed to be a good outlet
for those activists who showed future promise but could not enter the main track within
the organization.83

Leaders and members
Nowhere were the apparent deficiencies of the Committee's recruitment
approaches more visible than in relations between leaders and members. First, they
restricted an influx of fresh blood. By 2002 NDI recognized that the grip on power by
the present leadership became too strong and encouraged (to no avail) most senior
activists to move to other organizations.84 Recognizing that opportunities for professional
growth and meaningful decision-making were almost non-existent, most young members
moved quickly to jobs with political parties or other NGOs. Those who stayed accepted
their temporary role - from one election to the next - and small monetary benefits that it
brought.
Second, the arrangement did not promote efficient cooperation among CVU
leaders. Since personal loyalty played a critical role in earning top positions, it gradually
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became a substitute for professionalism. As a result, during the 2004 presidential
campaign (most crucial in Ukraine's history) half of the CVU regional offices were so
disorganized and weak as to unable to function properly.85
Grievances at the regional level could not be addressed properly, because
external and internal channels for their resolution were blocked. Few regional leaders
dared complain about matters directly to NDI for the fear of being viewed as a pariah
within the NGO. Internally, the organization did not have effective mechanisms of
feedback. It substituted an independent advisory board with a forum of leaders from the
central office and regional branches, who were likely to rubberstamp decisions because
of their financial dependence and personal loyalty.
The top-down approach to management and program execution constrained
contacts among regional branches. Oblast leaders felt more comfortable interacting with
their most geographically close peers (East, West, South) rather than CVU
representatives elsewhere the country.86 Frequent neighborly cooperation on difficult
election cases built trust and gave certainty that privately voiced complaints would not
be reported to the headquarters in Kyiv.
Finally, rigidity and elitism in the organizational structure led to increased
secrecy. CVU refused to establish a formal membership or release its membership lists
for the fear of possible government repercussions. The rationale was dubious at best,
since two of its regional branches in Lviv and Luhansk adopted an exactly opposite
policy. Sources in the donor community speculated that the Committee's reluctance in
this matter stemmed from a completely different concern. With a membership/observers'
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database at hand, NDI would be able to cheek its validity, thereby undermining the CVU
claim of a vast network of activists.87
To summarize, CVU membership strategies were so narrowly conceived as to
limit the pool of potential leaders and imperil its future viability. A clear separation
between leaders and members and within the leadership ranks diminished internal
coherence and external effectiveness.

Normative transfers
When it comes to normative transfers, CVU has passed through two periods, in
which increasing organizational maturity determined the nature and content of normative
transfers.
Between 1994 and 1997, NDI took an active part in ensuring the competency of
its domestic offspring. Katie Fox, the Institute's Civic Officer in Ukraine, conducted
initial trainings on election monitoring techniques.88 In April 1995 fifteen CVU senior
activists were brought to the United States to learn from American experiences. They
attended a short-term seminar at the Midwestern Academy for civic leaders and were
able to observe the mayoral elections in Chicago. As the organization's press report
indicates, "a special attention was paid to the role of civic groups in election campaigns
and to specific activities which are applicable for Ukraine."89
From 1997 and on, the organization was able to handle its own training needs
when it came to its core competence - elections. Between 1997-2000, the Committee
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made sure to educate its key activists in the regions. With that purpose, three national
trainings were held in October 1997, and one seminar was conducted for leaders of CVU
regional branches in December 2000.90 In these and other events, CVU applied
successfully the postulates of election monitoring (e.g. Why is it needed and what goals
should it pursue?) to the local context. It tailored trainings to the domestic election
legislation and political circumstances. For instance, all CVU observers were accredited
as journalists of the CVU newspaper "Tochka Zoru" (Viewpoint). Trainings for
monitors, when conducted at their best, were accessible in terms of context for those
volunteers who did not have a deep understanding of the political scene as well as
provided enough information for people to feel comfortable at a polling station during
the day of voting.
In the second phase, the Committee also became strong enough to initiate its own
programs that were based on local needs. The long-term observation initiative (LTO)
reflected an increasing complexity of the methods to rig elections prior to the voting day.
Its other initiative, public hours, was established to respond to the lack of accountability
that became pervasive at all levels of government in Ukraine. CVU activists and external
observers acknowledge that the organization's most successful ideas often came from the
regions that sought to counteract a particularly egregious type of violation in the future.
At this stage of CVU development, the majority of external normative transfers
were focused on the problems of nonprofit management. CVU requested trainings on
fundraising and grant writing from Western donors in Ukraine. NDI also pushed the
group to seek assistance on conflict resolution and mediation.
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There are strong grounds to conclude that the nature of normative transfers and
their content has evolved substantially throughout the fourteen years of CVU's
operation. First, external normative assistance moved from primary to secondary issues from election monitoring to organizational management. Second, the dynamic of
external transfers has changed - CVU requested, rather than was mandated, to have
certain educational opportunities, thereby becoming at least an equal partner, if not a
driving force, in assessing its needs. Third, the prevalent mode shifted from external to
internal. Since 1997, the major task was not to assure the competency of the CVU
leadership core, but of its rank and file.
Inter-NGO cooperation
A theoretical discussion on the sources of societal influence in Chapter II has
noted that cooperation among NGOs is one of the best opportunities to amplify their
domestic impact. Collaborating nonprofit groups bring together their distinct target
audiences, thereby promoting interactions among different segments of the population
and facilitating the emergence of a broader civil society. In the world of limited
resources, these NGOs are able to avoid duplication of some efforts and complete
neglect of others.
However, as our portrait of Ukrainian civil society shows, cooperation among
civic associations is easier said than done. While many nonprofits understand the
benefits and speak positively of their experiences, they are also cognizant of the
obstacles that make any joint projects a difficult endeavor.
It is thus unsurprising that CVU's performance in this regard is not
straightforward. At the national level, the group was a willing, but cautious partner in
working with other nonprofit entities. Though all interviewed CVU leaders recognized
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the appeal of coalitions to foreign donors and greater effectiveness of joint actions, they
were unwilling to cede their organizational autonomy to any joint initiatives.91 CVU
never delegated the task of making election assessments to any entity and earned the
respect for being independent and assertive of its interests in the nonprofit world.92
Whatever cooperation occurred, it was limited to informal, non-binding coordination of
activities, occasional joint meetings, and, at most, some specific short-term assistance.
For instance, CVU second-tier representatives attended meetings of many electionrelated NGO coalitions (including Vlad Kaskiv's "Freedom of Choice," a precursor to
Pora). CVU regional observers said to have kept an eye on exit poll staffers of other
groups, like the Democratic Initiatives Foundation.93
At the regional level cooperation between a CVU branch and other groups was
always more liberal chiefly for two reasons. There were too few strong organizations to
compete with CVU in the election field. And any regional collaboration with other
groups could go only so far due to the Committee's centralized organizational structure.
The Committee's semi-detachment within the nonprofit world can be explained
by three factors. First and foremost, it had the money and, with it, the degree of freedom
for an independent action. Unlike many NGOs (especially election-related coalitions),
CVU was not a short-term project looking to strike the iron of foreign funds allocated for
elections while the issue was hot. It could pick and choose its partners as well as be leery
of free riders on CVU resources. Second, throughout its long-term existence CVU
earned the reputation of a "diplomatic criticizer." It would always outline numerous
violations, but confirm overall legality of the parliamentary elections. That is why, the
91
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group could not take the risk of having its image ruined by a coalition whose judgment
was unknown. Third, even in the best of the worlds (i.e. a long-term coalitions, with their
own funding), CVU would have been a wary partner, concerned that an effective NGO
coalition would overshadow its own work and undermine its appeal for international
donors.
To summarize, when it came to working with other NGOs, CVU was an
independent and rather demanding actor. Influenced by the considerations of autonomy,
reputation and influence, it chose informal and non-binding means of collaboration to
formalized agreements on the national and regional levels.
CVU and political parties
CVU's cooperation with political parties was hampered as a result of weaknesses
in political party development that Ukraine was experiencing as a nascent democracy.
First and foremost, its ability to reach out to parties was limited by the latter's ideology.
Some, like the Communist Party or the Progressive Socialist Party, rejected the whole
idea of civil society and nonprofit organizations as a Western invention.94 Others, like the
Social Democratic United Party or the bloc of parties "For a United Ukraine," were
allied with the Kuchma government. Because the administrative system was working in
their favor, they had little interest in an election watchdog whose goal was to expose the
abuses committed by that same system. Cooperation with pro-governmental parties was
generally inhibited after the 2001 anti-Kuchma protests, when the government viewed
any dissent as a sign of personal disloyalty and opposition.
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Second, when it came to opposition parties (like Yushchenko's Our Ukraine or
the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko), CVU commanded informational, but not persuasion
authority. Unlike their retrograde opponents, these parties were likely to take CVU
reports into account and treat them as good piece of analysis, but neither of them would
consult with CVU or treat the organization as an equal.951 specifically inquired whether
foreign support made CVU reporting less credible and the organization in general less
attractive for political parties. Contrary to Georgia, CVU's standing among oppositional
parties and in the Ukrainian society was not undermined by external sponsorship. The
CVU Chairman noted that trust toward the organization among party activists was
strongly correlated with the quality of its reporting. That is why, the group had more
respect from political leaders in 2002 after its long-term observation program than in
1994 96 Opposition parties were unlikely to see it as a drawback, because many of their
own members received trainings from the same Western institutions. The Ukrainian
public was unaware of the sources that supported CVU, and government's attempts to
discredit the Committee's image through Internet publications or the war against "granteaters" in 2003-2004 did not get any traction.97
Third, the lack of more systematic institutional cooperation between oppositional
parties and the Committee stemmed from the pathologies of party development in
Ukraine. Many parties had their own youth wings or closely affiliated civic groups. This
created the expectation directly opposite to the one in developed countries. Instead of
political parties catering to the interests of civic organizations, which represent a larger
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spectrum of the population, civic groups were expected to follow the party line because
of provided financial assistance.98 Other parties continued to suffer from the old Soviet
habit of low tolerance for criticism. Because CVU was trying to be as non-partial as
possible and because in Ukrainian realities, all sides commit election violations (it is
their extent that matters), party activists would see CVU reporting of their mistakes as a
sign of betraying friendly relations." Little understanding of election observation
mechanics generated misconceptions about its results. Most oppositional parties would
expect CVU reports to uncover the evidence of a politically explosive "smoking gun"
that could be used to booster their own agenda.100
To summarize the situation, even within the pro-democratic opposition few
political activists understood the essence of civil society. Many rushed to apply
erroneously the same laws of "with-or-against-us" behavior from politics to civic groups.
Depending on their ideological orientation, Ukrainian political parties either treated
CVU as a Western nuisance or a source of useful analytical information. Neither
informal contacts between CVU and party leaders nor occasional trainings performed by
CVU for election commission members from political parties altered this arrangement.

Influence in the public
CVU had moderate influence in the Ukrainian mass media and nominal impact
on the Ukrainian public. It could not sustain media publicity and long-term public
interest toward itself for a number of reasons.
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First, most media remained oriented toward political parties and political life in
general, thereby relegating CVU to the second tier of news. Its press conferences
attracted a wide range of media outlets and its experts were always in demand for
commentary.101 But in both cases they served as an additional touch to the plethora of
already unfolding events. The situation was not a fault of either the Committee or the
press. The Ukrainian political life between 1994-2004 was marked by the predominance
of two factors - an overwhelming influence of President Kuchma and the inherent
instability of a highly hierarchical system of power relations that he built.102 That is why,
the media fixation on politics at the expense of other news was based on a possibility for
radical change that any shift in the system might have brought.
Second, CVU's inability to attract long-term public attention was due to its mode
of operation, which lacked a strong advocacy component. The organization was diligent
in reporting problems, but less aggressive in pushing for their solution. With time, the
list of concerns became repetitive, yet it was not clear what else the civic group could do,
besides rehashing them.103 Because the CVU leadership avoided radicalization and a
possible loss of neutrality, it pursued evolutionary, non-confrontational means of
addressing election deficiencies.
Third, my interviews made it clear that the longer the same group of CVU leaders
stayed in power, the stronger were its relations with key government players.104 The
Committee in no way "sold out" to the authorities, but it was definitely unwilling to pick
up fights with powerful stakeholders, like the Central Election Commission (CEC). What
in fact occurred is somewhat similar to the situation that radical political parties
101
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experience when they first come to power. Faced with a stark choice of moderation or a
loss of power (and an internal split), many choose to drop most extreme demands. As the
Committee of Voters was becoming more mature and the Ukrainian regime was growing
more repressive, it faced a choice of either to work within the system or to become its
harsh critic (and risk ostracism and repressions). By 2002, it was obvious that CVU
leaders chose and CVU members acquiesced with the former.
Fourth, CVU was well known among Ukrainian and Western politicos, but had a
vague recognition among ordinary people. Ukrainian politicians had to pay attention to
the Committee because its LTO reports were well received and read in Washington.105
Through its Congressional liaisons, the National Democratic Institute ensured that topranking members of the appropriate committees, like the late Congressman Tom Lantos,
would read assessments of the election situation in Ukraine. NDI Chairman and former
State Secretary Madeleine Albright was familiar with reports and mentioned them in her
meetings with high-level Ukrainian officials and national public forums.106
When it comes to ordinary citizens, there are continuous disagreements in the
assessment of CVU influence. As usual, the devil is in details - in particular, how one
defines the extent of public awareness of the Committee's work. Some Western donors
claim that CVU was better known in the power corridors and think tanks of Washington
than on the streets of Kyiv. Ordinary Ukrainians were likely to have no clue what CVU
was doing.107 The Committee's greatest optimists (including its own activists) view
familiarity within a larger society simply as "name recognition." This means that if
people have a vague association about the group, then it is doing fine in terms of public
105
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influence. At the same, their own estimates of this recognition provide diametrically
different figures - from 93 percent as the highest to 5 percent as the lowest.108 Their
anecdotal examples reveal that at best an average person may associate CVU with the
vague notion of elections or may recognize the group's "public faces" (like CVU
Chairman Popov or Press Secretary Oleksandr Chernenko).
To summarize the discussion, at best CVU had a visually, but not normatively
recognized brand. It appears that neither donors nor the organization itself relied on any
instruments to find out how popular it was. The CVU leadership frequently implied that
public visibility or recognition automatically translated into public influence. Absent a
critical event, this statement cannot be falsified. That is why, considering the group's
role in the Orange Revolution is important in evaluating the validity of this and other
claims of its influence.

CVU AND THE ORANGE REVOLUTION
On the eve of the Revolution, the Committee of Voters was a well-established
nonprofit organization. It has been active on the Ukrainian civic landscape for the past
ten years. In that time, it developed a well-tested repertoire of programs and gained
recognition within the Ukrainian political and civic establishment, if not the general
public. Its intimate connections with NDI enabled CVU to project its influence in the
United States. From the financial and methodological standpoints, it was one of the
best-equipped groups in the country to handle any electoral contingency. CVU had the
capacity to influence events, and do so decisively.

These are the assessments provided to me by Ihor Popov and Oleksandr Chernenko.
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Planning
CVU's goals for the 2004 presidential campaign were similar to those during
previous elections - to organize independent observation and inform voters whether
elections took place in a democratic manner. The group's Chairman Ihor Popov indicates
that prior to the campaign, the Committee conducted a situational planning to account
for possible contingencies and threats to a free election process and recommended a
number of programs to tackle potential issues.109 After my discussions with activists and
review of the organization's materials online, it remains unclear how this process
occurred and who, besides the top echelon of leadership in Kyiv and in the regions, was
involved.
Though CVU should be credited for sticking to its original mission and core
activities, in 2004 it had little reason to re-invent the wheel. Unlike many smaller NGOs,
which had to re-craft their goals to get foreign grants, CVU had its repertoire of wellknown programs and the certainty of NDI sponsorship. Popov himself noted that the
pool of available foreign assistance at the time was sufficient to shift funds in accordance
with unfolding priorities. Therefore, by being one of the top civic groups (in terms of
both expertise and access to donors) in the country, the Committee of Voters had a
considerable freedom in preparing for the elections as it saw fit.

Funding
Traditionally, CVU was funded by the National Democratic Institute through
grants, received from the National Endowment for Democracy and the United States
Agency for International Development. The 2004 elections were different in two aspects.
""Popov.

CVU secured some funds from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The evidence
of that project was a round table meeting organized under the sponsorship of the German
institute after the first round of presidential elections on November 8, 2004. no The
breakthrough is significant because European donor institutions are usually
overshadowed by American grant-givers, most notably US AID.
In addition to that, for the first time CVU attracted support of the Ukrainian
middle class who provided its in-kind contributions or volunteer services for monitoring
purposes. The demonstrations at the Maidan of Independence resulted in collapse of the
Kuchma regime. Throughout the country people became aware of the government's
actions to falsify the elections and saw the potency of their power in forcing a re-vote.
Driven by this newly acquired awareness, many contacted the Committee of Voters to
offer their services for the third round of voting.
Ihor Popov likes to describe somewhat surreal images of this assistance. On the
Election Day, one would see a new Mercedes driving through deep potholes of rural
roads to a problematic polling station. Its owner was fired up and ready to film any
violation on his family video camera.111 The appearance of this group had a shellshock
effect on commissioners. No longer were they dealing with the usual CVU crowd of
pesky, but infirm retirees and enthusiastic, but inexperienced college students. Having
survived the criminal chaos of the 1990s and the tax inspections of the early 2000s, the
Ukrainian middle class could not be easily ignored or bullied.
It is unclear whether the burst of civic activism was a byproduct of the
revolutionary events or a lucky conflation of a heightened awareness about the
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importance of elections and the public knowledge about CVU (as its activists tend to
suggest112). In either case, the group should be commended for thinking on its feet and
taking advantage of a new pool of human resources.
Regardless of the assistance from Ukrainian medium and small-size businesses,
CVU still had to rely on donor support to carry out its major programs for the 2004
elections. This raises the sore question on the extent to which foreign funding impacted
the CVU's ability to perform. Predictably, there are different opinions on this matter.
CVU activists tend to see external grants as one of the formative variables, which
shaped the contours of activities, but was not decisive for the group's involvement in the
campaign. Its spokesman, Oleksandr Chernenko, said the importance of grants varied by
the sphere of activities. CVU leader, Ihor Popov, went further by suggesting that because
of the overwhelming domestic support, foreign money in 2004 did not play as great of a
role as it used to in the previous elections. However, donors - both inside and outside of
NDI - tend to emphasize almost unanimously the cumulative effect of supporting CVU
(and the Ukrainian nonprofit sector in general) for the previous decade as a factor that
enabled its effectiveness.113
These disparate observations can be summarized in three points. One, foreign
funding in 2004 was important for CVU programs that were large in scope (i.e. election
day monitoring) or technical in implementation (i.e. exit polls). Even with public
enthusiasm, the organization would have been unlikely to find sufficient financial
backing for these initiatives. Two, support from the Ukrainian middle class provided an
unexpected, but welcome and important relief to monitor the additional (and previously
112
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unforeseen) round of presidential elections. It boosted credibility of the monitoring
effort. Three, it was not the immediate external assistance, but rather its long-term nature
that built the infrastructure and capacity of the Committee, so it could fare well in the
2004 campaign even with modest grant support.

Activities
CVU implemented numerous initiatives that targeted various audiences and
approached the central goal of election monitoring from a multidimensional
perspective.114
First, the group calibrated its monitoring capacity to accommodate the
peculiarities of the Ukrainian election cycle. It re-launched its long-term monitoring
program on June 25, 2004 to assure that authorities did not rig the election outcome
through unfair campaigning strategies. Based on the monitoring results from the first
round of voting, the group correctly identified the main opportunity for fraud - voter
lists.115 To address the issue, in October 2004 CVU launched a medium-term observation
program to uncover irregularities and mistakes in voter registration. Its short-term
monitoring initiative deployed observers at polling stations on the Election Day to assure
compliance with voting and vote tabulation procedures.
Second, the Committed conducted a parallel vote tabulation. By collecting ballots
from regular precincts, it sought to catch any manipulations with results at the district
and national levels. CVU assumed that the pressure to "re-distribute" votes would be
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greater at the level of district commissions where aggregate results are put together, and
a general picture of winners and losers is beginning to emerge.
Third, CVU expanded training activities to new populations. In addition to
training new members of precinct election commissions, the group identified two new
target audiences - rural teachers and young voters. The former was the most frequent
target of government harassment and intimidation. Because they command respect
among rural residents and depend on village authorities for elementary needs, rural
teachers were often coerced to campaign on behalf of pro-governmental candidates and
assure a high turnout and a "correct" vote among parents of their students. CVU
organized a number of trainings and distributed several brochures that outlined not only
teachers' rights as voters, but also stipulated punishments for violating the basic norms
of fair elections. For young voters, it organized a national training of trainers as part of
the "You Vote for the First Time!" project. The initiative ended up serving two purposes
simultaneously —educating first-time voters about their rights as well as recruiting them
to be election observers.
Finally, CVU tried to reach ordinary Ukrainians by opening an election phone
line. The "Voter Protection Service" project started in April 2004 and involved four
attorneys and twelve defense lawyers providing pro bono advice in twenty regions of the
country. The hotline became not only an important source of distributing relevant
information, but also an outlet to gather complaints about violations of the Election Law.
To summarize, in the 2004 presidential elections the Committee implemented a
compilation of its regular programs as well as sought to launch new activities in order to
accommodate changing circumstances and engage new target groups. Most importantly,
the content, timing and nature of initiatives reveal that the norms of election conduct had

been deeply internalized by CVU activists. Elections were no longer viewed as a oneday event, but as a process. It was not even the outcome (fair and free) that was
important for the nonprofit, but the manner in which it was arrived.

Cooperation with NGOs
Prior to the demonstrations at the Maidan, CVU maintained its usual "friendly,
but cautious" stand on working with other NGOs. The Committee's most visible
partnership effort was the "New Choice 2004" coalition of NGOs. Formed on October
31, 2003 (less than a year before the presidential elections), it included a star cast of
Ukraine's best-known civic groups, such as "Democratic Initiatives" (the nation's
strongest public polling think tank), the Laboratory for Legislative Initiatives (a
brainchild of the national Soros foundation), the Europe XXI foundation (known for its
fiercely pro-Western orientation) and others. From the information available about its
activities, it seems that the coalition was designed to facilitate information sharing
among the organizations and attract media attention to the civic aspect of elections. For
instance, on November 4,2003 its members petitioned President Kuchma to include a
civil society representative to the Central Election Commission as a permanent observer.
CVU Deputy Chair, Evhen Radchenko, was suggested for the position. On February 2329,2004 three coalition members (including CVU press secretary Oleksandr Chernenko)
visited the United States and briefed the American policy community on the course of
Ukrainian elections. To prove that eagerness of the "New Choice 2004" did not go
unnoticed, in January 2004 the coalition was invited to meet with Valeriy Mishura, who
was appointed by the Ukrainian parliament to investigate the role of foreign funding in
supporting Ukrainian NGOs. The coalition remained active throughout the campaign. It
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organized an NGO forum between the first and second rounds of elections. The event
was sponsored by the Soros foundation in Ukraine.116
In advance of voting, CVU also assisted international observation missions (i.e.
OSCE, ENEMO and CIS-EMO) that came to Ukraine to monitor elections. As its annual
report notes, the organization did not favor any mission in particular, instead preferring
to exchange information and provide reasonable assistance with training, assigning
monitoring locations and offering mechanisms for gathering and analyzing the data in
the 17 regions where such missions were deployed.117 The assistance in deploying five
hundred Canadian observers (most of whom were ethnic Ukrainians and came to
Ukraine after the Orange revolution made international headlines) shows that the group's
position on cooperation with other nonprofits was tactical and flexible. When it felt there
was a niche and need for its involvement, it provided such.
My interview with the CVU Chairman makes it clear that Popov preferred
informal methods of cooperation. For instance, he noted that during the election
campaign meetings of civic leaders with U.S. Ambassador John Herbst were most
helpful for him. They became a venue for otherwise busy NGO activists to come
together, share information and compare notes.118
While Popov deemed such examples of inter-NGO collaboration sufficient, some
CVU regional activists were interested more in joint activities than simple information
sharing. However, because regional branches of many national nonprofits were unevenly
developed, cooperation on equal terms was not always achievable. According to a CVU
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activist in the East of Ukraine, the capacity of Pora branch there was so appalling that
CVU had to stop any interactions or risk doing all of Pora activities.119
Whatever disappointments and personal tensions might have existed between
various civic leaders and groups, they receded to the background on November 22, 2004.
As many activists and observers noted, when the demonstrations at the Maidan began
unfolding, civic groups started coming out from every nook and cranny.120 People, who
have been working on joint projects for years or met together at a long forgotten Western
workshop, would call each other, asking to get involved. Some went together to the
Maidan in Kyiv to bring people food. Others signed up to be election observers in
Eastern and Southern Ukraine - the regions with the highest incidence of fraud.
To summarize, in the 2004 presidential elections the Committee of Voters
worked with many domestic and international nonprofits by coordinating activities and
providing sporadic assistance. In the course of the Orange Revolution, informal
interactions among NGOs increased exponentially, because civil society in Ukraine,
however feeble and dormant, still existed. All it needed was a pivotal event to get
activated.

Cooperation with political parties
The dynamics of the 2004 presidential campaign made it challenging for CVU to
sustain cooperation with oppositional parties, while maintaining its formal neutrality as a
civic organization.
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On one hand, authorities treated any criticism as part of some ubiquitous foreign
ploy to humiliate Ukraine and subvert its achievements. The President and his staff
insisted that the country was already a democracy and did not need anyone to monitor its
compliance with democratic norms.121 Because CVU observation efforts were bound to
reveal some irregularities (if not outright violations of the Election Law), the
organization was counted as "unreliable" and blacklisted from all media appearances.122
On the other hand, as the spiral of revolutionary events started to unravel, CVU
was coming under increasing pressure from several sources to side openly with the
opposition. First, it was the Ukrainian public that was both activated and radicalized by
the events. As Popov remarked, in the heat of the revolution people were unwilling to
listen or read dry, factual reports, enumerating violations. The public yearning for action
exerted implicit pressures on CVU to provide an indisputable proof that Yushchenko
won overwhelmingly123 and the victory was simply stolen from him. Then, there was
NDI that believed this was the time for CVU to pay off the years of investment by
becoming an indispensable ally of the revolution. And finally, the opposition forces,
willing to build upon popular resentment of the Kuchma regime, were pushing CVU to
join in the task.
Under these circumstances, it was only CVU Chairman Ihor Popov who could
manage a semblance of impartiality, by making the organization's support of the
opposition parties indirect, diplomatic and highly nuanced.
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In the course of the 2004 campaign, CVU trained Our Ukraine members to be
election observers and commissioners as well as collected complaints from local party
activists for its long-term observation reports.124 As demonstrations at the Maidan were
taking place, the task of separating political and civic activity became especially tortuous
for the Committee of Voters. On one hand, CVU provided Yushchenko's party "Our
Ukraine" with a dossier of specific violations that became the factual basis for his case to
the Supreme Court to invalidate the outcome of the second round. The information
proved especially crucial, because Our Ukraine activists failed to collect comparable
data on their own.125 At the same time, Ihor Popov turned down the request by Petro
Poroshenko, one of the most powerful members of Our Ukraine, to speak from the
Maidan's tribune. Justifying his decision, he stated that the atmosphere of righteous
anger did not make people predisposed to listen to objective statistics, which he would
deliver.
To summarize, the events of the Orange revolution have highlighted an eternal
dilemma that each civic group has to address in its own way - how to be involved in the
political life without crossing a blurred line that separates political and civic worlds.
When working with parties during the revolution, the CVU leadership stuck to
impartiality and neutrality to the displeasure of some activists, public and foreign donors.

Mobilization
Regardless of the extensive re-writing of history, done by Ukrainian politicians
of all colors, almost nobody anticipated how well attended and well sustained the
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demonstrations at the Maidan would turn out to be.

Therefore, like many ordinary

Ukrainians, CVU had to make an urgent decision on whether to join or stay out of the
demonstrations.
Among those skeptical about long-term viability of the Orange demonstrations
were CVU's Popov and Chernenko, who believed that at most the protests would be
another "Ukraine without Kuchma" - a series of failed uprisings that were violently
crushed in the wake of the "Tapegate" scandal in 2001.127
As the Committee's leadership was trying to make sense of this unexpected turn
of events, whispers for direction were getting louder in its regional offices and calls to
take a stand became incessant from NDI. At a hastily assembled CVU board meeting,
the discussion on joining the protests produced an internal split.128
A faction of "radicals," populated by activists from some Eastern Ukrainian
oblasts and the CVU press secretary, suggested siding with Yushchenko and fielding a
CVU representative to the Maidan podium.
The "moderates," headed most prominently by Popov, insisted on remaining on
the sidelines. This time, their reasons had nothing to do with the concern for impartiality.
Instead they boiled down to the instinct of survival. In the first days of demonstrations it
was clear that the turn-out was impressive and the durability was surprisingly long, but
until at least November 25,2004 (the arrival of international mediators) nobody could
have predicted whether the government would use force to disperse protestors or order a
re-vote. Popov asserted that if the peaceful uprising had failed, the repercussions would
have been much more severe than at the failure of the 2001 protests. He pointed to the
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case of the Freedom House office in Ukraine that endured harsh harassment of tax
inspections for its involvement in the "Ukraine without Kuchma" action. At worst, CVU
offices would be closed and CVU activists jailed for real and imaginary tax violations.
In the manner of internal decision-making emblematic of CVU, the discussion
was soon dropped and a board vote on the matter never took place. Though the
Committee issued a press release that welcomed "the civic activity of Ukrainian citizens,
a peaceful nature of meetings and demonstrations, a balanced position of the majority of
law enforcement officers, and an honest civic position of some journalists,"129 Popov
personally forbade CVU activists to participate in the demonstrations on behalf of the
organization.
The situation with activist mobilization provides an important insight into CVU's
deeper organizational problems. First, the decision to abstain from protests was a topdown order rather than a consensus-driven compromise, which explains why three years
after the revolution some activists still feel bitter about sitting out the event. Second, the
outcome showed the leadership too comfortable with the status quo - to be oppositional
enough to get foreign funds, but not too adversarial to provoke a government retaliation.
As one observer aptly put it, CVU put too many eggs in too many baskets, which made
the act of juggling them impossible.130 Thus, casual friendships turned into enduring
obligations. Finally, the situation highlighted another sore point for many Ukrainian
nonprofits - financial transparency. While CVU's worries are understandable given the
repressive nature of Ukrainian politics, the organization that was involved in such a
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sensitive area as election politics should have made certain that accounting practices of
its regional branches were beyond reproach.
To summarize, as the Orange Revolution was unfolding on the streets and
squares of Kyiv, the Committee of Voters was internally divided and chose to stay out of
limelight altogether. While some CVU activists joined the ranks of protesters as ordinary
citizens, their participation as civil society members was neither visible nor decisive at
that point.

Assessment of the performance
The previous section leaves us with the most difficult question to answer - how
did CVU perform during the Orange revolution? Because the resultant picture is so
multi-layered and contradictory, the subsequent assessments also diverge, depending on
the position of observers and their approach to the task.
If one is to consider purely quantitative indicators (which often end up in donor
reports), the general picture comes out positive. As a result of its monitoring efforts,
CVU produced seven long-term observation reports, submitted 5,168 legal acts, 2,826
notifications about violations of the election legislation, 176 complaint letters to district
election commissions and courts of different jurisdiction. The voter hotline produced
1,208 complaint letters to election commissions, 290 - to prosecutor's office and
provided 1,319 regular consultations. The service became so popular that lawyers from
Ernst&Young, one of the most well known firms in Ukraine, offered their pro bono

assistance. The "You Vote for the First Time!" program held 200 lectures in 125
educational establishments and involved 10,000 young people.131
When asked whether and why GVU was successful in the Orange revolution, its
activists point to a number of reasons. Among the most frequently mentioned is public
awareness about the group's brand that attracted a large number of observers from the
Ukrainian middle class for the third tour of elections. The Committee's Chairman
focused on institutional expertise and leadership continuity that made CVU activists
respected figures in the media and civic circles.132 Lastly, national and regional members
agree that CVU had a lot of activists who were mission-driven. Instead of hunting for
funds, they concentrated on improving what they did best - election monitoring. As a
result, even a normally critical NDI representative acknowledged that CVU's civic and
political analyses became more mature and sophisticated.133
Those critical of the Committee's performance during the Orange Revolution
believe its aversion to risk taking and predisposition to status quo diminished its impact
in three key areas. First, its Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) program failed to anticipate
the change in government tactics. While CVU thought territorial election commissions134
would be most likely sites for fraud, authorities manipulated the results at the level of
ordinary polling stations. So when the Committee collected election protocols from
regular polling stations, they merely confirmed officially fraudulent results. In the first
round of voting, CVU reported a statistical tie with 39.6% going for both Yushchenko
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and Yanukovych.

Unsurprisingly, the group's PVT for the second tour showed

Yanukovych's victory and created so much argument between CVU and NDI as to be
embargoed for public release. In addressing the issue, Ihor Popov whether PVT admitted
some methodological flaws and too much NDI meddling in the process, but flatly denied
any lack of oversight on the part of the Gommittee.136
Second, the group's short-term observation program (STO) was financially and
logistieally mismanaged. Sources within NDI claim that CVU did not deploy as many
observers as it promised, especially in the critical eastern and southern regions of
Ukraine137 where official harassment and fraud produced a Soviet-like ninety-some
percent outcome in favor of Yanukovych. The crisis brought to surface the issues of
accountability and transparency that existed between the Committee of Voters and the
National Democratic Institute in the past. Some openly blame CVU for not being able to
predict another twist in government tactics. With hindsight from the 1999 and 2002
elections, the authorities sought to ensure that local commissions would be staffed with
"right members," and people vote "the right way," by casting their vote at home or
through absentee ballots. So in many regions of Ukraine monitoring on the day of
elections turned into watching a carefully staged spectacle.138
Finally, CVU erred by choosing to sit out the events on the Maidan - the
sentiment shared by many activists and foreign donors. The decision seems even worse
in the retrospect not only because the Orange revolutionaries won, but also because it
confirmed CVU's organizational pathologies - overly powerful leadership and a
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preference to influence events indirectly. A review of its public statements shows a
protracted exercise in diplomacy that threaded an increasingly shrinking line between
admitting the truth and actively joining the public protest. In the statement on November
1, 2004 "CVU demands to indict those responsible for falsifying voter lists in the first
round."139 The question is who "those" are, and why they cannot be named by the group
that has monitored the process for so long and must know "them." In another press
release, the group says to be "disturbed by the information about an organized trip of a
great number (16,000) of citizens from Eastern Ukraine with the goal to observe
elections."140 Though the report proceeds to suggest there was no need for these people
to do the work of CVU, it shies away from calling the practice for what it was - a forced
busing of Eastern Ukrainians to vote multiple times using so-called "leave coupons."141
To summarize, the evaluation of the CVU performance against our two indicators
of success reveals that the organization only partially fulfilled its core functions of
providing quality election monitoring. Its pre-election reports attracted much needed
international attention to Ukraine, thereby increasing pressure on the already isolated
government of President Kuchma. However, due to conventional thinking, the
Committee proved unable to predict changes in state behavior and increased
sophistication in rigging the election, which rendered a number of CVU Election Day
programs not just meaningless, but potentially harmful as a tool to boost fraudulent
results. When it comes to the issue of contributions to the revolution itself, the NGO had
no direct impact on any stage of the event, preferring to keep a generally low profile
139
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until it became clear whether the revolution would win. By providing the evidence of
election fraud to Our Ukraine representatives, it indirectly helped resolve the political
impasse created by the second round of voting. In the end, the organization fared poorly
on both indicators (function and contribution), and its involvement in the Orange
Revolution did not become "a firing cannon" that would further strengthen the spirit and
spiral of protests.142

PROFILE: PORA
Launch
The idea of Pora was a product of simultaneous and uncoordinated deliberations
within Ukrainian political and civic circles. On the civic side, it was verbalized during
brainstorming sessions of the "Ukraine for the Truth" coalition of NGOs, whose activists
believed the upcoming presidential elections would be most brutally fought to maintain
the existing power structure.143 A group called "Youth Resistance" piloted the concept of
youth mobilization and educational outreach in Lviv, a heavily pro-democratic city in the
West of Ukraine.144 The experiences of Kmara and Otpor also proved to many domestic
activists that, if organized and united, civil society could make an impact.
On the political side, three leading figures within Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine"
bloc - Taras Stetskiv, Roman Bezsmertnyi, and Volodymyr Filenko - recognized that if
large-scale fraud occurred and an election outcome were falsified, Yushchenko's victory
would come about only as a result of active public pressure. However, they also had a
lingering doubt whether traditionally passive and private Ukrainians were ready to stand
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up for their rights. Since January 2004 Stetskiv took the lead in elaborating possible
options to address this issue.145
The events took a lucky turn for "Our Ukraine." On March 9, 2004 some young
activists were arrested in Kharkiv, while celebrating the birthday of Taras Shevchenko146
and protesting against the Kuchma regime. Among them was Evhen Zolotariov, a MP
representative for Volodymyr Filenko, who carried a Kuchma dummy during the
event.147 The demonstration and arrests showed that the Ukrainian youth - a previously
apathetic electoral segment - might be ready to get involved. Furthermore, the
resentment of the Kuchma regime must have spread far and deep to make protests
feasible in Kharkiv, a historically pro-Russian city in North-Eastern Ukraine.
Vladyslav Kaskiv, Pora's informal leader, did not need to conduct extensive
recruitment to get the group off the ground. He knew many potential activists through
trainings that were conducted for youth organizations since 2002 by the Network of
Social Democratic Funds of Europe.148 So merely a month after the demonstration in
Kharkiv, Pora conducted its first seminar in Uzhhorod149 and launched the first campaign
- "Kuchmism is...?" The organization's name and its literary associations immediately
put it on the societal radar.150 As if the message of change could have been missed,
posters, asking people to define what living under the Kuchma regime meant for them,
appeared on the weekend when Ukrainians moved their clocks one hour forward.
Kuchma's winter was over, the summer time has brought a welcome change.
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The second campaign earned Pora nationwide recognition as a force to be
reckoned with.151 It organized noisy protests during brutally falsified and violent
mayoral elections in a small Carpathian town of Mukachevo. The contest between proopposition Viktor Baloha and pro-government Emil Nuser became widely viewed as a
rehearsal for the presidential elections in November 2004.152
To sum up, from the very beginning the organization represented the duality of
political and civic involvement. First, its two leaders - Vlad Kaskiv and Evhen
Zolotariov - came from the NGO sector and party work respectively. The fact that the
idea about Pora did not originate at once and could not be attributed to a particular
source indicates that civic and political activists were thinking along the same lines for
some time. Therefore, the group became the embodiment of a consensus rather than a
top-down initiative or a donor project. Second, Pora was able to put itself quickly on the
political map because it was starting to tap into previously under-involved target
audiences through grass-root methods that caught attention of an average Ukrainian.

Mission
As one Pora activist aptly put it, its mission was to engage the disenfranchised
and the angry.153 It sought to fight public apathy, especially among young voters,
through large-scale awareness campaigns and (if elections turned out to be fraudulent)
mass mobilization.
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By 2004, Ukraine continued to have low levels of public efficacy and
participation. Political experts speculated that reasons for the estrangement from politics
varied by age. Whereas older generations were skeptical of their influence due to Soviet
experiences, those in their twenties learned to rely on themselves and disengaged from
the politics, which did not impact their daily living.
By learning from previous successes and failures of civic activism in Ukraine,
Pora sought to break this pattern of behavior. From the 1990 student hunger strike, Pora
activists took the importance of grass-root work to recruit participants and visible actions
to attract media and public attention. Based on the failed anti-Kuchma protests in 2001,
the group decided that its focus should be on non-violent methods of resistance.155 In
March 2001 the government was successful in sparking clashes between demonstrators
and the police. The footage of massive unrest prompted ordinary Ukrainians to stay at
home and undermined the image of protesters in the international community. As a
result, public statements from foreign governments adopted a neutral stand and called for
both sides to resolve their differences peacefully.156 Pora was determined not to repeat
any of those mistakes.
Between April and October 2004, Pora defined its mission very broadly as
spreading awareness about importance of the campaign through its posters and public
actions. However, after the first round of the presidential elections in September 2004,
the civic group had to adjust its goals according to the situation. Shocked by the scale of
fraud and its blatant nature, Pora activists realized that they were trying to accomplish
too much in a short period of time.157 Instead they decided to re-focus their efforts more
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narrowly to fight state propaganda through mass actions and placed a greater emphasis
on recruiting people for possible mobilization.
To summarize, because of the proximity to its target audience, Pora instinctively
found a niche among those who yearned for change, but were either shut out or
disaffected by the political process. It began tapping into this audience with a wide array
of methods that relied on its core principle of nonviolence and sought to attract public
attention. The shift in the mission from awareness to mobilization and protests speaks
positively of Pora's ability to assess the situation after the first round of voting and sense
the changing public mood.

Funding and sustaihability
Pora and its leaders were able to overcome the usual pathologies of the Ukrainian
nonprofit sector by successfully securing funds from numerous domestic sources.
However, in the matters of financial accountability and transparency, the group
continued to display problems similar to other NGOs.
At the beginning, the organization survived on some seed money that was
available from the Freedom of Choice coalition, headed by one of the Pora leaders Vlad
Kaskiv.158 Because his NGO was well known from previous election cycles, Kaskiv
could secure some funding from the Marshall Fund and the Freedom House to begin
initial training activities, like the summer camp in Crimea/However, all talk about
sustained American support for the group seems to be just a myth. Both foreign donors
in Ukraine and Pora activists indicated how wary the former were of being perceived to
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have any close association with the group.

Any institutionalized contact became

especially radioactive after the government started pursuing a vigorous campaign to
portray Pora as extremist and violent.
Lacking access to external funds, Pora had to turn inward and focus on possible
domestic sources of support. Its financial base consisted of contributions and in-kind
donations from medium and small businesses as well as ordinary citizens who contacted
Pora activists through the phone numbers provided on street leaflets.160 Each group was
drawn to Pora for different reasons. Businesses sensed that a large-scale effort to
redistribute property in favor of the Donetsk oligarchic clan was already underway. Its
ruthlessness and breadth offered a preview of what would yet to come, if Viktor
Yanukovych won. Middle-class Ukrainians understood that their cosmopolitan ambitions
would be cut short if Ukraine obtained the image of a European pariah, akin to Belarus.
Many also suspected that under the new regime, they would have to become serfs to
oligarchs to maintain any semblance of good living standards.
What pushed all these social groups to help Pora was the government's zeal in
besmirching the civic organization. The surreal tales of Pora activists being trained by
former Vietnam War veterans on urban warfare only further confirmed the opinion that
Pora was the real thing. Otherwise, the Kuchma regime would not have wasted so much
airtime and propaganda talent on something it deemed benign (e.g. the traditionally
"oppositional" Communist Party).161
At the same time, the evidence provided by Pora activists makes it clear that the
group did poorly in terms of planning their funding. The initial intention was that Vlad
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Kaskiv would use his connections within the donor community to generate grant money.
By summer, it became apparent that foreign support was not forthcoming for a number
of reasons.

While in July-August the organization was so cash-starved that activists

had to pay for cell phones from their own money, by the end of the election campaign
(October-December 2004), it was overwhelmed by donations from citizens and
businesses. It was then when Pora acquired a powerful financier, David Zhvania, who
openly defected to join Yushchenko and began sponsoring the group. In the wake of the
demonstrations at the Maidan, the group opened an improvised office at a local cafe
downtown Kyiv where supporters of the Orange revolution could stop by and donate
funds for residents of the Orange tent city. Evhen Zolotariov, the other Pora leader,
acknowledged that soon they had more money than they could use.163
Like many Ukrainian NGOs, Pora's leaders also did not institute clear fund
allocation and reporting procedures. At first, this did not seem to be a problem since
there were no funds to report about. The situation turned one hundred and eighty degrees
in the fall with the deluge of public and business support. To this day, it remains unclear
what the extent of contributions from each sector of the society was and, more
importantly, where it went. The lack of financial transparency continues to provide a
propitious ground for conspiracy theories, alleging clandestine foreign backing of the
group by the Soros Foundation in Ukraine and the United Nations Development
Program.164 In addition, the group's domestic foes, especially among former
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disenchanted members, assert that the top leadership (including Kaskiv and Zolotariov)
might have appropriated the leftover of the funds donated during the demonstrations.165
To conclude, though the potential of Pora to fundraise among the Ukrainian
public powerfully attests to its broad appeal, the inability to manage money in a
transparent and responsible manner underlies a bigger problem. Pora's strong rootedness
in the Ukrainian society also brought a cavalier attitude toward money that many
Ukrainians continue to carry from the Soviet times - "everything that belongs to a
collective belongs to me."
Donor influence
Regardless of the widely held assumption about the West funding the Ukrainian
revolution by supporting Pora, the influence of international donors on the group was
limited and sporadic. Three reasons can be provided to explain that.
First, as the government was ratcheting up its rhetoric against Pora, many donors
decided to stay away from the group. Their decision was driven by multiple factors.
They feared that any cooperation might provoke the Kuchma regime to suspend their
own activities and presence in the country. Some observers in Ukraine and Georgia point
out that donors were able to recognize the benefit of citizen-driven protest groups only in
retrospect.166 Pora (like Kmara in Georgia) was a completely new creature on the
domestic civic scene. It did not quite fit the standard understanding of an advocacy NGO
with its sedentary emphasis on education and glossy publications. Neither could it be
branded as a political party, because it did not run for office. Pora's edgy, "in-your-face"
tactics of work made international funders even more leery to get involved with an
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organization that was so volatile and unpredictable. It represented people's power at its
raw and produced the same cautiousness with which donors treated "people movements"
during the Cold War.167 On one hand, they were willing to support a genuine display of
citizens' participation. On the other, they were wary of its larger political consequences
(i.e. large-scale regional instability). Another factor had to do with priorities. Many
donors admitted that they (and their headquarters in Washington, DC) felt it was time to
throw support behind Viktor Yushchenko who was the first viable oppositional candidate
in a long time. Spending funding and political capital on Pora was seen as both
dangerous and wasteful.
Second, because of the previous rationales Pora developed a different pattern of
relations with donors. Since any donor funding would come with strict conditions, the
group sought exclusively methodological and technical assistance.169 For instance, it
used grants from the Marshal Fund and the Freedom House to conduct activist
training.170 If donors could not provide direct financial assistance, it participated in their
joint activities. Seeking to enhance its cooperation with Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine,"
especially at the regional level, Pora turned to NDI to organize an informal training
where members of both organizations could meet and get to know each other.171
Otherwise, for its major programmatic activities the group relied almost exclusively on
domestic funds, which vitiated possible foreign leverage.
In the end, many Pora activists and outside observers suggest that the lack of
heavy donor involvement made a number of unexpectedly positive contributions. It
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provided an early test of survival, thereby pushing the group's ability to come through to
the limits. Whereas many Ukrainian civic organizations spent years in the greenhouse of
foreign funding and ultimately never made it to the outside alive, Pora was forced to face
a post-donor reality fairly quickly. The absence of foreign grants made the group's
activists think harder of how to appeal to ordinary citizens and be more persistent in
seeking public support.
With no financial backing, it also had no content-related strings attached.
Therefore, many of Pora's activities, which mocked the Ukrainian authorities
mercilessly, m would not have been imaginable if it had any foreign funding for they
were too risky and provocative for donors to finance.
Finally, as mentioned before, Ukrainian civil society was a developed sector.
Thanks to the previous years of infrastructural investments and seed grants, Pora had
some fellow organizations (most prominently the Freedom of Choice coalition) to help it
weather financial dry spells.
To summarize, though Pora received some donor funding for training purposes, it
failed to secure any continuous foreign support for its edgy programmatic activities. The
lack of donor enthusiasm stemmed from the political atmosphere on the ground, Pora's
non-conventional nature and a limited pool of grant resources. In the end, having no
foreign backing proved to be a blessing, for it enabled the organization to seek domestic
support.
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Membership
Members of the organization can be broadly divided into two groups, which
encompassed "little Ukrainians" (as Viktor Yushchenko lovingly called the ordinary
folk) and urban would-be elites.
The first group was older, mostly male and over 35 years old. Its participants
came from small towns in Central and Western Ukraine and had some previous
"combat" experience by taking part in the 2001 protests of "Ukraine Without
Kuchma."

They joined Pora mostly for two reasons. The first had to do with the sense

of patriotism. Sociological studies widely confirm that inhabitants in these regions of
Ukraine are more patriotic than those from the heavily Russified East and South.174
Many of them never perceived Russian-speaking Kuchma as a true steward of the
Ukrainian nation. Extensive spread of the Russian capital throughout Ukraine left little
doubt in their mind that Ukraine was heading for another period of colonization. Fueling
the feelings of patriotic indignation was the gut sense of injustice. Living deep in the
Ukrainian heartland, they were far away from the glamour of Kyiv or other financial
hubs (like Donetsk or Dnipropetrovsk) where ordinary people could get spillovers of the
economic growth. Instead, all they saw during the Kuchma decade was impoverishment,
unemployment and massive labor migration of their family and relatives to the European
Union in search of a better life. This group, mostly known as Black Pora, became the
working horse of the organization. It made up the crowd during demonstrations,
populated the Orange tent city and stood in freezing temperatures on the Maidan. Their

Soboleva, Zolotariov.
Panina.

tenacity and grit came from one simple fact - the life was so bad that they had little to
lose.
Contrary to them, the second group had a lot at stake in 2004. It consisted of
urban and highly educated young professionals who matured in already independent
Ukraine. Though each articulated a different reason for joining Pora (i.e. a concern for
the fairness of elections, the state of Ukrainian democracy, and support for
Yushchenko's ideals), underneath it all was a basic worry about their future in a wouldbe authoritarian Ukraine.175 Like Pora's middle-class supporters, they realized that no
good would hold for independent-minded, career-oriented individuals in a country where
success is doled out based on oligarchic connections and loyalty. Known as Yellow Pora,
this group became the core of leadership and generated ideas and activities that formed
the public image of the organization.
Pora began recruiting members long before it emerged. The initial wave of
recruitment relied on a simple principle of networking. Those interested in the ideas of
civic activism took part in a series of seminars on leadership skills that were organized
and funded by the Westminster and Alfred Muller Foundations in October 2003 - April
2004.176 At these events, future Pora members identified people who shared similar
opinions and values about the political situation. Though, as the interviews reveal, the
selection was informal, it was also fairly rigorous. Olha Aivazovska says Pora usually
picked one to three people out of thirty participants in a seminar. She asserts that
selectiveness reflected not simply elitism, but an intention to choose real believers
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among those who often go to donor events because they are free of charge and provide a
break from the work routine.
The second round of recruitment relied heavily on grass-root organizing.
Borrowing the term from the 17th century Ukrainian Cossacks, Pora activists divided
Ukraine into 78 "kushs" (translated as a bush) and proceeded to establish a small cell in
each of them.177 Later on, this regional division became blurred. Trying to attract as
many students as possible, Pora allowed a group of activists to form a "bush" in a
university, as long as it had enough people.
The government's over-reaction to the civic group produced a powerful countereffect. The aura of danger, secrecy and adventurism, which infused its public image,
became a magnet for the previously disaffected and passive youth.179 By September
2004, when Pora was rolling out its most popular initiatives, like "The Tour in Stripes,"
joining the group gave one the ultimate status of being "cool." It is estimated that Pora
had between 20,000 - 30,000 active members throughout the 2004 presidential
180

campaign.
Given the seeming ease with which it was able to attract participants, one
wonders how many of them joined for either superficial reasons of being fashionable or
for practical considerations to advance their career (should Yushchenko win, of course).
Persistent inquires on the issue provide a positive result that further strengthens the
argument of Pora's societal embeddedness.
Because Pora did not pay its activists, the monetary incentive (which usually
persuades a lot of unhappy NGO members to stay) was moot. Though being in the group
177
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was considered cool among peers, university and law enforcement authorities, not to
mentioned concerned parents, did not share the same opinion. Pora activists were
regularly harassed by the government and often had to support financially their
membership related activities, Diuk accounts that about 355 activists were arrested
throughout the campaign,181 and on October 15 Pora's office and private apartments of
its activists were raided by the police.
So why did they stay? One of the reasons has to do with the intensity of
involvement. Unlike other civic groups, which often turn into debating societies, Pora
1 83

leaders sought to retain people by keeping them busy.

Immediately upon joining, new

members became engaged in small, but publicly visible activities. As if to confirm their
expectations of danger, they were asked to post anti-government leaflets in public places
at night. The other reason for members' retention lay in the internal workings of the
group. For many activists, Pora's lateral structure made it possible to have their voices
heard for the first time. This point brings us to the relationship between members and
leaders.
Leaders and members
If there was a point in my interviews that members were insistent on me getting
right, it was about a special pattern of relations between Pora members and leaders. The
group's organizational structure, they emphasized, was fundamentally different from that
of a typical Ukrainian NGO. According to the sketched profile of the Ukrainian
nonprofit sector at the beginning of this chapter, many civic groups were strong at the
181
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top, but weak at the bottom. Recognizing this drawback and the fact that mobilization
would be impossible without strong grassroots, Pbra leaders proceeded to establish a
new pattern.
First, the organization had no formal leadership, meaning that no internal
hierarchy was established. The decision produced double benefits. On one hand, it
prevented endless fights over titles and ladders of subordination. Instead the focus was
placed on what specific tasks each person (or a group of people) would have to
accomplish. On the other hand, it significantly decreased the danger of Pora's collapse
under possible repressions. Had it adopted a traditional hierarchical internal structure, a
quick arrest of the top echelon of its activists would have meant a severe loss of
institutional capacity. At best, the group would have taken weeks to recover. At worst, it
would have descended into the chaos of succession battles for the leadership "crown."184
Second, even with the lateral structure Pora managed to establish a clear division
of tasks thanks to a massive devolution of responsibilities. While the core group of
twenty activists in Kyiv was in charge of developing thematic messages and activities,
their implementation was placed completely on the shoulders of regional and local
members. Each region would have a group of 10-12 people. They each knew another
five people in the "bushes" to pass down the message and the strategies to implement it,
who, in turn, relied on a similar principle of communication. This method assured a
number of things. The most important of them was, of course, a sense of ownership and
individual responsibility. Activists felt it was incumbent upon each of them to make sure
that the message would be communicated and that Pora members would show up for a
planned event. The principle helped expand organizational ranks as people further down
184
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the communication lane would seek to bring new activists who could recruit others. The
fact that each activist knew personally a limited number of people ensured that a)
regional "bushes" would remain intact, even if one or several members are arrested and
forced to reveal the names of all Pora activists they knew and b) government
provocateurs would have a more difficult time penetrating the organization.185
In the end, what Pora members called fancifully the "network" principle is
reminiscent more of a "snowballing" method, used by many researchers to conduct
participant recruitment in unpropitious environments. Like a social scientist, who studies
a politically or culturally sensitive issue, Pora knew that to get involved in acts of civic
protest and disobedience in a semi-authoritarian Ukraine, people would have to be
approached by someone they knew - their close friends.
At the same time, the lateral organizational structure presented a number of
problems. First, the core group of activists in Kyiv had little control over the
implementation of their messages and strategies. As it turns out, they worked great in
some places and failed in others, particularly in the East and Donetsk (where Pora did
not even have a branch).186 Second, with members being so loosely connected, gathering
feedback and making improvements was almost impossible. That is why, in my
interviews some activists found it hard to suggest what should have been done
differently in terms of activities, because they did not have an idea what went wrong in
the first place.
To conclude this discussion, Pora was right to rely on "snowballing" to expand
its membership ranks. Since equality among current and would-be participants is a key
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prerequisite for the method to work, the group managed to ameliorate significantly both
leadership contestation and threats to its survival from authorities. Regardless of the
weaknesses that a highly lateral and loose organizational structure creates, it seems to
have been the proper approach for a short-term campaign, such as the 2004 presidential
elections.

Normative transfers
While Pora activists learned extensively from domestic and foreign experiences
of democratization, they received little formalized or systematic training from foreign
donors or groups. The group's normative transfers can be divided into three categories from fellow civic organizations outside of Ukraine, from international donors and from
interactions among its own members.
First, a lot of media and public attention has so far been paid to Pora's
cooperation with Georgia's Kmara and Serbia's Otpor. The attention proved so
overwhelming as to create a worldwide backlash against civic groups and democracy
promoters in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.187 The inclination to
exaggerate links between these groups is natural for both supporters and critics of "color
revolutions." While the former attempt to uncover the evidence of effective norm
transference, the latter seek to bolster their case of these events being a Western
orchestrated conspiracy.188
In reality, the record does not match the hype. In August 2004, Otpor members
came to the Crimean summer camp, provocatively titled "Pora [It is time] to Wake Up,"
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to teach three hundred activists the techniques of non-violent resistance and talk about
their experiences in prevailing against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.189 Some
members of Black Pora, a more radical wing of the organization, stayed in contact with
Kmara, frequently soliciting its friendly advice. At least two activists from Otpor and
Kmara were in Ukraine during the Orange revolution.190
However, Ukrainian activists indicate that the main contributions from both
groups were methodologies and an inspiration for change. Otpor and Kmara acted as
classic political entrepreneurs. They sensed that a set of factors191 created propitious
conditions for their skills and knowledge and brought them to Ukraine. The interviewed
Pora members harbored no illusion that Otpor's or Kmara's friendly advice was no more
than a toolbox, which would have to be adapted to the domestic reality. They recognized
that Ukraine's size, population and national mentality presented a unique set of factors
that vitiated any literary replication.192 One activist was keen to note that along with
young people from Serbia and Georgia, members of Belarus' "Zubr" and Russia's
"Smena" came to Ukraine during the Orange demonstrations to see first-hand how
"Ukrainians were making democracy."
Casual statements from Pora and Kmara leaders further diminish the claim about
a closely-knit web of cooperation and a mutual understanding that existed among these
civic groups. When asked about ties with foreign civic groups, Evhen Zolotariov of Pora
mentioned that the group relied a lot more on the experiences of Polish Solidarnost than
Serbian or Georgian activists, because of Poland's proximity to Ukraine and shared
189
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features of the national character.194 He also added it was clear to him that both Kmara
and Otpor were externally conspired, while Pora was self-organized. Levan Ramishlivi,
Chairman of the Liberty Institute and one of the co-founders of Kmara, noted that,
because Pora was propped up and financed by Orange oligarchs (like David Zhvania), its
freedom of action was limited.

The fact that the leaders of these organizations were so

profoundly misinformed about the other group attests that any contacts between them
were rather limited.
Second, immediately after its launch in April 2004, Pora turned to representatives
of international donor organizations for trainings. Because the response was lukewarm
(for the reasons already mentioned), it had to train the first wave of activists in summer
2004 partially with the help of Otpor and partially through its own capacity. At the early
stages of the presidential campaign, the group received a seminar on communication
strategies from the National Democratic Institute that in practical terms was aimed at
brining together regional activists of Pora and Our Ukraine. However, further assistance
from NDI had to be quickly suspended after pro-governmental newspapers ran stories of
Americans training Pora.196
Third, after the heightened government scrutiny had made Pora an "untouchable"
among foreign donors, the organization relied on its own capacities to train activists.
Here again the overall level of development in the Ukrainian nonprofit sector was a
helpful factor. Having been a beneficiary of consistent Western funding in the first
decade of independence, it had many activists who have previously received trainings
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from the National Democratic Institute or the Counterpart International Alliance. Thus,
Pora could rely on the existing domestic pool of expertise.
Most internal trainings were focused on a set of skills and attitudes that members
should have before fieldwork. In this regard, the group's normative background was
shaped by Gene Sharp's book on democracy and non-violent resistance.197 Its cult-like
status provides a perfect illustration of how a norm, advocated by an external source,
was quickly absorbed, because the conditions for its domestic acceptance were ripe.
Driven by the recognition that Ukrainian society would never accept violent resistance,
Pora activists were looking for an alternative path to victory and Sharpe's book offered
1 no

just that.

It became such a must-read for any activist that some Pora members jokingly

compared it to Mao's "Red Book." Other components of member trainings usually
offered details on how activities and communication would be organized logistically as
well as some helpful advice on interacting with law enforcement and state authorities.
All content-related ideas were generated domestically either through internal
brainstorming or by developing previously successful projects of Pora activists.199 This
made them original and appealing. For instance, Pora's manifesto combines pragmatism
and patriotism and reads like a piece of literary work. Engaging in a wordplay with the
group's name (Pora, meaning "It is Time"), it proclaims, "Pora to stand straight or fall
down. Pora to believe or forget. Pora to love or hate. Pora to fight or betray."200 The text
provides a perfect illustration of the ideological core of the group - an emphasis on
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action and change, disdain for ambiguities and compromises, and a penchant for
radicalism.
To summarize, while Pora's interactions with foreign donors and civic groups
were not as dense or consistent as previously believed, the norm of nonviolent resistance
still managed to become the group's overarching normative paradigm thanks to a fusion
between external inputs and internal dynamics. Secondary norms of Pora's structure and
activities were determined solely by its own members. Because many of them were
experienced civic leaders, these internal normative transfers were much richer, much
more intensive and much more successful in the end.

Inter-NGO cooperation
Pora's major NGO partner was the Freedom of Choice coalition, which enabled
the group to weather financial dry spells in summer 2004. As for other civic
organizations, Pora preferred ad hoc cooperation on complementary initiatives to
formalized NGO coalitions that would inevitably invite a fight over a division of
responsibilities.
The arrangement worked especially well on the regional and local levels.
Because Pora had a loose structure and did not pay the majority of its members, it was
able to attract a wider audience of civic activists from other organizations. Many of them
decided to join Pora to add a more edgy part to the "desk" activities of their NGOs. They
were also able to pull their resources to assist with the group's "fieldwork."201
In general, Pora's allies in the nonprofit world can be divided into three broad
categories. The first and ideologically closest encompassed friendly youth-driven groups,
201
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such as the "Student Wave" and student unions in colleges and universities. The second
was patriotic organizations, like the "Clean Ukraine" and the "Young Prosvita." They
supported Yushchenko and were attracted to Pora because its activities aimed at raising
national self-consciousness. The last category consisted of "professional" nonprofit
organizations that had a different target audience or focus, but shared a similar goal with
Pora. For instance, Znau (Know) was a darling of Western projects on election assistance
and education. Like Pora, it wanted to tell Ukrainians about their rights. However, it did
not want to cross the bridge from education to active advocacy. In another example,
GVU and Pora activists in the regions cooperated because they shared the same political
space and were concerned about the same subject - violations of people's constitutional
rights. Unsurprisingly, many Pora members acted as CVU observers on the day of
elections.
To conclude, there were a number of reasons that contributed to Pora having such
a diverse range of informal partners. One was the nature of its membership. The "comeas-you-please" approach meant that members were free to get involved whenever they
felt their help was needed.202 As a result, activists of other nonprofits did not view their
participation in Pora as a threat to their organizational loyalty. The other reason is in its
broadly defined goals that made them complementary to other NGOs. Finally, both Pora
activists and external experts acknowledge that the overall level of civil society
development in Ukraine helped the group net a lot of partners. In the decade since
independence, Ukraine experienced a boom in the quantity (but not always quality) of
civil society groups. Given the sheer number of civic associations, Pora had a large pool
of nonprofits within which it could attract a few that were ideologically similar and
202
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organizationally capable. In addition, it was inadvertently assisted by the gradual
radicalization of Ukrainian civil society as a result of increasing authoritarian tendencies
in the Kuchma government.

Pora and political parties
At the beginning of Pora's existence, there was little formalized cooperation
between the group and oppositional parties, most prominently Yushchenko's "Our
Ukraine" and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko. Cognizant of this reality, the National
Democratic Institute organized a joint training session to introduce activists from Pora
and "Our Ukraine" to each other. Due to the publicity generated by this event, NDI could
no longer play a facilitative role, and most inter-organizational contacts between Pora
and "Our Ukraine" became confided to the level of regional members who exchanged
information and political gossip.204
With few exceptions among "Our Ukraine" rank and file, oppositional leaders
(including Yushchenko and Tymoshenko) saw Pora at best as a promoter of their ideas
(which had to be subsumed in order not to waste scarce resources) and at worst as a
noisy distraction from the real campaign (which had to be neutralized). It is not
surprising that after the first round of voting, Viktor Yushhchenko met with Pora
activists and suggested they demote their tent city downtown Kyiv and instead "go into
the masses" to encourage people to vote.
During the course of events between the first and second tour, Pora had to give
up any pretense of civic neutrality and openly ally itself with the opposition. On October
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15, first attempts to coordinate activities between Pora and the opposition bloc "Syla
Narodu" (backed by Yushehenko) began.

Defending this decision, Pora activists

argued that the magnitude of violations, their blatant execution and government
harassment of critical voices left the group no choice.207 In order to fulfill its raison
d'etre - free and fair elections, they had to support Yushehenko whose victory
represented the will of Ukrainian people.
It took the second round of voting to challenge the attitude to Pora at least among
leading "Our Ukraine" officials. Yushehenko's political bloc needed to generate the first
wave of protests in order to forestall the impending legitimization of Viktor
Yanukovych's fraudulent win through domestic and international acquiescence.208 Time
was a precious commodity. It was then when "Our Ukraine" leaders began to act in close
coordination with Pora and divided responsibilities over most critical projects (e.g.
mobilization, picketing, etc). My interviews with Pora activists further undermine any
suggestions of the "plan" that was allegedly available to either (or both) side to start
public unrest immediately after the presidential elections (no matter what an outcome
was). As it turns out, neither Pora nor "Our Ukraine" members planned any actions after
the voting on 21 November. Confirming this finding, other accounts note of a small
gathering by Pora activists at the Maidan of Independence that day, which quickly
dissipated by nightfall.209 Most active regional members purchased train tickets and left
for Kyiv, merely wishing to be at the center of any future events. Lacking funds and
instructions, the rest stayed home.210
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To conclude, the cooperation between Pora and "Our Ukraine" did not take any
systematic character until the final stages of the campaign. The prevalent view among
political party leaders and members that regards civil society as ancillary to politics
prevented deeper institutional collaboration. For some Pora activists, the situation did not
present a problem because the group and the party targeted different audiences. Others
believed it diminished possible joint effects as well as persuaded most ambitious Pora
activists to set up a separate political party shortly after the elections.

Influence in the public
There are continuing disagreements on the influence and recognition of Pora
among ordinary Ukrainians, which cannot be decisively resolved due to the dearth of
supporting statistical data. In a very conscious attempt to diminish the narrative of the
Western media, some international donors assert that at most 5 percent of Ukrainian
911

citizens knew about Pora.

They suggest that the attribution of the revolution's success

to Pora came as an after-thought. In public forums, TV talk shows and elite parlors,
many were wondering how the regime that was so seemingly strong and firm in its grip
on power as Kuchma's could collapse so spectacularly. In search for answers, Pora was
quickly identified as the main culprit, because of its colorful identity. In reality, the
skeptics insist, the group's influence on the course of events was minimal. To buttress
their position, they cite the organization's performance during the 2006 parliamentary
elections. Immediately after the Orange revolution, one of Pora's founders, Vlad Kaskiv,
decided to patent the group's trademark and organize a party under the same name. His
intention was clear - to capitalize on the popularity and name recognition that the
21
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Orange Revolution provided to Pora. The outcome was a crushing defeat. Pora, as a
party, garnered a mere 1.47 percent of voters, falling far below the required 5 percent
threshold to get into the Parliament.212 This result, the skeptics insist, proved that Pora
was not a household name as the Western media claim.
Optimists interpret the group's election performance differently. Pora got
i n

373,478 votes

- not a paltry amount for an organization that emerged in 2004 and

landed the 10th spot among political parties, whose leaders have been permanent fixtures
on the Ukrainian political landscape for the past decade. One thing, they say, is obvious.
Pora was no ordinary civic group, because few of those attempted to enter the political
arena in their own right. The amount of gathered votes is even more impressive given the
fact that in 2004 Pora did not have any positive publicity in the media. Furthermore, Pora
members point to their own research that showed 93 percent recognition of the group.214
To summarize, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Previous media reports in
the West and conspiracy theorists in Russia overplayed the influence of Pora in
Ukrainian society. Even Pora activists do not deny that their societal penetration was
rather low in the East and South of Ukraine - the core constituency of the Party of
Regions. At the same time, the group's performance during the 2006 parliamentary
elections (as the only quantitatively available indicator) shows that it had quite a lot of
supporters. The number of votes Pora received is especially impressive given the
competition it faced from such political giants as "Our Ukraine" and the Bloc of Yulia
Tymoshenko fighting for the same constituency of Ukrainian voters. It shows that the
group successfully dealt with the main problem of Ukrainian nonprofit organizations.
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The majority of them are widely known only in narrow circles of NGO leaders and
experts. It is without doubt that Pora's role in the events on the Maidan turned it into
from a simple civic group a visible actor on the domestic scene.

POPvA AND THE GRANGE REVOLUTION
On the eve of the Orange Revolution, Pora was a very young, but promising civic
group. Established only in April 2004, it managed to attract attention within various
segments of Ukrainian society through provocative and eye-catching activities. Though
Pora was certainly energetic and enthusiastic, its potential and capacity were not well
tested by time. It also stood out from other Ukrainian organizations because of its loose
organizational structure and non-conventional advocacy methods that were reminiscent
of those used by popular social movements rather than traditional nonprofit
organizations. Finally, what outweighed the relative short-term existence of Pora was its
impressive ability to tap into the dormant resources of Ukrainian civil society.

Pre-election goals and activities
Pora's goals were two-fold - to increase activism and political awareness among
Ukrainians, in particular young people, and to be prepared to defend the fairness of
elections if large-scale violations occurred.215
In appealing to the broad audience of Ukrainian citizens, the group was not alone.
It had to compete with political parties and other civic organizations. However, because
of the non-conventional nature of its activities and its clearly crafted message of protest,
Pora succeeded in finding its own niche, which included "the disenfranchised and the
215
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angry."

The former came from the educated, urban youth who stayed aside from

domestic political processes in the past. The latter consisted of the former middle-class
who had to subsist in small towns throughout central and western Ukraine.
To emphasize its preference for grass-root activities and difference from regular
"programs" of other nonprofits, Pora called its initiatives "fieldwork."217 A team of 1012 activists in Kyiv was put in charge of generating ideas. However, thanks to Pora's
horizontal structure, it was not alone in this task. Many good suggestions were often
picked up from regional or local "bushes."218
The organization faced peculiar challenges in implementation. Its colorful
initiatives had to be tested informally and implemented simultaneously throughout the
country. Any overt pilot testing would alert authorities to act preventatively elsewhere.
Though the main challenge was for an idea to work well the first time, the biggest
reward was an element of surprise and shock (at how well organized Pora was)
experienced by authorities. If the content of Pora's actions and posters could be
summarized in one word, it would be - originality. Their messages wisely combined
popular folklore images, caustic humor with memorable slogans.
The obstacles in implementation and a complete media boycott generated a
curious blending of most rudimentary and most advanced strategies of outreach. Street
activities became the first tool to attract attention of inadvertent by-standers who would
then spread the word to their friends and relatives. The second was a return to the archaic
methods of publicity. Instead of glossy brochures that often became the benchmark of
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NGO development, Pora posted leaflets on buildings and in public transportation. The
task required persistence and dedication. Activists faced a continuous battle with local
police that was ordered to take off any provocative material during the day only to find it
91Q

re-appear in the morning.

Finally, the third tool was the Internet where the group

provided an instant response to the daily flow of the campaign in the manner to which
people could relate.
To achieve its first goal of raising political awareness, Pora sought to undermine
990

the government narrative.

Its first activity was designed to poke holes in President

Kuchma's argument that his regime brought a welcome economic stability. Posters
appeared on many streets asking people to define what living under Kuchma meant for
them ("Kuchmism is...?"). By leaving the question open, Pora challenged people to
think independently and raised their curiosity about possible answers. Within a week,
new posters proclaimed, "Kuchmism is Destitute, Unemployment, Corruption,
Crime."221
Another activity, "The Tour in Stripes," and a series of posters "Ukraina v.
Urkaina" pointed to the criminal past of the pro-governmental candidate Viktor
Yanukovych and a prison-like future of Ukraine under his regime. "The Tour in Stripes"
became an immediate hit. Borrowing its title from one of the most beloved Soviet
comedies, Pora activists marched on main streets of many cities wearing a prison
uniform (with vertical black and white stripes). A series of posters soon appeared that
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contrasted a folkloric image of Ukraine with what it could become under would-be
President Yanukovych.222
Finally, Pora websites223 proved effective in combating government propaganda
and official censorship. They became one of the key sources for an alternative narrative
about the presidential campaign with stories about official abuse of resources or
incidences of opposition harassment throughout the country. Most importantly, they
turned into an outlet for people to make fun of the regime. By sharing anecdotes and
jokes about Kuchma or Yanukovych, people were able to express their frustration and
see that the authorities were not omnipotent. For instance, the footage of the prime
minister "sustaining injuries" after eggs were thrown at him at one of the campaign
stops

became the butt of Internet jokes, which soon found their way into the public.
The second goal of Pora activities was to emphasize the importance of the

presidential elections as a turning point for Ukraine. Therefore, between August 1 and
November 21, 2004 Pora pursued a vigorous multi-step informational campaign.225
Its message was simple, yet appealing. By framing the fairness of elections in
terms of human dignity, the group pointed to the disrespect that the government showed
for ordinary people, by believing they were stupid enough to buy the falsified election
outcome as their own will. The theme stroke a cord with Pora's target group, who felt
hoodwinked by post-Soviet privatization, aggrieved by economic injustices and angered
by their political marginalization. Furthermore, the organization was successful in
increasing the urgency and the categorical tone of its message with each step of the
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election campaign - from "Pora to Wake Up!" in August to "Vote or Lose!" in
October.226
In addition to Pora's work, government tactics and rhetoric were reinforcing the
group's message, by adding the fuel of arrogance to the fire of public frustration. In
interviews, President Kuchma said, because of their inherent passivity, the Ukrainian
people would not be able to mount resistance similar to Georgians in 2003. The progovernment candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, compared any opponents to silly goats (a
Ukrainian pejorative for an idiot). Pora immediately responded with a poster, asking
people to prove him that they were not "goats."227
Recognizing a high probability of fraud, the group distributed materials that
called upon people to come together at specified locations after voting. Such gatherings
would set in motion the initial stage for mobilization and would deter authorities from
proceeding brazenly and hastily to acknowledge the results as legal.
To summarize, Pora's pre-election work provided one of the few visible outlets
for criticism and open dissent, thereby forestalling official efforts to frame and structure
the presidential campaign to the government's liking. Its outreach strategy was built on a
sequence of steps designed to activate public consciousness and stir public activism for a
possible action.

See Appendix III.2.
Ibid.
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Mobilization
Contrary to the widely held assertion that Pora' s sole goal was to foment
revolutionary unrest, the group did surprisingly little in terms of drawing up specific
plans for mobilization as well as forecasting scenarios of post-election responses.
Some activists and external observers have noted that the attempt to cover too
many areas (i.e. awareness-raising, campaign response, street "fieldwork") during the
election campaign spread its resources too thin and ultimately distracted it from properly
99 o

preparing for active mobilization during the revolution.

For instance, the organization

had very few opportunities to test its general framework of civic participation during
four local by-elections.
Furthermore, Pora was discouraged from pursuing overt mobilization strategies
by the opposition. After the first round of elections, Viktor Yushehenko called upon its
activists to disband their tent city at Kontraktova Ploshcha - the location of Kyiv Mohyla
Academy, one of the oldest and most liberal universities in Ukraine. His concern was
that an overly antagonistic behavior would give the government a pretense to cancel
elections altogether or provoke violence. Still sensing the need to respond to the
unfolding political crisis somehow, Pora organized a campaign to monitor voter lists and
later started its famous "Orange Wave" - a large-scale action to distribute orangecolored ribbons, scarves and other symbols of the Yushehenko campaign.230
The belief that the Kuchma government would honor the will of voters was dying
hard. In my interview, Olha Aivazovska, a Pora activist, acknowledged a somewhat
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bipolar perception on a possible course of events.

On one hand, large-scale fraud was

seen as inevitable, especially after the violent mayoral elections in a Carpathian city of
Mukachevo. On the other, many members kept holding on to the idealist hope that the
government would not dare falsify the election or use violence under "the watchful eye
of the international community." Because of these mutually exclusive opinions, neither
Pora nor Our Ukraine was completely prepared for the reality and the aftermath of the
second round of elections.
In the evening of November 21, Ukraine's Central Election Commission
produced Soviet-like percentages of support for Viktor Yanukovych in the East of
Ukraine, which tilted the victory in his favor. Under these circumstances, the ability to
launch protests became necessary to attract a critical mass of fence sitters among
politicians and ordinary citizens, produce a chain reaction within the larger society and
ultimately disrupt a quick legitimization of results.
At that point, Pora and "Our Ukraine" began working together to mobilize their
supporters and stage demonstrations at the country's main square - the Maidan of
Independence. The lack of prior preparation was soon apparent. Neither group had a
sufficient number of people whose participation would give the demonstrations
necessary credibility. Though some Pora activists went to Kyiv at the end of the election,
the majority stayed at home either having no instructions on what to do or having no
money to buy train tickets.232 As Diuk recounts, five thousand people gathered at the
Maidan that day, but went home by nightfall.233

Aivazovska
Zolotariov.
Diuk.

The first wave of protesters would not have been able to get to Kyiv on time
anyway, because the government delayed all trains going from major regional centers to
the capital. To save the situation, Pora turned to university students and university strike
committees, many of which were set up a short while ago.234 The strategy worked well
because of the previously established system of communication. On Monday, November
22, 2004 Pora activists were leading thousands of students from Kyiv's largest National
Polytechnic and National Shevchenko Universities to the Maidan of Independence where
they met a growing number of Kyivites. As the day went on, the crowd increased to over
two hundred thousand people. This was the beginning of the Orange Revolution and an
early sign of the end to the Kuchma regime.
To summarize, in the immediate aftermath of the election Pora was not
logistically prepared to mobilize its supporters because of discouragement from "Our
Ukraine" and its own widely focused pre-election activities. However, the group was
able to change the situation thanks to its connections and popularity among Kyiv
university students who were able to mobilize quickly and sustain the nascent
demonstration at the Maidan. In addition, because Pora had a strong presence in other
regional universities, its activists in major student hubs began organizing their local
"maidans," thereby turning the Orange Revolution into a nation-wide event.235

Assessment of the performance
The emerging evidence on the influence of Pora produces a two-dimensional
picture. On one side, during the Orange Revolution Pora on its own was not as

Demes and Forbrig, 95; Pora, "The Chronology of Events."
Aivazovska; Demes and Forbrig, 95.

paramount of a player as its public reputation led many to believe. On the other, the
group found a unique niche for civil society in quickly unfolding revolutionary events by
having dedicated activists who were able to recruit others, organize and sustain their
involvement for general and specific purposes. As my previous evaluation of CVU
revealed, it is important to distinguish between involvement in actual events and general
contributions to the revolutionary process. From this perspective, Pora performed well
on both counts.
First, its deep roots within the student community of Kyiv and close relations
with "Our Ukraine" enabled an expedient mobilization of the former and an effective
coordination of activities with the latter. By housing a readily available pool of
demonstrators, Pora's tent city on Khreshchatyk (near the Maidan) was a physical
remainder of unrelenting public pressure on the Kuchma government to give in to
Yushchenko's demands for a new election.236 Pora's well-attended and noisy protests at
key government buildings instilled a sense of the opposition's inevitable victory. The
national government was brought to a standstill when the group picketed the Cabinet of
Ministers, Central Election Commission and the Presidential Administration. At his own
dacha, President Kuchma had to contend with a continuous drumbeat organized by Pora
activists who were determined to make his life unbearable.237
In effect, the group contributed to the two factors critical for success - the breadth
and depth of support for the revolution. In regard to the former, a sheer number of
demonstrators persuaded many fence sitters in the public and political establishment to
join Yushchenko. Kyiv major Oleksandr Omelchenko admitted that previously unseen
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crowds were a sign of the change in public attitude and prompted him to side with the
• •

238

opposition.
As for the latter, the prevalent opinion was that large-scale demonstrations could
not be sustained over a long period of time. The sentiment was definitely shared by the
government. Conversations released by the New York Times showed the Ukrainian
political elite in panic.

Realizing that demonstrators could no longer be ignored or

neutralized, President Kuchma grew so anxious as to seek advice from his equally
perplexed counterpart, Vladimir Putin.240 This piece of evidence serves to further
confirm the extent to which the perseverance of demonstrators proved surprising for all
political actors.
Second, speaking of the larger contribution of Pora to the revolution as a social
event, the group reawakened the generation of young Ukrainian who came of age since
the country's independence. Asking how they did it, Pora activists and external
observers give four reasons. First, from the beginning the organization had an open
mindset and actively searched for ideas that could attract young people and make them
active. In order to "click," it had to be oriented toward the external world and glue itself
to the host society. Second, the absence of organizational hierarchy helped avoid internal
rivalry and automatically created a lot of free space for diverse individuals and interests.
Third, Pora went right about choosing the content of their message (which had to do with
human dignity and liberty) and the methods to deliver it (which were nonviolent and
creative). Fourth, because Pora did not complete for donor funds, it also did not get
trapped in organizational mechanisms of the nongovernmental sector where the penchant
238
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for process often overwhelms the sight of goals. In the end, all these factors made Pora
and its story more accessible and more believable to people.
An opposite argument can be made that Pora was simply lucky to fall in the right
place (the semi-authoritarian Ukraine with public discontent) at the right time (critical
presidential elections). This is a true, but incomplete view, as it misses another critical
variable. When falling in the right time and at the right place, Pora was also of the right
shape in terms of its content and composition. In case there is any doubt that the group
represented "people power," former President Kuchma, no fan of Orange
revolutionaries, pejoratively labels it as the "lumpen resource."241 However, even he
cannot deny the role of civic activism in those events - "After the revolution, nobody
can tell that a Ukrainian is all about 'not in my backyard.' Civic institutions have been
activated. The country has matured." 242 As far as the content is concerned, Pora's
statement of principles243 and its supporting actions resonated with the society's mood
for fundamental changes, rejection of moral compromises and a willingness to cleanse
the Ukrainian power structure.

The organization was by any means not perfect. Because so much in Pora was
driven by passion, too little room was left for planning. This led to a number of other
mistakes. Qne of them had to do with fundraising strategies, which were driven at first
by the conventional wisdom among Ukraine nonprofits - to ask for money from donors.
Only when that approach failed, the group decided to target medium and small
businesses. The other drawback was the group's overly ambitious thinking. Formed at
241
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the beginning of 2004, it tried to do a variety of activities instead of concentrating on the
specifics of the 2004 elections. Narrowing the focus on those problems would have
brought better results, most importantly in terms of mobilization. The third mistake was
about its initial appeal, Founded by patriotic and pro-Ukrainian youth, it had a hard time
adjusting its image to appeal to Russian-speaking Ukrainians.244 The group did not have
a branch in Donetsk oblast (the homeland of Viktor Yanukovych). Some of its branches
in the East (the stronghold of the Party of Regions) were weak and disorganized. Finally,
Pora in its pre-revolutionary and revolutionary forms was suitable for short-term goals.
Its internal mechanics did not always assure control over the message and its
implementation. In its advocacy, it blurred the line between being a purely civic group
and a political party. Being at the borderline of civic and political societies, it was soon
forced to make a choice to which world it wanted to belong. As a result, immediately
after the revolution the group split into two - those who thought it was time to exert
influence in politics and those who thought Pora should continue engaging the
movement of the disappointed in peaceful and constructive civic activism.
To summarize we need to evaluate Pora's performance based on the indicators of
success - function and contribution. In terms of function, Pora did what it said it would
be - it empowered two previously apathetic audiences to defend the choice of Ukrainian
voters and made sure that the will of people could not be ignored. The group's
contribution to the Orange revolution was most critical in two stages - the initial
mobilization of protestors and the ability to sustain demonstrations around the clock,
mainly by setting up an Orange tent city. By this, it carved a niche for genuine political
participation of civil society during those important events. None of these achievements
244
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would have been possible if Pora had not been successful in establishing deep roots
within the Ukrainian society.

CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY: GEORGIA

The goal of this chapter is to assess the degree of embeddedness for two
Georgian nonprofit organizations - Kmara and ISFED. For this purpose, it will begin by
providing a general overview of the Rose Revolution as well as the contribution that
each group made to its success. It will then offer a detailed description of the formative
period for both organizations. In this section, a specific attention will be given to
Georgian civil society, as the knowledge about it will enhance our understanding of the
environment within which both NGOs were formed and had to operate. After offering a
composite portrait of the civil society, the research will trace the evolution and
maturation of Kmara and ISFED. The chapter will conclude with the successes and
failures that they had during the Rose Revolution, thereby setting stage for a more
comprehensive analysis in the last chapter.

ROSE REVOLUTION
Stakes and candidates
At the end of 2002, Georgia was gearing up for another parliamentary election.
The country already had four of them since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. While
change may not have been in the air, the sentiments of stagnation and frustration were
quite powerful. The disapproval of President Eduard Shevarnadze was staggeringly high
at 83 percent.1 Having lived under his rule for almost twenty-five years, many Georgians
1
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felt a palpable "Shevarnadze fatigue."2 And although the elections were not about his
performance (the next contest for presidency was not till 2005), the conduct and content
reflected the political reality that Shevarnadze built after bringing Georgia from the
abyss of the civil war in the early 1990s. By the end of his presidency, the country was
"a neo-patrimonialist state, in which notions of public accountability, constitutional
review and normative rules and standards of government played little role."4
Political forces that were running in the 2002 parliamentary election could be
divided (rather conditionally and broadly) into oppositional, pro-governmental and
neutral. The United National Movement, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, belonged to the
first camp. After parting ways with President Shevarnadze in 2001, Saakashvili
burnished his already strong credentials as a reformist. His work through the Tbilisi
City Council brought visible improvements to the nation's capital and unsubtly hinted at
his capacity to do similarly great things for the whole country.6 Then, there was a
coalition of Burdjanadze-Democrats, pulled together by the extremely popular Speaker
of the Georgian Parliament Nino Burdjanadze and David Zhvania, who (just like
Saakashvili) represented the breakaway faction of young reformers nurtured by
Shevarnadze. Regardless of personal tensions and leadership ambitions, both political
parties coordinated major activities during the campaign and in the course of the Rose
Revolution.
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The government put forward "For a New Georgia" bloc, led by Avtandiv
Jorbenadze and later by Vazha Lortkipanidze, both prominent and long-term members in
the Shevarnadze administration, and the Democratic Union for the Revival of Georgia,
backed by powerful leader of the country's Adjara region Asian Abashidze. Though the
former did not become a visible player until March-April 2003, it quickly earned itself a
bad reputation through affiliation with the unpopular president as well as unsubstantiated
statements, which accused the Georgian opposition of having Russian backing.
Abashidze's party never truly campaigned outside of Adjara, certain of an easy victory
in his own heavily controlled region.
The third group included such contenders as the Labor Party of Georgia, which
espoused populist and anti-globalist slogans,7 and the New Rights Party, which tried
hard to position itself as an alternative to the leftist National Movement. Both forces
preferred to play an independent role, resisting domestic and foreign attempts to form a
larger coalition of democratic parties.

Election campaign
At the beginning of the campaign, the opposition had very modest expectations to gain sufficient political visibility in a new parliament that would translate into a
momentum before the critical 2005 presidential elections.9 Recognizing the danger of
this opportunity, the government took numerous steps to foreclose it.

7
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The first of them was a battle over the composition of the Central Election
Commission. The official policy would effectively neuter the body with the majority of
members appointed by the President and delegated by Ajara leader Asian Abashidze.10
The issue gained such international prominence that the Georgian government received a
letter from Senator John McCain and a visit from former Shevarnadze's interlocutor Jim
Baker in July 2003. As a result of that visit, the Baker formula11 proposed a more fair
division of seats, but was later quietly discarded by the regime.12 In the end, the dispute
did more harm than good to the pro-governmental forces, by pushing Speaker Nino
Burdjanadze to side openly with the opposition.
Throughout the summer, the government continued to create obstacles to a fair
voting process. In August, it announced that the CEC would not have to provide a total
turnover of voters for several days after the elections. Soon it was discovered that 30-40
percent of voter lists had significant discrepancies that would in effect disenfranchise
large segments of the population. Though it is not clear whether the authorities were
completely at fault, the situation underscored a general state of the government's
weakness. Furthermore, it played into the hands of Saakashvili's National Movement
that sought to radicalize the discourse and broaden participation, especially outside of the
capital.14

'"Wheatley, 180.
The Baker formula envisioned that the national Central Election Commission would consist of 15 members. Its Chair would be
nominated by OSCE and appointed by the president. The president would also have the right to appoint 5 additional members. The
rest of the seats (9) will be divided between those oppositional parties that met three criteria: a) attained a four-percent threshold in
the last parliamentary elections; b) gained four percent in the Tbilisi City Council elections; c) had more than 100 seats in the country
as a whole. (The explanation is taken from David Usupashvili, "An Analysis of the Presidential and Parliamentary Election in
Georgia: A Case Study, November 2003-March 2004," Election Assessment in the South Caucasus (2003-2004) (Stockholm,
Sweden: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2004), 77, 79.)
12
Areshidze; Usupashvili, 82-85.
13
Areshidze,145.
"Kandelaki.
11

Last months of the campaign witnessed a predictable sharpening of rhetoric on
both sides. The government was increasing pressure on local oligarchs to stop funding
the opposition and independent media outlets.15 Badri Patarkatsishvili, a Georgian
businessman with strong Russian connections, defected from the New Rights Party to
support Shevarnadze's "For a New Georgia."16 Rustavi-2, a vocal media critic of the
president, was denied a permit to broadcast on the open "ORT frequency"17 that would
ensure its national reach. On his end, Saakashvili tried to challenge authorities by
campaigning in such government strongholds as Kvemo Kartli and Adjara. The attempts
sparked unrest and beating of Saakashvili's supporters in Bolnisi and Batumi,18 thereby
showcasing the regime's desperation to control the campaign narrative.

Voting
The Election Day was marred by large-scale irregularities and outright chaos in
certain parts of the country. Polling stations in Kutaisi, Georgia's second largest city,
were so unprepared that they could not open on time. In response to a public outcry, the
Central Election Commission had to extend the elections there for additional two hours.
International observers reported unrest in 15 percent of polling stations, tensions in 21
percent and 22 cases of open violence.19 The voting process was completely controlled
in the areas populated by Georgia's two largest national minorities - Armenians in
9ft

Javakheti and Azeris in Kvemo Kartli. The elections in Adjara were a Soviet-like
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spectacle of people coerced by the Abashidze regime to come to polling stations with the
full knowledge that their choice would never be recognized. Numerous reports indicate
that government supporters (particularly state employees) were forced to establish a
voting "merry-go-round" where an individual may vote at several polling stations.21
At the end of the day, it was becoming clear that official results would not match
the parallel vote tabulations done by TV channel Rustavi-2 and the International Society
for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED). The discrepancies were not minor.
According to the emerging official count, "For a New Georgia" was strongly in the lead,
followed by Abashidze's Revival Party and only then the oppositional National
Movement.22 ISFED and Rustavi posited that the National Movement gained 26.26
percent, followed by "For a New Georgia" (18.92 percent), the Labor Party (17.36
percent) and Burdjanadze-Democrats (10.15 percent).23
These competing realities could not be easily reconciled. President Shevarnadze
felt he did not have to justify himself or the results. In conversations with close aides, he
dismissed possible Western objections as a noisy nuisance that would eventually
subside.24 At the same time, the Georgian opposition was not prepared to give up its
rightful victory. The elections for many summarized everything that was wrong with the
regime - utter corruption that was suffocating the nation. Thus, the stage for collision
was set.
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Rose Revolution
The Rose Revolution began quietly and did not reach culmination until the very
end. In the days that followed the election, Shevarnadze and its government
inadvertently helped the revolutionary cause, by backing falsified results and refusing to
call for a fraud investigation and a new election. What the Georgian President seems to
have miscalculated badly was the mood of his own society.
On November 3, protesters first gathered around the Philharmonic Concert Hall
and then walked down Rustaveli Avenue. Because their numbers were relatively small,
nothing predicted any public unrest. Four days later, on November 7, the results from
Adjara were announced. Abashidze's party received an overwhelming victory - 269,000
out of 284,000 votes cast. Shevarnadze accepted the results and decried any
international involvement.

Sensing that the victory may be snatched from their hands if

more votes were added from Kvemo Kartli and Javakheti, the opposition and its
supporters set in motion a series of protests that started on November 8 and lasted until
the end of the Revolution.
At the same time, numerous attempts to reach a compromise continued to fail
when key opposition leaders met with Shevarnadze on November 9 and when alleged
negotiations between Saakashvili and Jorbenadze broke off on November 12.27 Trying to
shore up support, President Shevarnadze went to Adjara and accepted Abashidze's offer
to send his supporters to Tbilisi to help with restoring order in the capital. Many
Georgians were furious at the comment for it exposed what everyone long knew Shevarnadze allowed the Adjara leader to establish his own fiefdom in return for
25

The number of registered voters also increased by 20 percent between 2000-2003. See for more information OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission, Post-election Report, 3-25 November 2003.
26
Karumadze and Wertsch, 8.
27
Areshidze.

220
political loyalty. On November 14, the opposition had one of its largest rallies that
included 20-30 thousand protestors.
Things began to unravel precipitously after Shevarnadze's televised speech on
November 19 in which he promised to convene a new parliament three days later.
Seeking to enhance his following beyond the capital, Saakashvili went to the Western
city of Zugdidi, which was known for its nationalist sentiments. As a long line of buses
from Western Georgia was moving toward Tbilisi, the showdown seemed all but
inevitable.
The following day, the Georgian president addressed the new parliament. "The
speech said volumes about the extend to which Shevarnadze did not understand, or did
not wish to acknowledge, the level of unrest on the streets."28 At the Liberty Square, the
largest crowd between 50 and 100 thousand protesters was demanding his resignation.
As the opposition entered the parliament, chanting, "Resign," Shevarnadze was whisked
away by his security. Saakashvili overtook the podium and invited Burdjanadze to take
up the position of the acting president. Later that day, protesters took over the state
chancellery, thereby incapacitating any functioning of the old government.
The regime was in agony when Shevarnadze announced the state of emergency
in the evening. Mediation efforts by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Ivanov could no
longer salvage the situation. On November 23, relieved that he managed to bring all
parties to the table, Ivanov left Tbilisi for Adjara. Like many others, he was surprised to
find out the outcome of that meeting. When Shevarnadze emerged from his official
residence in Krtsanisi, he announced his immediate resignation. In later interviews, he
28

ibid.
Giga Chikhladze and Irakli Chikhladze, "The Rose Revolution: A Chronicle," in "Enough!" The Rose Revolution in the Republic
of Georgia 2003, ed. Zurab Karumadze and James V. Wetsch, 18.

25

221
suggested he did not want any bloodshed, which he felt would be inevitable if tensions
continued. Other sources indicated that Shevarnadze could not count on the support of
the army or police. Thus, fearing the fate of Caucescu or Gamsakhurdia, he opted out for
a somewhat graceful exit on his own terms. In any case, the revolution succeeded in
ending his controversial tenure as Georgia's leader - the tenure that brought much
needed stability at first, but at the end became the obstacle to further development.

Kmara andlSFED in the Rose Revolution
Kmara began to mobilize its activists immediately upon the announcement of the
election results. The message to gather for protests in the center of Tbilisi quickly spread
thanks to the power of email and cell phone. Growing numbers of Kmara activists helped
create a snowballing effect among the general population who was persuaded that the
protest had reached a sufficient level not to be easily dispersed. During revolutionary
days, Kmara worked in close cooperation with Rustavi-2, an independent TV station,
that helped spread the word about on-going and future protests as well as showed large
crowds in order to attract more participants. The group's contribution to the Rose
Revolution was two-fold. First, it helped generate grass-root level activism in the period
preceding the elections. This empowered the young generation previously disenchanted
with the political process. Second, it incited and helped sustain the first wave of protests
that mobilized the rest of Georgian society.
If Kmara was the public face of the revolution by providing its foot soldiers,
ISFED gave the event its substance. The NGO's two Election Day initiatives monitoring and, most importantly, parallel vote tabulation (PVT) - gathered ample
evidence that the process was falsified to the extent that would substantially alter the will

of voters. ISFED vigorously publicized its findings, which enabled others to call for
public protests. Its PVT numbers were immediately printed in thousands of leaflets and
distributed all over Tbilisi. Furthermore, the organization launched a series of legal
challenges that resulted in invalidation of the voting results on party lists. Thus, even
without participating directly in demonstrations, ISFED became one of the unsung
heroes of the Rose Revolution. Through quiet, professional data gathering and advocacy,
it delivered a lethal blow to the regime by exposing its fraud.

FORMATIVE YEARS
The discussion of the formative years is important because most of the literature
analyzing the involvement of civic groups in the "color revolutions" reminds of a fairy
tale. It captures the events themselves, showing NGOs as powerful, if not omnipotent, in
facilitating the rise of people against evil and corrupt authoritarian leaders. Then there is,
of course, a happy ending of victory over these rulers. And the story usually stops at this
point, assuming, like in a good fairy tale, that all of them lived happily thereafter. The
narrative is unhelpful because it simplifies the complexities of civil society's role in
democratization and raises expectations of a brighter future ahead. That is why, the
dissertation will first sketch a portrait of Georgian civil society to understand the milieu
within which the civic groups under analysis had to operate. It will then trace the
organizational evolution of both NGOs. This research is critical to answering the central
hypothesis of my work - whether the groups' success can be explained by their
embeddedness. It will also help illuminate how different they are from their domestic
civil society and whether such differences may predict any future challenges for that
society and the organizations under study.

NONPROFIT SECTOR IN GEORGIA
Legal framework and NGQ growth
Georgia's legislation on nonprofit activities in 1991-2003 can be considered
liberal. One of the reasons for that lies in active civic involvement in the design of
pertinent laws. The other is about the political situation at the time. In 1997-1998, the
Shevarnadze regime sought to improve its external image and obtain Western support to
cement control over the country. Therefore, "allowing certain liberal freedoms was
more of a political calculation than a commitment to an open society."32
Three key documents regulated activities of Georgian not-for-profit groups - the
Law on Grants, the Civil and Tax Codes. For legal purposes, NGOs were broadly
divided into two categories - unions/associations and foundations. The former were
required to consist of at least five individuals and be registered by district courts. The
latter did not have to have any members and needed to be registered by the Ministry of
Justice.33 The registration process was simple, quick and inexpensive, albeit
inconsistently applied.
The Georgian legislation stipulated that grants, membership fees and donations
were exempt from income tax. The same regulation applied to auxiliary entrepreneurial
activities that served to accomplish nonprofits' statutory purposes.34 On a positive side,
the national Tax Code did not require civic groups to maintain a certain level of
expenditure to remain legal. Doing otherwise would have severely undermined the sector
where many organizations re-surge based on donors' priorities. However, neither did it
30
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encourage active giving, by providing no deductions on charitable donations for
individuals or legal entities. As in many post-Soviet states, the implementation of legal
provisions remained a weak spot. Whereas grant recipients were entitled to a refund on
any VAT (value added tax) on goods and services purchased within the framework of a
grant, few were persistent enough to go through a procedure of claiming the money
back.36 Like in Ukraine, NGOs were subjected to the same extensive requirements on
accounting and reporting to tax authorities as commercial structures.37 This placed an
undue burden on small groups with limited funds and personnel.
Over the period of twelve years (between acquiring independence in 1991 and
the Rose Revolution in 2003), Georgia's civil society underwent three stages of growth.
Its first stage was significantly delayed as a result of the civil war that engulfed the
country during the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,38 When the war ended in 1994,
Georgia was in ruins, a shadow state that lost two large chunks of its territory (Abkhazia
in the south-west and South Ossetia in the north) and where the government could not
effectively manage any territory past Tbilisi. At that time, emerging civic groups became
an employment venue for a vast group of Soviet-educated Georgian intelligencia.
Viewed with suspicion as second-class citizens by the Soviet regime and completely
neglected during the civil strife, those people managed to find a new niche that would
generate some income.39 In terms of the level of NGO growth, the period was marked by
rather moderate achievements. The country began with 19 associations and 10
foundations in 1995 - the first year when the National Statistics Committee started
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recording the data. In 1996, merely 6 new associations and 6 news foundations were
registered. The following year, that number tripled for both types of nonprofit entities.
The real proliferation of NGOs did not occur until 1998. By the end of the year,
Georgia accounted for 559 associations and 252 foundations. Without a doubt, the
country's third sector entered a new stage of development that lasted until 2001. During
that time, the Georgian government proceeded to institutionalize key elements of civil
society, by establishing a proper legal framework. Domestic civic groups became more
professionalized and more apt at securing funding from a quickly expanding pool of
international donors.41 Many of them also managed to attract a young generation of
Western-educated Georgians. In essence, the NGO sector became one of the most
vibrant spheres at home and among other former Soviet states.42 By the end of 2001, the
country registered 2,599 associations and 714 foundations. In the meanwhile, the regime
of Eduard Shevarnadze was turning increasingly corrupt. Aimed with the motto, "Do
everything, just don't fight against me," it tapped into the "coping strategies" of the
Georgian society that rejuvenated informal family and crony networks and disregarded
common societal objectives for the sake of their own goals.43 The divergent paths of
development were bound to set the government on the course of collision with civic
associations.
It is hard to tell the precise beginning of the third stage in the development of
Georgian nonprofits. Certainly, the emergence of a strong media outlet, "Rustavi-2,"
which provided airtime to civic activists and opposition leaders, contributed to the
40
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change in official attitudes. In 2001 the murder of a popular Rustavi-2 anchorman Giorgi
Sanaia underscored the government's recognition that civil society groups posed a real
danger to the stability and continuity of the Shevarnadze regime.44 Even if one
disregards the strength of NGOs (always a subjective judgment45), their sheer number
(4,082) in 2002 made them a formidable presence in such a small country as Georgia.
Thus, the Shevarnadze government proceeded with a set of attempts to curtail an active
role of civil society. In 2002, the Ministry of Finance put forward a bill, which
envisioned a government review of foreign funds. A year later, the Parliament
strengthened the legislation on libel by extending a possible term of imprisonment up to
five years.46 Pandering to public apprehension about evangelical groups in Georgia, the
Ministry of Security proposed to suspend foreign militant and other organizations. All of
these actions were complemented by a government propaganda campaign against NGOs,
accusing them of "grantchamia" (grant-gobbling) and dissemination of anti-national
values. Because of a harsh and very vocal response from the domestic civil society, the
Shevarnadze administration had to withdraw the legal initiatives.47 The clash showcased
two points. First, though the Georgian government was growing increasingly
authoritarian, it could not muster an effective clampdown on NGOs, because it did not
have the material capability to do so without alienating critical foreign support that was
necessary for its own survival. Second, the seeming prosperity of the third sector in
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Georgia was fragile and illusory for it depended on the state's weakness and donors'
generosity.
To summarize our discussion, pushed by dire domestic circumstances, the
government of Georgia sought to establish a liberal legal framework for registering and
operating civil society groups. Unpropitious economic conditions and the availability of
foreign funding persuaded a sizeable segment of the country's educated class to start up
nonprofit associations. Between 1995-2003 Georgian civil society grew at a staggering
rate, adding on average 510 organizations per year.48 Regardless of all this success, high
and low-ranking officials in the legislative and executive branches had little
understanding of the concept of a nonprofit and its role in society.49 Furthermore, the
government attitude to NGOs began to change dramatically when the independence of
strongest civic groups threatened to challenge the existing political status quo. It is only
thanks to the weakness of the state and its reliance on foreign assistance that President
Shevarnadze was not able to suppress non-governmental organizations as dramatically as
his Russian and Central Asian counterparts did later.

Public participation and attitude
Georgian society is known for a volatile combination of public passivity and a
dormant, bellicose sentiment to conflict resolution. Due to bad economic conditions and
distrust in state institutions, "the confrontational model is used overwhelmingly... to
deliver ultimatums to the government."50
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Available public surveys show low levels of efficacy. For instance, in Tbilisi the biggest city and the center of national power - 64.1 percent of residents believe they
exert no influence on key decisions in the country.51 It can be speculated that the level of
apathy is even higher in provincial areas that were often neglected by the government
over the period of independence. While majorities throughout the country (71 percent in
2001 and 73 percent in 2003) continue to believe in democracy as the best form of
governance, they are profoundly disenchanted with the Georgian state. 91.7 percent
think the government is corrupt, 62 percent distrust politicians and 53 percent courts.54 Given this reality, 57.3 percent of Tbilisi residents are ready to join a protest
rally and only 36.2 percent would appeal to local authorities.55
The Georgian public remains ambiguous and divided in its attitude to civic
organizations. One of the reasons for that lies in low or skewed awareness. 81.2 percent
admit being poorly informed. 92.3 percent derive any knowledge about nonprofits from
the media. Thanks to television, 55.6 percent know about the Liberty Institute (the key
founder of Kmara), 18.8 percent have heard of the Georgian Association of Young
Lawyers, and 15.2 percent are aware of the Soros Foundation.56 Therefore, most people
perceive civil society as a whole through a dozen of NGOs that appear on TV talk
shows. Think tanks and social nonprofits are much less known.57
This brings us to the second reason - many people harbor a bipolar attitude on
the proper role of nonprofit organizations. On one hand, the majority (56.9 percent)
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wants most problems to be solved by the government, leaving very little space for civic
activism. On the other, many believe civic groups should address their most immediate
concerns. For instance, 48.7 percent think civil society should deal with the issue of state
corruption. Almost one quarter of the population suggests NGOs ought to provide
humanitarian assistance or charity. As a result, people frequently approach civic groups
with the "What have you done for me lately?" question and want to know their output in
kilos of meat distributed for free.
Needless to say, when such expectations are not met, bitterness and distrust
ensue. In the general population, the margin of difference between those who think
positively and those who are negative about civil society is about 6 percent in favor of
the former.59 While 42.3 percent believe NGOs promote progressive notions, 32.3
percent think they spread foreign ideas and a quarter of the population cannot provide
any answer. 60.2 percent believe the existence of civic groups makes no difference and
37.4 percent suggest the only thing they do is give out promises.60
Finally, Georgian society has a powerful isolationist streak that is supported by
the Orthodox Church.61 It purports Georgia's uniqueness among nations - a claim easy
to sustain for the ethnicity that uses its own alphabet. Emphasizing the Christian
Orthodox faith as the guiding light that helped preserve the national identity through
decades of foreign subjugation, Georgian isolationists despise non-governmental
organizations as one of the mechanisms that is designed (this time by the West) to
weaken and conquer the country.
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To summarize the point, the Georgian society suffers from the usual post-Soviet
apathy and resentment toward polities and politicians. However, the veneer of passivity
hides powerful sentiments of frustration and despair that are ready to spill over if pushed
to the brink. Few people are aware of civil society at the level deeper than provided by
television. Thus, they approach it in the manner similar to other state institutions. They
expect NGOs to address their daily concerns - from pervasive corruption to the lack of
materials goods. Because most Georgian civic groups are focused on advocacy, they are
not able to tackle these issues. The resultant public attitudes are divided between those
who know little of and see no utility in NGOs, those who perceive them as a beneficial
societal element and those who regard them as a pernicious element of Western
intrusion.

NGO landscape: distribution, structure and capacity
As in other states of the former Soviet Union, the majority of Georgian NGOs
was first set up in Tbilisi and later established regional branches. Based on the available
data, 60 percent of all registered NGOs are based in the capital where only one-fourth of
the country's population lives.62 There are divergent expert assessments on the extent of
robustness of NGO activities outside the capital. Khatuna Nachkebia of the Civil Society
Institute notes that there are fewer social service nonprofits outside of the capital.
However, those that exist perform much better as a result of the natural survival process
that sharpened their capabilities.
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The rural-urban divide is most acutely felt in the area of funding and
sustainability. The comparison of budgets between regional and Tbilisi-based NGOs in
2000-2002 revealed great discrepancies. For instance, the percentage of Tbilisi
associations whose budget was 50,000-100,000 dollars increased from 21 percent (2000)
to 29 percent (2003). Outside of the capital, the percentage grew by merely 2 percent
during the same timeframe. Whereas 34-36 percent of regional civic groups had to
subsist on 500 dollars or less, only 4-6 percent of their Tbilisi counterparts had to live on
the same budget.64 In a different survey, 65.2 percent of capital-based organizations
acknowledge having had no funding interruptions. Only 32.3 percent of groups outside
of Tbilisi had the same experience.
In terms of issue orientation, the majority of NGOs remains heavily focused on
public advocacy. About 30.4 percent of organizations work in a watchdog capacity, by
protecting human rights, monitoring the government or conducting civic education.
Another 35.4 percent engage in a specific aspect of the democratization agenda (i.e.
children and youth problems, women issues, and media development). Unfortunately, a
disproportionately small share of groups deal with daily concerns of Georgian people,
like poverty alleviation. Only 3.9 percent of NGOs help internally displaced persons
(mostly refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and handicapped (a social pariah in
many traditional societies), 2.2 percent are preoccupied with economic development and
employment issues.66 The answer for the disparity in the causes pursued by Georgian
civic groups lies in how civic groups see their role. The majority believes that poverty
will be better addressed by the state within the context of larger political and economic
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Therefore, purely social issues are wrongly perceived to be out of the purview

of civil society.
Speaking of internal composition, the reliance of NGOs on permanent staffers,
part-time employees and volunteers is greatly influenced by their location. Civic groups
in the capital tend to have more salaried personnel and fewer volunteers. On the contrary
to that, regional organizations rely less on paid staffers and more on volunteers. The
differences are truly striking. In Tbilisi almost one third of all groups employ eight or
more people. Outside of the capital, only 9 percent of associations do that. Whereas 48
percent of NGOs in the capital hire eight or more temporary workers, 10 percent of their
regional counterparts use that type of human resource. The situation is reversed when
accounting for volunteer use. 38 percent of groups in Tbilisi recruit volunteers,
compared to 51 percent in the regions. The available statistics make it clear that the
access to funding greatly impacts NGO recruitment practices. Unfortunately, it does so
not in a positive manner. The more money capital-based nonprofits get, the less likely
they are to entice people to contribute rather than pay them for work.
The evaluation of financial sustainability shows an overwhelming degree of
dependence on foreign sources.69 80 percent of civic groups rely for 50 to 100 percent of
their budgets on international donor organizations. Only one-third of NGOs charges
symbolic membership fees that constitute merely 5 percent of their total income. The
7ft

issues of financial transparency remain a concern. According to the data, Tbilisi-based
groups seem more accountable than those in the regions, partially because their
continued access to external funding is dependent on their reputation among donors. In
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2002, 69 percent of NGOs in the capital conducted an external audit, compared to 31
percent in the regions. However, the atmosphere of secrecy in financial and
programmatic efforts continues to prevail, as only 13 percent of nonprofits made their
71

annual reports public.
Finally, it is challenging to analyze the overall capacity of Georgian NGOs. If
one judges it by a mere presence of civic groups, then civil society and civic values seem
to be well established.72 With a scarcity of domestic assessments on NGO strength, the
most consistent analysis has so far been provided by the United States Agency for
International Development. Out of seven indicators used to evaluate NGO sustainability,
two pertain to capacity characteristics - organizational capacity and infrastructure. In
regard to the former, the country's civil society has scored consistently around 4 points
on a seven-point scale where 1 is advanced and 7 is least developed. Between 19982003, the sector did not make any significant improvements. In 2002-2003 its
organizational capacity was slightly worse than that of neighboring Armenia and on par
with Ukraine. In the other indicator, infrastructure, the country continues to hover
between 3.5 as the lowest in 1999 and 4 as the highest in 2002. Though it has the
strongest infrastructural capacity in the Caucasus region, it falls in the medium tier of
civil society development in the former Communist bloc. Overall, the classification
provided by USAID would place Georgia at the low end of the mid-transitional stage.73
In other words, the capacity of Georgian civil society is higher than that of Central Asian
states, but significantly lower than that of Central and Eastern European countries.
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To summarize, in 1991 -2003 the internal development of Georgian civil society
was impacted by a host of issues that included a predominance of capital-based NGOs,
significant discrepancies in funds and human resource use among civic groups based on
their location and a high degree of dependency on foreign grants.

NGO members and inter-NGO relations
The Georgian nonprofit community cannot find a common theme that would
unite its worthy, but often disjointed efforts. As a result, inter-NGO relations are
impacted by a set of the following problems.
First, though the majority of organizations operate with the similar type of issues
that pertain to either general or issue-specific advocacy, the shared agenda often
generates not cooperation, but rivalry, which is instigated by a continuous competition
for funds. While the USAID 2002-2003 assessment reports relatively high percentages
of inter-NGO cooperation and coalition-building experiences in Tbilisi, the same
statistics are very modest in other parts of the country.74 The discrepancy can be
explained by the lagging development of regional groups as well as the privileged status
of organizations in the capital. Like civic associations in Moscow or Kyiv in the 1990s,
their Tbilisi-based counterparts used the proximity to foreign funds to create an elite
community of civic leaders. Even if there is cooperation among various organizations
(regardless of their location), one wonders how genuine it is. In the same survey, all
groups reported that NGO-coalitions were established primarily at the initiative of a
donor.
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Second, Georgian civil society does not apply the democratic principles it
preaches to its internal practices. 50 percent of groups in Tbilisi and 78.2 percent of
regional NGOs do not have a separation of the organization's board from its executive.75
In practice, this means that the group leader both implements projects and evaluates his
own performance. When coupled with the fact that most groups work in the same area,
this breeds the insularity of thinking that impedes prospects for cooperation with other
NGOs. Nodia rightly summarizes, "An undue focus on common agenda and values
within civil society sometimes leads to a low level of pluralism and tolerance toward
different opinions within the NGO community itself."76
Third, the dearth of information that is available on the socio-economic
characteristics of civic activists paints the picture of a rather elite segment of the
77

population.

A typical Georgian NGO member is likely to be young, well educated, and

reside in the capital. "It can be presumed with a certain amount of confidence that they
genuinely share the values of liberal democracy, including trust, tolerance and public
spiritedness."78 Members of low-income classes, those with less education and rural
dwellers are much less like likely to hold NGO leadership positions, due to the lack of
70

social connections and education. As a result of progressive values being predominant
within Georgia's civil society, women are better represented as civic leaders
(approximately 29 percent of organizations) than in other spheres of social life.80 At the
same time, ethnic minorities lead only those NGOs that are focused on ethnic issues. The
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limitation attests not only to how far the progressive values of Georgia's civil society can
go, but also to the overall weakness of Georgia in integrating national minorities.81
In the end, the country's third sector continues to be dependent on specific
leadership figures within organizations, who run around searching for money without
bothering about higher conceptualizations. There are no large umbrella organizations
that would bring together numerous NGGs in different areas of activities.83 On a wider
scale, civic groups failed in their ultimate mission - to deepen social networks and create
social capital.

NGOs and other societal actors
Cooperation of Georgian nonprofit organizations with four main societal actors the government, the business sector, media and the public - has been uneven and mixed
at best. What one often finds is a civil society hampered in its outreach efforts by
unpropitious external conditions and its own unwillingness to step out of the comfort
zone and engage with groups that may hold different views than its own.
Interactions with government authorities have assumed peculiar contours. On one
hand, civic groups that do not work with governmental agencies constitute an absolute
minority - 6-7 percent. On the other, the patterns of collaboration seem either superficial
or one-sided. For instance, 39 percent of associations outside Tbilisi exchange only
information with relevant governmental actors. 27 percent of groups in the capital
engage with the government by offering their assistance or services without a prior
request. At the same time, working with the Shevarnadze regime was not an easy thing.
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The president was not genuinely interested in civil society as an independent actor. Nor
was it an endeavor that would always earn a civic group new friends among fellow
nonprofits. The highest level of NGO-government interactions occurred naturally in
Tbilisi. 50 percent of capital-based groups reported the experience of implementing joint
projects, compared to 24 percent in the regions.85 While the statistics can be seen as a
positive sign of civil society trying to find its' niche, some oppositional elements among
non-government groups begged to differ. In his own assessment of the situation, Levan
Ramishvili, the Chairman of the Liberty Institute, pointed that extensive cooperation
often created cooptation. Once civic groups became deeply embroiled in joint projects
with the government, they could no longer criticize it as freely. They were also much
more willing to favor the political status quo that would bring change through a slow
evolutionary rather than revolutionary transformation.

In the end, it seems, many

nonprofits found themselves caught between two fires - the Georgian state that had to
pretend to be cooperative to maintain its international image and "purists" within civil
society that chastised others for getting too cozy with that state.
In reaching out to ordinary citizens, Georgian civic groups relied on highly nonpersonal strategies, which could not assure that their target audience had been properly
contacted. In 2002, among the most frequent means to spread the message were
newspaper articles (61 percent), media presentations (53 percent) and booklets (51
j)*7

percent). Only 29 percent of organizations conducted presentations. However, the
picture is not all bleak. In reporting on their activities the same year, 77 percent indicated
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doing trainings and seminars, 74 percent pointed to consultations, and an overwhelming
majority (86 percent) spoke of collecting and disseminating information.88 The question
remains to what extent these activities were self-serving (i.e. seminars for civic activists
who are already involved) or purposefully exaggerated for the survey. Other assessments
only further such doubts. For instance, only 12.7 percent of the public reported receiving
NGO services and 5.8 percent cooperated with nonprofit organizations. 94.2 percent said
they had never collaborated with civic associations. The problem here might be twofold. Its one side has to do with strategies used by organizations to communicate with
people. Many civil society members are often too comfortable with foreign funding to
avoid reaching out to the "unenlightened masses." The other side deals with the problem
over which civic groups have little immediate control - namely their issue orientation.
Ordinary people are unwilling to cooperate on NGO projects, because they perceive a
civic need for "policy input" to be self-serving. In other words, all they see are welleducated, relatively well-off civic activists who seek information from them to fulfill
their project requirements and, in the end, get paid. Unsurprisingly, 23 percent think
NGOs are inefficient, and 16.8 percent believe they are self-serving.90 In the end,
attempts at cooperation between civil society and the public are often stifled because the
lofty and progressive agenda of the former can never satisfy the literal appetite of the
latter.
Compared to other segments of the society, interactions between Georgian civic
groups and businesses are fairly insignificant.91 On average, almost 50 percent of
organizations have never cooperated with the private sector. About a quarter offered
88
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their services to businesses, and around 10 percent actually implemented joint projects.
The meager record of cooperation is lamentable, especially because the private sector
has a relatively positive view of civil society. In 2002 61.4 percent reported having
positive and rather positive attitudes toward NGOs. The problem was about finding the
right modes of cooperation. On one hand, businesses in Georgia were generally weak.
Medium and small-size enterprises were barely getting on their feet and had no money to
splurge. Large businesses did not want to support a group whose radical ideas would get
the private sponsor in trouble with the government and, more importantly, tax services.
In addition, the biggest oligarchs were already heavily committed to supporting key
political parties.94 On the other hand, NGOs were leery of working with so-called
oligarchs - a class of nouveau rich who acquired their wealth through thuggish business
practices and close relations with the ruling elite. Furthermore, because of the readily
available foreign money, they did not have to make any hard compromises between
accepting business money and their own integrity
To summarize, Georgia's nongovernmental organizations tried to work with
other societal actors. Their degree of success in such endeavors was determined by the
willingness of both sides to collaborate as well as external circumstances. When it came
to working with the government, NGOs (mostly in the capital and to the chagrin of their
radical fellow groups) usually initiated cooperation. In case of the media, it was
television stations that sought out nonprofit experts to comment on daily issues. While
interactions with ordinary citizens were complicated by their misperceptions of civil

92
The Center for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia and the United Nations Association of Georgia, "Countrywide
Assessment of Georgian Civil Society Organizations," 39.
93
Nodia,46.
94
Areshidze gives the figure of 15-20 million dollars spent by large businesses to support parties in the 2002 parliamentary elections.
(Areshidze, 105).

society, joint projects with businesses were hard to come by because of civic reluctance
and economic hardships. In the end, many of these patterns were shaped by the funding
and fundraising patterns, which bring us to the next section.

Fundraising practices
Georgian non-governmental organizations had a hard time securing funding
because of the domestic environment and their own weaknesses. Before the revolution,
many nonprofits were caught among three forces - a bad state, a poor populace and an
abundance of foreign donors.
Between 1991-2003, government support of civic groups remained both low and
non-transparent. Few available estimates indicate that for instance, in 1997 the state
allocated 0.0002 percent of the overall budget expenditures to civil society. Even this
money was distributed through presidential "reserve funds," which made any open
competition for it impossible. This comically low level of funding is a result of two
factors. One is the lack of interest on the part of the Shevarnadze regime that did not
appreciate the meddling of NGOs in public affairs.95 The other is the magnitude of
economic collapse that Georgia was experiencing in the post-civil war decade. A brief
review of the budget data for 2001-2003 reveals a growing domestic and foreign debt as
well as increasing debt service payments.96 The government was simply unable to
finance nonprofit organizations when it struggled to pay for essential public services. As
a consequence, only 15.5 percent of organizations relied on state support.97
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The support from public was lukewarm. Though almost a quarter of NGOs
OR

reported receiving private donations, the population did not understand the purpose of
the third sector. Here the problem is again two-fold. On one hand, many people believe
if civic groups are charitable, then they are supposed to be free." When this
understanding is combined with mixed public feelings about civil society, nonprofits
become less inclined to solicit money from the general population or charge
membership/service fees.100 On the other hand, the ability of an average citizen to
contribute was severely limited by economic circumstances. The unemployment data
available from the National Statistics Office indicates that in 2001-2003 between 11.1
and 12.6 percent of the population did not have a job. 101 The figure reflects only those
who were officially registered to collect unemployment benefits and is likely to be much
higher. Given this reality, few would be willing to support groups whose purpose they
cannot comprehend in the first place.
The contribution of domestic businesses to civil society was negligible. The
blame for this situation is shared equally between the two parties. Like in Ukraine, many
businesses were leery of engaging with NGOs because of past scandals that involved
money laundering and grant embezzlement.

This feeling was only fueled by the fear

of possible state reprisals against those who would contribute to known anti-government
groups, like the Liberty Institute. As another expert in civil society noted, Georgia had
very few capable and well-off entrepreneurs and those knew who [meaning the
government of Shevarnadze] they had to be thankful for their continued wellbeing.103
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Similarly to Ukraine, the specter of political oppression and the Byzantine tax system
pushed NGOs to hide the real level of contribution from businesses. Thus, the available
estimates show great divergence-from 9 to 20.3 percent.104 At the same time, many
nonprofits were unwilling to engage with domestic entrepreneurs for their support may
come with a lot of string attached as to the content of their activities.
Under these circumstanceSj foreign funding proved an easy and readily available
solution. As donors and locals acknowledge, Georgia never experienced a lack of
international support.1 5 The country's position as the hub of regional assistance in the
Caucasus,106 its previous history of civil violence and a worldwide reputation of Eduard
Shevarnadze as the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs during the "perestroika"
contributed to the heavy presence of American donor organizations. The United States
government was the largest bilateral donor. Since 1991, it spent 1.1 billion dollars on
assistance programs in Georgia. In 20G2, 23.5 million dollars was spent on democracy
programs.107 Though not comparable with American grant giving, the European Union
also spent a hefty sum of 385 million euros between 1991 and 2003.108 With this amount
of money, it is understandable that 84 percent of NGOs said grants constituted their
major source of income.109
To summarize, when it comes to fundraising Georgian nonprofit organizations
were caught in a tough spot that made an addiction to foreign grants much easier to
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acquire and much more difficult to give up. They had little chance of receiving support
from a weak state, a destitute public and a feeble business sector. The scarcity of money
from domestic sources was compensated by the heavy presence of foreign donors.
Having gained the taste of grant support, many were unwilling to engage with public or
businesses for fundraising purposes.

Georgian civil society: strengths and pathologies
Strengths
In the first decade of independence, formal political embeddedness remained the
strongest aspect that facilitated the birth and tremendous growth of Georgian civil
society. Upon assuming power, the government of Eduard Shevarnadze established a
liberal legislative framework that regulated registration and activities of civic
organizations. Furthermore, driven by the concerns for his international image of a
reformer, Shevarnadze was unwilling to launch open repressions against nongovernmental organizations that grew increasingly critical of his regime in 2000-2003. no
As a result of this policy, Georgia experienced a boom in newly registered civic groups
and acquired an image of the state with one of the most vibrant civil societies in the postSoviet space.
The second strong feature of Georgia's third sector was its ability to attract young
people who were educated in the West. Many of them were lured to join civic groups as
a way to implement their idealist vision for the country. It of course did not hurt that
compared to other sectors of the national economy employment at nonprofits provided a
steady and fairly decent income.
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This brings us to the third strength - external involvement. Because of the
country's strategic location in the Caucasus, its previous history of violent conflict and
Shevarnadze's stature in the international community, Georgian civil society never
experienced a shortage of international attention. Thus, the presence of foreign donors
created propitious conditions not only for NGOs' registration, but also for their survival.
Many organizations, especially those located in Tbilisi, were able to set up a permanent
infrastructure, attract qualified staff and develop valuable initiatives only thanks to the
continuous support of foreign grant-givers. It has been noted before that without
international assistance, civil society in Ukraine would not have been the same in terms
of strength and capacity. This point is even more pertinent when applied to Georgia,
which after the civil war and two ethnic conflicts was thrown back in development by
several decades. Under those circumstances, there were no other (but foreign) sources
that could afford the luxury of supporting abstract democratization projects.
In the end, Georgian civil society made it alive and well through the decade of
hardship thanks to the willingness of the state to allow its existence, the appeal of NGOs
to Western-educated youth and intelligencia, and the financial support of foreign donors
(primarily the United States).

Pathologies
In its struggle to survive, the Georgian not-for-profit sector has developed three
critical weaknesses - inability to fit in politically, inability to connect socially, and
inability to sustain itself financially. With all of them, the blame for failure ought to be
shared between civil society and other relevant actors with which it tried to engage.
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On the political front, convoluted taxation policies and overly extensive reporting
requirements have prevented many groups from taking advantage of the otherwise liberal
legislative framework. Most importantly, neither the Shevarnadze government nor
officials at the regional and local level saw the utility of civil society. For them, it could
be compared to a strange garnish that had to be added to a dish to make it attractive for
the viewing by outsiders. Once the latter were satisfied, the government could brush the
garnish aside and proceed with governance as usual. As a result, the NGO sector had a
hard time fitting into the political life as an independent actor. Only by the end of the
1990s, a small number of NGOs from the capital managed to establish their own
reputation and voice through mass media. However, their impact on the political course
of development remained minimum.
From the perspective of societal embeddedness, Georgian civil society had a
difficulty connecting with its population due to four distinct factors. First, the national
public mood was a combustible mixture of passivity and confrontation. People were
unwilling to get engaged unless they were cornered by desperate economic and political
conditions. Second, the lack of awareness about NGOs determined a low level of public
involvement or interest toward them. Many thought of civic groups based on the few that
appeared on television talk shows. In this regard, they came out looking no better than
politicians who talk a lot, but do little. The predominant advocacy orientation of
nonprofits at the expense of social and humanitarian issues only confirmed that opinion.
Third, because of rural-urban discrepancies non-governmental groups outside of Tbilisi
were much less stronger and thus less capable to engage with the local public. The
uncovered differences in terms of funding, sustainability and personnel use confirm that
the post-Soviet reality applied to the nonprofit sector, too. Thus, NGOs that were closest
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to regular people were also least able to help them. Fourth, a combination of insufficient
accountability and an elite composition of many civic organizations made them seem
even more out of touch. A pervasive impression painted by internal and external
observers was of a civil society operating in its own universe. Not seeing any way how
civic groups, focused on abstract democratization causes, can bring practical resolutions
to their daily problems, people became unwilling to help with NGO projects. In their
mind, well-educated civic leaders were working for their own benefit - to imitate civic
activism that would allow them to meet grant requirements, get well paid and lead a
relatively prosperous life in Tbilisi, while the rest of the population had to endure
provincial subsistence.
Finally, though foreign funding seemed abundant, especially for groups that were
in Tbilisi, pathological dependence on external support eroded the ability of civic
associations to secure venues that would sustain them financially in the long term. The
fault of Georgian NGOs is only partial for other domestic actors were either unwilling or
enable to collaborate. The state did not have a clear idea as to what to do with nonprofits
that were emerging like mushrooms after rain. Neither did it have the money to support
their growing appetites, spoiled by foreign grants. Ordinary Georgians were too
preoccupied with their own struggles to make ends meet to even think of donating
elsewhere. Big businesses, known as oligarchs, considered NGOs as chump change,
preferring to support political parties that yielded real influence. In the end, foreign
grants became the default option for organizations that wanted to survive with their
mission and integrity intact.
To conclude our discussion, while Georgian civil society had the advantages of a
liberal legislative framework, the energy of young activists and the interest in the
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country from foreign donors, it struggled to become part of the domestic society. The
process of its embeddedness became imperiled by the inability to secure its own place in
the political sphere, appeal to ordinary Georgians and loosen the reliance on external
help.

PROFILE: KMARA
Launch
The Liberty Institute was at the roots of Kmara's emergence in Georgia. Founded
in 1996, the Institute focused on key human rights issues, such as the freedom of speech
and religion, access to a fair trial and prevention of arbitrary detention.
Since 1999 it had been working with numerous student self-governance groups.
One of the strongest among them was located at Tbilisi State University (TSU) - the
most elite higher education establishment in the country. In 2001 one-third of TSU
students, who were also members of the student government, took part in the universitywide elections. Their demands were modest in scope. They wanted to curb corruption at
TSU, improve the level of instruction and bring interactive teaching methods into the
classroom.111
It would likely have taken years for the group to step outside the boundaries of its
school, had it not been for inadvertent help from the Shevarnadze regime. In October
2001 the government attempted to suspend a broadcasting license of Rustavi-2, an
independent television station that was growing increasingly critical of the ruling regime.
In response many TSU students launched public protests and promptly transformed their

111

Ramishvili; Lika Sanidze, Kmara activist, interview with the author, July 2007.

group into the Student Movement of Georgia.

The demonstrations became a huge

success. The government was forced to back down and allow Rustavi-2 continuing its
broadcast. Furthermore, as an implicit recognition of the debacle, President Shevarnadze
had to sack several government officials responsible for letting the situation get out of
control.113
BUoyed by it newly found voice and power to influence events, the TSU student
government realized that it needed to extend the movement to other universities in
Georgia.114 It recognized that instead of battling specific issues of higher education, it
had to look at their root cause - corrosive corruption within the Shevarnadze regime.115
The key figures within the Liberty Institute, like Giga Bokeria and Levan Ramishvili,
acknowledged that on the eve of the 2003 parliamentary elections the balance of forces
between the government and the opposition remained equal. Thus, a third actor was
needed to tilt an election outcome in favor of the latter.

This actor would also have to

position itself very differently from other student unions, which were artificially set up
by Shevarnadze to confuse the public.117 This is how the idea of Kmara (in Georgian
"Enough") emerged.
Its first protest took place on April 14,2003. The group's highly nonconventional tactics, which clashed with the conservative Georgian society, put it
immediately on the map. That day "Kmara" sprayed its name on numerous public
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buildings and burned a flag portraying Shevarnadze and his entourage in front of the
State Chancellery.118

Maturation
Kmara's maturation, as a civic organization, was marked by three factors. The
first was a trip that occurred even before the group was actually set up. In February
2003, Giga Bokeria went to meet with Otpor leaders to see how useful their experience
may be in Georgia.

It was in Belgrade where "he learned the value of seizing and

holding the moral high ground and how to make use of public pressure."120 Therefore, by
the time Kmara began putting its first activities in place, it already possessed a rather
clear vision not only of what it wanted to achieve (i.e. Georgia without Shevarnadze),
but also of how it would go about it (i.e. by espousing the Otpor model121).
The second factor was Kmara's inseparable ties with its "founding father" - the
Liberty Institute. Seeking to differentiate itself within a large pool of advocacy groups,
that NGO was known to adopt more radical approaches and seek confrontation to get its
point across.12 When it came to street activism, it had one of the most experienced
cohorts of civic leaders in the country. It meant that Kmara did not have to go through a
steep learning curve, which was usually experienced by all new civic organizations.
The final factor was a series of events that pushed Kmara to further
radicalization. One of them was a conflict over the composition of the Central Election
Commission, which was not resolved satisfactorily even after the involvement of Jim
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Baker. The other was a trip of its activists to observe the presidential election in
Azerbaijan on October 15,2003. Kmara members were stunned by the weak and muted
Western reaction on what in fact amounted to the coronation of Ilham Aliyev. Both
occurrences provided empirical support to their suspicions that Western responses to
election fraud would be the same m Georgia.
To summarize, compared to an average NGO Kmara matured very fast. The
reason for that was not only a limited timeframe (from April to November 2003) within
which the organization had to fulfill its goals, but also the level of preparedness among
its activists. By the time Kmara was ready to launch itself, its key leaders had already
gone over the planning stage, thus sparring the group from the need to learn through its
own mistakes. Participating in the unfolding election campaign in Georgia and observing
one in neighboring Azerbaijan provided a useful reality check as to what can be expected
on the Election Day.

Mission and its evolution
Kmara's initial mission emerged as a result of successful protests against the
closure of Rustavi-2. A group of student activists from Tbilisi State University saw that
once united, student organizations had the capacity to expand their demands from mere
improvements in the higher education system to fundamental political and social
changes.
A widely held conspiracy theory that Kmara was set up by Americans with the
only goal of toppling the Shevarnadze regime in the 2003 elections does not hold on a
closer examination. At least two Kmara activists confirmed that the group's mission at
123
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the beginning was much more modest. It wanted to demythologize the Shevarnadze
rule.124 By exposing flaws of the existing government, it sought to alter the perception
(formed after the civil war) that Georgia could not do better, that given the internecine
nature of domestic politics Shevarnadze was the only hope for stability. Thus, one part of
Kmara's mission was to achieve a change in the discourse.
The other was to prepare for the 2005 presidential elections. That year
Shevarnadze would no longer be eligible to run because of the constitutional term limits.
However, like in Ukraine and other post-Soviet semi-authoritarian countries, Georgian
opposition expected attempts either to change the constitution or to manipulate the vote
for the victory of a successor anointed by Shevarnadze. From this perspective, Kmara
viewed its activities as a dress rehearsal before 2005.
As the election campaign unfolded, Kmara's mission became more radical for it
saw the government weakness as an opportunity for large-scale change. President
Shevarnadze badly overplayed its hand, by refusing to address the conditions that were
ripe for change. So instead of waiting till 2005 Kmara decided to capitalize on the
moment that produced a unique constellation of forces - an increasingly weak regime
and a progressively strong opposition.

By the middle of summer Kmara activists, like

Ramishvili and Bokeria, seemed intent to remove Shevarnadze even through non197

constitutional measures.
To summarize, Kmara's vision was borne out of frustrations with daily
corruption in the Georgian education system. Thanks to initial successes, it expanded to
include a more comprehensive political change, albeit in a somewhat distant future, in
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2005. However, the group's mission soon underwent another alteration as a result of the
shifting external circumstances. The blunders committed by the Shevarnadze
government, the unity of Georgia's fractious opposition achieved by the defection of
Speaker Nino Burdjanadze and the brewing public discontent gave a valuable opening
for Kmara to push for change in 2003. All of these factors, not an American conspiracy
plot, turned a student government of a Tbilisi university into a radical advocate for a
revolution.

Funding and sustainability
Kmara derived all of its funding from the Open Society Georgia Foundation
(OSGF).128 The group consciously did not attempt to seek other sources of support. One
of the most widely spread misconceptions holds that the local Soros Foundation almost
manually set up Kmara and fed it from its hand. The reality looks a bit more
complicated. In fact, legally Kmara never received any direct support from Soros for one
simple reason - it was not yet registered as a non-government organization. So when at
the beginning of 2003 OSGF (the Open Society Georgia Foundation) announced a grant
competition for election monitoring projects, Kmara was not eligible to apply. Most of
its financial assistance came directly from a sister-NGO, the Liberty Institute.129
It was never clear why the Liberty Institute decided not to register Kmara.
Perhaps, it knew that authorities would not process Kmara's papers anyway. And if that
had happened, the group would have become explicitly illegal. Operating without
registration relegated Kmara to a certain twilight zone where its assets could not be
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seized. If the government had decided to attack viciously, the unregistered group would
have had an easier time vanishing, just like it appeared.
Though funding amounts are usually hard to obtain, a number of reputable
sources reported thatKmara received about 500,000 dollars for a start-up grant in April
2003.130 This was not a paltry amount. Based on my analysis of funding levels for many
Georgian NGOs, Kmara was definitely in the top of the top tier of civic associations in
the country. One of the group's activists, Levan Ramishvili, insisted that Kmara was
much more effective and frugal in using this amount of money than many other
Georgian NGOs because it operated like a Protestant church. By shaving off luxuries and
adopting a simplified organizational structure, it was able to focus 95 percent of funds on
programmatic activities instead of administrative expenses.
Kmara did not seek funding from the general public or the business sector. In the
course of interviews with the group's activists and external observers, I heard a number
of explanations for such passivity. One of them was the recognition that contrary to
Ukraine in 2004, Georgia did not have an expansive middle class. Asking money from
the already poor populace was something unimaginable.131 In addition, in Georgia
political or advocacy fundraising carried an inherently negative stereotype of being selfserving. A Kmara activist told me that the group had much more success in hosting a
charity event for a local orphanage than in approaching citizens about donations.132 In
the end, Kmara was successful getting some in-kind assistance from its own members
who provided accommodation and food for the group's activists outside of Tbilisi during
the revolution.
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Asking for donations from businesses carried some perils, too. One was the
anxiety about Kmara in the business community. Georgian businesses, like their
counterparts in many post-Soviet states, were dependent on the government for their
continued success. Fines and court summons produced by a series of "uncovered" tax
violations could drive into the ground any nascent enterprise. Knowing that, Kmara did
not even pursue that direction.

The other was a fear on the part of Kmara activists that

funding from oligarchs would limit the group's freedom of action. Many pointed to
Ukrainian Pora and the Orange Revolution in general that fell victims of a heavy
involvement from so-called "Orange oligarchs," who hampered the impetus for change
after the revolution.134
In summary, Kmara relied exclusively on financial support of the local Soros
Foundation to sustain its activities. Though a number of independent factors (like general
poverty, corrupt business sector and a skeptical public) objectively prevented the group
to diversify its funding base, it is also clear that Kmara did not try too hard to do so.
With the Soros grant making it one of the most well financed groups in the country, it
saw little need to step out of its comfort zone. Its message of radical change definitely
did not extend to altering the perceptions of ordinary Georgians about the nonprofit
sector. In fact, based on the following section, the group seems to have been in the best
of the worlds - it had enough funding and enough creative freedom to use the money as
it saw fit.
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Donor influence
Given Kmara's overwhelming dependency on a single foreign donor, the issue of
its influence and the perception of such influence become paramount. In this regard, the
obtained information posits that there was no programmatic interference from the
national Soros Foundation. However, the group's association with George Soros
damaged its credibility among certain segments of the Georgian population.
Similarly to Ukraine, both domestic civic activists and foreign donors on the
ground play down the importance of foreign support in the actual success of foreignfunded nonprofit organizations. A representative of the International Republic Institute
noted that it would be a mistake to think of foreign money as the driving force behind
Kmara.135 While the support came from overseas, without the impetus within the
Georgian society it would not have had any impact. The same opinion is echoed by the
Executive Director of the Georgian Soros Foundation. He said his organization had been
supporting election observation projects and NGOs since 1994, and none of them had the
kind of effect that Kmara did.

Thus, it was something different about the group rather

than the money pumped into it.
Kmara activists also denied the influence of grants. For instance, Levan
Ramishvili dismissively noted that the Liberty Institute got the money for the purposes,
which were "typical NGO bull...," but used them for meaningful activities, like thematic
trainings of activists.137 His statement implies that there was little monitoring on the part
of OSGF over the implementation of grants. The relaxed supervision may be explained
by the fact that the foundation itself espoused anti-Shevarnadze views.
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However, to the detriment of Kmara, the majority of Georgians were not aware
of these fine nuances in the relationship between the group and the Soros foundation.
Because of Kmara's noisy reputation, its financial links to Soros became soon exposed
by the government and alienated the conservative part of the population. Georgian
Orthodox groups, which strongly objected to any external intervention, used Kmara's
foreign funding to undermine its credibility among nationalist and isolation-minded
Georgians.

As a result, Kmara activists were derogatively labeled "rentier democrats"

and gasorosebuli ("Sorosized" in Georgian).
At the same time, the scope of overall damage remains unclear. Many observers
and activists acknowledged that irrespective of Soros funding, Kmara would not have
been able to attract some Georgians due to their status quo orientation.140 The criticism
of Kmara's foreign links produced a positive side effect, by enhancing its iconoclastic
image and fueling its appeal to the youth. The group gained the necessary counterculture status to be a magnet for those young people who were most radical and adamant
about change.141
To summarize, in the months preceding the 2003 parliamentary elections the
goals of Kmara to bring about change and the intentions of the national Soros
Foundation to assure fair elections coincided. Thanks to the experience of the Liberty
Institute, which secured grants for Kmara, the group received little supervision for its
activities. The association with George Soros produced diametrically opposite reactions,
by alienating religious and traditionally-minded Georgians and attracting young
progressives - the precise target audience for Kmara.
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Membership
Kmara's pool of members consisted mostly of university students and young
professionals who were recently out of school. At its peak, the group accounted between
2,000-3,000 participants.142 Though divided on the specifics of political arrangements
and preferences, they shared a common understanding of the need for fundamental
reforms.143
Regardless of age similarities, Kmara was by no means homogenous. Its core
membership in Tbilisi included the first post-Soviet generation of Georgia's Westernized
youth - those who either worked in Western NGOs or studied abroad.144 From the
beginning, leading activists at the Liberty Institute realized that in order to win the fight
against social apathy, Kmara had to become more than a group for off-springs from
Georgian elite families. Thus, its two concurrent goals were to broaden the base by
expanding onto new student populations and to energize its members by establishing an
unequivocally activist identity for the group.145 Kmara activists went to different
universities in the capital and outside Tbilisi to persuade students to join them. They
turned the group's biggest disadvantage - its lack of political experience - into its
strongest selling point among young audiences who felt tired of compromised leaders
and politics as usual.146
Their efforts proved successful because they correctly identified their target
audience and were able to get its attention. Kmara members reasoned that other young
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people would be attracted to the group because youth wings of political parties were
notoriously weak.147 So politically active young people had often no place to go to air
their concerns. At the same time, Kmara's horizontal structure and its snowballing
methods of expansion, when new members were recruited through friends and very
informal visits to other universities,

would create the sense of ownership. The group

was able to tap into the traditionally high desire within the Georgian society to protest,
especially among young people who see this method as a means for self-assertion.149
Like Ukraine, the group's recruitment was made easier by the government whose overreaction kept Kmara continuously in the news and helped fuel its popularity.150 In the
end, the second sub-group of Kmara members emerged. While they were also young
(19-20 years old), they did not have much of an urban and upper-class flair, coming from
outside of Tbilisi and speaking no language other than Georgian. How could then they
relate to their much more privileged counterparts in the capital? For different reasons
both groups felt equally disenfranchised from political processes and distressed about
their future. Having lived overseas, sophisticated urbanites were appalled by the state of
their country and the direction it was moving. After seeing the bleakest sides of life in
the 1990s, young people outside of Tbilisi felt things could no longer get worse. David
Kikalishvili, a prominent journalist from Rustavi-2, half-jokingly told a story that many
teenagers in Zugdidi (a city in the West of Georgia) did not know why there were
electric posts along roads for their town almost never received any electricity.151
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Like Ukrainian Pora, Kmara also recognized the need to move people from
words to action rather quickly. Therefore, in order to test the seriousness of its new
members, they were immediately asked to take part in demonstrations, protests and other
activities. This way, the Kmara leaders told me, they were certain that people came to
Kmara because of the ideological affinity, not for material reasons.152
Regardless of generally progressive and inclusive recruitment strategies, Kmara
faced a significant problem that it decided not to try to overcome. In particular, it proved
unable to attract participants from other age groups. After probing this matter, three
distinct explanations were collected. First, Kmara's controversial campaign strategies ran
against the conservative nature of ordinary Georgians.

And while the group had to be

aggressive to sap the confidence of the regime and attract the attention of people,154
tearing portraits of political leaders and embarrassing them in public could not be
tolerated by the nation where maintaining one's honor is taken very seriously. Second,
the group had a very limited timeframe and resources to implement its goals - from
April till November 2003. Soon any attempts to attract members outside of university
circles were abandoned for they would bring little yield for a lot of distraction.155
To summarize, Kmara was successful in bringing together young people
throughout the country regardless of their social background. It succeeded in overcoming
both apathy and resistance of the youth who benefited from the system of bribery and
corruption.156 Where it performed much less effectively was in expanding its ranks to
other demographics. Scared by Kmara's radicalism and scarred by Georgia's experience
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with violence, Georgians of other ages might have supported the group, but were
unwilling to join it for the fear of uncertainty any change might bring to the existing
fragile peace.157

Leaders and members
Like Pora, Kmara had a very horizontal internal structure that brought its own
benefits and flaws. Because relations between members and leaders were very informal,
it was hard to pinpoint who was exactly in charge. On one hand, as one of the leaders
Giorgi Kandelaki notes, it "encouraged a greater feeling of ownership and participation
among activists that would have not been possible within a hierarchy."158 On the other, it
was not always clear who was speaking on the behalf of the organization. Seeking to
enlarge its cadre, Kmara was admitting many members who were not disciplined. Some
of them chose to give interviews on behalf of the group to without being authorized or
aware of the "party line."159 Thus challenges with message control resulted in several
instances of outright public embarrassment.
From the programmatic standpoint, the lack of hierarchical relations was a
blessing to a free flow of brainstorming sessions that several members described as long
and heated.160 Kmara was able to overcome one of the biggest weaknesses of many
Georgian NGOs when as a result of group-think ideas are never vigorously challenged
by those members who are not socialized into the internal nonprofit discourse.
Furthermore, with Kmara's main principle - "Democracy in planning, but dictatorship in
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execution," the group was able to implement decisions rather coherently once tactical
details and budgets were worked out.
While a loose organizational composition encouraged creativity and challenged
the potential of each member, it also complicated the mundane tasks of organizational
management and activist mobilization. One activist acknowledged that because Kmara's
internal structure was rather weak and rudimentary it struggled to manage all of its
members. In the end, it compiled a database of most active supporters to be called upon
to spread the world to others in ease of urgent events.161
In sum, non^hierarchical relations between members and leaders seemed to have
brought more good than harm. Although having no clear lines of authority often meant
little control over members and protracted decision-making, the absence of the leadersversus-members schism enabled greater creativity in generating ideas and more intense
involvement in their execution. The structure suited well in achieving the short-term goal
of Kmara - to weaken Shevarnadze's grip on power before the November elections.
Normative transfers
From the very beginning, Kmara espoused the methodology of nonviolent protest
and selective public pressure as the major tool of fighting against the Shevarnadze
government. Its key normative tenets were successfully borrowed from Otpor - a
Serbian youth organization that was instrumental in bringing down the regime of
Slobodan Milosevic.
Even before launching the group publicly in April 2003, members of the Liberty
Institute became interested in the tactics used by Otpor and conducted a preliminary
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Internet search on the Serbian group.162 To obtain more information, in February 2003
Giga Bokeria and two representatives from other organizations163 went on a fact-finding
mission.164 The visit made such an impression on the Georgian activists that they invited
Otpor members to come and conduct trainings in Georgia in summer. As a result, three
large summer schools were held for over 1,000 participants.J

5

Asked what they learned from those trainings, Georgian activists mention two
points. The first has to do with content. Otpor emphasized repeatedly the need to
abandon the use of violence and do so explicitly in order to earn the trust of people and
forestall government provocations. An openly stated preference for nonviolent tactics
was especially important in Georgia where a fear of another civil war continues to loom
large in the public consciousness. The second point is about presentation. In order to
catch public attention, Kmara could not be an ordinary NGO whose protests were feeble
and boring to watch. As some interviewers noted, every public action had to have some
theatrical element - be it "Kmara" graffiti sprayed on the walls of government buildings
or protesters tearing up a portrait of Eduard Shevarnadze. More importantly, the group
had to make sure that its activities had a large physical presence (whether real or
imaginary) and took place simultaneously to make an impression of a potent and wellcoordinated civic movement.166
External normative transfers were predominant at the beginning of Kmara's
establishment. Kmara used Otpor's symbol (a clenched fist) and defined itself as a
movement rather that a traditional NGO.167 However, external influence was not decisive

162

Tutberidze.
They included head of the Soros Foundation in Georgia and a member of the Georgian Young Lawyers Association.
MacKinnon; Karumidze and Wertseh, 65-66; Wheatley, 179.
165
MacKinnon, Sanidze.
166
Tutberidze; Ramishvili; Usupashvili, 93.
167
Bunce and Wolchuk, "Youth and Electoral Revolutions": 57-59.
163
164

throughout the group's whole existence. It is important to dispel a widely popular myth
that Kmara was a puppet whose strings were aptly pulled by Otpor and the American
government.

While it is true that Bokeria' s trip to Serbia and the summer seminars

were fully funded by the Open Society Foundation Georgia,169 it was up to Georgians
(not Serbian activists or American consultants) to decide what shape Otpor's
methodological help was going to assume in the country.
Kmara leaders understood that if they were to succeed, external norms had to be
married to domestic realities. Most Kmara members outside of Tbilisi spoke little
English and, more importantly, were not socialized into the Western civil society
discourse. Thus, the group had to find an overarching issue that would stir emotions and
rally young people to the cause of change in an Otpor-like nonviolent manner. They
correctly identified that general problem to be corruption, which "had become the
dominant metaphor explaining state incapacity."170 Furthermore, Kmara aptly appealed
the values of Georgians, especially younger generations, who identified the country with
Europe, the West and Western democracy.

All of these factors logically tied external

and internal normative transfers - Georgia could not become a European country (which
it was destined to be) because of corruption. The only way to overcome the system of
corruption was to get rid of the Shevarnadze regime that was at its core. Dismissing
Shevarnadze ought to be done through civic and peaceful disobedience in order to gain
wider public support.
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As another proof that Kmara did not simply copy-cat Otpor' s strategies,
interviews with its activists made it clear that there were vigorous debates on the content
of its activities throughout the group's existence. The obvious division was between
those who argued for embracing more positive messages that would not only criticize
Shevarnadaze, but also help attract audiences from other demographic groups.172
Because the group decided to stick to a negative tone of campaigning, its activities
generated a vicious and contradictory reaction by the government. This, in turn, helped
unite the opposition by showing the extent of authoritarian degeneration within the
173

regime.
Finally, when it came to specific initiatives, Kmara activists relied extensively on
the Georgian tradition of direct action that persevered through the Soviet times in
1978174 and during the struggle for independence in the 1990s.175 Similarly to Pora, most
ideas had to be tested among friends and families to see the initial response.176 Here we
note once again a blending of external advice and domestic realities. From Otpor, Kmara
took the importance of public visibility. Based on the media market in Georgia, its
members knew that the only way to get publicity was to appear in the news on Rustavi-2,
a prominent oppositional channel. Therefore, it designed its activities to be
newsworthy.
To summarize, the normative input of Serbian youth group Otpor proved critical
in providing Kmara with the general framework for civic activities that included the
emphasis on nonviolence and publicity. However, Georgian activists deserve most of the
172
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credit for successfully adapting that methodology for local activists and translating its
abstract tenets into specific activities that in the end enabled the regime change. The
effectiveness of internal norm sharing was proved by the high level of participants'
retention after summer schools. The fact that many people chose to stay with Kmara
showed a genuine interest in its work rather than a simple desire to spend a free of
charge week in the capital.

Inter-NGO cooperation
Cooperation between Kmara and other Georgian NGOs was limited in scope and
strained in breadth. The reasons for that lie in the attitudes that both sides had toward
each other.
On one side, Kmara activists claim that they failed to establish cooperation with
other NGOs because the latter were interested in maintaining a status quo. Since many of
them partnered with the Shevarnadze government on implementing Western-funded
projects, they could no longer criticize it without ruining productive relations.179 The
deep-seated opinions that leading Kmara activists had about the Georgian traditional
third sector also did not help foster cooperation. For instance, Giorgi Kandelaki asserts
that most civic associations remained fundamentally elitist, never winning the support
and participation of the masses.180 Levan Ramishvili seconds his opinion and adds that
they had little accountability to the public and spent most of their time writing reports or
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applying for grants.

Born out of frustration, Kmara espoused a black-and-white

strategy in selecting civic partners.
On the other side, Georgian nonprofit groups were perturbed and angered by
Kmara's attitude, actions and even its mere existence. Many of them had a hard time
taking it seriously. How could a group of youngsters take down a government or bring a
revolution? NGOs, both domestic and international, were dismissive of its influence until
after the Rose revolution when attempts of historical revisionism quickly proliferated.182
Even more sensible voices within civil society, who credited Kmara for its audacity,
questioned its "take-no-prisoners" approach toward campaigning.183 Two of them
compared Kmara to the Chinese Red Guards during Mao's Cultural Revolution who
were bent on destroying and humiliating everything and everyone from the past. Finally,
many NGOs were secretly irked by the group's success for it exposed their own
organizational weaknesses and handicaps.184 It showed that many of them lacked
stamina and, most importantly, guts to fight for their goals.
As a result, Kmara cooperated with a very few civic groups (e.g. ISFED and the
Georgian Association of Young Lawyers) that consisted of demographically similar
audiences. Their help, Kmara leaders acknowledge, was very important, especially at the
beginning. By supplying their members, they enabled Kmara to boost the number of
participants at its protests and fulfill the group's second goal - publicity. Its events
seemed better organized and attended than they were in reality.185 In turn, ISFED could
count on a lot of Kmara members to serve as election observers.186
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To wrap up the discussion, there was little formalized cooperation between
Kmara and other Georgian NGOs because of mutual apprehensions. While Kmara
believed other nonprofits have sold out civic activism in the process of cooperating with
the government and securing Western grants, the latter felt annoyed and sometimes
jealous by the group's self-righteousness and its non-conventional, aggressive methods
of Work. In the few instances where collaboration existed, it covered similar target
audiences and was highly informal.

Kmara and political parties
Kmara's cooperation with political parties was extensive in scope, yet limited in
the number of actual partners. The group worked most actively with the National
Movement led by Mikheil Saakashvili. A host of factors facilitated this unusually close
type of cooperation.
First, leaders of both entities had much in common. They were close in age
(mid- to late-30s at the time), came into the political arena in the decade since
independence, and grew eventually disenchanted with the Shevarnadze rule. Saakashvili
was recruited by David Zhvania to enter Georgian politics as a promising young man
with Western education. Ramishvili joined politics as a student in Georgia's liberation
movement against the Soviet Union and later authored several laws. Thus, when several
Kmara activists spoke about the unity of minds and almost familial relations about the
two organizations,187 their words were easy to believe, especially since after the Rose
Revolution many Kmara members moved to work for the Saakashvili government.
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Second, both organizations had the same message (i.e. the need for change), but
realized that each would be better at delivering it for its own target audience. Kmara, as a
group borne out of university self-governance, would fare well among younger and more
radical audiences. In turn, the National Movement could attract older Georgians who
would not listen to "green teenagers." Their approach was successful in both cases,
because they reached out to populations (whether students or provincial residents) who
were shut out of the political life after the demise of Gamsakhurdia.188
This brings us to the third, larger point - each saw the utility of cooperating with
the other. The National Movement needed young idealists that Kmara was bound to
1 &Q

recruit as voters and its loyal political supporters.

Kmara recognized that good

relations with a key political actor gave it an opportunity to impact the course of political
developments, by pushing for more radical solutions.190
Finally, the top tier of the National Movement (i.e. Bokeria, Saakashvili and
Zhvania) not only understood the role of Kmara (which many of their rank and file
members did not grasp191), but also succeeded at establishing practical mechanisms for
cooperation. Civic and political activists from both organizations held biweekly meetings
where they coordinated strategies and compared notes.
The benefits of this cooperation were obvious. Each side could build upon the
strengths of the other to achieve its own goals more effectively. In a rare exception for
post-Soviet civil societies, where civic groups and political parties inhabit two parallel
universes, Kmara and the National Movement were actively working on a goal greater
than merely a victory in an election or the fulfillment of grant requirements. At the same
188
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time, this cooperation carried one significant problem. In working closely with the
National Movement, Kmara had to give up any pretense of impartiality. This raises
questions of whether and to what extent Kmara has crossed a thin and very blurred line
that separates civic and political worlds.

Influence in the public
Though Kmara acquired worldwide popularity thanks to the international media
coverage of the Rose Revolution, questions about its influence in the Georgian public
have not been properly addressed. The evaluation of existing data and interviews with
civic and political activists reveal bipolarity in public views about the group.
On one hand, the Kmara had a plenty of admirers. A survey in Tbilisi shortly
after the revolution indicated that 59 percent of the capital's residents had a positive
opinion about Kmara, 25.6 percent found Kmara useful and approved its conduct.192
Ordinary citizens felt natural respect toward Kmara activists because of their high level
of education. As one observer noted, Georgians tend to scrutinize the education of those
in positions of power. In this regard, many Kmara members definitely stood out having
studied in the West.

In essence, this segment of the population treated Kmara

supportively for it represented an opportunity to end stagnation that has come along with
stability of the Shevarnadze regime.
On the other hand, there were many who liked Kmara's lofty goals, but despised
its methods of implementing them. 33.4 percent of Tbilisi residents shared this opinion
after the revolution. As mentioned before, much of the group's work was geared toward
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attracting public and especially media attention. However, with that attention came the
embarrassment of high-level officials, in particular President Shevarnadze. In a country
where a man's honor is a perennial theme of national folklore, Kmara's crassness made
people cringeFinally, there was a sizeable segment of people who held negative views of the
organization. In Tbilisi, 15.3 percent thought badly of Kmara and its role in the
revolution. In my interviews, two reasons figured prominently. The first was, of course,
foreign funding, which was regularly used by Shevarnadze to sway the opinion of
conservative Georgians against the group.' By implicating Kmara in receiving outside
assistance, the government was able to tap into a rich well of existing xenophobic
sentiments. Myths about Jewish-Masonic conspiracies to subjugate Georgia painted
Kmara as an agent of foreign influence.195 The group's affiliation with the Liberty
Institute did not help allay the fears. The Institute earned a reputation for promoting
zealous secularism.196 The second factor was a deeply hidden fear that Kmara's actions
would produce radicalization, which pushes the Georgian society into another civil war.
Polling by domestic and international organizations reveals that one of the constant
concerns of many Georgians was a risk of escalating instability.

Many remembered

how Gamsakhurdia's radicalism and unwillingness to compromise plunged the country
into years of infighting and massive impoverishment. To them, hotheads in Kmara did
not realize that by playing with matches of public discontent, they could ignite the fire of
a bloody rebellion. Kmara tried to change the perception of its radicalism and nonconformity by distributing leaflets about its purpose and becoming more structured in
1,4
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delivering its message. In the end, many of its activists acknowledged that they had little
chance of breaking through to the most conservative segments of the society.
Though the data from a public survey in Tbilisi provides a glimpse into popular
attitudes, it cannot objectively tell the whole picture without examining samples in other
parts of the country. However, based on my interviews and external sources, two
speculations can be made. First, the recognition of Kmara was lower outside of the
capital, because of the limited reach of Rustavi-2 beyond Tbilisi.198 Second, negative
attitudes toward Kmara could have been much higher in rural areas where conservative
and religious attitudes are much more predominant than in the capital.
To summarize, Kmara was a well-known player on the domestic scene. However,
public attitudes on its impact were split between those who thought it was useful, those
who liked its goals, but not their execution, and the ones who despised Kmara as a
externally propped up entity. To the group's credit, it recognized its key shortcomings
and how they limit its appeal. But, given the polarization of the Georgian society, it is
not clear what it could have done (short of giving up its radical message) to appease the
ones displeased with its conduct and to convert its skeptics. Thus, the only option it had
was to use its leverage to the maximum during revolutionary events and (as numerous
activists told me) hope that people would join it in the process.

Kikalishvili.

KMARA AND THE ROSE REVOLUTION
Planning and pre-election activities
Kmara's planning for the 2003 parliamentary elections concentrated on two
concurrent goals - to increase public participation in elections and civic life and to sap
the confidence of state authorities in their omnipotence.
Through their numerous anti-government protests, Kmara activists sought to
attract the attention of ordinary Georgians to the importance of elections as an
opportunity to change the country's trajectory of development. Some of Kmara actions
were filled with symbolism. For instance, its first demonstration took place on April 14,
2003 and Commemorated the anniversary of the 1978 student protests against the Soviet
attempts to introduce Russian as the state language in Georgia.199 Later in summer, the
group actively embroiled itself in major political controversies. It demonstrated against
Shevarnadze's attempts to stack the Central Election Commissions with his loyalists and
spoke up against the government's campaign to bully international grant-giving
•
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organizations.
Recognizing that public protests in Tbilisi were not sufficient, many activists
embarked on a grass-root campaign to spread the message among Georgian university
students and young people in the capital and throughout the country.201 During these
personal meetings, Kmara members explained not only the importance of voting to
increase the turnout, but also the necessity to be ready to stand up against fraud. The
group was able to gain supporters from different parts of the country who later joined the
protests in Tbilisi. As a result of these efforts, Kmara crushed the prevalent government
199
200
201
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view of NGOs as the sector small m number, disconnected from the public and
vulnerable to cooptation, intimidation and defamation.202 It also created a powerful
official backlash against its activities. For instance, on October 10 police forces
dispersed an attempted Kmara protest near the State Chancellary in Tbilisi, and thirteen
days later its office was ransacked at night.203
While in many interviews with the press Kmara activists repeatedly spoke about
following the Otpor model, little post-election planning occurred in reality. In fact, just
like with the theatrical nature of protests, references to Otpor were part of the bluffing
strategy that the group used to intimidate the government. Assessing the situation now,
many of them acknowledge that they did not expect anything revolutionary. For
instance, both Zurabishvili and Ramishvili assert that it was the tenacity of Shevarnadze
(i.e. his unwillingness to compromise) that doomed the deal worked out between him
and the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi.204 Tea Tutberidze says until the very last moment
(possibly Saakashvili's trip to Mingrelia, the Western part of Georgia) she was not
certain that enough people would join the protests.
At the same time, it would be wrong to suggest that Kmara activists watched the
unfolding events from the sideline. Several sources confirm that in the days after the
election, Kmara was urging a radical line.205 Its activists approached Mikheil Saakashvili
with the proposal to organize a "march of the million angry voters" and bring people
from the countryside, which he rejected. This fact confirms two points. One, mentioned
before, is that negotiations over a possible compromise with the Shevarnadze
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government were really underway.

The other is that in those revolutionary days

Kmara did a lot of things on the spur of the moment rather than as a consequence of
deliberate planning.
To conclude, Kmara's involvement in the election campaign added a distinct and
very loud civic voice to the political debate. The group established a necessary grass-root
infrastructure in Tbilisi and outside of the capital to be called upon for post-election
activities. In regard to the latter, it seems that Kmara did not conduct extensive planning
for contingencies. Instead the leading role in this area was given to the opposition,
mainly Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Movement.207 While negotiations among
various parties were underway, Kmara and its activists were holding protests merely to
remind the government of what was in store.

Cooperation with NGOs and media
Due to Kmara's radical profile, its cooperation with NGOs was initially limited.
As its spokesperson tersely remarked, "we worked with people when our interests
coincided and we moved on in cases when they did not."

Thus, Kmara's cooperation

with NGOs and other actors was most effective when it was spontaneous, need-based
and mutually benefiting.
In the months before the revolution, Kmara relied heavily on the support from the
Liberty Institute that provided technical and logistical resources, assisted with regional
outreach, training and coordination with oppositional parties. The second closest group
was the Georgian Association of Young Lawyers (GYLA) that gave pro bono legal
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advice when Kmara activists were detained by authorities.209 Realizing that they need
help in implementing one of its key goals of monitoring election, Kmara turned to the
country's oldest election watchdog ISFED. Both ISFED and Kmara members reported a
positive record of cooperation in deploying civic observers (many of whom came from
Kmara) to monitor elections throughout the country.210
It remains unclear whether and to what extent Kmara was active in NGO
coalitions. One thing is obvious that international donors favored building such
coalitions as a way to amplify the power and voice of civic groups. Kmara activists that I
interviewed said they avoided formalized agreements and preferred to cooperate with
other civic groups on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, some of the leaders noted (not
without disdain) that many nonprofit groups leaped to help Kmara only when it was
becoming increasingly clear that Shevarnadze's days in power are numbered.211 Contrary
to these claims, Areshidze asserts that in September 2002 the Open Society Georgia
Foundation sought to put together a coalition of six NGOs, including Kmara's founder,
919

the Liberty Institute.

The effort did not last long. It is speculated that because the

Liberty Institute, GYLA and CIPDD held more radical positions, other members were
91 ^

either excluded from further meetings or left on their own.

Whatever the case might

be, the project did not go anywhere as informal patterns of cooperation prevailed over
more formalized initiatives.
At the same time, collaboration was much more extensive and genuine with TV
channel Rustavi-2. Founded by many civic leaders and employing many journalists with
209
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Western training in news reporting, the media outlet was an open critic of Shevarnadze.
While there was no formal deal, an implicit understanding existed between Kmara and
Rustavi-2 that whenever the former would speak up, the latter would come to cover a
demonstration.214 In essence, it was Kmara's protests, their coverage by Rustavi-2 and
angry government reactions (covered again by the media) that gave the group the biggest
exposure and boosted its cause.

Mobilization
Like many Kmara activities, its mobilization during the events of the Rose
Revolution occurred spontaneously and was assisted by other factors and events
happening at the time.
While the membership pool of the group was significant (2,000-3,000 people)
compared to other NGOs, it was not nearly enough to create the kind of public protests
that would be treated seriously by the government. Recognizing this, the leadership of
Kmara and the Liberty Institute sought to educate a larger public about the message of
peaceful resistance. Several days before the elections, they provided a popular
oppositional channel (and a not so secret admirer of Kmara) Rustavi-2 a documentary,
produced by a small independent studio in Washington DC, with an activist social
stand.216 "Bringing Down A Dictator" was a story of how ordinary Serbs removed from
power one of the bloodiest leaders in Europe, Slobodan Milosevic. The film was replete
with references that immediately resonated among ordinary Georgians. Kmara looked
and acted just like Otpor. The Georgian political opposition reminded of its Serbian
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counterparts - disunited and always bickering within, it seemed only recently to have
come together. At one point, the documentary shows Otpor activists cutting a cake where
each piece represented a part of Serbia split away as a result of Milosevic's militant
policies. Georgians immediately thought of the territorial losses that the country suffered
since becoming independent - South Ossetia, Abkhazia and half-independent Adjara.
The main message was clear - if the vote is stolen, you must come to the capital (Tbilisi)
and press for the real results to be recognized. In the end, showing the documentary
became an important moment for rallying Kmara activists and educating ordinary
citizens about the peaceful nature of possible demonstrations.
As the result of exit polls and ISFED parallel vote tabulations were broadcast on
Rustavi-2, Kmara recognized that the showdown was inevitable. It began to mobilize the
core of activists by email and cell phone.217 Soon, the "snowball effect" kicked in, as
Kmara members started text-messaging their friends, relatives, friends of friends and
relatives of relatives to join the protest near the State Chancellary and then at the Liberty
Square.
Kmara's mobilization effort was inadvertently assisted by a number of other
factors and events. The first was a continuous support from Rustavi-2 that broadcast
unfolding protests and informed the public where future events would take place.
Furthermore, the TV channel showed mostly close-ups of the demonstrations to create a
perception of large public events and skew a cost-benefit analysis of ordinary people (i.e.
the larger the crowds - the less likely the use of force).

The other was the formation of

the ArtCom - a public group consisting of famous Georgian artists, singers and actors.219
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The involvement of intelligence in a country where the public reveres its educated class
persuaded many ordinary citizens to step into the fray of revolutionary events. The final
factor was the force of a revolutionary cascade.220 As teachers went on strike and cars
drove honking their horns in protests, more and more people joined Kmara students to
defend their vote.
To conclude, Kmara's mobilization effort was successful as a result of its lateral
strategies and inadvertent support from other forces. Taking advantage of modern
communication technologies, it was able to mobilize its enlisted members. Assisted by
the media attention, it tapped into extended social networks of its members. Most
importantly, Kmara was able to build on its own success, its popularity and its
connections within the student and youth community in Tbilisi and around the country.
Had that not been the case, the first wave of demonstrations would have taken much
longer to materialize.

Assessment of the performance
Kmara's performance in the revolution should be divided into two parts - preelection activities and participation in the revolutionary events. On the first count, the
group was successful, because it produced "quality activism."221 What this means in
practice is Kmara was able to attract people to its cause by making them feel
empowered. This was not NGO activism as usual. Students and young Georgians joined
Kmara not because of material rewards (e.g. an all expenses-paid seminar in Tbilisi or a
small monthly stipend), but because of the genuine concern about their country's future.
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Since their involvement was much more spontaneous arid genuine, it was also more
appealing to others. As a result, the organization ended up playing the role that civic
groups are supposed to play in pre-election campaigns - a noisy observer and a restless
watchdog of the government.
As far as the revolutionary events are concerned, Kmara's contribution was twofold. First, it incited and sustained the first wave of mobilization. In the morning
following the election, Kmara activists plastered Tbilisi streets with the results of parallel
vote tabulation that differed dramatically from the official record.222 The group's
members made up the crowd for small-scale, but continuous demonstrations that lasted
from November 8 till November 14. By mobilizing up to 10,000 students, Kmara created
a visible presence that was hard for the government to ignore. Second, through close but
informal cooperation with Rustavi-2, the group helped fuel larger mobilization of the
Georgian population.

Having Kmara protesters in place, Rustavi-2 used media

techniques (e.g. camera angles) to make demonstrations seem larger and better attended
than they were.224 In this effort, both assisted Saakashvili's National Movement that
sought to bring people out to the streets after failed negotiations with Shevarnadze.
In the end, the questions of whether Kmara was consequential and decisive
enough loom large. The answer is yes to the first and no to the second. Kmara's
participation defined the public image of the Rose Revolution as a youth-driven event
and radicalized the discourse about possible solutions by framing election fraud into the
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larger narrative of overall corruption that permeated the Shevarnadze regime.

If initial

demonstrations had not been well attended, the opposition would have been pushed into
an unfavorable compromise. Given the American concern about regional stability in the
Caucasus,

both sides might have been pressured to sign a pact that would have left the

Shevarnadze regime mostly in tact. However, the presence of street protesters (many of
whom came from Kmara) gave Saakashvili and other oppositional leaders enough
backing to insist on the cancellation of election results as a nonnegotiable demand. Had
the discourse been shaped differently, the outcome might have failed to achieve greater
mobilization as it happened in 1999 and 2002.227
This brings us to the second part of the question. Contrary to the impression that
many media reports gave at the time, Kmara was not the decisive force for the
revolution's success. Many, including Saakashvili himself and U.S. Ambassador Miller,
claim that Rustavi-2 proved much more important as the megaphone of the revolution.228
The role of opposition was certainly important in facilitating the political process. In
fact, most observers openly acknowledge that contrary to Otpor in Serbia, Kmara took a
backseat in the revolutionary cascade.
As a summary of the discussion on success, it is important to evaluate Kmara's
performance against the suggested indicators of function and contribution. In terms of
the former, Kmara fulfilled its key stated function by energizing a specific part of the
Georgian electorate about the elections. Its contribution to the revolution was two-fold. It
225
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helped to initiate the first wave of protests that persuaded many others to join the
revolutionary cause, and it sustained the demonstrations when the public enthusiasm
seemed to be waning or when political negotiations between the government and
opposition were taking place. Thus its input to the initial stage of the revolution and the
management of protests is without any doubt. In essence, as many observers note,
Kmara's great success in fulfilling its mission of voter mobilization and regime change
became the cause for its demise. Once those goals were accomplished through the
revolution, there was no place for Kmara in its old shape and form in the Georgian civic
life.

PROFILE: ISFED
Launch
In 1995, after several years since the return of Shevarnadze into the war-torn
country, Georgia was acquiring a modicum of stability. The president managed to
consolidate power and neutralize his powerful opponents, like Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba
Ioseliani. As a sign of stabilization, Georgia ratified its new constitution on 24 August
1995. Several days later, the Georgian parliament adopted the electoral code and
scheduled the first post-war parliamentary and presidential elections for 5 November
1995.230 Like Ukraine in 1994, Georgia desperately needed an independent civic group
that would monitor elections. Thus, the International Society for Fair Elections (ISFE)
was established at the initiative of several existing local NGOs that lobbied foreign
donors to provide funding for election-related projects.231 Set up specifically in advance
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of the 1995 elections, ISFE deployed 1,300 observers during its christening
experience.

However, the organization got its first taste of Georgian rough politics

only a year later when in September 1996 Ruslan Abashidze, the authoritarian ruler of
Ajara, denied ISFE the right to monitor election of the Ajara Supreme Council.

Maturation
ISFE recognized the limitations of its primary focus on elections early in its
existence. In 1996 it sought to expand the field for its activities by adding an advocacy
component - Citizens' Public Dialogue Meeting and Citizens' Advisory Committees that
were designed to solicit feedback from regular people and incorporate it in decisionmaking processes of local officials. A year later on 22 November 1997 the group decided
to add democracy to its title, thereby making overall democracy promotion a definitive
component of its work.
Though the organization tried to expand its operation beyond election
monitoring, on a closer look a clear difference emerges between what it aspired to do
and what it did or could do in local circumstances. In 1996-1999, ISFED activists
identified four priorities - governmental transparency, civic participation and selfgovernance, education and empowerment, and advocacy. In the first area, the group
launched a series of monitoring initiatives aimed at increasing accountability for
budgetary processes of Sakrebulos (local councils), enhancing transparency of
governments and police authorities at different levels and promoting the observance of
"sunshine" laws. As for civic participation, the group accounted for 18 Citizens'
Advisory Committees (CACs) in different regions of the country. It also established
232
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neighborhood associations and student governments in three Georgian cities (Tbilisi,
Kutaisi and Gori). ISFED''s efforts seemed to be most prolific in the areas of education
and advocacy where it developed and distributed numerous educational materials for
voters and election observers, created the Civic Education library and produced its own
publication "Civil Society." The organization's leadership engaged in extensive lobbying
efforts to improve the status of Sakrebulo members, discuss legislative drafts and amend
the national election legislation.
While the mere enumeration of activities may paint the picture of an extremely
busy and vibrant organization, in reality ISFED struggled to adjust to its self-proclaimed
mission. Several outside observers noted that before 2003 the group never managed to
make a leap from being a purely election watchdog (which got activated from one
election cycle to the next) to acting as a more permanent civic entity. Of course, it
would be natural and thus easy to assign some blame on ISFED activists who should
have tried harder to overcome the difficulties of organization building. However, their
fault is only partial. Indeed, the attempts to establish a more stable shop might have been
doomed from the start given Georgia's economic realities and a relatively limited pool of
international funding. Mark Mullen, NDFs Country Director in Georgia, indicated that
in-between elections ISFED had nothing more than a group of staff members in the
capital and a few coordinators of rayons (counties) who had small, but regular salaries.
So whereas it was possible to attract people for election monitoring, the group struggled
to retain its participants on a volunteer basis after elections.

The economic situation

outside of Tbilisi was such that many people could not even fathom donating their time
for free.
233
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Mission and its evolution
The group's gradual maturation is clearly depicted in its mission. The review of
ISFED mission-related documents shows that, unlike many NGOs in the former Soviet
Union where mission writing was seen as a formality to satisfy foreign donors, the
organization was both thoughtful and idealistic about its tasks. The normative
framework, which guides organizational activities, is a predictably pithy statement of
goals as well as an elaboration of espoused values and ideals, including a reference to
international documents.
Between 1995-1996 the organization did not have an extensive view of its role.
In this nascent stage it was mostly concerned about voter education, election monitoring
and some basic elements of advocacy. Having gone through a set of formative
experiences (both the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1996 elections in Ajara),
ISFED sought to define its place in Georgian civil society and its own view on the
country's developmental trajectory.
It borrowed the central motto from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which states, "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country... The
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government: this shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections." Though some of its espoused values
consisted of usual civic buzzwords (e.g. human rights, open civil society), others showed
a genuine concern for the country (e.g. independent, democratic Georgia and its
constitution).
In the end, ISFED's mission statement settled for generalities that were slightly
modified to show the group's inclination to work in the election field. More specifically
it indicated that ISFED would promote democratic practices through citizens'
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participation^ civil society development, election and general government monitoring,
advice, advocacy and civic education.
To simmiarize our discussion, two points should be noted. First, it is clear that the
leadership of the organization was aware of the international normative framework234
that guided activities of election watchdogs in other countries. Second, ISFED also
shared (at the very least rhetorically) the core assumptions and principles of this
framework, which explains why it sought to embrace and elaborate upon them in detail.

Funding and sustainability
From the founding and till the Rose Revolution, ISFED was completely
dependent on NDI in terms of funding and organizational support. While the group made
regular attempts to secure grants from other sources, the level of support did not amount
to any significant diversification of its financial base.
Numerous sources interviewed for the dissertation provide different reasons for
this situation. ISFED activists indicate that the group consciously chose not to approach
local businesses, perceiving them as biased and threatening to the NGO's image of
impartiality.

Whenever ISFED applied for donor funding, it engaged NDI to lobby on

its behalf or provide assistance with developing a grant proposal together. Thus, the
group was able to get money from such top-notch grant-providers as the British Council,
Soros Foundation in Georgia (OSGF) and US AID. Unlike many other nonprofit groups,
especially outside of Tbilisi, ISFED acknowledges that it never had to go through real
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"dry spells" when funding was not available for basic operational expenditures. The
main problem was how to put funds to good use rather than how to get them.236
The issue of financial sustainability came up frequently in discussions with NDI
representatives who, as the most significant funder of ISFED, felt a special responsibility
for its survival. However, even in this case the positions of two sides diverged rather
sharply. Mark Mullen, who spent a long time in Georgia, believes that NDI was not
genuinely interested in letting ISFED expand its roster of funders. The Democratic
Institute recognized that if ISFED became truly independent, it would undermine the
extent of NDI's control over the NGO, especially its ability to influence post-election
statements.237 One of the former Executive Directors of ISFED, Tamar Zhvania, shared
at least part of that assessment when she expressed displeasure at the constant NDI's
meddling in daily operations of the group.238 Another NDI representative, who worked
in Georgia, disagreed. Lincoln Mitchell remarks that accusations of sinister motives on
part of the Institute are usually a face-saving technique. In reality, there were always
talks in both organizations to give more space for ISFED to operate on its own or to
remove the NDI safety net. However, when it came to action, both entities recoiled
because they were not sure if ISFED would be able to make it on its own. Thus some
ISFED activists might have created the perception that "they are not being let go" as a
justification for organizational weakness.
As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle and it is much more nuanced.
Depending on specific circumstances, ISFED preferred to act independently during some
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times and run for help from NDI during others. Though the group was able to secure
occasional grants from other funding agencies, it was nowhere near achieving the
diversification of sources that would enable it to distance itself from NDI on a more
permanent basis. The interviews with activists and donors made it clear that the task of
getting money and assuring financial sustainability was doubly complicated in the
Georgian context. It seems that both activists and donors gave up on the attempts to
secure money from the government or the business sector (not to mention the destitute
population). In this case, the only hope for ISFED to have a more stable financial future
was (and is) to have several donors with substantial and long-term contributions to its
budget. By the time of the Rose Revolution, ISFED did not achieve that goal.

Donor influence
Financial dependency of ISFED on external assistance poses a natural question
about the extent of influence that foreign organizations, in particular NDI, exerted on the
group. The accumulated evidence shows a complex picture of donor-grantee relations
where interdependence between the two parties was not as one-side (i.e. the donor
dominating the grantee) as it might have seemed from afar.
On one side, NDI tended to be bossy. According to the ISFED former director,
until 2003 there was a tacit agreement that the group would not fundraise from other
sources, solely relying on NDI. The ISFED leader was required to make weekly reports
at the NDI office in Tbilisi.240 For the first two years, NDI reviewed and approved
ISFED's post-election statements. However, neither ISFED nor NDI was internally
united in its approach to the other side. As it happens in many organizations, those
240
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divisions were greatly influenced by interactions among specific individuals and their
ability to get personally along with each other. For instance, the relationship was
definitely frosty between NDI and Ms. Zhvania, who sought to discontinue the practice
of weekly reporting. On the other hand, Kakhaber Sopromadze, ISFED's current deputy
director and long-term activist, spoke more gratefully about the Democratic Institute,
calling it an extremely strong ally of ISFED that supported it through most difficult
times.241 At NDI, differences in how to treat the Georgian election watchdog emerged
between the Institute's office in Tbilisi and its headquarters in DC. For instance, Mark
Mullen did not hide his opinion that NDI-DC was a meddlesome, "bad cop" with
ISFED. He sought to discontinue the practice of approving the NGO's post-election
reports and fought hard, but unsuccessfully to publish the ISFED parallel vote tabulation
report in 1999, which presented the leading pro-governmental party CUG (Citizens'
Union of Georgia) in a bad light and was consequently embargoed by NDI for public
release.242
On the other side, ISFED became the premier election civic group thanks to NDI.
Having the backing of the Institute allowed the civic group to win a lot of political
battles and get heard at the highest levels of government. It is also clear that the Institute
had to be protective of ISFED for two other closely related reasons. First, the group often
tended to exaggerate its capacity to act independently or to perform program-related
tasks.243 For instance, Lincoln Mitchell, who worked at NDI-Tbilisi, believed ISFED
would not have been adequately prepared to conduct a critical parallel vote tabulation in
the 2003 parliamentary elections if it had not received the external training set up by
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NDI.244 Second, because of the Institute's long-term commitment to the group, NDI felt
that its own image and stature were tied to ISFED. The Democratic Institute was under
intense pressure from the regional office of US AID to spread donor funding for elections
among several groups and set up NGOs that would perform tasks similar to ISFED.245
The precarious situation was not helped by the fact that left to its own devices, the
leadership of ISFED showed a propensity for self-destruction. In the years preceding the
Rose Revolution, Zurab Tchiaberishvili (the then Executive Director of the group)
registered another nonprofit, called the Fair Elections, and transferred all the property
and technical equipment possessed by ISFED to his own organization. The case
eloquently demonstrated to NDI that the Georgian NGO was not yet ready to enjoy full
independence.
To summarize the discussion, NDI exercised a great deal of influence over
ISFED's programming and development. Both organizations developed an interesting
pull-and-push dynamic. ISFED liked to play up its experience and readiness to act on its
own, especially since its leadership recognized that NDI would always come to rescue.
NDI was torn between two extremes as well. On one hand, it wanted to have a genuinely
Georgian election group that was not seen as an American puppet. On the other, it
gradually invested its own reputation into the wellbeing of ISFED and was not willing to
have it compromised by the group's rash statements or actions. In the end, the extent of
donor influence continued to depend on personalities in both offices and specific events.
If people found a common language and managed to establish trust, NDI's meddling did
not seem so intrusive. By 2000, NDI was willing to give ISFED for autonomy for events
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of a lower magnitude. Most importantly, this relationship demonstrates one critical point
- the pattern of dependency between foreign donors and their grantees abroad is not as
one-sided as often assumed. Indeed, as seen with NDI and ISFED, the longer the funder
supports the organization, the more dependent it becomes on the grantee's continued
survival and performance. As a result, the implicit recognition of this reality changes
profoundly how democracy-promoting organizations interact with their foreign
beneficiaries.

Membership
From the very beginning, ISFED pursued multiple strategies to recruit its
members throughout the whole country. As a positive outcome of this approach, the
organization was able to get a diverse pool of individuals who still met the selection
criterion of being nonpartisan. However, the long-term tradeoff was that ISFED
members, who were so different from each other, had a lower level of personal loyalty
and organizational identity.246
In 1995, ISFED sought to establish a broad governance structure that widely
dispersed responsibilities between the central and regional [rayon] offices. Under the
scheme, membership recruitment was outsourced to regional branches, and the
headquarters in Tbilisi never attempted to conduct a serious recruitment campaign.247
ISFED had two categories of members - regular staff and election volunteers. For
regular members, the organization worked hard to get individuals who were
professionals and had a stature in their communities.
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the usual suspects - retirees who were mad at the previous Communist system and had
time on their hands and students who were passionate and fearless about the task. The
biggest in ISFED's recruitment strategies was their dependence on particular branch
coordinators. Because Georgia is a very small country, personal relations played a great
role in persuading ordinary citizens to volunteer for ISFED. The major problem came up
after elections. While the organization maintained an extensive database of members,
most of them were not involved in non-election activities. In reality, each branch had a
smaller cohort of activists who could be counted to mobilize a larger crowd.249 However,
this mobilization technique became useless when a branch coordinator left his position,
thereby effectively dissolving the smaller cohort that formed around him. As a result,
many regional branches lost a lot of institutional memory and experiences with any
leadership changes.
It becomes clear from the interviews with ISFED activists that in terms of
recruitment they were concerned with two issues - impartiality of their members and
organizational diversity. Many of them emphasized laborious mechanisms that the group
utilized not only to check the initial background of permanent staffers and volunteers,
but also to monitor their interactions with political parties. In this regard, the task was
made much easier by the size of the country, which encompassed 75 election districts
and 3,000 polling stations.250 As for diversity, both external observers and activists
emphasized how the group tried to ensure some gender balance251 among members (an
arduous task in the country where female politicians were few and far in-between). The
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headquarters in Tbilisi sought to bring people outside of the capital in a meaningful
manner, by assigning them to the positions of program coordinators and board members.
The strategy had its own advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it made the
organization look more credible, because voters saw real activists who could emphasize
with their problems. By being visible members in their communities, those people
proved to be extremely dedicated, brave, unspoiled by the excesses of Tbilisi and very
hard-working. Many of them had to deal with real clashes of interest and harassment.252
On the other hand, the recruitment strategy decreased the group's political clout, because
(unlike such famous NGOs as the Liberty Institute), ISFED had a lot fewer well-known
and politically connected activists who had made their name in Georgian politics.253
Though the organization did not charge membership fees, by 1999 it had six
regional subdivisions and most developed branches in Batumi and Kutaisi.254 Overall,
ISFED could boast a fairly successful set of recruitment strategies. As a result of those, it
was able to attract different audiences to the cause of fair elections and ensure a
continuous blood flow within the organization. The practices were not without their
flaws. One of them was the group's inability to involve significant numbers of "middleaged" Georgians (those in their late 30s-40s). The other was a comparatively lower
attachment of activists to the organization, which was dictated by their relatively short
tenure in the group. The situation comes back to the familiar points on how an NGO
should try to embed itself while balancing two conflicting impulses - an openness to
newcomers and the strive for professionalism.
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Leaders and members
ISFED's open internal structure ensured a close interaction between leaders and
members. Drawing parallels with certain types of government systems, ISFED was more
of a parliamentary republic where the executive board (composed of a lot of regional
members) had a greater say in the running of the organization. Like any state with an
immature parliamentary system, ISFED rescued itself from creeping authoritarianism of
some NGOs where a strong leader crowded out potential competitors and turned a group
into his own fiefdom. However, the multiplicity of voices often resulted in
organizational volatility where leaders, who could not get along with the board, were
quickly pushed out.
ISFED's initial leader Nugzar Ivanidze was quietly relieved of his duties by the
board at the end of the 1990s. Board members saw a need for change when Ivanidze was
becoming more authoritarian and allegedly corrupt.255 In 2000-2001, theNGO went
through a period of organizational uncertainty where two other executive directors had to
leave after failing to establish their authority successfully. By the end of 2001, Zurab
Tchiaberishvili assumed the reins and sought to re-make the organization.
Tchiaberishvili's plan included bringing a group of young English-speaking
activists into the headquarters in Tbilisi, attracting high-profile political figures to the
ISFED Executive Board and raising public awareness of the group. Needless to say, the
changes of this magnitude created discontent among ordinary members. In 2002, a clash
of cultures emerged between the central and regional offices. Regional activists were
grumbling that Tchiaberishvili was more interested in the big picture rather than the
minutia of office administration and supervision. There was also resentment of the fact
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that Tchiaberishvili was a member of the Georgian elite NGO class in the previously
egalitarian ISFED. Sensing the tensions and trying to upstage possible challenges to his
leadership, he secretly established the "Fair Elections" foundation.256 In doing so,
Tchiaberishvili took advantage of the convoluted legislation on NGOs, which did not
require the presence of co-founders for nonprofit foundations.
In the end, it seems, the group was able to pull itself together and do a great job
with its election programs before the Rose Revolution. It is also clear that
Tchiaberishvili's fast-paced and ambitious approach was necessary to take the
organization up to a higher level of operations. At the same time, his tumultuous tenure
exposed a significant weakness that existed in the interactions between regular activists
and the group's leadership. While the organizational was democratic internally (a rare
example in the former Soviet space), it did not have more formal mechanisms for
auditing programmatic errors, gathering feedback and incorporating otherwise rigorous
informal discussions into future decision-making.257
To conclude, the review of leader-member interactions in ISFED emphasize two
important points. First, the more open are the mechanisms of governance for an NGO,
the less likely it is to succumb to authoritarian tendencies of particular leaders. Second,
openness is not a cure in itself. Unless accompanied by sufficient formal mechanisms of
feedback gathering and analysis, it may lead to excessive organizational volatility and
internal strife. By 2003, ISFED was learning both lessons the hard way.
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Normative transfers
ISFED provided a wide range of training activities to assure that its activists were
competent in relevant election-related activities and aware of the organizational norms
and values. At the early stages of its existence, ISFED conducted a general training for
all members of the organization on election management and administration, a legal
framework and media relations.

For every election, the group set up a plethora of

trainings that were calibrated for specific capacities of observers. For instance, there was
a separate seminar for long-term monitors, since they began their efforts very early in the
election campaign. A week before an Election Day, there was a training for those who
were involved in parallel vote tabulation. At that point, participants did not know which
polling station they would be observing - a precaution taken to avoid possible
harassment or corruption of monitors.259 It was only the night before election when
observers were assigned a specific polling station. The NGO sought to maintain the
competency of its regional leaders and regular activists by assuring that those who join
the organization in-between election cycles would get eventually trained through its
seminars on citizen participation and other on-going projects.260
Domestic trainings for activists focused heavily on the requirement of
impartiality that would sustain ISFED's reputation for being an independent force.
Trainings that the group received abroad or from foreign consultants were tailored to
specific skills that would enable better project implementation. For instance, in 2003
NDI invited an expert that worked with ISFED to design and implement a reliable
system of parallel vote tabulation. The group's successful performance in this area
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helped make a critical normative shift within the larger Georgian society. Since 2003
when ISFED publicly released the results of PVT, the procedure and its results have
become the golden standard to measure the veracity of election results. 261
In general, ISFED members talked little about external normative transfers.
However, it is clear from the interviews with NDI that those were significant especially
at the beginning and in critical projects. Some at the Democratic Institute complained
about the Institute's fixation on bringing Western assistance rather than letting local
activists to take field trips to the countries of the former Soviet bloc where civil society
groups were most successful.

Regardless of these deficiencies, ISFED proved good in

two things. First, it was able to assure that its members were trained in methodology and
cognizant of the group's key emphasis on impartiality. Second, the NGO was
sufficiently open to effectively absorb international normative assistance, especially in
the area of parallel vote tabulation.

Inter-NGO cooperation
ISFED's cooperation with fellow non-government organizations was short-term
and specific in nature. The group made an effort to avoid getting entangled in NGO
coalitions and alliances. On the surface, ISFED interacted with a wide variety of
Georgian and foreign institutions that included such titans on the domestic scene as
GYLA, the Liberty Institute, Open Society Foundation, UNDP and the British Council.
However, as ISFED members acknowledge, these interactions were not deep, because
each of the mentioned organizations had its segment of work. Therefore, most genuine
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cooperation began only in advance of a specific election campaign when tasks (and with
them the available money) became clear for every actor. Until 2002 ISFED coordinated
very little with other NGOs, partially because (unlike CVU) the group was much less
advanced in its organizational development. The other reason was certainly the position
of the National Democratic Institute. Fearing that ISFED may be dragged into dubious
coalitions, NDI was weary of ISFED's cooperation with others. It insisted that if ISFED
were to cooperate with others, they should divide election-related tasks rather than assign
different parts of Georgia to different groups for monitoring. The latter, quite reasonably,
would undermine efforts to produce a comprehensive and credible election report.
Since 2002 ISFED has tried to establish informal mechanisms of cooperation that
would include mostly information sharing and in rare cases exchanges of human
resources. For instance, the group came to rely heavily on members of the Georgian
Young Lawyers' Associations (GYLA) to provide law students as observers.
Two other aspects significantly complicated efforts to work with other civic
groups. One, Georgian civil society was highly polarized. Thus, engaging with new and
unknown NGOs promised a minefield of guessing whether they were truly impartial. So
ISFED preferred to avoid asking for assistance at all for the fear of damaging its
reputation for neutrality. The other, the group had little to offer to other organizations in
the period between elections, because its activities never took off the ground to the
extent that would make it an attractive partner.
To summarize, within Georgia's civil society ISFED stood out for it was not
eager to engage with other NGOs. Strengthened by continuous funding from NDI,
ISFED sought help from a very few organizations, whose political leanings were known
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and who could help it with very specific tasks (e.g. providing monitors and observing
their compliance with the rules of impartiality);

ISFED and political parties
ISFED had extensive cooperation with Georgian political parties and
governmental authorities. However, throughout all of these interactions, the organization
had to exercise extreme caution, trying to genuinely engage various political actors
without becoming embroiled in their partisan squabbles.
The testimony from ISFED regional activists reveals that direct cooperation with
parties and state authorities was the purview of the NGO's central headquarters in
Tbilisi. Thus, regional branches acted as a conduit to pass information from ordinary
activists to decision-makers in the capital.

The lack of official cooperation at the lower

levels of the organization can be explained by several factors. One, of course, had to deal
with the internal cohesion of ISFED. Unlike regional branches of the Committee of
Voters of Ukraine, regional offices of ISFED were much weaker in their capacity. As
mentioned before, changes of the top personnel often resulted in the loss of institutional
memory and previously established connections. Because of the size of the country,
centripetal tendencies were much stronger in Georgia than they were in Ukraine.
Political parties were also too weak to work effectively beyond the capital and a handful
of big cities. Therefore, everyone understood that problems could be addressed only in
Tbilisi.
In the capital the organization was well known among the government and
political parties for its seriousness and impartiality. ISFED rebuffed several attempts to
263
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buy its observers, thereby passing, the-political litmus test that enabled it to earn the trust
of political leaders.264 In 2001, it cooperated with the government on the 2001 Election
Code that was a comprehensive bill for all types of elections.265 Because of the group's
stature as an expert in election-related matters, it worked productively with the Central
Election Commission where it even had an accredited representative.266 Overall, the
record of working with the state is mixed. In the areas where the government knew what
it wanted or desired real action (like election legislation), ISFED was effective and
visible. Where the state preferred an imitation of activity (like the Inter-Agency Task
Force to which ISFED was invited), the outcome was dismal.
By 2002 the relationship between ISFED and political parties has taken more or
less set shape - ISFED would equally engage with all actors, by providing them with
information on election developments.267 In turn, political parties would share the data
on the violations they observed in the field, betting on ISFED's impartiality to report
them in the media.
ISFED seems to come closest to striking the golden middle in working with
political parties and government authorities before the 2003 parliamentary campaign. On
one hand, it lobbied state authorities for election reforms and sought information from
political parties on legal violations. On the other hand, it managed to maintain its
neutrality and implemented several mechanisms to assure that activists on the ground
would not become "double agents" willing to overlook violations for the sake for their
party. ISFED was unconsciously assisted in these tasks by external circumstances. For

264

Zhvania, Mullen.
Sopromadze; Usupashvili, 75; Wheatley, 146.
266
For instance, one of the earliest things ISFED did was to supply state officials with the recommendations how to prevent
violations of citizens' registration rights through the Soviet system, known as "propiska."
267
Sopromadze.
265

instance, Georgian oppositional parties were always more willing to talk to the group
because they could dump facts about violations that would have been otherwise ignored
by the authorities. The other important factor that many authors frequently mention is the
inherent capacity weakness of the Georgian government. Unlike Ukraine, where state
authorities had enough muscle to cajole and coerce, the Shevarnadze administration had
limited resources and a seemingly greater willingness to show that it could work with
civil society. All of these amplified the leverage of ISFED election statements and its
stature in the national Central Election Commission.

Influence in the public
Despite a variety of strategies pursued by the group, ISFED remained unknown
to the majority of Georgians who lived outside the capital or who were not deeply
interested in politics. Since its establishment the group tried a number of ways to reach
out to the public. It organized education meetings, trainings, seminars and conferences. It
published and distributed brochures and leaflets through its Civic Education Library
series. It produced its own newsletter, "Civil Society," with the circulation of 5,000
copies.268 The efforts were a complete failure. Several activists acknowledge that the
organization was only known to people who followed politics closely through the
media.269
The organization can be blamed for not trying harder. It never did any targeted
research to make sure that its publications got to the people. Nor did it step outside the
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usual toolbox of impersonal outreach strategies used by the rest of Georgian NGOs.
ISFED recruitment strategies were de-centralized and relied on personal connections.
Fortunately, ISFED's public image was not affected by the perception of its
foreign funding. One of the reasons for that was the length of existence. Because the
group had been functioning since 1995, it was considered part of the civic landscape.270
While Kmara was treated as an annoying mosquito, which appeared out of nowhere,
ISFED had a wide range of established partnerships and a very well known agenda. The
values it advocated (i.e. organizational neutrality, emphasis on a free and fair election)
had long been accepted. Whereas Kmara adopted agitating, "in-your-face" tactics to
reach out to people, ISFED preferred more conventional methods of gaining publicity.
Finally, the fact that ISFED received support from NDI rather than the Soros Foundation
made it less susceptible to attacks. NDI represented an amorphous structure, somehow
related to the U.S. government. It lacked a specific individual who could be turned into a
target. Not to mention that so many Georgian political and civic actors (including the
971

government) took the money from the American government.

Therefore, the blame

was harder to assign and more difficult to sustain for it would have implicated many
others. The fact that the Open Society Georgia Foundation was supported by one person
(George Soros) made it easier to turn him into a puppeteer and portray the NGOs, funded
by OSGF, as the blind followers of his will. Therefore, ISFED might have lost some
support on the fringes of Georgian society, but its reputation remained in tact. Both
external observers and ISFED activists admit that the Rose Revolution gave the biggest
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boost to ISFED's popularity.

One week in November 2003 did what all the years of

public outreach efforts failed to achieve - they made the organization a household name.

ISFED AND THE ROSE REVOLUTION
Planning
For the 2003 parliamentary elections, ISFED mounted a serious preparatory
campaign that included elements of previous activities as well as new components to
promote the group's first-time initiatives.
In terms of the former, the nonprofit updated and developed manuals and
instructions for observers. It held numerous trainings for its own monitors.273 Though it
did not have an extensive long-term observation program (like CVU), it still managed to
monitor the pre-election period and keep the public informed about the course of the
campaign. For instance, ISFED produced a blistering statement after the failure of the
Baker formula to resolve the dispute between the government and the opposition on the
composition of the Central Election Commission. In the statement, it "concluded that the
government had little if any intention to use the expertise and enthusiasm of civil
society"274 to assure a more honest and transparent election process. This was a key
moment that pushed ISFED closer to the opposition. As Tamar Zhvania put it, the
organization had to be guided by the principle of choosing the best of the two evils.275
In the course of the election campaign, the organization did not give up attempts
to assist the government. Its activists prepared electronic voter lists, which were
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supposed to diminish the likelihood of fraud. Unfortunately, this effort bore little fruit
as the national Election Commission decided to use only handwritten lists.277
Finally, the leadership of ISFED, and especially its Director Zurab
Tchiaberishvilij should be credited for doing an enormous amount of awareness
campaigning and educating key political actors and the public about the role and
intricacies of parallel vote tabulation. This was a truly monumental task, given the
complexities of PVT and the difficulty of explaining its difference from an exit poll.278

Cooperation withNGOs and political parties
Preceding the election, ISFED worked closely with civil society and political
parties. However, the approach to cooperation with each of these actors was
fundamentally different. Among nonprofit groups, ISFED collaborated most closely with
the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA). Though the relations with GYLA
were both informal and very specific, they provided a perfect example of how civic
groups can establish a mutually useful partnership without placing themselves in the
shackles of formalized coalitions. ISFED needed to recruit as many observers as possible
to cover all polling stations in the country. Ideally, those individuals had to be well
educated, so they could be easily trained as well as be receptive to the values of impartial
election monitoring. There was no better audience for ISFED to ask for than law
students, many of whom harbor ambitions of a political career. On its end, GYLA
needed to be more than a professional guild for youngsters from elite schools and

276

The assumption in this case is that because lists are electronically made, it would be almost impossible to made sudden
"corrections" at the local level.
277
Nodia, "The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Georgia," Election Assessment in the South Caucasus (Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2004), 121.
278
Mitchell.

304
families. It wanted members to be involved in politics, and monitoring national elections
provided a perfect opportunity to acquire political experience. Therefore, it was a natural
match for both groups. The closeness of the two and their ability to divide tasks and be
mutually helpful explains why each one was so successful in retaining its original profile
after the revolution when many other NGOs faced a profound identity crisis.279
In working with political parties ISFED had to tread carefully. Since 2002
relations with the government began to deteriorate. It was clear that the Shevarnadze
regime was not interested in a genuinely open election. In addition, ISFED could not but
be swayed by widespread popular dislike of the Georgian leader.280 After its initiative of
working with election authorities had miserably failed in April 2003, the organization
became viewed as anti-government. In that sense, unlike many popular Georgian NGOs
(such as the Liberty Institute), it held out the longest in avoiding that label. At the same
time, the group did not turn into a cheerleader for the opposition.281 Tamar Zhvania, then
the ISFED representative at CEC, explained that the organization was always leery about
newly minted fighters for people, since all of them (including Mikheil Saakashvili) came
from the moderate wing of the Shevarnadze regime.

ISFED managed to use the equal

leverage that it had previously established with all political actors to its advantage. The
organization established a media center where various political and civic groups could
come and report violations.283 This initiative further strengthened its image of being an
impartial observer of the process and enhanced the trust among the public and political
actors to ISFED reports.
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Activities
On the voting day, ISFED deployed almost 3,000 of its own observers to polling
stations throughout the country. It also assisted in assigning 600 foreign representatives
to critical locations.2 As a result of this effort, the organization was able to collect
numerous testimonies about the compliance with voting procedures. This feedback laid
the ground for the ISFED election report and further legal challenges. More importantly,
the presence of observers proved critical for the group's second project - parallel vote
tabulation (PVT).
The NGO placed its PVT monitors in 20 percent of all the polling stations to
assure that the margin of error for reported results would be no greater than two
percent.285 The organization went to great lengths to get a national statistically valid
sample that would enable it to make a reliable projection. Unlike CVU, ISFED did not
accept all the results that it received within its sample. Based on the analysis of voter
turnout and the quality of election-day processes (i.e. the magnitude of violations), it
discarded certain polling stations, because manipulations there would distort the general
picture. Given the debacle of the PVT operation in Ukraine,

this proved to be the most

consequential decision of all.
At the end of the Election Day, the group amassed a sufficient number of reports
from its field observers to declare that "The falsification of election results is not just
misconduct.. .ISFED believes that what happened during the election... was in fact a
purposeful obstruction of the voters' will."287 The categorical tone of the assessment was
284
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not mere rhetoric. The PVT results, which differed significantly from the official count,
provided the necessary factual basis to challenge the government. They were a spark
needed by the opposition to mobilize its supporters.

Mobilization and participation in the Rose Revolution
ISFED's participation in the Rose Revolution was limited, but visible and
consequential. On one hand, the group did not declare an open mobilization of its
members. On the other, it was assumed that many ISFED observers would take part in
the demonstrations as private citizens. What seems to make ISFED's performance so
different from the lackluster response by CVU is the vigor with which it pressed its
opinion and pursued legally available options to ramify the situation.
Immediately after the release of the PVT results, Kmara and the Liberty Institute
printed and distributed tens of thousands of leaflets that contrasted the ISFED PVT with
the official results.288 Based on its own assessment that "the officially reported turnout
has been inflated and protocols were forged," ISFED filed 400 appeals and urged the
Central Election Commission to investigate them and invalidate the fraudulent results.285
It filed a petition to the Supreme Court on the matter, which annulled the party list
component of the election results on 25 November 2003.290
In the end, three things made a difference in the group's performance during the
Revolution. The first was its willingness to pursue active advocacy through multiple
channels. Not only did ISFED let its results be distributed by other sources, but it also
spoke up on its own. Unlike CVU, ISFED took a risk on the revolution and it paid off.
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The second was a definite success of its PVT initiative. While the effort was criticized
by having some errors, few could dispute that it presented the right picture. In this
regard, both ISFED activists and NDI should be credited for providing the group with
sufficient technical expertise to set up such a complex procedure and assure its smooth
running throughout the country. The final aspect was the group's ability to find its own
niche in quickly unfolding events. ISFED knew where its expertise was and did not
hesitate to use it. Therefore, the prior criticism that all ISFED did was elections and
nothing more helped rather than hurt the nonprofit. In other words, unlike CVU (which
had too many eggs in too many different baskets), ISFED had its priorities straight.

Assessment of the performance
To measure I SFED's performance during the Rose Revolution, we turn to our
two indicators— function and contribution. In regard to the first, the group fulfilled its
stated function by monitoring the parliamentary elections as well as vigorously
publicizing the result of its efforts. Parallel vote tabulation (PVT) was its most successful
monitoring initiative. According to PVT, Saakashvili's National Movement had a lead of
eight percent. Numerous observers indicated that thanks to the trust which ISFED
enjoyed in the Georgian society PVT bolstered the results of numerous exit polls and
became the final piece of hard evidence to certify what everyone already knew, but had
ho factual way of proving - the government tried to steal the vote.
ISFED also made a major contribution to the success of the Rose Revolution by
helping resolve the legal impasse that caused the public unrest in the first place. It
legally challenged the results submitted by more than 150 precinct election commissions
291
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and filed numerous complaints against district electoral commissions.292 The fact that
many of these challenges were satisfied, not least at the level of the national Supreme
Court, gave legitimacy to the demand to annul the election results. It proved that the will
of voters was manipulated beyond recognition. Therefore, the situation required either a
re-vote (something Shevarnadze refused to acquiesce to) or deposition of the regime.
In the end, ISFED came out a winner from the revolutionary events. The
prominence of PVT made it the permanent golden standard for future elections in the
country. It also raised the profile of the group, making it one of the most recognizable
NGOs in the country.

Broers, Kandelaki. Khvichia.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The research for this dissertation started with a key puzzle that had to do with the
much-praised (or vilified, depending on one's political stand during those events) role of
civic organizations in the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia.
After reading through numerous assessments of the performance delivered by
Ukrainian and Georgian groups,1 one is left with the impression that an important piece
to understand their success is missing. Simply saying that civil societies were strong and
effective during the color revolutions does not help much, as it does not answer what
precisely contributed to their strength. Was it foreign funding during the first decade of
independence, as autocrats in the regional neighborhood assert? Or was it a canny act on
the part of the NGOs that rode the wave of fame and success on the back of popular
political parties, as many politicians tend to believe? Getting to the core of the matter has
been further complicated when many authors offer comprehensive and multiple
explanations for all the factors that help peaceful revolutions to transpire. While
contributing to our understanding of the phenomenon, the complexity became so
overwhelming as to imply that for civil society to ever be effective in a peaceful
democratization event one has to have a perfect, star-like alignment of variables that
rarely happens in the sky, let alone in politics.

1
Previously reviewed works include: Kuzio, "Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions"; McFaul,
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Civil Society"; Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution; Welt, "Regime Vulnerability and Popular Mobilization in Georgia's Rose
Revolution"; Wilson, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West."
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This work is advancing a hypothesis, which seems obvious, but yet has never
been explicitly put forward. Civic groups that have better ties with societies within
which they operate will also be able to respond better to such critical events as a
revolution. Having defined such ties in a more abstract manner as organizational
embeddedness, the dissertation places its work within two bodies of literature on civil
society and democratization and seeks to answer critical questions about the role of
NGOs in the "color revolutions" as well as highlight relevance of the concept for key
debates in each field.
The findings presented below will address four major debates on the role of civil
society that were elaborated in Chapter I. First, by analyzing interactions of the four
NGOs under consideration with political parties we will look at the practical dimension
of the perennial debate on the differentiation between civic and political realms. The
main conundrum here is how a civic group distinguishes itself from a political party
while seeking to impact political life. Second, the analysis of political embeddedness
will consider state influence on the origins and evolution of civil society, in particular
how the public and legal space, allotted by the state, impacts the trajectory of civil
society development. Third, the findings on interactions within nonprofit groups will
shed more light on the discussion about the nature of exchanges within civil society.
Specifically, they will answer two questions: a) what kind of exchanges our NGOs
promote among their members; b) whether embeddedness enhances the benefits and
mitigates the weaknesses generated by civic groups. Finally, my attempts to look at how
NGOs members work with each other on a daily basis and what they take away from
their civic activity speak to the larger issue of a relationship between the individual and
civil society.
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After my analysis of embeddeness summarizes the groups' performance, it will
place civil society within the international context of democratization. In this regard, it
will concentrate on two critical debates. The first deals with the methods of providing
better international support for civil society development. The dilemma, which reappears on the agenda of all foreign donors, is how to strengthen and support local civil
societies and their most capable groups without making them chronically dependent on
aid and detached from domestic publics. The other debate attempts to find a niche for
civil society in the overall scheme of democratization and make it one of many (e.g.
impartial judiciary, independent media, real separation of powers) effective components
that conspire to the consolidation of democracy.
To fulfill my goals, the chapter will start by assessing the evidence accumulated
for each group in the case studies. For that purpose, I will use the scale of embeddedness,
which was elaborated in Chapter II. Based on the obtained results, the study will then
consider the debates outlined above. The analysis will conclude by suggesting several
lessons that can be taken from my dissertation by political scientists, NGO activists,
government officials and Western democracy-promoters.

ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS
The assessment will be conducted separately for each organization. It will follow
the categories established in the methodology for my study. For every group, it will
evaluate social, political embeddedness, external influence as well as indicators within
each sub-category.2

2
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Pora
The movement, which translates from Ukrainian as a brave call for action - "It is
time," has received a total of 77 points on a one hundred-point scale. The result puts it at
the higher end of moderate embeddedness. Compared to the three other groups, Pora
took the first place, because it proved to be most powerful in terms of social
embeddedness as well as the capacity to handle external influence. At first blush, this
outcome is surprising, given a relatively limited period of Pora's existence. But a deeper
analysis portrays a movement that attracted a cohort of highly experienced civic leaders
who put to use the lessons of civic activism learned throughout the first decade of
Ukraine's independence.

Social embeddedness
In social embeddeness Pora scored 42 out of 53 points possible by the scale. Its
strongest point was the ability to excite ordinary citizens and attract them to its cause. Its
weakness was a lack of foresight about finances.
The movement's constituency reminded of a Brownian motion of molecules.
Recruitment was open to different audiences and strove for diversity. Horizontal
structures brought a welcome exchange of ideas and participation that involved every
member. However, the model was not without its flaws, as it did not provide any
channels for long-term feedback and failed to develop plans for a timely mobilization of
regional members. In essence, the internal structure was only good for the prerevolutionary period when mass sentiments of discontent were brewing and needed a
release. It was too loose and informal to be sustained over a long period of time.
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Given its lack of formal organization, Pora performed extremely well inassuring
that internal normative transfers were communicated to all members and executed with
precision. Having no officially designated leaders in field offices and in the central
headquarters, the organization overcame the major risk of its operations becoming a
game of "broken phone." The group was successful in inculcating and ensuring
everyone's unwavering allegiance to the ideas of nonviolent protest. That and the shockand-surprise effect from its spontaneous activities secured Pora's place as the leading
civic force in the Orange revolution.
Unfortunately, on the matters of societal influence, the movement proved to be
both popular and divisive. Its fiery rhetoric attracted a large segment that was
disenfranchised by and angry at the Kuchma regime. Its daring actions and the
government's overreaction turned the group into a household name. However, with the
popularity came resentment and fear. Pora's early embrace of nationalism turned off
potential members in eastern Ukraine to the extent that it did not have any declared
supporters in Donetsk region. Its cooperation with NGOs was limited to sporadic joint
efforts, dictated by pragmatic interests rather than a deeply shared agenda.
Finally, the movement scored lowest on financial sustainability. In this area, the
motto of many activists seemed to be - make up as we go. The consequences of that
were almost catastrophic, as Pora was on the brink of shutting down in the middle of
summer 2004. It obtained funds from a variety of sources, but conducted little financial
planning. It is unsurprising that the money was used with dubious efficiency and no
accountability. The latter only fueled the rumors of furtive foreign support. In the end,
Pora was so fixated on a short-term victory that it disregarded completely its long-term
survival and had to re-build from scratch after the elections.
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Political embeddedness
When trying to get implanted into the political landscape, any nonprofit has to
make the best out of the situation that is set up by the force beyond its control - i.e. the
government and political parties. By scoring 16 out of 27 points, Pora fared modestly. Its
varied performance was not an accident, but rather a deliberate effort.
The group had a steep ladder to climb, because Ukraine, as a state, scored
mediocre on formal embeddedness. Throughout its tenure the government of Leonid
Kuchma gave a veneer of approval to NGOs without ever bothering to develop a more
nuanced appreciation of civil society. This harsh assessment is substantiated by the
incongruity between formally adopted legal instruments and real behavior. Though the
country had a generally liberal legislative framework on registering and setting up nonprofit organizations, laws on taxation were convoluted and open to bureaucratic
interpretation, thereby discouraging substantial public giving to NGOs. The government
record on civil and political liberties also confirms that the country remained partly free
in both areas and exhibited steady erosion toward authoritarianism since 2001.2 In sum,
striving to meet only minimal international standards, the Ukrainian government was
leery of NGOs and their entrepreneurial activity.
Pora's core goal of achieving a peaceful regime change foreclosed any venues of
cooperation with the government or pro-governmental parties and drastically lowered its
informal political rootedness. The group engaged only with one party (Our Ukraine)
whose candidate represented the opposition. Speakingfiguratively,Pora put all of its
eggs in one basket (that of Viktor Yushchenko) and was going up or down depending on
his performance. The magnitude of this choice exacted a heavy toll. At the last stages of
2
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the campaign, coordination between the two entities became so intimate that it clearly
violated the tenets of civic impartiality. Having condemned the existing political system
as fundamentally flawed, Pora sought to embed itself into the political milieu with only
one goal - to undermine the regime in power to the point of collapse and establish a new
framework for interactions, In this commitment, it was ready to sacrifice everything,
including its political neutrality.

External involvement
The group rated well in this category, getting 19 out of 20 possible points. Pora's
success is a story of less (of direct donor's intervention) being more (in terms of the
group's ability to learn from external sources and avoid financial dependence).
With respect to normative transfers, Pora did exceptionally well. Having no
formal backing of one or a group of donors, it was left to its own devices. The absence of
sponsorship proved liberating in many ways. Pora contacted independently relevant
international actors (like Otpor and NDI) and sought the information it needed, not the
one that was deemed better by some donor. Because the normative exchanges were
initiated consciously, the group was also able to recognize very quickly the limitations of
their applicability to Ukrainian realities. In the end, it adapted the foreign methodology
of nonviolence to the theme of human dignity that resonated well within the Ukrainian
society. Pora's success in this area strongly confirms that external assistance becomes
very effective when its domestic recipients seek it purposefully and know their local
societies exceptionally well to adapt the acquired techniques.
The issue of external influence has received a lot of attention, especially because
of the accusations that Pora was a puppet in the hands of foreign governments. The
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accumulated evidence shows a rather different picture. The group was treated by foreign
governments and donor agencies as a red-haired cousin who may embarrass you during a
carefully staged wedding ceremony. Foreign entities were afraid of Pora's radicalism
and of its ability to get them in trouble with the Kuchma government. Therefore, any
cooperation was mostly technical and related to trainings and seminars. Foreign funding
was very limited and (starting in fall 2004) non-existent. But, as mentioned before,
donors' leeriness about Pora made its relationship with them healthy, precisely because it
was so limited. Pora's domestic fundraising efforts (mentioned in the previous section)
give a glimpse of a possible mismanagement of international funds, had those been
available.

Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU)
CVU showed the weakest performance on the scale of embeddedness among the
four civic groups under analysis. Its score of 63 points reveals an insufficient level of
rootedness and a consistently lower showing on the major categories. The result flies in
the face of much conventional wisdom, because the group, which existed longest and
was so carefully nurtured by foreign money, was expected to be much more robust. As
the analysis below proves, money can buy you happiness, but it cannot always buy
influence or longevity.

Social embeddedness
Among the three categories in my scale, CVU received the highest score for
social embeddedness - 35 out of 53 points or 66 percent. However, even in this area, the
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group's weakest spots turned out to be its own constituency and the ability to influence
Ukrainian society.
Speaking of the constituency, the Committee traded loyalty for diversity, as its
pool of members was highly and personally dedicated to the organization, but not very
dynamic in terms of turnover. The leadership abandoned active recruitment strategies in
favor of internal stability, which consequently circumscribed communication among
members and foreclosed opportunities for membership expansion. In the end, CVU has
become somewhat of an elite country club. It had a stable and small base that shared a
deep attachment to the organizational values, but was unwilling to open the doors and
provide the perks of belonging to outsiders.
The organization was a bit more successful in internal normative transfers. From
the very beginning, it managed to attract people with relevant expertise and a genuine
interest in the issue area. Thanks to a great deal of selectivity and the length of their
tenures, its core leaders were highly knowledgeable about election legislation, skillful
and very strategic in political analysis. The leadership was able to train competent rankand-file members. At the same time, normative transfers within leadership were often
hampered by an overly hierarchical and rigid organizational structure that discouraged
honesty. So while the NGO was successful in providing basic training, it was terribly
slow in recognizing its own mistakes because channels for feedback were either closed
or self-censored.
The group's second weakness was a rather limited scope of societal influence.
CVU exhibited a peculiar pattern of behavior. Having been created as an activist
nonprofit, it often acted more like a think tank. The Committee earned the reputation of a
respected source in the NGO and expert community, but did little to engage wider public
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in capacities other than Election Day monitors. The leadership seems to have believed
the knowledge about CVU among think tanks and media outlets in the capital and
regional centers would eventually trickle down to the larger public. This expectation was
only partially fulfilled. Though the Committee's representatives appeared frequently in
the news, the organization itself was a mere buzzword to an average citizen, who
frequently confused it with a governmental body.
In terms of financial sustainability, the group performed better than the three
other organizations. Though its dependency on the National Democratic Institute
decreased overtime, it remained so significant that NDI could be labeled as the CVU's
chief safety net. The nonprofit was forced to diversify its pool of funds for election
campaigns, but remained unwilling to expand its base of grants beyond elections. Part of
the unwillingness can be attributed to a kind of fatigue and resignation about the chances
of securing support in Ukraine's difficult economic conditions. The other explanation
pertains to the lack of a sustained process for contingency planning in finances. As a
result, the prognosis about CVU's future is mixed. Without single donor support, its
chances of survival would be a bit higher than fifty percent since it has an established
infrastructure. But in order to make it, the group will require tremendous downsizing by
shutting down nonperforming regional branches and giving up on the luxuries (like an
office located in a posh downtown apartment complex) that few nonprofits even in
developed countries are able to enjoy.

Political embeddedness
In this category, the group got 15 out of 27 points. As mentioned in the analysis
of formal political embeddedness for Pora, Ukraine had a challenging climate for NGO
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development. While the government was declaratively supportive of civil society, it did
little to facilitate its development and foster a genuine partnership. In the last years of
President Kuchma, the mask of approval was slowly falling off and revealing nothing
short of contempt and disdain for foreign-backed "grant-eaters."3
The difference between Pora and CVU in surviving these conditions and making
themselves informally embedded in the political landscape was stark. Whereas Pora put
its faith in one political force, CVU preferred diversification to the extent that many of
its bids became mutually exclusive. From the beginning, the group embraced the motto
of incremental, not revolutionary, change within the existing system. It cooperated
extensively with government authorities (especially the Central Election Commission) in
training monitors and commissioners and suggesting amendments to election legislation.
Its activists worked with many political parties by training their observers and gathering
complaints on legal violations. This strategy of interactions allowed CVU to be heard,
though not listened to, in the Ukrainian political establishment. As cracks in the political
system began to widen in 2004, the Committee struggled to take an unequivocal stance.
The truth was harsh to swallow - many of its leading activists became co-opted by state
authorities and parties through enduring personal relations, which, in turn, became a selfcensoring mechanism. As a result, CVU's bet on diversifying political friendships did
not pay off. Having become part of the political architecture, the group was forced to
make a choice. Without making it explicit, it picked the status quo during the revolution
and hid behind the adherence to impartiality to avoid taking sides. The words of one
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Anatoliy Grytsenko, "Ataka vlady na "grantoyidiv" [The Attack on Grant-Eaters].
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activist summarize it best - "our leadership got too scared that if we protest, we would all
be multiplied by zero4 later on."5

External influence
The nonprofit received 13 out of 20 points. Its relatively good performance in the
first indicator was offset by a meager showing in the second one. When it came to
receiving external norms, the group proved effective, but arrogant. It developed and
frequently exercised the ability to analyze the advice it received from NDI. The
Committee was extremely effective in learning and adapting the methodology of election
monitoring to Ukrainian realities. Within 5-6 years of its establishment, the leadership
could claim a greater understanding of detail and nuances of the national election and
political landscape than foreign donors. At this point, the organization stopped seeking
direct normative transfers on its key competencies and instead asked for assistance on
organizational management and development. By 2002, a clear pattern in dealing with
external normative transfers emerged - the group accepted outside advice unless it
threatened organizational stability or the leadership's preconceived notions of how
programs should be implemented. As the 2004 elections approached, the Committee
was growing increasingly insular and on some occasions tended to reject suggestions
before carefully reviewing them. The dismal performance of the parallel vote tabulation
program (PVT) serves to confirm this tendency.
CVU's love-hate dealings with NDI got it the lowest scores on the last indicator
- the mechanisms of external influence. Both entities developed a complex relationship

4
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A Ukrainian slang for being harshly repressed.
CVU regional member.

of mutual dependence. To make the matters worse, it was poorly defined and subject to
continuous bargaining and contestation in terms of where the authority of the donor
began and the independence of the grantee ended. The differences were fundamentally
irreconcilable, because NDI and CVU moved at a different pace along the continuum of
donor-grantee relations that normally start with subservience and end with cooperation.
Mismatched expectations about the roles of each other and resultant tensions negatively
impacted the performance of the group as well as its organizational maturation.

Kmara
Standing for "Enough" in Georgian, Kmara showed the second highest score
(and a tie) among our organizations. At 72 points, it can be classified as a moderately
embedded organization. While the movement's relations with political parties leave
much to be desired, its performance in social embeddedness is the second best after Pora.
In a surprising turn, the group places on the same level as another Georgian organization,
ISFED, which was often the unsung hero of the revolution.

Social embeddedness
In this category, Kmara received 3 8 out of 53 possible points. Though it was its
second best performance on the scale, the obtained result was surprisingly lower than
one could imagine (especially given all the publicity during and after the Rose
Revolution).
To use a movie analogy, Kmara's constituency was "no country for old men."
The implemented recruitment strategies were wide, but not diverse. As the election
campaign progressed, the organization implicitly gave up on attracting other age
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segments of the society. The group's activists combed through many student audiences,
looking to recruit as many followers as they could. In fact, as many admitted, Kmara
should have applied stricter membership criteria to avoid random people. In the end, the
core membership was highly dedicated and capable of mobilizing its peers. Because of
that, the group was successful in activating the Georgian youth (a slice of the population
to which its leaders could most closely relate), but it did not reach out to others assuming that either they would be covered by political parties or it could not win them
in the first place because of its radical message.
The process of internal normative transfers was a creative disorder. However, it
proved greatly effective in spreading the key principle of nonviolent protest - the
accomplishment even more praiseworthy because the majority of ordinary members
spoke only Georgian and thus could not benefit from Western materials. Kmara was also
superb in generating ideas about specific means of protest on the spot and then quickly
mobilizing its rank-and-file to implement them. The major caveat of this arrangement
began to manifest only close to the end of the election campaign, as it became clear that
Kmara needed a better structure for daily operations, especially ongoing message control
and media response. Like Pora, Kmara seemed content with the situation for as long as it
knew it was short-term.
When it came to societal influence, the group proudly wore the label of l'enfant
terrible of Georgian political life. It was the infamous squeaky wheel that could be
greased only by the resignation of Shevarnadze and a profound regime change. Thus, it
lavished its status of being a household name that made even the admirers cringe at some
of its public actions. The group was not too picky in using anything that helped to stir up
people - be it graffiti on government buildings or the burning of Shevarnadze portraits.
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Its leaders were extremely savvy in exploiting the media's predisposition for
sensationalism to gain notoriety. Kmara's "take-no-prisoners" approach alienated an
established civic community that despised its radicalism and flashiness. To conclude on
the subject, the group's unconventional tactics made its prominence possible, but also
left few without a strong opinion on its methods. This, in turn, set clear limitations on the
scope of its influence within Georgian society.
Kmara got the lowest score for financial sustainability, because from its
establishment till the revolution the group was living for the day. Though its leaders
espoused progressive values for civic involvement, the attitudes on financing their
activities were definitely retrograde. Without realizing it themselves, they became
completely socialized by the mores of the Georgian NGO sector that they despised so
much. One of those mores was unabashed dependence on foreign money and refusal to
seek domestic funding for the fear of political influence. All of Kmara leaders repeated
numerous times that they saw nothing wrong with relying completely on external funds.
For them, Kmara was a project for which they had no plans of long-term survival. And
even if they did, they said, there was nothing they could do in the existing financial
climate. Therefore, financial sustainability was something that one preferred not to think
about.

Political embeddedness
As mentioned before, in the analysis of political embeddedess nonprofits are
placed in a tricky position since they have to make the best of what they have been
offered by the government. For this indicator, Kmara received 17 out of 27 points.
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The best that the Georgian government could give to its civil society was a "letyou-be" attitude. Thus in terms of formal political embeddedness, it was neither
encouraging nor unbearably oppressive. In the middle of 1990s, the Shevarnadze
government adopted a liberal legislative framework on the establishment and registration
of NGOs. It muddled through with cumbersome reporting and taxation requirements that
were the result of lacking civic experience rather than malice. At the end of the decade,
NGOs were not helped by further deterioration of the country's democratic standing. In
the realm of civic and political liberties, Georgia continued along a wobbling path. The
country moved from the lower to the middle end on the scale that still identified it as a
partly free state.6 A greater vacillation can be observed in terms of political freedoms from the higher to the medium end of being partly free. Throughout the first decade of
independence, the official attitude toward NGOs ranged from indifference (in the early
1990s), to tolerance (in the middle of the decade) and then finally annoyance and subtle
attempts of repression at the end of Shevarnadze's tenure. What prevented the
government to move as swiftly against civil society as authorities did in Russia and
Ukraine (not to mention neighboring Azerbaijan and Central Asian states) were the
concern over the president's international reputation and the lack of financial resources
at the government's disposal.
In assuring its informal embeddedness in the political system, Kmara chose to
use a bit more than a half of the available potential. First and foremost, cooperation with
the government was precluded by the antagonistic nature of its activities and the key
goal of regime change. The group further alienated itselffrompossible allies by treating
everyone that was not vociferously opposed to Shevarnadze as a possible
6

See Freedom House annual reports on Georgia, "Freedom in the World," http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfin?page=15.
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collaborationist. Thus, links with political parties, other than Saakashvili's National
Movement, were never established. It firmly decided that it had to back one force that
had the most realistic chance to bring about change, and the National Movement was that
force. In fact, cooperation between the two entities was so intense on formal and
personal levels that it raised doubts about Kmara's impartiality, which it did not even
bother to maintain. In the end, the two presented political and civic sides of the same
coin and found utility in each other. Having become Saakashvili's "comrade in arms" on
the civic front, Kmara was given access (previously unavailable to NGOs) to the
political process, but it lost the credibility among other political forces, which civic
groups cherish so much.

External involvement
Kmara performed best when it came to dealing with outsiders. As with Pora, less
seemed to be more. The group got 17 out of 20 points. In asking other organizations for
normative transfers, the group showed civic entrepreneurship at its best. It was extremely
pro-active and effective in finding foreign groups (like Otpor) and learning from them.
Its leadership demonstrated the understanding that foreign ideas would have limitations
early in the process. That is why, it took the foreign methodology (most succinctly
presented in a documentary, "Bringing Down the Dictator") and translated it for the local
landscape, by making corruption its main theme. Because the movement had a cohort of
highly experienced civic leaders (mostly implants from the Liberty Institute), it did not
seek any normative assistance from foreign donors that were based in Georgia. This
proved a blessing in terms of giving Kmara a lot of independent space for adapting
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foreign ideas. In this regard, the organization can serve as a textbook example of how
civic entrepreneurs from abroad can spread their ideas successfully.
In relations with donors, the movement was very impersonal and business-like.
Kmara activists showed a slightly disdainful attitude toward the donor machine that was
more interested in meeting internal requirements and showing grant reports than real
accomplishments. This attitude produced an arrangement where donors exerted no
substantial programmatic influence. So contrary to public perceptions and speculations,
Kmara did not receive "instructions" from international organizations on how to act.
Through confidence that often turned into arrogance, it managed to establish a firm
distance that (regardless of its complete financial dependence) did not allow donors to
dictate the content of the group's work.

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)
ISFED shared the second place with Kmara, by scoring 72 points on our scale.
The organization's moderate level of embeddedness stands in stark contrast with the
performance of its Ukrainian counterpart on election observation. Even a brief
comparative look at the scores reveals two key differences in their performances. ISFED
proved stronger in three areas - greater societal influence, a more open membership base
and unrelenting neutrality in cooperation with political actors. Regardless of its long
existence, the NGO escaped the major risk of becoming a part of the existing political
architecture or turning into a election bureaucracy instead of an activist group.

Social embeddedness
In this area, the nonprofit showed mixed results, getting 37 out of 53 points. The
abysmal performance in the last indicator, financial sustainability, undermined a
moderately high showing in other categories.
In terms of constituency, ISFED can be described as a symbol of diversity. The
group strived for inclusive recruitment that was mostly centered on the networks of
relatives and friends. Its activists emphasized that a specific effort was made to assure
societal and gender equality, by recruiting members from different social classes and
women. From the beginning, the organization established and maintained a democratic
structure of internal governance with the board playing a strong role. However, absent
formal mechanisms of feedback, that structure did not live up to its full potential and
instead frequently produced leadership volatility. Several ISFED directors got fired
before they could ever figure out what was lacking in their work. Diversity often became
too much of a good thing. On one hand, it produced a marked difference from CVU with
its macho culture and a "good-old boys" network. On the other, ISFED members did not
possess high institutional loyalty due to their constant rotation. Unlike the Ukrainian
Committee of Voters, ISFED's "revolving door" produced few passionate supporters of
the organization. Therefore, while being inclusive, mobile and often unintentionally
diverse, the ISFED constituency frequently suffered the loss of institutional memory that
retarded organizational growth.
In conducting normative transfers among its members, ISFED displayed a steady,
albeit slow progress. It was successful in educating its rank-and-file about election
procedures and developed rigid training protocols. The leadership was especially
scrupulous about impartiality of its members. The accumulated evidence makes it clear
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that the notion of political neutrality was taken so seriously as to become almost
sacrosanct. All of these actions turned ISFED into the premier nonpartisan voice on
election monitoring in the country. At the same time, the organization was slow in
developing its own programs that would cover issues in-between election campaigns.
There are two reasons for this failure - low funding from NDI and a lack of human
resources that could be paid to do programming. As a result, though exceptionally good
at election training and monitoring, ISFED did not succeed in expanding its base of
activities beyond the core theme.
The Rose Revolution became a long-needed event that catapulted the civic group
into the realm of popularity and made its societal influence unparallel. Before the events
in November 2003, ISFED filled the niche of election observation and managed to
maintain leadership in this field through consistent NDI backing and its own diligence.
The group (especially its leaders in Tbilisi) was active in the NGO community, but only
few ordinary people, who were deeply interested in politics, were aware of its existence.
Building on its expertise and professional standing, ISFED used the revolution as an
opening to attract public attention. Because of its initial credibility, the NGO's parallel
vote tabulation results were trusted by the majority of people and became one of the
most important pieces of evidence against the Shevarnadze regime. When the dust of
revolutionary events settled in December 2003, the Society was a household name and
its PVT procedure had become the golden standard for measuring election fairness.
While the Revolution showed the group's best side, its attitude toward funding
and financial sustainability presented ISFED at its worst. For the most part of its
functioning, the civic group was in a state of denial when it came to its dependence on
NDI or the future without the American donor. Only after the Rose Revolution, the
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implicit agreement between the two entities that forbade ISFED to fundraise from other
sources was re-negotiated by another director. The organization's leadership pursued
lackluster attempts at diversification of funds and showed a derogatory attitude toward
funding from business sources. If one were to imagine the nonprofit's survival now
without American money, the chances would be less than 50-50. Unfortunately, in the
matters of fiscal independence ISFED was no harbinger for change. Rather it was a
typical representative of Georgian civil society with its total dependence on donors and
unwillingness to look for other sources of support.

Political embeddedness
In this indicator, ISFED demonstrated its best performance. Indeed, the
organization has much to offer to others in terms of handling a precarious situation and
turning it to its advantage.
As noted before, the Georgian government performed modestly in providing
formal political embeddedness to non-governmental organizations. It was neither
welcoming (like Baltic states) nor openly hostile (like neighboring Azerbaijan). Having
no resources to counteract NGOs and being chronically dependent for its survival on
international institutions, it chose to tolerate (sometimes barely) the domestic civil
society. In fact, Shevarnadze noted numerous times in interviews that he regretted not
having "concentrated" on "pernicious" activities of foreign-funded organizations. In the
end, the landscape for formal implantedness received 9 out of 13 points - the result,
which can be summed up as mediocre.
Under these circumstances, the group performed better than any other
organization under analysis. In achieving informal embeddedness in the political
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landscape, it became a friend, but not a buddy for key political actors. It cooperated
closely with the government on election legislation and yet managed not to become coopted. This accomplishment should be attributed not only to the moral stamina of ISFED
activists, but also to the fact that changes of the top leadership were not conducive to
personal entanglements. ISFED also managed to achieve a semi-official recognition of
its importance as a civic authority on election matters when it got an observer-status on
the Central Election Commission. It endeared itself to political parties because of its
proven neutrality. As a result, the group's media center became a focal point for
gathering complaints from political parties on election violations. If there was any
weakness in its informal rootedness, it was about the scope, as interactions with the
political establishment were circumscribed mostly to Tbilisi. To summarize, the
nonprofit received 12 out of 14 points in this category - an almost perfect score, for it
managed to establish and maintain cooperative relations with political parties thanks to
the perception of impartiality and due to continuous leadership rotations.
External involvement
For this indicator, ISFED obtained 70 percent (its second highest score) by
getting 14 out of 20 possible points. The group's performance was not balanced. It did
especially well in absorbing external normative transfers and failed in setting adequate
outside mechanisms of influence.
Thus, in terms of the former, ISFED slowly transitioned from completely
dependent to semi-partnership relations where internal trainings were done by NGO
members and external assistance was requested on specific issues. For instance, unlike
CVU, the group was more open to accepting external ideas and recognizing the need for
help. The notable example here is how masterfully it handled the 2003 parallel vote
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tabulation where foreign methodological assistance was instrumental. At the same time,
ISFED activists subconsciously realized the liability of being too closely associated with
foreign sources and consistently underplayed outside help. The group also had
surprisingly little contacts with similar organizations overseas, partially because the
funding for travel opportunities was still tightly controlled by NDI. Thus, with years the
nonprofit became more independent in accepting external assistance, but remained
weaker than similar groups in the western part of the former Soviet Union.
When it comes to external mechanisms of influence, ISFED, as one
representative of the key donor organization put it, was trying to have it both ways. Its
relations with NDI were subject to unpredictable push-pull dynamics. The group wanted
to have more breathing space, but ran to the Institute for help the moment the going got
tough. In addition, much of the interactions were heavily dependent on specific
personalities. Those executive directors, who were authoritative and persistent, managed
to carve out a greater space for themselves. Others, who became stuck in struggles with
their own board to the point of extreme weakness, had to follow NDI orders more
closely. Therefore, throughout its later stages of existence, ISFED was going through
terrible growing pains and did not manage to come up with a workable model for the
relations with its main donor. It is not clear whether and how the group will come to
terms with that. One thing is obvious - without NDI's help, it would shrink immensely
and may discontinue functioning throughout the regions.
To summarize, the detailed comparisons of the NGOs' performance enable to
identify which variables are most critical for organizational embeddedness. First, it is
clear that social embeddedness plays the leading role in assuring that a nonprofit
establishes sufficient roots in a domestic society. No non-governmental group under

analysis scored more on the overall scale, while receiving low scores on social
embeddedness. This variable is also most amenable to influences from civic actors
themselves, while the two others (political embeddedness and external influence) are
shaped with powerful inputs from the state and foreign donors respectively. Second,
when it comes to political implantedness the most influential mechanisms for any NGO
are informal. In essence, it is the ability of a group to walk a fine line between
cooperating with political entities for the benefit of a group's cause or getting either
completely subsumed or entirely shunned by them. Those who do it best, like Georgian
ISFED, become more politically rooted than others. Finally, a meager showing of the
four groups on external mechanisms of influence point to the importance of the other
sub-variable in this category - external normative transfers. As described above,
complex dynamics that are often at play between donors and their grantees often make it
impossible to determine who impacts whom and to what extent. Given that, the success
of foreign influence comes down to whether recipient NGOs are able to effectively
translate foreign external influences to local circumstances their own agenda. The two
NGOs (Pora and Kmara) that performed best in this category also proved to be most
embedded.

EMBEDDEDNESS AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Research question and key hypotheses
The dissertation began with a simple question, "What made the NGOs under
consideration effective during the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia?" In an
attempt to put in perspective the excitement generated by the media and some scholarly
works, I advanced the hypothesis, which suggested that the more embedded an NGO was

in domestic social and political landscape, the more successful it was during those
democratization events. Three subsequent sub-hypotheses asserted that embeddedness
would be greater if: a) an NGO is able to relate better to the political society; b) it has
more connections to the society at large and its members in particular; c) it enjoys more
tailored external assistance. The analysis below will evaluate whether each subhypothesis has been confirmed by the accumulated evidence. This, in turn, will
determine whether the main assertion stands at the conclusion of my work.
Sub-hypothesis 1
Table 1. Sub-hypothesis 1
Better ties to political society • • greater embeddedness
OUTCOME: partially confirmed
• Overall embeddedness more impacted by constituency, societal
influence
• State influence as a powerful limitation
• Higher political embeddeness as a sign of organizational maturity
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. For NGOs:
• Embrace issue advocacy
• Cooperate with parties on specific issues only
• Re-assess political embeddedness based on dilemmas:
• Political influence v. longevity/public acceptance
• Incremental v. revolutionary change
• Ensure internal leadership turnover
2. For Donors:
• Remove civic/politics barrier
• Establish monitoring and compliance mechanisms on impartiality
• Teach how to process learning experiences

It is partially confirmed that the better an NGO is able to relate itself to the
political society, the more embedded it becomes in the domestic landscape. In this case,
ISFED provides the most positive example of political embeddedness (and thus the
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highest score). The organization had a significant amount of officially recognized
influence on the course of the election campaign and voting itself.
CVU, Kmara and Pora showed weaker examples of political embeddedness and
fell victims to two scenarios. In the first one, an NGO chose greater cooperation and
(intentionally or not) cut out others. As a result, Kmara and Pora became a partisan, not
an independent voice that they were supposed to be. For the second scenario, a civic
group manifested such a desire to accommodate all political players that it made itself
irrelevant. This woe betided CVU whose "independence" meant that nothing in reality
depended on its assessments.
In the general scheme of results, the sub-hypothesis holds only a partial key to
explaining organizational embeddedness as a whole concept. Thus, the groups that were
not sufficiently embedded in the political landscape, managed to be better embedded in
the domestic landscape through a stronger constituency or greater societal influence. The
evaluation of evidence has revealed two critical points. First, in societies where the state
predated civil society, political rootedness will be heavily influenced by existing political
conditions. The Ukrainian organizations obtained lower scores than the Georgian ones,
because the regime in Ukraine was more authoritarian and the space for civil society was
more tightly controlled. The outcome also highlights a sad reality (of which external
observers of NGOs will need to remind themselves continuously) that sometimes no
matter how hard a group tries to become part of political landscape, it is doomed to be
weak in this area. Second, while political embeddedness is not a make-it-or-break-it
indicator (which is a good thing given the previous point), higher rootedness is a sign of
an NGO's organizational maturity. In other words, an organization shows it can play in
the world of decision-makers on its own, and it knows its proper place as a
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representative of civil society. Pora and Kmara failed because they were too young.
CVU did not manage to attain it because the years of existence did not translate into the
understanding of fundamental rules of political behavior for civic organizations.
This brings us to the set of key questions mentioned at the beginning of the
chapter. The first of them deals with the perennial challenge for any civic group - how to
remain distinct from politics, while advocating closely related issues and seeking to
make political impact. The four nonprofit groups under analysis answered the dilemma
differently, and each paid a price for finding a more or less successful way to balance an
inherently political nature of civic demands. Three ways, though, broadly emerge from
their cumulative experiences. First, it is important for NGOs to embrace open advocacy
of the issues that pertain to their raison d'etre. If a civic group works on fair elections, it
should protest vocally against and expose those who seek to discredit the election
process. By doing this, it will inevitably take sides in a political dispute. Pretending to be
a mere impartial observer in this case will render the whole existence of a civic
organization meaningless in the medium and long-term. So, one may ask, should a civic
organization abandon its political neutrality? Yes, if neutrality means detachment from
life and from the society in which it lives. No, if neutrality means a wider concept of
non-affiliation with a specific political force. And this is where the second point comes
to light. While advocating passionately for the causes it espouses, an NGO should never'
commit a mistake of associating itself with a political party, no matter how strongly this
party supports or promotes a certain civic cause. A close affiliation between the two is
dangerous for one obvious reason. Ideologically, parties are much broader creatures than
civic groups. They embrace multitudes of issues and a range of political views (even
within the same broad school of thought - i.e. from moderates to hard-liners). On the
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contrary to that, non-government organizations work in a certain issue niche. As our first
chapter noted, issue specification is important for any nascent NGOs to attract
supporters, since groups that cover everything often end up standing for nothing. If an
NGO gets too close with a political party, it may be perceived (or may feel forced) to
support the party on a range of other issues on which its members may have divergent
views. For instance, many people joined Pora for the need of fair elections. But it does
not mean that all of them uniformly support Ukraine's membership in NATO, which Our
Ukraine (the party with which Pora chose to affiliate extremely closely) advocates.
Finally, the discussion above makes clear how hard it is to define the balance between
situational agreements with political parties on the issues of common concern and open
support of those parties' agenda. Based on the experiences of our four NGOs, the only
cure seems to be staff rotation and leadership turnover. There is something about fresh
blood that enables new people to see the dividing line between civic and political
societies sharper and spot a conflict of interest (or an encroachment of the political
world) quicker. This study supports the theoretical view that civil society is a training
school for political life. At some point, civic activists tend to outgrow the boundaries of
civic activism that forbids them to play a more direct role in politics. In that case, those
people need to be pushed out to seek greener pastures in political party life. The fact that
this process did not take place in CVU and the Liberty Institute meant that too many
people had oversized ambitions for being just civic leaders. Staff and leadership turnover
allows civic activists to realize those ambitions and prevents the formation of enduring
personal relations between civic and political leaders who are supposed to play different
roles.

The second dilemma is more practical, as it pertains to the challenge that
international donors face in making civil society development an effective component
within the larger context of democratization The answer here is simple to state, yet hard
to implement. On one hand, donors need to remove artificial boundaries that often
separate civic and political worlds and push NGOs to become actively involved in
politics by advocating their core issues. The disdain that intellectuals within civil society
feel toward party members and leaders should be fought with vigor. In Ukraine and
Georgia politicians may not be noble and pure as highly educated civic elite would like
to see them, but they still remain the product of those societies. If NGOs want to change
them or the quality of the political discourse, the only way to do that is to engage with
the people you got, not the ones you want to have. Keeping this in mind, foreign donors
should encourage NGO involvement in politics, but also insist on establishing
procedures and compliance mechanisms that would assure civic impartiality. The
question should be asked not whether NGOs should cooperate with political parties, but
how. In this case the obvious concern is that despite elaborate mechanisms and
comprehensive steps to assure impartiality, civic groups will never get it right. To
assuage the worries they probably will not, but they will have to learn how to balance.
Civic activists through their own experience or by watching other organizations soon
discover that NGOs will be taken over by two opposite, but rather natural processes if
they do not get their cooperation with the political world right. Under one scenario, if a
group is too political, it will either split and turn into a political party or disband as a
result of joining an existing political force. The first happened to Pora that produced two
offspring - a civic organizations "Opora" (meaning support) and a political party, Pora.
The second was the fate of Kmara, which disbanded after the revolution, letting its most

prominent members join the Saakashvili government or, in very few cases, return to their
initial NGOs. Under the second scenario, if a group is too detached, it will be sidelined
from the political landscape. This is what happened to CVU. Though the organization
remains active, it is bound to find itself asking a question whether it wants to be a
professional election think tank.
The final critical issue speaks to the long-standing debate on the relationship
between civil society and the state. The accumulated evidence makes it clear that in
countries where political society preceded civil one, the state would be able to shape the
beginning of the path to political embeddedness that civic groups will be presented with
as a fait accompli. However, this should not be a reason to despair since the state cannot
shape the course along that path or its final destination. The proof to that are differences
in political embeddedness between Pora and CVU, ISFED and Kmara. Each pair
functioned in the same formal political environment, yet achieved a different stage of
informal political embeddedness thanks to its own skill and ability to turn the existing
political architecture to its advantage.
As with every rule, this one has its exceptions. In cases where civil society is
under a direct attack from the state (thereby the state either denies formal
acknowledgement of any NGO or prefers only GoNGOs), informal political
embeddedness will be almost impossible to achieve. Under these circumstances, a civic
group will have three choices. One is to ally itself with the government as its support
source. The other is to ally itself with any political force that guarantees its future
recognition when that force comes to power. If (as in many Central Asian states for
example) political opposition is banned and demolished, a group will have no choice but
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to rely only on societal support and work to redefine the formal political landscape in a
way that will provide both formal and informal political embeddedness.
In conclusion, the discussion on interactions between politics and civil society
presents every non-governmental organizations with two kinds of dilemmas that they
have to struggle continuously to resolve individually. First, in relations with political
parties civic groups have to balance the issues of political influence with their own
longevity (as an independent civic force) and their wider public acceptance. The price
for each choice is clear - greater political influence usually comes with a danger of
dissolving an NGO in a specific party or losing support among the segments of the
population that disagree with that party's politics. Second, in dealing with government a
nonprofit has to decide what kind of change it is willing to accomplish - incremental or
revolutionary. Willingness to settle for piecemeal progress ensures smoother cooperation
with existing authorities. An ardent desire for a revolutionary breakthrough is likely to
seal off interactions with most governments that are inherently status quo oriented. These
dilemmas are presented here as binary challenges. The beauty and complexity of reality
lie in the ability of each organization to find its own comfort zone on the continuum
between the two extremes that each dilemma outlined.
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Sub-hypothesis 2

Table 2. Sub-hypothesis 2
More connections to society "^ greater embeddedness
OUTCOME: strongly confirmed
• nature of civic interactions: subjective due to practical implementation
of abstract goals
• better embeddedness -> greater polarization, especially when: a) other
channels are closed; b) external agent present
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. ForNGOs:
re-assess social embeddedness based on dilemmas:
wide recruitment & loose structure v. strict membership & greater
control
institutional memory v. staff turnover
visibility v. substance
2. For Donors:
focus on grassroots and field work
stress the need for personalized appeal and distinctiveness

It is strongly confirmed that groups with more connections to the society at large
and its members in particular were more embedded than those who had lower societal
embeddedness. Pora and Kmara, the movements with higher scores, were most visible
during the revolutions. Pora (which obtained the greatest number of points for social
embeddedness) also proved the most rooted of all four. Corollary to that, the Committee
of Voters performed the worst in terms of its implantedness in the society and was the
least visible political force in the Orange revolution. A deeper analysis of social
embeddedness raises four crucial questions on a wider and more fundamental role of
civil society.
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The first harkens back to the debate on the nature of exchanges that civic groups
promote by their functioning. In that regard, there are two interesting points - can NGOs
be truly neutral and impartial and, if not, do they fuel general polarization within their
host societies. As activities of Kmara and Pora show, the assessment of NGO exchanges
is highly subjective. What the two movements promoted, was seen as positive by
supporters and destructive by opponents and the government. So while abstract goals
that nonprofits espouse can be neutral and impartial, their practical implementation will
always produce an inherently political result. For instance, by numerous admissions of
its activists all Pora ever wanted to do was to assure a fair election - a goal that is neutral
in terms of supporting a specific political force. However, even Pora members
acknowledged that the practical application of that goal often meant allowing people to
express their will by voting for Viktor Yushchenko (a clearly partisan figure) and by
having their voters count. In the end, what Pora saw as an application of the abstract and
nonpartisan principle became the death knell to viability of the Kuchma regime, because
Pora sought to ensure a complete execution of that principle. Even ISFED, the most
impartial group of all, said its neutrality in observing elections did not translate in a
neutral stance in the election's aftermath. It was clear that the Georgian government
falsified the result, and thus there was nothing one could be neutral about.
So if pure neutrality is not possible in reality, do NGOs then become a vehicle for
polarization? This is where an NGO's success in embedding itself in the host society
becomes its enemy. Kmara and Pora, the best performers on this indicator, were also the
most polarizing. The logical link between successful embeddedness and polarization is
clear. The more relations a nonprofit has with its own society, the more visible it
becomes by the sheer fact that its activists recruit and communicate with a greater
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number of people. Visibility may create a fertile ground for polarization, especially when
combined with the presence of polarizing external agents (like George Soros in Georgia)
and the inability of the political system to digest feedback. Our case studies prove that
the groups with greater embeddedness were also more polarizing thanks to their
visibility and to the efforts of their national governments pitting regime loyalists against
those groups, by asserting that the latter's agenda was not politically neutral, but covertly
partisan.
The second critical question is how NGOs can become more socially embedded.
There are no definitive answers since every civic group, like a human, is unique to some
extent. Therefore, it would be more useful to concentrate on a set of dilemmas that each
NGO has to address and balance for itself. The first one juxtaposes wide activist
recruitment and a looser organizational structure against strict membership criteria and
consequently greater efficiency and vertical control. For instance among our
organizations, CVU chose the second model, while Kmara and Pora went with the first
one. ISFED fell somewhere in-between. The advantages and negatives of each approach
have been described in great detail in the case studies. So it will suffice to say that an
NGO would be wise to conduct an honest review of its practices (to see where they
might fall against these two extreme) even if such practices are officially declared as
open and non-hierarchical, especially as it ages and its structure becomes more settled
and thus more rigid.
The second dilemma is the need to balance institutional memory against the
infusion of new blood that brings innovation and regeneration. Like any organization, a
civic group has to maintain a core of activists who will remember and learn from
previous experiences. However, it should also strive to bring new members. Otherwise,
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the group will remain stuck in the past, as the old cadre grows increasingly cynical about
politics and chances of success and skeptical about trying anything new or re-trying
failed projects. Gf the groups under analysis, CVU veered too much toward the first
extreme with both institutional memory and loyalty turning into powerful impediments.
ISFED, on the other hand, was perhaps too nonchalant about losing its members. Pora
and Kmara represent a more appropriate golden middle. While both organizations were
relatively young, they managed to retain experienced civic leaders and recruit young
firebrands on the ground.
The final dilemma is an ongoing struggle between visibility and substance. It is
worth mentioning that the two are by no means exclusive - there are a lot of substantive,
sophisticated and well publicized advocacy campaigns. The struggle pertains to a more
fundamental question that many activist groups (especially those propped up by foreign
money) have to address and revisit continuously in developing civil societies. It is about
a balance between deskwork and grassroots. If deskwork overwhelms grassroots
organizing, the group begins to resemble a think tank. Any democracy practitioner in the
former Soviet Union can easily name dozens of nonprofits that became analytical centers
without realizing that or even ever leaving their offices. If the opposite happens, then
many grassroot activities look like endless demonstrations with no long-term purpose.
The Ukrainian Committee of Voters was a perfect example of the first extreme. Some
Kmara activities, as its more critical supporters admit, fall in the second category. Within
the Georgian movement, there was a great desire to attract attention, but there was little
willingness and no time to bring more substance to protests.
To sum up our discussion on the dilemmas, two points should be added. First,
these challenges are universal to all NGOs at different stages of their development.
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Second, only conscious attention to them will help an organization choose a more
nuanced position and avoid drifting toward one or the other extreme.
The third essential point inquires how to make civil society development an
effective component within the larger context of democratization. Based on the
performance of the four NGOs under analysis, the general path lies through grass-root
organization and fieldwork.
It is clear from the table of embeddedness that social rootedness occupies the
central place in assuring that an NGO becomes an integral part of its host society. In
none of the four cases, a nonprofit was able to get to a higher level of implantedness
while having lower social ties when compared to its counterparts. Our detailed analysis
of the groups also revealed that in building more bridges with domestic societies, the old
prescription of talking directly to people continues to stand and gain even more validity.
In the complex and multilayered informational highway, it is much easier for citizens to
ignore civic groups that choose conventional methods. Pamphlets and glossy brochures,
press releases and expert appearances get quickly lost in the media noise. Therefore, only
those NGOs that take time and make an effort (sometimes mundane and long-term) to
talk directly to citizens will be able to develop a following. The attention must thus be
paid to how (not whether and to what extent) nongovernmental organization can
distinguish themselves and continue to re-design new ways to appeal to their target
population. Pora and Kmara were successful precisely because they found a way (often
not a polite one) to get through to people regardless of a vicious government reaction or
a purposeful neglect by officially censored media.
The last question looks at social embeddedness as a tool that may enhance the
benefits of civil society (e.g. civicness, greater tolerance and trust, higher participation)

and ameliorate its weaknesses (such as polarization). Unfortunately, the results in this
area are inconclusive. From numerous interviews it was clear that activists from groups
with higher embeddedness are more open to general participation and have a greater
sense of efficacy. However, in statistical terms the evidence does not allow for
generalization. Therefore, additional research (in particular statistically reliable surveys
among NGO members) is sorely needed to speak conclusively on the benefits of greater
rootedness.

Sub-hypothesis 3
Table 3. Sub-hypothesis 3
Better Tailored External Involvement •> Greater Embeddedness
OUTCOME: Confirmed
• Less micromanagement on daily routines and specific targets
• Focus on fundamental dilemmas and indicators of impact
RECOMMENDATIONS:
For Donors and NGOs:
• Pay attention to the signs of dependency
• Extended length of support
• Loose terms of assistance
• Increased visibility of foreign support
• Focus on normative transfers to diminish dependency
• Provide stable and consistent funding expectations
• Conduct afrequentand realistic content assessment

The dissertation has confirmed that the more domestically tailored the external
involvement, the more it helps an NGO become embedded. At the same time, the
accumulated evidence enables us to refine this fairly general proposition by specifying
what it is meant under rightly tailored involvement.
Positive experiences of Pora and Kmara (and negative ones of CVU) prove that
international assistance is successful when it does less micromanagement and instead
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concentrates on a bigger picture. When donors are preoccupied with technicalities of
grant agreements that manifest themselves in the urgent need to fulfill artificially set
indicators (e.g. public hours held per month, volunteers recruited per week) then those
indicators are the only ones being met. It is worth remembering that in the former Soviet
societies (where people are wired to misreport the achievement and over-achievement of
five-year plan, pyatiletka, goals), civic activists feel more at ease with short-term hurdles
than long-term challenges. Therefore, an internal discussion would gladly concentrate on
how to establish a declared number of local branches rather than how those branches will
fit in to the local civil society. Not to be misinterpreted, asking big questions does not
mean engaging in grand philosophical discussions that have become an abhorrent
landmark of many round tables and seminars in the region. What it does mean is that
donors are not afraid to raise constantly big and hard dilemmas - e.g. how do you
cooperate with political parties, is it effective and how can we make it more productive.
Such questions transform the overall discourse from lofty abstract speeches (or endless
whining routines on, for example, how arrogant and corrupt party bosses are) to specific
measures that can improve the situation incrementally in the medium term. Like any
researcher who knows how painful the search for adequate indicators to measure
something is, NGOs should be challenged by donors to think whether their activities
accomplish what they intend to do - does the campaign to increase female representation
in power echelons really ensure not only visible gender diversity, but also the diversity
of opinions? Finally, less micromanagement means letting NGOs decide what their
needs are and sometimes waiting for them to arrive at recognizing a certain need that a
donor has long considered essential. From the four available case studies, we see that
where donors responded to the request of a nonprofit, they were more effective in

facilitating external normative transfers than in the situations where a transfer (through a
training) was foist upon a civic group.
In the end, it all comes down to two critical questions for every foreign donor how to avoid making its brainchild dependent and how to fit it into the larger context of
democratization. Here are some propositions that come out from my research for each
issue.
As far as dependency is concerned, four observations should be kept in mind. In
each case, the longevity of donor support is positively associated with dependency. CVU
has with a messy relationship with NDI precisely because the Democratic Institute was
its benefactor since the dawn of time. Furthermore, our research reaches a surprising
conclusion that the pattern of dependency works both ways. Donors also become
attached to specific NGOs in order to sustain and justify their institutional agendas. And
in this case the length of relationships has a pernicious effect, too. The more a donor
funds a certain group, the more its own reputation becomes related to the success of that
group. As seen for CVU and ISFED, domestic civic groups are not afraid to exploit
donors' fears that an NGO failure or dissolution will be a dark stain on the reputation of
grant-giving institutions. The opposite examples only add veracity to this analysis.
Donors were more objective toward Pora and Kmara. The harsher treatment pushed the
Ukrainian group look for other sources of funding - something it did not plan to do.
The second observation indicates that the looser and more vaguely defined terms
of support, the greater the dependency. Pora knew that donors would not step in if it
failed. Its activists had to count only on themselves. At the same time, CVU and ISFED
seemed to be always willing to see how far they can push the envelope by resisting
donor control while relying on donor support as a permanently available safety net. In

other words, if donors are unwilling to set and stick to clear indicators that would be off
the bounds for their influence or would result in decreasing support, they will find
themselves in a quagmire of creeping dependency.
This conclusion is closely linked with our third point - the more visible the
relationship, the harder it is to let go of it for both sides. CVU serves as a perfect
example for this situation. The organization, especially in the donor community, was so
clearly linked to NDI that other funders were leery to engage with it for the fear of
upsetting the Institute. As a senior international donor staff said, "It would feel like
dancing with another husband's wife."7 Such a high level of visibility corners both sides
into a kabuki dance aimed at saving faces and inadvertently exacerbating the existing
dependencies. It was clear from interviewing numerous NDI sources that the Institute is
unable to let go or substantially decrease its support of ISFED for the fear that if the
organization simply collapses, it will tarnish the image of NDI. The Institute's farewell
with CVU in 2006 was protracted and painful, because the NGO could not believe it
would be actually cut loose. In an implicit acknowledgement of this highly visible
relationship, other donors often spoke in whispers and with their eyes down about NDI
dropping its main grantee in Ukraine.
The final observation pertains to normative transfers. Their predominance over
simple funding relations re-defines the relationship into less dependent. If an NGO is
interested in a foreign donor because of the information and content it can bring, this
balances (if not decreases substantially) the financial side of the relationship. In other
words, the grantor is not viewed merely as a cash cow. It is also a provider of valuable
information mat is directly related to NGO's activities. For example, Pora and Kmara
7

Western NGO representative.

had a healthier relationship with foreign donors because they were interested more in
their expertise rather than just grants. CVU and, to a lesser degree, ISFED regarded NDI
as primarily their financial benefactor and political protector. One interviewer used the
Russian word "krysha" (roof) to describe how NDI would shelter the two organizations
from undue pressures by the government and political parties.
Based on the observations above, international donors will need to pay attention
to the following three indicators in order to make NGOs an effective component within
the democratization agenda. The first speaks to consistency of funding. Stable levels of
grant support help avoid short-term dependency, by decreasing the likelihood that NGOs
will hoard funds or inflate their budgets in the expectation of future cuts. The second is
about the scope of funding. The more civic groups are funded, the greater positive
spillover effects. Donors should make peace with the fact that many civic groups they
fund will die, reorganize or disband. Such things happen in the West, too. What will not
be lost is the civic potential and experiences that civic leaders will retain even after they
move to other careers. The last, and definitely not the least, has to do with context. An
adequate and continuously updated assessment of local conditions is paramount in
several respects. It assures realistic funding plans. There is no need to fuel a nonprofit'
funding if it can never be sustained in local conditions. In many post-Soviet states,
NGOs forgot that they were not-for-profit associations. They should not be competing
with businesses in terms of their salaries, the luxuriousness of office space or the use of
expense accounts. Most importantly, the situation assessment will allow aid
organizations to promote embeddedness of their local partners with the domestic society,
political parties and government regardless of where each of those entities stands in
understanding the essence of civil society.
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To summarize, our discussion has come a full circle to the original argument.
Effective external involvement that is tailored domestically is also the one that promotes
NGO embeddedness by tying it to the host society and avoiding dependency patterns that
in essence substitute stable support at home with good donor relations.

Alternative hypotheses
Table 4. Alternative Hypotheses
1. Greater Western Support '•#• Better NGO Performance During
Revolutions
OUTCOME: Rejected
• Long-funded NGOs proved less effective
• Previously similar efforts gave no results
• Western support matters for general long-term effects only
2. Greater Alignment with Parties •¥ Better NGO Performance During
Revolutions
OUTCOME: Partially Confirmed
• NGO-party cooperation depends on a goodness of fit (i.e. similar
capabilities, complementary goals)
• Neutrality abandoned in critical incidents

The major assertion of my work (i.e. embeddedness as the major factor that made
NGOs strong during the "color revolutions") is by no means widely accepted. Other
prominent interpretations attribute the success of non-government organizations to their
backing (mostly financial) by the West, and their close relations with political parties. It
is worth examining each of them in greater detail.

Alternative hypothesis 1
In explaining the "color revolutions," their opponents blamed the West, in
particular the United States, for instigating public protests by funding oppositional civic

groups. The case was made especially eloquently in regard to Kmara, which had close
financial ties with the local Soros foundation. The sheer number of those who ardently
support this viewpoint prompted to look at it separately as an alternative hypothesis that
may help the success of NGOs. Therefore, the dissertation speculates that the more
support an NGO received from the West, the better it performed during the revolution.
The gathered evidence provides strong grounds to reject this assertion for a number of
reasons.
First, as the scale of embeddedness clearly shows, nonprofit groups that got most
donor support performed either worse (CVU) or at the same level (ISFED) than the one
that did not have substantial backing (Pora) or had a one-time grant infusion (Kmara).
Second, taking further the argument of those who believe that money buys power, one
could have expected CVU to be the loudest voice among all. After all, the organization
was on continuous foreign funding, had the most extensive regional infrastructure, and
believed that NDI would back it under any conditions. Because, as numerous people
pointed out, the dog did bark and the cannon did not shoot, it means that something else
was at work. That something apparently was also working in the case of Kmara. As the
Executive Director of the Soros Foundation in Georgia remarked wryly, his organization
funded election-related activities for a long period of time, and before the revolution
nobody rushed to label them as treacherous. Perhaps, the major difference was that in
2003 such activities were approached seriously not as a part of the usual grant-utilizing
routine. This brings us again to the central point - the success of Kmara and the failure
8
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of CVU lies not in the fact how much money (or for how long) has been pumped into
them. It is centered on their ability (or a lack of thereof) to embed itself in the societal
context and take the most of it to accomplish its goals.
In summary, money was not central to the success of civic participation in the
revolution. Having said that, one caveat is in order. While funding was not a make-it-orbreak-it issue, it proved important in two aspects. First, having Western money available
in the 1990s enabled to build a background upon which a future, more mature civil
society was able to develop and evolve. Second, continuous Western funds provided
much needed normative transfers and created overlapping networks of activists who
could excite others to speak up even without grants. It is easy to imagine a
counterfactual. If the United States and, to a lesser degree, the European Union had not
given grants to civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia, the civic component would have
been absent from those revolutionary events because civic activists a) would be too weak
to act together or b) would join political parties long ago to have any impact. In that case,
the transitions most likely would not have happened at all because the government would
have squelched a small elite group of oppositional politicians with nothing to fear from
the larger public.
Thus, as it turns out, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Contrary to what
conspiracy theorists believe, there is no direct or immediate connection between funding
nonprofit groups and having those entities "produce" a revolution. There is, however, a
relationship between the presence of Western financial support, its longevity and quality
on one hand and the long-term effects it is bound to generate.

Alternative hypothesis 2
The second alternative hypothesis attributes the success of domestic NGOs to
their alignment with political parties.9 In other words, the more allied a civic group was
with a major oppositional force (Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" or Saakashvili's
"National Movement"), the better it performed during the revolution. Based on the
accumulated evidence, the hypothesis is partially confirmed. In each country, the leading
protest movement (Pora and Kmara) was closely tied to the opposition. However,
ISFED presents a powerful exception. The organization was able to influence the course
of elections while maintaining its neutrality.
This mixed result carries a number of critical implications. First, the relationship
between alignment with parties and NGO success is dependent on the goodness of fit
that comes from two things - an area of operation and the strength of each entity. In the
cases where areas of operation overlap and complement and the entities are equally
strong, cooperation and alignment are more likely and, as a result, will be more
beneficial. For instance, during the period of the Orange Revolution both Pora and Our
Ukraine were focused on citizens' mobilization, but targeted complementary audiences:
the former - activist students, the latter - Yushchenko supporters. The two had an
equally powerful presence on the ground. Therefore, it made sense for them to join their
efforts to ensure success of the common project - a large-scale mobilization of
Ukrainians against election fraud. A similar situation is observed in Georgia where the
National Movement and Kmara were targeting complementary audiences, but for the
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same purpose. Like in Ukraine, both entities had a firmly established own standing that
made one useful for the other in achieving its independent goals.
Looking at ISFED, it is easier to understand why the NGO did not need
alignment with a powerful political patron to make a difference. Political parties in the
region are notoriously weak in election observation. Most of them are so consumed with
campaigning and obsessed with winning that monitoring the actual voting often becomes
an after-thought. From that perspective, the National Movement did not have the same
level of expertise as ISFED. The other difference has to do with the complementarity of
interests. While the two were broadly committed to democracy and free elections,
ISFED did not see it as its task to mobilize the population or to appeal to any specific
group. Rather, it was narrowly interested in communicating the results of election
monitoring to as many people as possible. To achieve that, it pursued limited cooperation
with the National Movement and Kmara. Therefore, the group did not need to ally itself
with any political forces because: a) no party could claim to have as much expertise in
the field of election monitoring; b) ISFED did not share the immediate goals of political
parties to mobilize voters for protest.
The second implication from this hypothesis speaks to the larger issue of how
NGOs can maintain their political neutrality and when they may abandon it. In all four
cases, the non-governmental organizations gave up on the most purist interpretations of
impartiality that assigns civil society the role of a detached observer of politics. The most
extreme examples were Kmara, followed by Pora and, to a much lesser extent, ISFED
and CVU (the latter got trapped in a web of conflicting political loyalties). Their
experiences point that at crucial stages of a democratic transition NGOs may have to
actively take sides in a political struggle. Such stages include various attempts to
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challenge the fundamental principles of democratic governance - e.g. election fraud, a
coup, an introduction of military/direct presidential rule, etc. They can also be described
as critical incidents that will determine a country's future democratic or authoritarian
trajectory. At these periods, civic and political components of any society are forced (by
the nature of events) to come together to defend (or defeat) the existing order.
The final implication bears on the ongoing debate on how NGOs can remain
distinct from the political society, especially taken into account that in an emerging
democracy there may be times requiring cooperation more intimate than usual. The only
reasonable prescription for these groups is to learn from iterative experiences how to
distinguish between critical incidents and a routine (albeit often over-dramatized) daily
political struggle. This internalized knowledge will enable NGO leaders and members to
identify situations when overstepping normal bounds of neutrality is needed to salvage a
long-term democratic future. Through their own mixed performances, groups will also
begin to feel where they stand on the blurred line that separates civil society and political
parties, and how to avoid those patterns of cooperation that may lead to internal collapse
or absorption by a party.
In summary, the performance of NGOs at critical stages of a democratic
transition is enhanced by their close cooperation with political parties when the two
forces share a common agenda, possess similar organizational capabilities and work on
complementary goals. At the same time, NGOs can be equally effective without close
alignment with a political force when they possess a strong and self-sufficient capacity
that fills the void in the competencies of political parties.

Anteceding variables
Numerous studies have speculated that the strength of civil society is
significantly influenced by three intervening variables. The first is domestic political
culture that creates a general milieu, which enables or disables pluralism at the ground
level. The second is the capacity of the state to carry out its policies. And the third is the
ability of external forces to influence state leaders by tying civic freedoms to other
policies. The discussion below will review the performance of each variable and its
impact of NGO embeddedness.

Table 5. Anteceding Variables

1. Political Culture: More Participatory Culture • • Greater Embeddedness
OUTCOME: Modified (to subject-participant) and Confirmed
• Change possible if significant portion (1/3) carries participant attitudes and
another part is undecided
• Groups with participant attitudes: Westernized youth, middle-class, old
intelligencia
2. State Role: More Powerful State + More Challenging Embeddedness
OUTCOME: Confirmed
• Semi-authoritarian regimes in consolidation or equilibrium as culprits
• Ukraine: moderate to high capacity in elite organization, power control,
governance experience; low capacity in national identity
• Georgia: weak capacity in elite organization, power control, governance
experience; moderate capacity in national identity
3.

Leverage Politics: Greater Western Leverage + Easier Embeddedness
OUTCOME: Confirmed
Ukraine: High reputational and moderate economic costs -> Moderate
responsiveness to Western pressure
Georgia: High reputational and high economic costs -> High responsiveness
to Western pressure
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Political culture
In his seminal research on civic culture, Sidney Verba asserts that citizens are
most engaged in the matters of governance in a participant culture that encourages public
involvement and interest.10 Extrapolating from this finding, my dissertation hypothesizes
that nongovernmental organizations will be better embedded in a participant culture
because it provides a fertile ground for active citizenry, which civic groups can utilize to
plant their roots in a host society.
Our analysis confirms this hypothesis partially and requires its modification
based on the two countries under analysis. As the data below will show, neither Georgia
nor Ukraine has a fully-fledged participant culture. But both are a classical example of
the subject-participant culture where "a substantial part of the population [in Ukraine youth and the new middle class, in Georgia - mostly youth and intelligencia] has
acquired specialized input orientation and an activist set of self-orientations, while most
of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian
governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientations."11
For instance, in Georgia and Ukraine one-third of the population supports protest.
In Georgia, 66 percent believe in democracy and 34 percent have a medium to high level
of interest in politics.12 In Ukraine, the support toward the Communist Party declined
from 22 percent in 1998 to 7.4 percent in 2005; over one-third of the society recognizes
the need for a multiparty system. What these statistics persuasively show that while
democratic and participatory attitudes are not yet overwhelming, they have taken a rather
strong root in at least one-third of the society. Both countries also have large segments of
10
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undecided individuals who can be swayed by either side. And this is precisely what the
pro-democratic parties and NGOs were able to do during the "color revolutions." By
framing the issue in a way that spoke to the domestic society (corruption in Georgia,
human dignity in Ukraine), they drafted a large number of uncommitted citizens to their
cause.
This finding brings both good and bad news to democracy promoters. On the
good side, countries without a developed participant culture are not doomed to decades
of authoritarianism. Change is possible there with the presence of two important factors
- a segment of the population that carries participant attitudes and another group of
people whose political preferences are fluid or immediately indeterminate. This is where
the bad news comes in. The two countries under analysis make it clear that three groups
can play the role of a conduit for change - youth with Western education or experience
of living in the West, new middle-class with its addiction to Western consumerism and
standards of living, and old intelligencia with its highly ethical and progressive outlook.
In many authoritarian states, it is hard to develop either of these groups to a sizeable
proportion for different reasons. Youth may be either indoctrinated early on15 or choose
not to return after education abroad. Middle classes are negligible in size and/or
subservient in attitude because benefits are distributed through a patronage system.16
And old intelligencia is vigorously jailed or exiled.17 Thus, fostering any of these three
agents of change may be a difficult long-term task, especially if efforts are sabotaged by
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local governments. The second part of bad news concerns the undecided segment of the
population. If authoritarian governments are good at anything, it is intimidation and
indoctrination, as they try to make sure that citizens have a firmly held opinion on
everything and that opinion always coincides with the party line. To conclude, the
immediate challenge seems to be not what authoritarian regimes fear most - the export
of "color revolutions" but the need to develop independently thinking sectors within
populations that can embrace key notions of participant culture.

Role of the state
While one of my indicators considered the formal landscape that the state created
for NGO operation as a part of political embeddedness, it is important to evaluate
broadly the role of the state and its impacts on civil society and rootedness. A more
general look will ameliorate the highly legalistic and narrowly sectoral approach that the
evaluation of formal implantedness for each NGO under analysis was bound to produce.
In this regard, my initial hypothesis asserts that the more powerful the state, the harder it
is for NGOs to get embedded.
State powers are assessed through a set of indicators originally offered by Bunce
1 ft

and Wolchik. Those include elite organization, authoritarian powers of control,
experience in governance and a perception of the incumbent's national identity. The
acquired information is then used to classify the Ukrainian and Georgian regimes by the
extent of their semi-authoritarian strength. In doing so, the research relies on the
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classification developed by Marina Ottaway that distinguishes such governments as
those in consolidation, decay, change and equilibrium.19
Based on the analysis below, our hypothesis is confirmed - in states with semiauthoritarian regimes that are on the path of consolidation or in the equilibrium stage
nonprofit organizations will experience more trouble getting embedded in the domestic
fabric of society. Regardless of visible similarities in the shape and nature of "color
revolutions," Ukraine and Georgia were at different points in the evolution of
authoritarian rule in each country.
Ukraine was an authoritarian regime on the path of consolidation. All the four
indicators of state strength show a significant increase between 1992 and 2004. Elite
organization improved from low to moderate. Whereas at the collapse of the Soviet
Union President Kravchuk faced a tough reality when informal ties of the Communist
party network no longer worked, President Kuchma managed to concentrate power and
establish networks of enhanced regime loyalty through tightly managed privatization of
state assets. State authoritarian powers grew from low to moderate. To their dismay, the
first president, Leonid Kravchuk, and during his first term the second president Leonid
Kuchma discovered that they had few real instruments of control over key societal
actors. Vertical control (over subordinates) was weak. The state was financially impotent
and thus unable to offer any rewards or punishments. Initial rounds of privatization
created powerful oligarchs who did not yet feel any loyalty to the state. The situation
began to change at the end of the 1990s. Improved finances bought more loyalty.
Kuchma mastered the game of playing various oligarchic groups against each other and
used further privatization as a tool to secure personal obedience. The experience of
19
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governance grew from low to high. In the early 1990s, no Ukrainian politician knew how
to govern or even function in a pluralist system. By 1999 the Ukrainian government
learned how to manipulate the public opinion and secure the necessary outcome in
elections. To summarize, while the government was by no means omnipotent, its
capacity in the key areas has risen from low to moderate (or even high). Furthermore,
realizing the inevitable reversal of fortunes, the regime was determined to consolidate
gains by promoting an insider to succeed president Kuchma.
The situation in Georgia was qualitatively different. First and foremost, president
Shevarnadze started with a steeper decline in the four sectors of control. There was a
total breakdown in elite organization that resulted in violent internal challenges for
leadership. In the early 1990s Georgia politicians had few common ties to each other Gamsakhurdia, Ioseliani and Kitovani all hailed from the intelligencia class and had no
experience of political interactions among themselves that went back to the Communist
days. State power was virtually non-existent as the country plunged into the abyss of
disintegration. South Ossetia and Abkhazia claimed independence, Ajara (a southwestern area) operated as a feudal part of Georgia. The powers of central government
stretched no further than the capital. Georgian nationalist leaders had no experience how
to run a state, and their Communist opponents had no idea how to be democratic. By the
end of the 1990s, the situation changed. State powers became moderate in the areas of
elite organization and governance experience. President Shevarnadze established small
patronage networks and eliminated non-state paramilitary units. He also gained
experience in manipulating elections, but remained afraid to use it to the fullest extent
not to damage his international reputation of a reformer. However, unlike Ukraine, state
authoritarian power remained rather weak. State finances were in a sorry state, relying on

substantial flows of aid. Feudahzation of governance and centrifugal tendencies
continued. The government was operating mostly in the survival mode. To sum up, the
authoritarian regime in Georgia was in a state of decay, seeing no clear path how to
consolidate gains and eliminate dissent with limited financial resources.
Given the analysis above, it should not be surprising that Ukrainian NGOs had a
greater difficulty (than their Georgian counterparts) embedding themselves into the
domestic society because of the moderate authoritarian capacity of the state and its
experience in suppressing dissent. However, they managed to survive unlike many
nonprofits in Russia. What helped them in this situation was a widespread nationalist
resentment of Kuchma within the population and even among the disunited prodemocratic elites. Unlike in Georgia, where neither Gamsakhurdia nor Shevarnadze was
ever seen as a Russian stooge, by the end of his term Kuchma was viewed as a traitor of
national interests by the populations in central and western Ukraine and pro-Ukrainian
intelligencia (the latter constituted the core of many national NGOs).
To conclude the discussion, our case studies make it clear that an overly powerful
state is an obstacle to NGO embeddedness. However, the ingenuity of Ukrainian NGOs
in dealing with this situation shows that state power should not always be treated as a
death sentence to civil society, especially in countries with dual/split national identity.
Leverage politics
The debate on the importance of leverage politics in international relations has
been long and prolific. In the area of democracy promotion, it has taken a clearly
predictable shape. It speculates that the greater the Western leverage and, concomitantly,
elite responsiveness to that leverage, the easier it is to promote democracy and, in our
case, for NGOs to get embedded.
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The evidence presented by the four cases studies strongly confirms this
hypothesis for Ukraine and Georgia. Non-governmental groups in the former had a more
difficult time surviving because the Kuchma regime was not as responsive to
international pressures as the Shevarnadze government. However, in both cases the
international leverage was sufficiently high. Thus neither Ukrainian nor Georgian
leadership could afford to suppress or ignore the role of NGOs. The reputational and
foreign policy costs trumped the desire of Kuchma and Shevarnadze to clamp down on
NGOs completely.
As the hypothesis at the beginning of this section indicates, the evaluation of
Western leverage should be approached by reviewing not only the tools, which Western
states have in possession to influence foreign governments, but also the vulnerability of
domestic regimes to external impacts. The example of many post-Soviet states (among
which Russia figures prominently) shows persuasively how some instruments have
failed to work as well as provoked a sharp backlash because of their low capability to
influence political elites. That is why, in reviewing the outcome for the intervening
variable of leverage politics, the discussion will concentrate on both leverage
mechanisms and elite responsiveness to them.
In Ukraine, Western leverage included high reputation and moderate economic
costs. As the Kuchma regime grew progressively authoritarian, Western governments (in
particular the U.S. and EU) sought to freeze their diplomatic contacts at high-level with
official Kyiv. From 2001 Leonid Kuchma met mostly with Polish President Alexandr
Kwasniewski and infrequently with German chancellor Gerhardt Shroeder. Those close
to the president rumored of his obsession to secure a meeting with George W. Bush. The
20
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public humiliation of the Ukrainian regime went as far as a change of alphabets (from
English to French) to avoid sitting the Ukrainian president between George Bush and
Tony Blair at the 2002 NATO summit in Prague. In the meantime, the West continued to
press for change by denying visas to key oligarchs who were allies of the regime,
suspending portions of the U.S. foreign assistance to Ukraine and publicizing monitoring
reports that were highly critical of the government. While the reputation costs were high
and visible, economic ones were modest. Ukraine was not yet heavily integrated into the
Western economic space. The major bulk of cooperation remained with Russia. Its share
and importance continued to increase as Ukraine became increasingly dependent on
cheap Russian gas to fuel the growth of its reinvigorated industrial sector.
Because of that, the responsiveness of the Ukrainian government to Western
pressures was rather moderate. Kuchma officials increased their anti-American rhetoric,
which in the months preceding the revolution turned into an outright hysteria. The
government also did its best to impede the functioning of Western nonprofit
organizations, such as IRI, NDI and Freedom House, by threatening to suspend their
accreditation in the country. At the same time, the regime continued to emphasize multivectoralism. Kuchma insisted on attending personally the NATO summit in Prague and
developed a very close bond with the Polish leadership, which helped a historic
reconciliation of the two peoples. Although President Kuchma did not answer repeated
phone calls from U.S. State Secretary Colin Powell during the events of the Orange
revolution, his government accepted a foreign mission to mediate discussions between
the opposition and pro-governmental forces. In other words, a much stronger internal
capacity of governance (see the previous section) and an ability to re-orient to Russia
and tap into the fears of instability from Ukraine's immediate Western neighbors (like

Poland and Lithuania) to avoid complete isolation gave the Kuchma government a
greater degree of autonomy in handling foreign criticism than Eduard Shevarnadze ever
had.
Western leverage in Georgia was high both in terms reputational and economic
costs. Shevarnadze was heavily invested in his image of a reformer that lingered from
the times of Gorbachev. He was also interested in maintaining the reputation of a
national savior that he acquired domestically and abroad after coming back in the middle
of the 1990s to war-torn Georgia. Therefore, initially his government had much less
space for maneuvers and forays into the authoritarian realm. That autonomy was even
further undercut by high economic costs, which any slide into dictatorship risked to
impose. As acknowledged by numerous interviewees and government officials
indirectly, Georgia was completely dependent on foreign aid to maintain the political
system and make debt repayments. Without Western support, the government would
have been unable to pay even meager salaries to state employees and social payments to
retirees.
When combined, the two factors determined a high level of responsiveness to
foreign interference. Shevarnadze was willing to show openness (albeit fake and
temporary) and bow to international advice. For instance, he accepted foreign mediation
from Jim Baker to resolve the dispute over the composition of the Central Election
Commission. Overall, the government was never as repressive toward NGOs and
independent media as in Ukraine. Rustavi-2 covered freely numerous protests by Kmara.
ISFED was allowed to maintain its representation on the CEC - something that was
never even under consideration in Ukraine, regardless of formal pleas from the
Committee of Voters.
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To summarize, both states were responsive to Western pressures but the extent of
outside influence depended on the governments' concern for their reputations and the
damage that could be done by Western isolation to their economies. In Ukraine,
Kuchma's willingness to accommodate the West was moderate. He still cared about his
reputation and did not want to be completely cornered into cooperation only with every
former Soviet republic to the east of Ukraine. Therefore, the government did not kick out
Western foreign groups, did not conduct massive arrests and never used torture against
political activists. These were the red lines that Kuchma knew would make him
"nevyjizny" (oinable to exit the country - a Soviet term for those who could never leave
the country). Unlike Yanukovych, he also shirked from the use of force against Orange
demonstrators, understanding that it would land the Ukrainian government in permanent
isolation from the West. However, the second Ukrainian president was no pushover. He
had and used resources to silence his most annoying critics. He actively played the
Russian vector to compensate for the lack of contacts with the West. But in essence, it
was Ukraine's geopolitics - its location between East and West and thus its permanent
attachment to each of those poles - that did not allow Kuchma to lapse into excesses.
In Georgia, the government's willingness to accommodate the West was high for
it understood that without Western moral and financial backing the country may not
survive. Again, the position seems to have been detennined by the country's geopolitical
location and economic strength. Before the viability of pipelines bypassing Russia
became too obvious, Georgia was considered a far and remote country for close Western
interest.

367
LESSONS LEARNED
The dissertation has proved that organizational embeddedness plays a critical role
not only in helping nascent civil societies survive and thrive in new democracies, but
also in facilitating the overall process of democratization. This central finding bears a
number of implications for four key audiences that are concerned with civil society
development as part of their agendas. I will review below what lessons each of these
groups should take from this work.

For political science theorists on civil society and democratization
My dissertation contributes to our understanding of civil society by serving
empirical proof that in nascent democracies societal embeddedness is the key in turning
civic groups from a witness to a participant in the democratization process. It, therefore,
adds to the existing knowledge on the role of civic groups in the "color revolutions."
Most studies on the subject talked about the NGOs, which participated in those
events, without providing a substantial previous background that would help explain
how those groups emerged so strong on the day of elections. That is why, it was not clear
what a group needed to do in order to become a strong voice in the process of democratic
transition. It seemed puzzling why some NGOs stood out of the crowd, while others
disappeared in the general picture. My dissertation provides a resolution to this puzzle
through its most significant discovery - societal embeddedness as an explanatory factor
of the successful performance of non-governmental organizations during the "color
revolutions." By assessing the degree of embeddedness, one is also able to see the
difference in performance among the four groups under analysis as well as the difference
between them and the rest of NGOs in their countries.

The second substantial finding of this research pertains to a series of alternative
arguments. My analysis shows that the arguments about Western financial backing or
party alignment as the key explanatory factors carry either no or much less (and more
conditional) weight than previously assigned.
A new research agenda emerges from my dissertation and focuses on five points.
The first emphasizes the importance of micro-level analysis. A large number of previous
works were pre-occupied with assessing general trends (i.e. macro level) of civil society
development in the former Soviet Union. This led to concentrating on either simple
numeric measurements, or legalistic aspects of civil society functioning, or on painting
too broad of a picture (e.g. the portrait of a national NGO sector) to gauge what actually
needs to be done. As my dissertation shows, there is a need for more works on specific
NGOs that would detail their successes and failures, let us refine our understanding how
civil society really works and improve our policy recommendations. The second point
pertains to the need to consider societal embeddedness in the framework of analysis. By
doing so on macro- and micro-levels, scholars will be more inclined to see the
performance of civic groups on the continuum of the embeddedness dilemmas rater than
in dichotomous terms. This process will produce more nuanced suggestions and avoid
two biggest pitfalls in recommendations - one that regurgitates common sense ideas (e.g.
work with parties, cooperate with government), which read like truisms at this point, and
the other that slides into highly judgmental and often condescending propositions of
what is right and what is wrong. The third aspect is about re-focusing on normative
transfers at the micro-level to see how foreign, mostly Western, ideas are re-constructed
in other societies. It combines previously successful research on normative transfers with
the attention to micro-level analysis of specific NGOs. The benefit of such endeavors is
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more data that is available to all interested parties (but most importantly to democracy
promoters on the ground) on what works and what does not, and how the process of
transfer occurs. The fourth part of the agenda should break the analytical wall of
separation between NGOs and other societal actors. This wall exists both literally (in too
many texts there are separate section on parties, government, media and civil society)
and figuratively, as there is no attempt to see how these actors interact with each other
and how their interactions change internal dynamics within each of them. The analysis of
my dissertation makes it clear that in order to be effective, these assessments need to be
intertwined. The final point is about an existing research gap. There are very few studies
on attitudes within civil societies. Due to that, it is impossible to know if civic
participation makes any difference for NGO activists or if such people are just another
type of bureaucrats, albeit internationally funded. If the latter is the case, this would be
another sign (at the macro level) that NGOs are not sufficiently embedded.
To conclude, it is important to identify what my work signals for current trends
of the discipline. In essence, it suggests a refinement of existing approaches that brings
together a micro-level analysis of NGOs, makes embeddedness the cornerstone in
assessment and places NGOs under review within the general process of
democratization.

For NGO activists in nascent democracies
Three key lessons come out of the dissertation for local activists. First, the need
to concentrate on domestic societies should be a paramount and overarching priority in
their work. In this regard, nothing will replace grass-root outreach and fieldwork. Only
when these two are effective, a civic group is capable to de-Westernize the concept of
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civil society and the specific norms it is advocating among the population. Unless such
de-Westernization happens, there will be no local ownership in their project and no local
interest in their future.
Second, non-governmental organizations must recognize and revisit the
dilemmas of embeddedness. Only a continuous assessment of where an organization
falls on the spectrum of choices in its relations with government, parties and public will
make it aware of red flags, which may be pointing that the group is going off-course.
Embeddedness should be recognized as a continuous balancing act, not a one-time event
where major decisions are made once and forever.
Finally, civic groups need to become serious about domestic funding. Unless
there is a minimum level of financial support at home, they may not be able to survive
changing currents of foreign aid as well as a volatile economic situation.
To summarize, though each of these recommendations is not new, they look at
the problem from a different angle - what an organization needs to do to transform itself
from a body, implanted by foreign forces, into a natural entity in the domestic society.

For governments in nascent democracies
Much has been already said about the need for a larger and more systematic
discussion within governments and between a government and an NGO sector on how to
work together. Unfortunately, in most former Soviet states, this discussion seems
necessary, but is unlikely to be helpful in enhancing cooperation in practical terms. The
major reason for this grim assessment is that most individuals, who populate those
governments, have little understanding about the concept of civil society. And even if
they do (something that may be believed about Georgia's President Mikheil

Saakashvili), they are all too willing to ignore it in order to pursue their own agenda
without having to overcome the hurdles of civic scrutiny and criticism.
In these circumstances, workable solutions should aim for a medium-term
impact. To achieve it, governments need to recruit a new generation of citizens to midlevel bureaucratic positions. Such people are more likely to understand civil society and
have participatory attitudes that come from three factors - no upbringing in the Soviet
system, Western education and possible prior involvement in civil society. However, the
arrival of this generation is not a matter of time. It ties directly to the ability of a
government to pursue a larger democratization agenda that would fight corruption and
nepotism and launch a progressive civil service reform. Without these changes,
governments in nascent democracies will remain the last resort for an ambitious youth to
work. Instead they will be what they are right now - a graveyard for ideas and a
monument to passivity and incompetence.
Another point within the democratization agenda that governments have to
consider is the need for greater institutional predictability. It is next to impossible for
civil society to structure its interactions with a state that continues experimenting with
various forms of government - parliamentary, presidential or mixed. Institutional
unpredictability is usually a corollary of the political struggle among many factions that
often results in a constant rotation of mid-level bureaucrats with whom civic activists are
most likely to work on a regular basis. Therefore, in a situation when the political mega
framework shifts all the time, NGOs prefer to retreat to their own civic domain until the
system settles and the roles of each player can be clearly deduced.
Governments in nascent democracies need to advance economic reforms. Their
success will have indirect positive results on the functioning of civil society. As wealth
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spreads from the privileged few, NGOs will be able to fundraise more widely without
fearing for political dependence on their patrons. Public donations and volunteering will
increase, too.
To sum up, to help civil society it is more productive for newly democratic
governments to engage in a larger political and economic reform whose positive
externalities will assure both a better cooperation between NGOs and state, and greater
chances for the nonprofit sector's financial survival.

For Western promoters of democracy
The dissertation advances a number of lessons that should be put to use in the
effort to improve the delivery of foreign aid for democratization. The first of them
stresses the need for an ongoing assessment of limitations for democracy promoters. As
the case studies make it clear, geopolitical considerations alter the leverage of external
democratic agents - sometimes for the better (where other states become interested in
fostering democracy in a critical country for the sake of stability), but mostly for the
worse (where immediate tolerance of authoritarian regimes is often advocated). Robust
domestic economies, however flawed their model may be, may further circumscribe the
channels through which pressure can be exerted on local governments. This does not
mean that any attempt to build civil society is doomed if the country is high on the U.S.
totem poll and its economy makes it less receptive to outside criticism.
In fact, the opposite may be true in a lot of cases, which brings us to the second
lesson. In authoritarian regimes, it is possible to promote democracy and plant future
(albeit very remote) seeds for civil society without providing a direct sponsorship of
NGOs. Instead, foreign donors may concentrate on three types of citizens who
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potentially carry participatory attitudes. Such groups include youth, middle-class and
intelligencia. In this case, the goals are for the first group to get exposure to Western
education, for the second group to form as a class regardless of hostile economic policies
and for the third group to survive purges.
In the societies where host governments are willing to accept external assistance
and stay on the path of democratization, donors should follow three general
prescriptions. The first is to concentrate on bottom-up initiatives from the field as a
means to avoid funding fads in Western capitals and better tailor normative assistance. It
often means taking up non-conventional projects like Pora and being skeptical of longstanding civic associations whose membership pool can fit in a telephone booth. The
next advice is to develop greater responsiveness to a host society's social needs. The
major obstacle to greater relevance of nascent civil societies is the abstract nature of their
activities at the time when people are suffering very concrete economic needs.
Therefore, donors need to balance the funding for NGOs that deal with pure advocacy
and those that provide social support. As patterns of foreign support become entrenched,
external democracy promoters need to work hard to avoid dependency of their grantees.
My dissertation suggests a number of ways to do that, most important of which is the
assessment of how embedded a funded organization is in the societal and political
environment.
Finally, much has already been written about the need of reform in the United
States that would give foreign aid the priority it deserves. When applied to civil society,
this suggestion means that any reform should be undertaken in order to better coordinate
long-term efforts on civic and political fronts, thereby enabling a more organic transition
from a foreign-sponsored to more independent nonprofit sector.
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CONCLUSIONS
My dissertation has demonstrated that societal embeddedness is critical for civic
organizations in nascent democracies to survive and thrive as a natural and strong
component in their host societies. The initial success of the "color revolutions" in
Georgia and Ukraine left some wondering about a role for NGOs in the "new"
environment where the governments are openly committed to democracy. The sense of a
long-awaited victory put many civic activists in a state of stupor about reality. A lot of
them hit the speaking circuit and went to rest on laurels. Others quickly joined the new
governments. As a result, in Ukraine and Georgia civil society has not yet become an
active participant in the new stage of state building and democratization. Its failures have
been glaring in both countries. First, the NGO sector was a watchdog that did not bark or
barked not loud enough when the Saakashvili and Yushchenko governments began
moving away from democracy by creating a super-presidential structure of governance
(in Georgia) and eroding already weak institutions for the sake of personal gains (in
Ukraine). Second, civic groups were unable to deal with the reorientation of international
aid flows toward the Middle East and Afghanistan. More broadly, Ukrainian and
Georgian civil societies failed to take advantage of the propitious post-revolutionary
environment to build on the existing civic activism and increase the number of people
with participatory attitudes. After the revolutions, most demonstrators returned to their
homes, believing it was not theirs but the government's turn to build a new country.
The democratic stalling after the "color revolutions" indicates that civil society
remains critical to ensure a return to democratization in Georgia21 and to push for
21
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national reconciliation in Ukraine. Furthermore, it remains central to combating the
Soviet political culture that treated people as subjects, not equal actors, of political
process. There are a number of short-term tasks civil society needs to accomplish. NGOs
should exercise their watchdog capacity more vigorously to ensure government
accountability for the economic stabilization program (which Ukraine has received from
the IMF) and the post-war reconstruction fund (which Georgia obtained from the U.S.
and the EU). Civic groups must continue monitoring the observance of democratic
freedoms and principles especially during these dire times - the war's aftermath in
Georgia and a profound economic collapse in Ukraine when publics may yearn for a
"strong hand" and leaders may advocate less democracy for more stability.
Participation of civil society is also important in the medium and long term. Ukraine and
Georgia are facing profound questions in terms of foreign and domestic policies - what
to do on the international arena now as EU and NATO memberships are out of reach,
how to interact with Russia after the August war with Tbilisi and the gas dispute with
Kyiv, how to re-structure the domestic economies to avoid similar financial shocks in the
future, and how to maintain the countries together, given the loss of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and centrifugal tendencies in the Crimea. Civic groups can and should take an
active part in forging a common societal agenda by engaging with other actors and
developing ways for a wider public involvement. Civic groups will be capable to meet
these challenges only if they are perceived as a natural element of domestic societies.
The relevance of their societal embeddedness at the present stage stems from three
factors. First, Western governments will have no (or very limited) funds for lavish aid
programs. Therefore, most nonprofits will have to tighten their belt, fend for themselves
and find other sources if they do not want to go extinct in this economic ice age. Second,

domestic public will hunger for concrete initiatives rather than round-tables on abstract
topics and glossy brochures. This will demand more grass-root work and greater reorientation toward social programs. Third, governments and political parties will be
much less tolerant of a meddlesome voice from the so-called civil society when that
voice does not have public support.
To conclude, a vibrant civil society in Ukraine and Georgia is a necessary
component to achieve further democratic consolidation and address the fragilities that
both states are currently experiencing. The vibrancy can be achieved only if nongovernmental organizations are deemed as a natural participant in unfolding social and
political processes.
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APPENDIX I - INDEX OF EMBEDDEDNESS

Societal Embeddedness - 53 Points
• Constituency (16)
• Internal Normative Transfers (11)
• Societal Influence (14)
• Financial Sustainability (12)

Scale of Embeddedness
Highly Embedded: 90-100
Moderately Embedded: 65 - 89
Insufficiently Embedded: 40 - 64
Weakly/Marginally Embedded: 0 - 3 9

Political Embeddeness - 27 Points
• Formal Legitimacy (13)
• Informal Legitimacy (14)
External Involvement - 20 Points
• External Normative Transfers (11)
• External Mechanisms of Influence (9)
Potential Total - 100 Points

2003
2004

4.6
3
5
3.5
5
3
5
4
4.5
3.9
4
3.7
3.6
3.5

3.7
4
3.5
3.5
4
4
4
4
3.5
4
3.9
4
3.9
3.8

4.6
4
5
4.9
5
5
5
5
5
4.9
4.8
4.6
4.6
4.8

4.4
4
5
3.5
4
2
4
4
3.5
4.3
3.4
4
3.1
3.7

Scores:
Consolidation of Civil Society: 1 - 2
Midway Transition: 3 - 4
Early Transition: 5 - 6

Service
Provided

4.2
3.4
4.1
3.8
4.4
4.0
4.3
4.0
4.0
4.2
3.9
4.1
3.8
3.9

2.5
4
4
5
3
4
3
4.2
3.3
4.4
3.3
4.1

Public Image

2002

Ukraine
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia

Infrastructure

2001

Advocacy

2000

Fin Viability

1999

Org Capacity

1998

Country

Legal Env

Year

General

APPENDIX II - USAID COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY
IN UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

3.5
3.5
4
3
4
3
3.5
4
3.5
3.8
3.8
3.9

3.9
2
4
4
5
5
5
4
5
4.4
4.4
4.4
4.1
3.7
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APPENDIX III - POSTERS

no PA*

K*MII3IH.||£ """*
www.kuchmizm.info
8-4504855906, 8-067-9756677
A/C 49, KHIB 01030

Figure 1. Pora poster: "Kuchmism - tse beznadia"
[The era of Kuchma is hopelessness].

nopa AOBecTM, 1140 TM
He K03en!
nOPA neKae Ha Te6e!
www.kuchmizm.info

Figure 2. Pora poster: "Pora dovesty, shcho ty ne kozel!'
[Time to prove that you are not a moron]
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APPENDIX IV - EMBEDDEDNESS SCORES

Social
•
•
•
•

Embeddedness
Constituency
Internal normative transfers
Societal influence
Financial sustainability

UKRAINE
Pora
cvu
35
42
9
13
11
9
9
12
8
6

GEORGIA
ISFED Kmara
37
38
10
11
10
9
11
12
6
6

Political Embeddedness
• Formal
• Informal

15
8
7

16
8
8

21
9
12

17
9
8

External Influence
* External normative transfers
• External mechanisms of influence
Totals

13
9
4
63

19
11
8
77

14
9
5
72

17
11
6
72

VITA
Vladyslav Galushko
Graduate Program for International Studies
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23509

EDUCATION
PhD candidate 2004 - Present Old Dominion University, International Studies Program
MP A 2002 - 2004 University of North Dakota, Master's in Public Administration
BA 1996 - 2001 Kyiv Shevchenko University, Bachelor's in English and Japanese
EXPERIENCE
2008-now International Crisis Group, Central Asia Analyst
• Research and write on issues with a potential for conflict in Central Asia.
• Conduct advocacy activities on behalf of the organization.
2004 - 2008 Old Dominion University, Graduate Assistant and Adjunct Faculty
• Taught courses in general education and political science.
• Evaluated students' performance.
2001-2002 National Democratic Institute, Civic Program Assistant
• Cooperated with Ukrainian nonprofit organizations on election-related issues.
• Monitored and reported on political and civil society developments.
2000-2001 Soros Foundation (Ukraine), Scholarship Programs Coordinator
• Managed scholarship programs in Ukraine.
• Monitored operations of seven regional advising centers.
1996-1999 Soros Foundation (Ukraine), Debate Program, National Coordinator
• Launched the program throughout Ukraine through trainings and presentations.
• Organized national events, including workshops and seminars.
SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS
2004-2008
Graduate Assistantship, Old Dominion University
2002-2004
Graduate Assistantship, University of North Dakota
2005-2006, 2007-2009 Global Supplementary Grant, Open Society Institute
1999-2000
Freedom Support Act Undergraduate Scholarship, U.S. State Department
CONFERENCES AND PUBLICATIONS
• "Who is 'We'? Ukraine, Turkey and the EU." Prepared for the 2007 Annual
Conference of the British International Studies Association. Cambridge, UK: 18
December 2007.
• "Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy Options in Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan." Prepared with Marina Mateski for the 2006 Middle East and
Central Asia Politics, Economics and Society Conference. Salt Lake City, UT: 8
September 2006.

